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Abstract 
 
Political Economy, Geographical Imagination, and Territory in the 
Making and Unmaking of New Granada, 1739-1830 
 
Maria José Afanador-Llach, PhD  
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
 
Supervisor:  Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra  
 
This dissertation interrogates the intersections between political economy and 
territoriality during the transition from colony to republic in New Granada—modern day 
Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panamá. It proposes a framework to analyze the 
discursive and on-the-ground impacts of early-modern political economy in pre-, and 
post-colonial politico-geographic debate. This dissertation sheds light on the territorial 
shifts and political debates between 1739 and 1830. First, it traces the imperial reform 
that led to the establishment of the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739 and its 
territorialization over the course of the eighteenth century. Second, it analyses the 
fragmentation of New Granada into autonomous sovereign states starting in the 1810s. 
Third, it studies the Spanish military recovery of New Granada during the Reconquista 
wars. Lastly, it explores the unification of the Gran Colombian republic and its separation 
in 1830. To fully comprehend the political and territorial outcomes of the era, it is 
 ix 
essential to understand that the coexistence of different spatial conceptions within 
colonial territories shifted both along geopolitical contingencies and spatial political 
economies that were long in the making. The rearrangement of territories from the 
eighteenth century to the republican era implied negotiations among often opposing ideas 
and interests over how to economically and politically organize and connect different 
spaces. Geographical imagination and ideas about nature played a central role in these 
processes. Throughout the eighteenth century and beyond, this tradition informed debates 
involving rights over municipal, imperial, and national spaces advancing conceptions of 
territory that shaped political debate. Because of its distinctive position, New Granada 
provides a useful perspective from which to explore key themes in the history of 
eighteenth-century imperial reform, the revolutionary period, and the early republican 
era. 
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 1 
Introduction 
On July 14, 1811, priest José Cortés Madariaga, representative of the Confederate 
Provinces of Venezuela, began a journey between Santa Fe and Caracas. He was 
returning to Venezuela after a three-month stay in the capital of the newly created State 
of Cundinamarca in the former Spanish viceroyalty of New Granada. Amid the political 
turmoil that overthrew the king after Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 
1808, and which prompted Spanish Americans to establish autonomous ruling councils, 
Cortés sought to secure treaties of friendship, alliance, and a federation with the newly 
created autonomous state of Cundinamarca—previously known as the province of Santa 
Fe.  
During the journey, he described the landscape while he reflected on how to 
export commodities and products from Venezuela to New Granada and Quito. “In my 
endeavor I decided,” he wrote, “to discover the closest navigation channel to the capital 
that flows into the tributaries of the Orinoco River in Venezuela.” His objective was to 
procure a comfortable route that safeguarded merchants and passengers from “the 
dangerous rivers, swamps, and cliffs in the valleys of the Cordillera.” “To my fortune”, 
Cortés added, “I set out for the only route that can assure the prosperity of the states of 
Cundinamarca and Venezuela.”1 Establishing a fluid commercial network was part of 
                                                
1 "Reflexiones sobre la utilidad del comercio”, En: "Diario de Observaciones del Prebítero Dr. José Cortés 
de Madariaga, en su regreso de Santa Fe a Caracas por la vía de los ríos Negro, Meta y Orinoco; después de  
haber concluido la comisión que obtuvo de su gobierno para acordar los tratados de amistad, alianza y 
unión federativa entre las provincias de la confederación Venezonala y el Estado de Cundinamarca", 
Caracas, Octubre 28 del año 1 de la independencia de Venezuela. 285-302. 
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Cortes’ larger goal to ensure the economic viability of both polities in the wake of 
independence with Spain. Cortés, as other independence leaders in New Granada and 
Venezuela, did not convey his territorial strategy and political project in the abstract.  
Cortés narrated the landscape in light of a political economy vision that was tied 
to the recent Spanish American claim to autonomous political authority over the colonies. 
When navigating through possible trade channels, he named a creek “Nariño” in honor of 
Antonio Nariño, a citizen from Cundinamarca and supporter of independence. When he 
entered a bay formed by three rivers along the route, he named it “Bahía de Lozano” 
honoring Jorge Tadeo Lozano, the president of the state of Cundinamarca.2 Later he 
named another bay “Escalona” after one of the officials holding executive power in the 
province of Caracas, Juan Escalona.3 Cortés’s movement across the territory rendered 
intelligible an imagined Neogranadian and Venezuelan post-colonial economic space and 
gave meaning to a set of places that exalted American sovereignty over major territories 
of the crumbling Spanish empire.  
A few years later, in 1819, after the successful patriot occupation of the city of 
Angostura—later renamed Ciudad Bolívar—on the riverbanks of the Orinoco River, 
Simón Bolívar proclaimed the union of New Granada and Venezuela in a single 
independent republic. The territory of Quito joined the republic later, in 1821, after the 
Bolivarian military campaign expelled Spanish forces and give birth to the Colombian 
republic. The new republic comprised the same jurisdictions of the Viceroyalty of New 
                                                
2 Ibid. 8. 
3 Ibid. 20.  
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Granada, which had been established in 1739. Notwithstanding the colonial origins of 
this jurisdiction, the union of these territories was puzzling given that only a few years 
earlier — during the Napoleonic invasion of Iberia — New Granada had broken into at 
least fifteen autonomous sovereign states that had written their own constitutions. What 
had led provincial leaders to take such actions? What had made of the Viceroyalty of 
New Granada a territorial unit in the first place? What led to unification? What ideas and 
discourses justified and legitimated the re-creation of New Granada as the Colombian 
republic? Ultimately, what brought these territories together, and what set them apart? 
This dissertation sheds light on these questions by exploring the ways in which 
the ideas and strategies linking political economy and territory energized eighteenth-
century imperial reform, inter-provincial conflict during independence, warfare strategies 
during the Spanish re-conquest, and early national efforts for political unification.4 In 
other words, this dissertation looks at the employment of discourses of political economy 
and territoriality during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and how they were 
harnessed to convey certain spatial conceptions in support of specific political and 
economic agendas.  
Historians of these eras barely pay attention to political change in light of spatial 
practices. The reconstruction of space and place through the movement of peoples and 
objects across a landscape makes possible the recreation of political geography, and of 
the understanding of power and territory held by historical actors. In order to reconstruct 
these ideas, I trace arguments involving rights over space and representations of the 
                                                
4 Kevin Cox. Political Geography Territory, State and Society. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2008, 6.  
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landscape in a broad array of primary sources, such as natural histories, maps, 
correspondence, economic improvement projects, memorials, newspapers, manifestos, 
proclamations, administrative reports, congressional debates, and geographic 
descriptions.5 I conceive of writing about the landscape and its resources as a non-neutral 
endeavor which entails engaging in arguments over the limits of a territory, and who 
rules over it and how. To trace these practices requires a comprehensive understanding of 
the eighteenth-century epistemological frameworks in which new understandings 
emerged that linked territory to wealth production.6 
Concerns with organizing and creating colonial spaces in order to advance 
economic productivity were not new for the eighteenth century. However, as historian 
Tamar Herzog demonstrates, shifts from an older conception of territory as part of a 
universal divine order to utilitarian understandings of the land modified the making and 
remaking of territorial divisions.7 Within eighteenth-century policies of spatial re-
ordering and economic revival, the government required “complete knowledge and true 
                                                
5 Andy Doolen has coined the term “cartographic text” to refer to a set of texts that are integral to the 
practices of territorial conquest. Among those texts, he uses: exploration narratives, novels, oratory, and 
natural histories, autobiographies, travel narratives, poetry, and periodical literature. Andy Doolen. 
Territories of Empire: U.S. Writing from the Louisiana Purchase to Mexican Independence. Oxford Studies 
in American Literary History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, 11. 
6 I am following here the definition of spatial practices proposed by Jonathan D. Amith. See: The Mobius 
Strip: A Spatial History of Colonial Society in Guerrero, Mexico. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 2005, 11. 
7 Tamar Herzog. Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015, 142-144. Also see David Blackbourn, The Conquest of 
Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany. 1st American ed. New York: Norton, 
2006. David Blackbourn argues that the dichotomy between pristine nature and human intervention is false, 
and that between c.1750-1970, a wide consensus held that man ought to bend, tame, shape, and otherwise 
dominate and conquer nature. For Keith Thomas and Chandra Mukerji this fundamental transformation in 
the meaning of nature shifted conceptions of nature as a dominion “set up by God for Man”, to land as 
property with impersonal qualities that could be learned through study and employed for human 
improvement. See Keith Thomas and Chandra Mukerji. Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of 
Versailles. Cambridge University Press, 1997, 22. 
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data” on which to base all provisions and speculations.8 This led to the pursuit of a type 
of knowledge that blended political economy discourse and local territorial descriptions 
as a means to intervene in the colony’s administration and advance certain economic 
agendas. 
 
Political Economy and Chorography 
  
Early-modern Europeans embraced knowledge of how to become and remain 
wealthy in competitive contexts. Emerging from the study of power, this field of learning 
developed over time under the heading of “political economy”. ⁠9 In this conceptualization 
—proposed by historian Sophus Reinert—the imperatives of economic survival in a 
hostile international environment made economic knowledge necessary. The process by 
which such practical economic knowledge began to be formalized and institutionalized 
cannot be understood without appreciating the significance of interstate rivalry. The 
competition between states formed the backdrop for eighteenth century reflection on 
political economy. Reinert argues that this process can be appreciated by following the 
circulation and translations of a currently unknown yet widely read book written by 
Bristol merchant John Cary and first published in 1695. In doing so, Reinert’s traces its 
translations across Europe, showing that Europeans sought to emulate the economic and 
                                                
8 Op. Cit. “Relación Caballero y Góngora.” 
9 Sophus A. Reinert Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011. 2. Røge, Pernille, and Sophus A. Reinert. (eds.) The Political 
Economy of Empire in the Early Modern World. Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series; 
Variation: Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
 6 
political success of England by studying political economy. Reinert challenges the 
commonly accepted idea that reduces political economy to the free-trade doctrines of the 
physiocrats, limiting its study to a few late eighteenth century thinkers.10  
Reinert’s scale of analysis is confined to political economy as a science that 
emerges in the texts of thinkers and merchants in the context of European competition. 
Recent contributions, however, have explored the emulation of foreign political economic 
ideas in eighteenth century Spain and its American colonies. Gabriel Paquette studies this 
emulation and the role of colonial actors such as merchant guilds and economic societies 
in proposing and adapting policies and ideas in the colonies.11 Paquette has also studied 
the centrality of consulados (merchant guilds) and Economic Societies in obtaining and 
disseminating useful knowledge to “encourage agricultural improvement as well as 
commercial expansion.”12 Although Paquette’s viewpoint focuses on the relationships 
between colony and metropole, his work opens the door to consider the multifaceted 
ways in which knowledge of political economy was created and negotiated across 
colonial spaces during the Bourbon reforms.  
In this dissertation I consider the production of discourses, projects and policies of 
economic improvement in New Granada and how they influenced territorial organization 
                                                
10 New approaches have emphasized the role of a variety of political communities—corporations, 
smugglers, and municipal leaders—in contesting mercantilist practices. See: Sophus Reinert. Mercantilism 
Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 
11 Gabriel Paquette. “Views from the South: Images from Britain and its Empire in Portuguese and Spanish 
Political Economic Discourse, ca. 1740-1810,” in Op. Cit. Mercantilism Reimagined. See also: Paquette, 
Gabriel B. Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and Its Empire, 1759-1808. Cambridge 
Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series. Basingstoke [England]  ; New York: Plagrave Macmillan, 2008. 
12 Ibid. Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and Its Empire, 142. 
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and ideas about the political order. Looking at the other way around, this research traces 
how interpretations about the landscape and its perceived characteristics influenced 
political economy discourse. In his book The Road to Botany Bay, Paul Carter criticizes 
so-called “imperial history”, a history that pays attention to time alone and reduces space 
to a stage on which events unfold.13 The historical facts of imperial history, Carter 
argues, cannot be detached from their “unique spatial and temporal context”. In other 
words, treating historical space as “natural, passive, objectively ‘there’”, has the effect of 
depriving history —in this case, New Granada’s — of its central features. Historian 
David Bushnell’s The Making of Modern Colombia starts as follows: “In the beginning 
there were mountains, plains, and rivers, but especially mountains; no one geographic 
feature has so molded the history of Colombia as the Andes.”14 In Bushnell’s account the 
landscape is the background on which events unfold. The spatial history of New Granada 
as it transitioned to the republic of Colombia offered in these pages understands space as 
actively produced by several actors.15 Any effort to affect, influence, and control a 
geographic area, that is, territoriality, starts with writing about it.16  
Descriptive geography has a long history within the Spanish empire.17 The 
scaffolding of the Spanish empire relied on the constant pursuit of information about the 
                                                
13 Paul Carter. The Road to Botany Bay: An Exploration of Landscape and History. 1st American ed. New 
York: Knopf, 1988, xvv-xvi. 
14 Ibid. 1. 
15 Henri Lefebvre. The Production of Space. Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 2000. 
16 Robert David Sack. Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History. CUP Archive, 1986. 
17 A humanistic tradition of geographic and historic dictionaries in the seventeenth century allowed for the 
systematization of information on localization, characteristics of places, and historical events, that would 
have otherwise been dispersed across several sources. For cartographers, the geographic-historical 
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territory and its population. The production of relaciones geográficas consisting of 
questionnaires to gather information about the land and its people, was Spanish policy 
since the sixteenth century.18 Through these devices, the crown requested information to 
control space occupancy, taxation, and the distribution of the population.19 As Sylvia 
Sellers-García has eloquently illustrated, in an effort to overcome distance, officials in 
Madrid could not “see”the Americas, therefore “they relied on American officials to 
make it visible and knowable.”20 However, the emergence of the Bourbon dynasty in the 
1700s was a turning point in colonial governance. Along with ‘bio-political’ projects, the 
Bourbon dynasty favored efficient management of the economy to strengthen and secure 
access to natural and geographic resources.21 In contrast to the first two centuries of 
colonial rule, during the eighteenth century the collection of knowledge began to coincide 
fully with a reform program formulated to exploit it.22   
Scholars have focused either on the connections between descriptive geography 
and ideas about empire, or cartographic projects in the interest of producing accurate 
                                                                                                                                            
dictionaries were fundamental inputs. The geographical dictionary of Alcedo, published in five volumes, is 
perhaps the most well-known work dedicated to the geography produced during the Bourbon reforms.  
18 Even in the eighteenth century, the relaciones geográficas continued to be a device of colonial 
governance. Juan Pío Montúfar y Fraso responded to the order of the viceroy of New Granada to produce 
the relaciones geográficas of the Audience de Quito on March 21 of 1754. Francisco de Solano. 
Cuestionarios para la formación de las relaciones geográficas de Indias: siglos XVI/XIX. Editorial CSIC - 
CSIC Press, 1988. 
19 “Significación y tipología de los cuestionarios de Indias.” In: Op.Cit. Francisco de Solano. 
20 Sylvia Sellers-García. Distance and Documents at the Spanish Empire’s Periphery. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2014, 25. 
21 Santiago Castro-Gómez has addressed the problem of biopolitics in 18th century Spain and analyses a 
set of medical, health, and demographic measures to argue for a change of “governance” in the Spanish 
empire and its relationship to geopolitics. Santiago Castro-Gómez. “Siglo XVIII: El nacimiento de la 
biopolítica.” Tabula Rasa, 2010. 34. 
22 Arndt Brendecke. Imperio e informacion: funciones del saber en el dominio colonial español,. Madrid: 
Iberoamericana, 2012. 36-37. 
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views of the cities in the empire.23 In recent years, however, historians and literary 
scholars have turned to look at a more inclusive language with which to think about 
territorial representation.24 The production of knowledge about colonial geographies has 
started to shift attention solely from mapping in the Spanish empire to cultural discourses 
about space and geography. Although territorial descriptions might seem a purely 
referential and neutral mode of writing about the land and its resources, Ricardo Padrón 
asserts that in fact it they “entail the encounter between data and expectations.”25 Using a 
persuasive language that described geographic features, local natural riches, and potential 
wealth, the producers of knowledge about the territory during the Bourbon era shaped 
political claims over space.  
Chorographic political economies informed claims over space, political debate, 
military strategies, and nation state unification policies. In the Diccionario de 
Autoridades of 1729, chorographia is defined as “the description of any kingdom, 
country, or particular province.”26 In a recent assessment of the chorographic tradition 
Darrell J. Rohl explains its roots in classical antiquity. While modern definitions stress 
the meaning of choragraphia, which means “writing about a country or region”, Darrell 
adopts a simplest definition of chorography as “the representation of space and place.” In 
                                                
23 See: Barbara E. Mundy. The Mapping of New Spain: Indigenous Cartography and The maps of the 
Relaciones Geográficas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Kagan, Richard L., and Fernando 
Marías. Urban Images of the Hispanic World, 1493-1793. New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 
2000. 
24 Ricardo Padrón. The spacious word: Cartography, literature, and empire in early modern Spain. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004, 71. 
25 Op. Cit. Padrón, 21.  
26 For more on the chorographic tradition see: Darrell J. Rohl. “The Chorographic Tradition and 
Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Scottish Antiquaries.” Journal of Art Historiography 5 (December 1, 
2011): 1. 
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this dissertation I understand chorography as both: descriptions with the aim of turning 
unfamiliar spaces into familiar places for economic, political and military ends.  
Different typologies of chorographic writing shaped the Bourbon era 
territorialization, the political debates between political entities during the provincial 
fragmentation of the interregnum era, to the spatial practices of the Reconquista war, and 
to the early struggles to unify the Colombian republic. I trace the relationship between 
political economy and territoriality in eighteenth century chorographic writings. These 
texts emerged from seventeenth-century arbitrismo which is a term derived from the 
arbitristas, which historian John Elliot defines as those who created files and redacted 
projects to reestablish royal finances and the Castillian economy in the context of 
economic decline of the seventeenth-century Spain.27 The eighteenth-century version of 
arbitrismo is often characterized as proyectismo. Eighteenth century proyectismo can be 
characterized as “enlightened thought of greater intellectual scope. It was forward 
looking, “proposing changes in the ways of doing things and even in their very 
essence.”28 The recovery of the arbitristas by Bourbon proyectistas laid the ground for 
the emergence of the new discipline of political economy. This new discipline was 
considered by leading Spanish reformers such as José Campomanes, one of the most 
useful tools for the good government of a nation.  
                                                
27 John Elliot. “La decadencia española,” Trevor Aston (comp.), Crisis en Europa, 1560-1660, Madrid, 
1983, pp. 180-207.  
28 See: González Enciso, Agustín. Phillip V: Economic and Social Reform in Spain in the Reign of the First 
Bourbon King. Translated by Dave Langlois. 1. ed. Serie Historia / Ediciones Universidad de Navarra 327. 
Pamplona, 2003, 19-20. 
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A set of texts created in the colonies advancing the tenets of economic 
improvement by knowing, describing, and harnessing nature in particular geographic 
settings deserve to be considered central in the literature of Bourbon imperial reform. 
Although most of the documents that I use to explore eighteenth-century territoriality and 
political economy were not published, and therefore did not circulate in the public sphere, 
they did circulate in internal bureaucratic networks in New Granada and in Spain. 
Therefore, they are invaluable to reconstruct the backstage workings of imperial 
territorial strategies. I divide the chorographic political economies of the eighteenth 
century in relation to the bureaucratic structure that produced them. As central devices for 
territorial organization and economic improvement projects, I identify four sub-
categories: military, ecclesiastical, fiscal and civil chorographic political economies. The 
second typology of chorographic political economy writings that I identify in this 
dissertation is intermingled in the political writings of the revolutionary era and the first 
decade of republican rule. The political chorographic texts produced during the crisis and 
collapse of the imperial state includes city councils instrucciones, papers by individual 
lawyers, newspaper articles, and congressional debates. I read these sources with 
particular attention to their use of ideas about geography in support of a certain political 
entity’s economic viability and desired political order. I found that along the language of 
political representation, sovereignty and autonomy, interpretations of the geographic 
realities and economic potential, greatly informed the debates that opposed different 
regional factions against each other across the viceroyalty. This same language permeated 
the debates across local, national and trans-imperial chorographic political economies 
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during the Gran Colombian republic. The third and last typology of chorographic 
writings that I study in this dissertation is topographic military documents produced and 
confiscated during the Reconquista war. These texts advanced military intepretations of 
the natural landscape at the same that presented political economy visions for the future 
of recovered insurgent New Granadian provinces. 
 
The Viceroyalty of New Granada, Imperial Reform, and the Enlightenment 
 
Changing the scale of analysis from inter-imperial, to local, inter-provincial, and 
corporate actors within northern South America, this study argues that political economy 
thinking and international geopolitics influenced the imperial reform that led to the 
establishment of a third viceroyalty in New Granada, first between 1717 and 1723, and 
again between 1739 and 1810. The relationship between political economy and 
territoriality is also fundamental to further understand the territorialization of New 
Granada during the eighteenth century. Historians tend to privilege the trans-Atlantic 
trade dimension of the Bourbon reforms as a crucial aspect of the debates in Spain about 
the ways in which American colonies might be made more profitable to the crown in 
Madrid. This study advances the current historiographical critique of the overreliance on 
the foreign trade dimension of mercantilism, to expand the conversation about inward 
colonial expansion through internal trade, fiscal interconnection, and local territorial 
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knowledge.29 An emphasis on political economy as a spatial practice allows us to bridge 
the gulf between intellectual debates circulating from northern European states to Spain 
and then its colonies, to a political economy that is local and shapes—and is shaped by—
territoriality. 
Since political economy is a central aspect of the Enlightenment, considering 
local colonial scales of analysis can help overcome notions of a one-dimensional 
Enlightenment. Recent studies on the Hispanic Enlightenment have given voice to the 
production of knowledge outside the dominant northern European patterns and 
institutions of learning and the non-passive reception of European discourses.30 I suggest 
that this should imply not only shifting the gaze towards geographies considered 
peripheral to the development of political economy, but also creating a more inclusive 
definition of what counts as knowledge of political economy and how interpretations of 
particular landscapes impact this knowledge. My repository of primary sources contains 
documents that do not always fit in the category of Enlightenment science and therefore 
cannot be considered modern.31 But it is precisely a more democratic understanding of 
                                                
29 Regina Grafe, “Polycentric States: The Spanish Reigns and the ‘Failures’ of Mercantilism” in Stern, P 
and Wennerlind, C. (eds.) Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and its 
Empire, (Oxford University Press) Oxford, 2013, 248-249. 
30 See particularly chapter 5 for a critique of Eurocentric views of the Enlightenment. Jorge Cañizares-
Esguerra. How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the 
Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World. Cultural Sitings. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2001. See 
also: Margaret R. Ewalt Peripheral Wonders: Nature, Knowledge, and Enlightenment in the Eighteenth-
Century Orinoco. The Bucknell Studies in Eighteenth-Century Literature and Culture. Lewisburg: Bucknell 
University Press, 2008. 
31 My analysis breaks with narratives about Spain’s place in the scientific and technological advancement 
of early modern Europe. This has become a very fertile field of research in recent years, arising from a 
critique of an earlier historiography which disregarded the Spanish Enlightenment’s contribution to the 
history of modern science. See for example: Daniela Bleichmar (ed.). Science in the Spanish and 
Portuguese Empires, 1500-1800. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2009. Cañizares-Esguerra, 
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the culture of knowledge production that can shed light on the ways in which the ‘useful 
knowledge’, whether scientific or not, that was produced by hundreds of bureaucrats and 
clerics across the empire impacted colonial territoriality, and how the geographic reality 
of the colonies shaped political economy thinking and practice.32 Imaginings of nature 
and wealth pervade the hundreds of texts that local officials penned to describe their 
jurisdictions in order to reflect on ways to make them more profitable for the Spanish 
Crown. These ideas constituted the basis for projects of territorial expansion and wealth 
production. Continuing to change the narrative of the limitations and insufficient 
character of the Hispanic Enlightenment requires unpacking the relationship between 
territoriality and political economy in particular geographic settings.33  
The pursuit of wealth, central to the Enlightenment philosophy of progress, 
advanced particular ways of thinking about territory. Reflecting on the ways in which the 
pursuit of material wealth led to the creation of territorialities contributes to our 
understanding of the ways in which imperial political economy was negotiated in the 
colonies and during the transition from colony to republic. Imperialism, as David Harvey 
asserts, is a political project based on territorial, governmental, and military strategies 
employed by the state and based on transnational circulation of capital, commerce, and 
                                                                                                                                            
Jorge. Nature, Empire, and Nation: Explorations of the History of Science in the Iberian World. Stanford, 
Calif: Stanford University Press, 2006. Antonio Barrera-Osorio. Experiencing Nature: The Spanish 
American Empire and the Early Scientific Revolution. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006. 
32 John Gascoigne. Science in the Service of Empire: Joseph Banks, the British State and the Uses of 
Science in the Age of Revolution. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
33 In the same way that recent scholarship has stressed the importance of looking at the Enlightenment as 
multiple ideas, practices, and meanings located in place and moving over space, the study of political 
economy must consider its role in creating spaces. Charles W. J Withers. Placing the Enlightenment: 
Thinking Geographically About the Age of Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
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information.34 But as Andy Doolen has argued, empire-building was never exclusively a 
top-down product of the state. Different corporate powers in the colonial settings were 
the ones who made effective the dynamic of acquiring, organizing, and exploiting 
territory.35 An analysis of the spatial domain of political economy involves an awareness 
of Spanish imperialism in imposing definitions and delimitations of space during the 
Bourbon reforms.  
But what does the case of New Granada offer to the study of early-modern 
political economy, eighteenth-century imperial reform, and Latin American independence 
and state formation? Although overlooked by scholars of colonialism and empire during 
the late colonial period, New Granada’s historical trajectory offers a perspective from 
which to examine the Bourbon reforms that is distinctive from those of better studied 
regions such as Mexico and Peru. Located in the northernmost reaches of South America, 
this territory corresponds to those of modern-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Panama. A peripheral colony of the Spanish empire, New Granada was characterized by 
a set of geographically disjointed territories constantly infiltrated by Dutch, British, and 
Portuguese smugglers. The Andean highlands were poorly connected to the Pacific and 
Atlantic littorals, evidencing the difficult internal communications.  
New Granada was mainly a gold producing colony. At least until 1780 mining 
production represented almost the totality of the exports of the colony of New Granada. 
Then, in the last two decades of the 1700s, the Spanish crown made an effort to diversify 
                                                
34 Andy Doolen. Territories of Empire: U.S. Writing from the Louisiana Purchase to Mexican 
Independence. Oxford Studies in American Literary History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, 9-
10. 
35 Ibid. 10. 
 16 
external income, resulting in a slight reduction of mining exports as the engine of 
external trade. Still, by the end of the eighteenth century, New Granada’s exports were 
estimated to be 90% gold and a 10% products such as cotton, cacao, sugar, and quinine.36 
It is important to note that these percentages do not reflect the cacao exports of 
Venezuela, which in 1786 was separated from New Granada. After then, within the 
viceroyalty, only the coastal cacao-exporting economy of Guayaquil was linked strongly 
to overseas markets. Most of the agricultural production of the other provinces supplied 
internal markets.  
Even so, New Granada’s main export, gold, could not rival the extensive silver-
mining industries in Mexico and Peru. While the Bourbon reforms developed Peru and 
Mexico’s extractive economies, the scale of mining enterprises in New Granada was 
never very large.37 By the mid-eighteenth century, as John Elliott describes, visitors to 
any of these viceroyalties were struck by the wealth of Mexico City and Lima. Reports of 
the era present evidence of commercial vitality, and social mobility over large areas of 
territory.38 In contrast, the reports of the time often described New Granada as a poor 
viceroyalty that lacked population and fluid communications, yet was full of unexploited 
natural riches and therefore economic potential.  
                                                
36 Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, Adolfo Meisel and Miguel Urrutia. “Continuities and Discontinuities in the Fiscal 
and Monetary Institutions of New Granada, 1783-1850”. In Transferring Wealth and Power from the Old 
to the New World. Monetary and Fiscal Institutions in the 17th through the 19th Centuries, Michael D. 
Bordo and Roberto Cortés-Conde, eds. (Cambridge, 2001), 414-450. 
37 Anthony McFarlane. Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics Under Bourbon 
Rule. Cambridge Latin American Studies 75. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 73. 
38 J. H. Elliott Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006, 255. 
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For a long time, historians assumed that New Granada followed a similar 
trajectory of economic growth and commercial expansion to that of Peru and Mexico 
during the Bourbon reforms, until the work of Anthony McFarlane questioned this 
depiction. In his book Colombia before Independence, still the most important 
comprehensive study on the Bourbon reforms in New Granada, McFarlane argues that 
although the reforms attempted to strengthen the colonial state, they neither altered the 
position of New Granada within the empire, nor expanded colonial commerce 
significantly. In other words, Bourbon economic reform failed to transform New 
Granada’s economy calling it “A distinctive territory with a character of its own”, 
McFarlane argues that New Granada does not fit the general picture of Spanish American 
history in the eighteenth century. This picture is one in which the colonial regions 
exposed to Bourbon rationalization of the political and economic system in disregard of 
colonial interests, created a context for the collapse of imperial authority.39 The 
possibilities of economic growth in New Granada, as McFarlane has demonstrated, 
continued to be limited by “the dispersion and small scale of settlement, the difficulties of 
internal transportation, and the scattered, low-intensity character of New Granadan 
mining.”40 In regards to independence, McFarlane argues that unlike Peru and Mexico, in 
New Granada “Independence did not usher in an age of economic transformations.”41  
While the question of whether imperial reforms succeeded or failed during the 
eighteenth century has occupied the attention of historians of the Bourbon era, this study 
                                                
39 Op. Cit. McFarlane. 
40 Ibid. 95. 
41 Ibid. 347. 
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is not concerned with following this line of enquiry.42 Rather, this study revisits 
eighteenth-century New Granada to interrogate the ways in which local political 
economy shaped territoriality. Territoriality, as defined by the geographical literature in 
space and place, is the use of territory for political, social, and economic ends.43 
 
The Independence of New Granada, Political Chorographies and Territorial 
Fragmentation 
 
Later in the eighteenth century, Bourbon educational reforms brought the natural 
sciences and political economy into prominence. Along with the expansion of the public 
sphere, discourses of political economy and local improvement projects circulated in 
newspapers and other print materials. In studying the way in which the Enlightenment 
was diffused in New Granada, Renán Silva describes new representations of wealth in the 
newspaper writings of Creole leaders. In doing so, he argues that the economic ideas of 
this group were structured under the logic of natural resources. While he adds that this 
logic was already circulating among viceroys and governors in the kingdom since the 
1740s, he chooses to emphasize the writings of Spanish Americans.44 Silva’s account, 
like much of the literature on the Enlightenment and independence, overemphasizes the 
                                                
42 The analysis of the limits of the Bourbon reforms in socio-economic terms has occupied the attention of 
Anglo-Saxon, European, and Latin American historiography alike. See for example: David Brading, 
Miners and Merchants in Bourbon México, 1763-1810, Cambridge, 1971. A large part of the 
historiography has focused on establishing the relationship between the reforms and independence. See 
Tulio Halperín Donghi, Reforma y disolución de los imperiso ibéricos, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1985. 
43 John Agnew. “Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers”, 95(2), 2005, 437–461.  
44 Renán Silva. Los ilustrados de Nueva Granada, 1760-1808: genealogía de una comunidad de 
interpretación. Universidad Eafit, 2002. 
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uniqueness of Creole’ representations of wealth in sharp opposition to Spanish despotism. 
Silva argues that the Creole lettered elite of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, in contrast to their predecessors, devoted their time to performing a diagnosis 
of the economy of the kingdom, proposing reforms, and creating a utopia of an abundant 
society. This utopia, Silva continues, coexisted with a paradoxical reality of economic 
stagnation, which the Creoles quickly blamed on Spanish despotism. As this dissertation 
illustrates, the Creole elite alone did not author the kinds of representations to which 
Silva refers. Spanish bureaucrats living in New Granada advanced the same type of 
representations in developing the Bourbon tenets of the economic government of 
America in order to extract greater revenues from the colonies. Some Spaniards were 
even harsh critics of Spanish despotism in commercial matters.45  
Scholars have also struggled to fit New Granada into the framework of “Creole 
patriotism”, whose literature also tends to conform to a similar pattern of following a 
narrative of Creole grievances. For the Mexican case, David Brading has defined Creole 
patriotism as the “exaltation of the Aztec past, the denigration of the Conquest, the 
xenophobic resentment against the gachupines, and the devotion to Our Lady of 
Guadalupe.”46  Taking the Mexican case as a model, other scholars have explored the 
ways in which Creole patriotism helped shape the language of the independence 
movement in places such as New Granada and Peru. Rebecca Earle, for example, argues 
that the celebration of an indigenous past was a fundamental aspect of the development of 
                                                
45 Salvador Bernabeu de Regaurt, “Plan de economía y buena administración o prospecto al gobierno 
político, militar y económico para el Istmo de Panamá.” Ibid. Instrucciones 
46 David Brading. The Origins of Mexican Nationalism. Cambridge Latin American Miniatures. 
Cambridge, England: Centre of Latin American Studies, 1985. 
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Creole Patriotism. For the case of New Granada and compared to Mexico, Earle argues 
however that there were “far less developed traditions of separate identity, and far less 
obvious examples of prevenient indigenous nations crushed by the conquistadors on 
which to draw.”47 For instance, unlike Mexico and Peru, New Granada’s indigenous 
population collapsed very quickly, representing just 15% of the population according to 
the census of the 1770s. As a result, in an attempt to reconcile the anomaly that New 
Granada represents in the framework of Creole patriotism, Earle has turned to argue that 
the experience of the Enlightenment provided a rich language for the expression of 
colonial grievances, as the writings of Simon Bolivar demonstrate.48 Such an 
interpretation is problematic. When Earl analyzes the coat of arms of the United 
Provinces of New Granada, for example, all she sees are “indianesque” themes, ignoring 
the fact that it featured elements from the natural landscape: the Chimborazo, the 
Tequendama Falls, and the Isthmus of Panama.  
One of the central arguments of this dissertation is that in the face of the crisis of 
the imperial state, the transitioning polities conveyed their autonomist aspirations in 
relation to visions of their natural environment. Thus, perspectives such as Earle’s that 
focuses on Creole narratives that exalt indigenous civilizations to bestow legitimacy to 
American authority, or the language of grievances against the Spanish monarchy, tend to 
erase the particularities of cases such as that of New Granada, simplifying the complex 
and multifaceted nature of the American response to the crisis in Spain across different 
                                                
47 Rebecca Earle. “Creole Patriotism and the Myth of the ‘Loyal Indian.’” Past & Present, no. 172 (August 
1, 2001): 125–45. 
48 Ibid. 129. 
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regions.49 Under the umbrella of Creole patriotism, the conflicts that emerged among 
different factions of New Granada and Venezuela during the interregnum period appear 
to be little more than a hitch that was soon overcome with Bolivar’s victories and the 
creation of the Gran Colombian republic. The narratives of a creole patriotism that are 
necessarily antagonistic to Spaniards have obscured the inherently ambiguous nature of 
revolutionary discourse during the early stages of the crisis. They have also overlooked 
the multiple and ambiguous ways in which Spaniards and Spanish Americans linked their 
understandings of political economy and territoriality to different views of the desired 
political order. As this study demonstrates, eighteenth-century political economy thinking 
and territoriality laid the ground for the territorial fragmentation that started in 1808. 
Spanish Americans’ understanding of their territories slowly became imbued with the 
language of political economy, and this in turn came to be used as an instrument for the 
pursuit of sovereignty in political discourse.  
The vacuum of power that began in Spain in 1808 affected the debates and 
confrontations between Neogranadians concerning existing territorial arrangements and 
political economy thinking. This study detects at least six clashing political projects 
during the crisis, besides the well-studied divide between centralist and federalist views. 
Some provinces, such as Mompox and Santa Marta, were pitted against the city of 
Cartagena in search of economic autonomy and regional preeminence. While the leaders 
of the capital city of Santa Fe generally agreed on the need to recompose political power 
                                                
49 Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, for example, has argued that for Creoles lands were rooted both in indigenous 
and Hispanic pasts. “Racial, Religious, and Civic Creole Identity in Colonial Spanish America.” American 
Literary History 17, no. 3 (September 21, 2005): 420–37. 
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by maintaining its role as the center of New Granada, they were sharply divided on the 
type of system that should govern the polity during the crisis. The province of Quito took 
advantage of the crisis to sever its fiscal ties with the port of Cartagena and advance long-
standing economic aspirations of becoming a regional center. The discourses of political 
economy that I study for each provincial space reflect the often-ambiguous spatial 
strategies through which provincial actors sought to control resources during the crisis. 
Recent historical research on the interregnum has highlighted the importance of 
the transformation of the colonies’ territorial hierarchy during independence, and the 
central place of the city in these processes.50 For the case of New Granada, Daniel 
Gutiérrez Ardila has highlighted how territorial disputes between self-proclaimed 
sovereign states motivated the formation of different cabildos (local councils) and 
ayuntamientos (municipalities) during the interregnum. In doing so, however, he has 
privileged contingencies such as the concerns of colonial provincials about defending the 
kingdom from foreign threats and the possible emergence of tyranny in the kingdom, in 
order to explain territorial rearrangements of the interregnum.51 The analysis of 
municipalization and the conceptual history of the changing meanings of categories from 
                                                
50 José Carlos Chiaramonte highlights how, in the case of the Río de la Plata, the sovereign entities of the 
interregnum were not the intendencias, audiencias, or viceroyalties but the cities, expressed politically in 
their juntas. Chiaramonte, José Carlos. Ciudades, provincias, estados: orígenes de la Nación Argentina, 
1800-1846. 1. ed. Biblioteca del pensamiento argentino 1. Argentina: Compañía Editora Espasa Calpe 
Argentina/Ariel, 1997. 42. For the case of Guanajuato, José Antonio Serrano argues that the institutions of 
Spanish liberalism and the wars of independence transformed the territorial hierarchy, particularly the 
relationship of subjugation between villas, pueblos y congregaciones, in regards to their capital cities. José 
Antonio Serrano Ortega. Jerarquía Territorial y Transición Política: Guanajuato,1790-1836. Zamora, 
Michoacán: El Colegio de Michoacán : Instituto Mora, 2001. 19-20.  
51 Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila. Un nuevo reino: geografía política, pactismo y diplomacia durante el 
interregno en Nueva Granada, 1808-1816. Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad Externado de Colombia. 2010. 
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pueblos52 to nation do not quite capture the spatial dimension and political economy of 
the territorial fragmentation of New Granada during the interregnum. 53 
Broadly speaking, these literatures have emphasized the political aspects of 
territorial fragmentation, focusing on the juridical foundations of the new 
constitutionalism, provincial diplomacy, the language of political representation, 
sovereignty, and political and civil citizenship.54 Historians of the independence era in 
Spanish America have privileged a non-spatial political history. Emphasis on the 
transition from colony to republic in light of political culture and a history of ideas, 
speaks of academic milieus preoccupied with situating Latin American history within 
narratives of modernity broadly defined as democracy and liberalism. This historiography 
has provided few tools for understanding the interplay between spatial practices and 
                                                
52 Jordana Dym has focused the role of the city and the revival of the doctrine of municipal sovereignty in 
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54 The influential work of Jaime Rodríguez, for example, sought to situate Spanish American independence 
within the broader political revolution for representative government in the Atlantic world. Jaime E. 
Rodríguez O., The Independence of Spanish America. Cambridge Latin American Studies 84. Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 3. 
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geographical particularities, embedded in the transition from colony to republic. This is 
also true for the wars of independence.  
 
War as a Spatial Practice and the Unification of Colombia 
 
Shedding light on a very thin historiography on the economic militarization of 
society, this dissertation rethinks the nature of warfare as the spatial reorganization of 
political economies. It can be said that save for military history scholarship recounting a 
collection of battles and war heroes or the terror in General Pablo Morillo’s Reconquista 
of New Granada and Venezuela, there is an absence of war studies. Similarly to the 
definition of viable independent spaces during the interregnum’s inter-provincial 
confrontations, the military campaigns of the Spanish reconquering army reconfigured 
colonial jurisdictions. Through a set of strategies, institutions, and practices to recover the 
insurrected colony, military men worked to make some spaces more economically 
central. Spanish and European historiography has mostly focused on the Spanish 
response to the French invasion of the Peninsula, while Latin American historians tend to 
focus on colonial warfare, patriot armies, Simon Bolivar’s victories, and the participation 
of foreigners in the wars.55 Recent historiography of the independence wars, however, 
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has increasingly paid attention to the active participation of Indians, people of African 
descent, and other popular groups in the independence armies.56  
Besides these fertile contributions to the social history of independence, another 
line of inquiry has explored the role of war in national identity formation. The most 
recent contribution to the study of the war is Clément Thibaud’s República en Armas.57 
Thibaud’s systematic study of the military institution rescues the fundamental role that it 
played in the construction of a national identity and as a ladder for social mobility. 
Following Guerra and Rodriguez’s conception of independence as a political event, 
Thibaud explores the role of the patriotic armies during the wars in the construction of 
political identities. For Thibaud, the independence wars led to the adoption of forms of 
political modernity from North America and France. In these approaches, the Spanish 
strategies to regain control of the colonies and recompose power have received little 
attention beyond a condemnation of the despotic and violent nature of the re-conquest. In 
addition, when conceiving of the militaristic aspect of warfare, current approaches to the 
                                                
56 For the case of Colombia, the works of Marcela Echeverri and Jairo Gutiérerez have contributed to this 
line of inquiry. See: Marcela Echeverri. “Popular Royalists, Empire, and Politics in Southwestern New 
Granada, 1809-1819.” Hispanic American Historical Review 91, no. 2 (2011), 240; Marcela Echeverri. 
Indian and Slave Royalists in the Age of Revolution: Reform, Revolution, and Royalism in the Northern 
Andes, 1780-1825. S.l.: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2016. See also: Gutiérrez R., Jairo. Los 
Indios de Pasto Contra La República (1809-1824). 1. ed. Colección Año 200. Bogotá: Instituto 
Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2007. For works on blacks slaves a free people of color see: Aline 
Helg. Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770-1835. Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004. Múnera, Alfonso. El Fracaso de La Nación: Región, Clase Y Raza En El Caribe 
Colombiano (1717-1821). 1. ed. Bogotá: Banco de la República : Ancora Editores, 1998. Pita Pico, Roger 
El Reclutamiento de Negros Esclavos Durante Las Guerras De independencia de Colombia 1810-1825. 
Primera edición. Bogotá: Academia Colombiana de Historia, 2012.  Gutiérrez R., Jairo. Los Indios de Pasto 
Contra La República (1809-1824). 1. ed. Colección Año 200. Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de 
Antropología e Historia, 2007. 
57 Clément Thibaud. Repúblicas En Armas: Los Ejércitos Bolivarianos En La Guerra de Independencia En 
Colombia Y Venezuela. 1. ed. en español. Línea del Horizonte. Lima: Bogotá, D.C: Instituto Francés de 
Estudios Andinos; Planeta, 2003. 
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wars tend to disregard the spatial dimension of the confrontations. The pragmatic aspect 
of controlling the territory directly relates to the on-the-ground challenges of moving 
peoples, commodities, and weapons throughout the territory. In addition, as this 
dissertation demonstrates, in controlling New Granada’s space, the Spanish military 
government crafted visions of political economy and territoriality as mechanisms of re-
legitimizing Spanish rule in America. The confiscation of local territorial descriptions 
and of the materials of the Botanical Expedition was also a central aspect of Spanish 
strategies for the recovery of the insurrected colonies.  
Lastly, this dissertation revisits the creation of the Colombian republic (1819-
1830), which comprised the territories of the old viceroyalty of New Granada. David 
Bushnell’s work on the Gran Colombia era remains one of the most thorough 
assessments of the political conflicts of the first decade of republican rule in Colombia.58 
His main concern, in common with much of the literature on the Gran Colombia, is the 
problem of establishing a legitimate form of government. This problem of political order 
has been largely explored from a standpoint that follows the political decisions and 
tensions of main figures of the era such as Francisco de Paula Santander and Simón 
Bolívar. By tying long standing political economy and territorial processes that were 
unleashed during the Bourbon era to the early national period, this study contributes to 
the scant literature on the Gran Colombian period, which has hitherto mostly been 
                                                
58 David Bushnell. The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1970. 
David Bushnell. The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself. Berkeley: Univ. of California 
Press, 1993. 
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concerned with tracing the personal skirmishes among republican caudillos.59 Conflicts 
among integrating national visions and local political economies shaped the debates of 
the early republic period. I analyze the political economy projects of the Pacific region 
provinces of Panama and Guayaquil to illustrate that the national political economy 
project for Colombia needed to be negotiated vis-à-vis local agendas. Long standing 
territorial and political economy projects undermined the unity of Gran Colombia from 
its very inception. 
The illusion of a unified Colombian republic dissolved by the late 1820s, resulting 
in the separation of Ecuador and Venezuela from Colombia and their proclamation as 
independent nations. While the provinces of Quito and Venezuela, which reinvented their 
political economies during the eighteenth century, separated from the new republic, 
coastal provinces like Cartagena, which maintained strong fiscal dependency with the 
Andean hinterlands, remained part of Colombia. This suggests that one should gaze 
towards the Bourbon processes of territorialization to fully understand more structural 
aspects that explain the separation of the Gran Colombian republic. Key aspects to this 
territorial and political outcome, as I demonstrate throughout this dissertation, are only 
possible to discern through an analysis of the long-standing relationship between 
territoriality, political economy, state administration, and war. Ultimately, this 
                                                
59 David Bushnell’s work on the Gran Colombia era remains the most thorough assessment of the political 
conflicts of the first decade of republican rule in Colombia even 40 years on. David Bushnell. The 
Santander Regime in Gran Colombia. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1970. For the thesis of the 
imperial origins of Latin American nations see: Horst Pietschmann. “Los principios  rectores de 
organización estatal en las Indias”. In Annino, Antonio, and François-Xavier Guerra. Inventando la nación: 
Iberoamérica siglo XIX. Fondo de Cultura Economica, 2003, 58-59.  
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dissertation is a meditation on what made of New Granda a territorial unit, what kept it 
together, and what drew it apart during the transition from colony to republic. 
 
Chapter Layout 
 
Chapter 1, “Political Economy and Chorography: Imagining the Geographies of 
Imperial Wealth in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, 1739-1808” serves as the 
background historical context in which the rise of the genre of chorographic political 
economies gained relevance. It traces the logic behind the imperial reform that led to the 
establishment of the Viceroyalty of New Granada and imperial and colonial competition 
in play during the late 1730s, before delving into the genre of chorographic political 
economy to illustrate its importance as a reflection of bureaucratic practice. The chapter 
aims to shed light on the larger jurisdictional changes that New Granada underwent 
throughout the century as a window into the complex and overlapping nature of colonial 
jurisdictions with which colonial provincials grappled in chorographic writing. The last 
two sections present two case studies: the territorialization of the Orinoco borderlands 
and the reinvention of Quito’s political economy. I argue that in the chorographic 
political economy tradition New Granada rarely emerges as one geographic unit; instead 
it appears as the collection of overlapping administrative partitions and geographically 
diverse regions that needed to be stitched together. 
Chapter 2, “Mapping the Fiscal State: Legibility, Bureaucratic Networks, and 
Local Autonomy”, studies the intersections between Bourbon fiscal structures, 
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territoriality, and geographical imagination in eighteenth-century colonial reforms in New 
Granada. Understanding the Bourbon reorganization of the colonial state in New Granada 
requires conceiving of fiscal matters both spatially and epistemologically. State 
administrators represented their territories, described them, and imagined efficient ways 
to impose tributary structures and trade networks on them. This chapter traces the spatial 
dimensions embedded in the works of royal administrators to make of the colony a 
legible canvas for matters of taxation, administering production, and collecting tribute 
and customs duties. While royal administrators made efforts to convey representations of 
New Granada as an integrated whole that looked inwards towards the capital city of Santa 
Fe, claims of local autonomy hindered fiscal territorial policy. In spite of this, a network 
of colonial bureaucrats moving fiscal remittances across the colony gave way to a sense 
of viceregal territoriality. 
Chapter 3, “Knowledge of Political Economy and the Search for Order during the 
Interregnum, 1808-1816”, examines the ways in which aspirations to maintain and 
expand the sources of revenue and secure access to natural and geographic resources 
shaped city-states’ projects to guarantee the political existence of their sovereign 
autonomous states during the imperial crisis that started in 1808. The crisis urged the 
political and economic elites of cities such as Cartagena, Socorro, Quito, Santa Fe, and 
Loja to advance in the definition of their projects of economic improvement while 
engaged in disputes about the desired political order. Local reflections on political 
economy organized territorial conceptions in New Granada, leading to a number of inter-
provincial conflicts. This chapter traces the emergence of potential regions and how the 
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crisis and wars created an opportunity for the reimagining of local, regional, and 
viceregal political economies. In the midst of the crisis, this reimagining created new 
possible centers making evident that New Granada was deeply fragmented along 
geographic, economic, and geopolitical lines. 
Chapter 4, “War Strategies, Natural Knowledge, and Territory During the Spanish 
Restoration in New Granada, 1815-1819”, argues that the Spanish military campaign to 
regain control over the colonies was a fight over who ruled the territory, its resources, 
and peoples, and over all knowledge about the territory. In the turmoil of the crisis, the 
former colony fought for independence while the empire fought to conserve the colony. 
Through militarizing statecraft, the Spanish army attempted to re-create the colonial 
space within a geographical and economic epistemological framework. The importance 
of decades of production of chorographic knowledge gathered to advance the 
territorialization of New Granada represented a crucial arena in the fight for sovereignty. 
The question of who owned the natural knowledge of New Granada became central as the 
Spanish military set out to regain physical and symbolic control of the territory and 
reinvent the colony’s political economy during the wars. 
Chapter 5, “The Ambivalent Landscapes of Colombia: Geographic Imagination, 
Republican Geopolitics, and the Pursuit of Inter-Oceanic Trade, 1819-1830”, 
demonstrates that republican leaders’ discourses of political economy and interpretations 
of the natural landscape shaped the ideals of the revolution and the imaginings of a 
Colombian national space. The aspiration of early republican statesmen to incorporate the 
republic into a modern commercial political economic space led to the construction of a 
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chorographic identity that linked Colombia to the Isthmus of Panamá and to a global 
trade. In a new era of geopolitical realignments, local political economies and 
territorialities needed to be negotiated vis-à-vis national, continental, and global 
geopolitical agendas. Differing regional visions and economic realities sharply contrasted 
with the representation of Colombia as a colossal nation and bearer of the world’s 
commerce and agriculture, a reflection of the vast gap between the country’s economic 
and political reality and foreign imagination of Colombia, and between national discourse 
and the on-the-ground challenges of uniting a large and regionally fragmented territory.  
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Chapter 1. Political Economy and Chorography: Imagining the 
Geographies of Imperial Wealth in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, 
1739-1808 
 
Introduction 
 
The main cause of disorder characterizing the colony of New Granada, according 
to viceroy Antonio Caballero y Góngora (1782-1789), was the aggregation of an 
immense territory under a single leader. The viceroy asserted that the problem dated back 
to the first conquistadores. They lacked knowledge of good government practices,” he 
believed.1 The lack of rulings and ordinances for the promotion of settlements in those 
early days, the viceroy argued, resulted in economic languor and hindered the extraction 
of goods from the colony. New Granada became a colony void of people, except the 
mountains which were inhabited by settlements of Indians and fugitive slaves, Caballero 
y Góngora went on to explain.2 Besides the main cities, some smaller ones, and a few 
parishes, he claimed, other settlements were little more than small and miserable huts.3 
The viceroy recommended fixing misplaced settlements inhabited by idlers and turning 
                                                
1 Antonio Caballero y Góngora, “Relación del Estado del Nuevo Reino de Granada, que hace el Arzobispo 
Obispo de Córdoba a su successor el Excmo. Sr. Don Francisco Gil y Lemus, 1789. Relaciones de los 
vireyes del Nuevo reino de Granada: ahora estados unidos de Venezuela, estados unidos de Colombia y 
Ecuador, 214. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. 
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them into well ordered and proportioned parcels of land ruled with measures intended to 
increase their economic productivity.4  
Years later in 1803, viceroy Pedro Mendinueta (1797-1803) called into question 
the characterization of the kingdom by viceroy Caballero y Góngora. He described it as 
“a horrifying portrait of an inexistent monster.”5 The exaggerated rendering of New 
Granada’s situation in Caballero y Góngora’s report, Mendinueta asserted, depicted New 
Granada “as void of agriculture and industry, without commerce or communications, 
lacking enough regular settlements.”6 This unjust portrayal of the kingdom contrasted 
with the reality that viceroy Mendinueta saw. He claimed that New Granada competed 
with the most expansive kingdoms in Europe, even though it struggled to mobilize 
enough resources to improve a population calculated at over two million inhabitants.7 
Unlike Caballero y Góngora, Mendinueta emphasized the existence of more than thirty 
cities, flourishing towns, a considerable number of parishes, and Spanish and Indian 
towns.  
Both viceroys, in spite of their differing views of New Granada’s situation, 
presented what they believed a viable colony would look like for Bourbon Spanish 
administrators. The incorporation of inhabitants into well-organized towns and cities was 
                                                
4 Ibid.  
5 “Relación del estado del Nuevo Reino de Granada, presentada por el Excmo. Sr. Virrey D. Pedro 
Mendinueta a su successor el Excmo. Sr. D. Antonio Amar y Borbón, año de 1803”. In: Relaciones de los 
vireyes del Nuevo reino de Granada: ahora estados unidos de Venezuela, estados unidos de Colombia y 
Ecuador. Impr. de Hallet & Breen, 1869, 53. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
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a crucial condition for the advancement of agriculture, trade, and industry.8 In tandem 
with the territorial organization of the colony, eighteenth century bureaucratic practice 
turned constantly to the question of how to transform the natural riches of the colony into 
actual wealth. Transforming the territories of northern South American into a wealthy 
revenue-producing colony for the empire became a priority of the Spanish crown in the 
wake of the Bourbon reforms. On the ground, colonial provincials adapted and promoted 
the rhetoric of imperial reform by producing natural histories, petitions, maps, 
administrative reports, and geographic descriptions.9 
As evidence of past bureaucratic practice, these documents reveal a tradition of 
chorographic political economy through which royal officials described the territories of 
the colony. In describing the territory these documents provided an epistemological 
framework for representing locations within the empire, which could also be turned into 
wealth. In doing so, they ordered the colonial space, described the territory, crafted 
utopias, and proposed economic reforms. This form of writing about the territory 
emerged out of the science of political economy, a form of knowledge imperial reformers 
understood as essential for the survival of the colonies.10 
                                                
8 As Jordana Dym has illustrated, eighteenth century Bourbon reforms encouraged, “good and more 
uniform government” seeking out dispersed settlements of Indians and castas and establishing municipal 
government. For the case of New Granada we will see that the search for uniformity occurred not only in 
the municipal level. Jordana Dym. From Sovereign Villages to National States: City, State,and Federation 
in Central America, 1759-1839. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006, 36. 
9 Andy Doolen has coined the term to refer to a set of texts that are integral to the practices of territorial 
conquest. Among those texts, he uses: exploration narratives, novels, oratory, and natural histories, 
autobiographies, travel narratives, poetry, and periodical literature. Andy Doolen. Territories of Empire: 
U.S. Writing from the Louisiana Purchase to Mexican Independence. Oxford Studies in American Literary 
History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, 11. 
10 Sophus A. Reinert. Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011. 2. Pernille Røge and Sophus A. Reinert (eds.) The Political 
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The limits and possibilities of what colonial administrators imagined their 
provinces could become were marked by a reform culture predicated upon political 
economy, a type of knowledge concerned with how to become and remain rich in a 
competitive context.11 This chapter then is a journey through the eighteenth century 
culture of reform and its peculiar contours in an American colony of the Spanish empire. 
I draw on over seventy chorographical writings produced in the viceroyalty of New 
Granada between 1739 and 1808 (see Appendix A). In the particular case of New 
Granada, reform was also the product of interpretations about the spatial reality of a set of 
geographically disjointed territories permeated and surrounded by other imperial powers 
and sovereign Indian polities.  
This chapter departs from traditional debates about the failure or success of the 
Bourbon reforms.12 Rather than question previous characterizations of New Granada as a 
colony that did not undergo major economic changes during the Bourbon era, I center my 
analysis on the workings of chorographic texts as tools of territorial reform and windows 
into the geographical imagination of the era. I shift the usual imperial scale of analysis in 
scholarship on early modern political economy to focus instead on the regional and local 
spatial dimensions and tensions over the organization of space in New Granada.  
                                                                                                                                            
Economy of Empire in the Early Modern World. Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series; 
Variation: Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Aware of the importance of controlling territory and knowing its resources, 
roads, and inhabitants, colonial provincials attached projects, arbitrios, and maps to their territorial 
descriptions. 
11 Sophus A. Reinert. Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
12 Op. Cit. McFarlane.  
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As a result of inter-imperial competition, territories were artificially put together 
under the umbrella of an administrative unit created in 1739 as the viceroyalty of New 
Granada.13 The royal decree that ordered the establishment of New Granada as a 
viceroyalty also instructed royal officials to write reports to send to Spain describing all 
provinces and people of the viceroyalty. Colonial officials wrote extensively about the 
territories they administered, advancing territorial visions of provincial spaces onto a 
larger map of the Spanish commercial empire. 
In this chorographic political-economic tradition, I argue, New Granada rarely 
emerged as one geographic unit; instead it appeared as the collection of overlapping 
administrative partitions and geographically diverse regions that needed to be stitched 
together. In Bourbon rhetoric, economic viability and cohesiveness depended on 
strengthening royal bureaucracies while improving internal communications, military 
defense, and trade and fiscal networks linking the viceroyalty internally and also to 
Spain.  
Chorographic political economies were central devices of imperial reform and 
territorialization because colonial wealth production occurred in colonial outposts, not in 
intellectual treatises in Europe. Cities and towns competed with each other for control of 
resources while adapting metropolitan policies to specific geographic conditions. Added 
to this, whether competing or cooperating, corporate structures including the 
ecclesiastical, civil, and military states administered the material life of the colonies and 
constantly negotiated the jurisdictional reach of local political economy projects. Texts, 
                                                
13 Real Cédula de 20 de agosto de 1739, Sam Idelfonso, Felipe V de España.  
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in these cases, became assets in Spanish territorialization of the borderlands and in 
debates over provincial boundaries.  
Local territorial descriptions showcased the complex and unstable juridical 
ordering through which the Spanish empire administered its territories. The instability of 
colonial administrative divisions and the lack of territorial correspondence among 
jurisdictions as described in chorographic texts paved the road to inter-provincial conflict. 
As Michel de Certeau has argued, written narratives “were journeys that served to 
traverse and organize geographic space.”14 In the act of structuring and delimiting the 
space in provinces, towns, cities, parishes, and capitanías, these texts developed imperial 
typologies clearly connected to political economy discourse. In doing so, they blended 
the early epistemological traditions of the relaciones geográficas, natural history, and 
arbitrismo with Bourbon proyectismo.15  
Locally based views of nature in chorography texts outlined ideal colonial spaces. 
While Spanish officials could never successfully exercise territorial control through sheer 
military, religious, fiscal, and economic muscle, these texts nevertheless crafted utopias. 
They informed strategies of territorial control in the borderlands, while feeding imperial 
imaginaries about the impending wealth and future of the nascent viceroyalty. As Emily 
Berquist Soule has explored for the case of bishop Martinez Compañon’s socio-economic 
reforms in Trujillo, Peru, many of the visions of territoriality and projects of political 
                                                
14 Michel de Certeau. The Practice of Everyday Life. University of California Press, 2011, 115.  
15 Eighteenth century proyectismo can be characterized as “enlightened thought of greater intellectual 
scope. It was forward looking, “proposing changes in the ways of doing things and even in their very 
essence.” See: Agustín González Enciso. Phillip V: Economic and Social Reform in Spain in the Reign of 
the First Bourbon King. Translated by Dave Langlois. 1. ed. Serie Historia / Ediciones Universidad de 
Navarra 327. Pamplona, 2003, 19-20. 
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economy in eighteenth century New Granada never materialized as colonial officials 
imagined them.16 Because these visions are inextricably linked to specific local contexts, 
however, they provide a unique opportunity to delve into the geographical imagination 
and conceptions of space so central to the negotiation of imperial reform in New 
Granada. 
The first section of the chapter explores the historical context in which the rise of 
the genre of chorographic political economies gained relevance. It traces the logic behind 
the imperial reform and inter-imperial geopolitics that led to the establishment of the 
viceroyalty of New Granada and imperial and colonial competition in play during the late 
1730s. Then it delves into the genre of chorographic political economy to illustrate its 
importance to bureaucratic practice. Then I turn to explain the larger jurisdictional 
changes that New Granada underwent throughout the century in order to offer a window 
into the complex and overlapping nature of colonial jurisdictions in chorographic writing. 
The last two sections present two case studies, of the territorialization of the Orinoco 
borderlands and of the reinvention of Quito’s political economy during the eighteenth 
century.  
 
 
                                                
16 Emily Berquist Soule. The bishop's utopia: envisioning improvement in colonial Peru. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. 
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Imperial Reform, Jurisdictional Tensions, and the Making of the Viceroyalty of 
New Granada  
 
New Granada occupied a peculiar place among the territories of the Spanish 
empire. It was characterized by a set of geographically disjointed territories constantly 
infiltrated by Portuguese, Dutch, and British smugglers. The kingdom’s coastal cities of 
Cartagena, Portobelo, Caracas, Santa Marta and Riohacha established connections to 
Circum-Caribbean legal and illegal trade.17 The political economies of these cities were 
entangled with British, Dutch, and French trading economies.18 Guayaquil and Panama 
were connected to illegal cacao export networks around the Pacific Ocean.19 Other 
regions such as Guayana, Orinoco and Maynas underwent the constant infiltration of 
Dutch, French, and Portuguese imperial agents and merchants. Moreover, borderlands of 
Darien, Panama, the Orinoco basin, Maynas, and la Guajira were often controlled by 
Native sovereignties that established trading networks with other empires in the 
Caribbean. (See Figure 1.) This inter-imperial infiltration reflected New Granada’s 
                                                
17 About smuggling, linking New Granada to other empires see: Lance Raymond Grahn. The Political 
Economy of Smuggling: Regional Informal Economies in Early Bourbon New Granada. Dellplain Latin 
American Studies, no. 35. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997. Ernesto Bassi has made the case for the 
legitimation of trade with foreigners, mainly with Jamaica, both after the Seven Years War and during the 
Anglo Spanish peace between 1783 and 1796. The Anglo-Spanish War in 1796 cut off trade between 
Jamaica and Spanish America. Although Bassi uses official records to illustrate the decline of the 
commercial relation between New Granada and Jamaica after 1796, the arrival of clandestine vessels 
anchoring far from major port cities was a reality in New Granada’s coasts. Ernesto E. Bassi Arevalo. 
“Between Imperial Projects and National Dreams: Communication Networks, Geopolitical Imagination, 
and the Role of New Granada in the Configuration of a Greater Caribbean Space, 1780s--1810s.” Ph.D., 
University of California, Irvine, 2012, 37-38. 
18 For the case of Venezuela’s entanglement with the Dutch Curacao see: Linda Marguerite Rupert. 
Creolization and Contraband: Curaçao in the Early Modern Atlantic World. Early American Places. 
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012. 
19 Jesús Hernández Jaimes, “El fruto prohibido: el cacao de Guayaquil y el mercado novohispano, siglos 
XVI-XVIII.” Estudios de historia novohispana, Nº. 39, 2008, pp. 43-79. 
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unique geostrategic space within the empire, a disturbing fact that Bourbon reformers 
came to recognize. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739.20  
 
While borderland provinces faced foreign intrusions, the hinterlands of New 
Granada struggled to open fluid domestic trade networks and connections to navigable 
                                                
20 Based on: Carta del Virreinato de Santafé y la Capitanía General de Venezuela. Carta IV del Atlas 
geográfico e histórico de la República de Colombia, 1890. 
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rivers or the sea. Mining-oriented provinces such as Antioquia, Chocó, Popayán, and 
Mariquita faced difficulties in trying to maintain the profitability of their mines. 
According to royal officials, in spite of possessing countless riches, New Granada 
suffered from several ailments: lack of people, corrupt officials, contraband, difficult 
internal communications, the presence of independent Indians and fugitive slaves, weak 
municipal government, constant foreign intrusions, lack of agriculture, no internal trade, 
no industry, and no scientific experts.21  
During the eighteenth century, the Spanish monarchy ascribed its preoccupation 
to create stable and clearly delimited borders for the Empire and its colonies to a 
defensive policy that sought to counteract the expansion of other European empires. The 
Treaty of Utrecht (1713), which ended the War of Spanish Succession, resulted in a series 
of territorial and economic rearrangements. While the Treaty safeguarded Spain’s 
overseas territories, in Europe, Spain ceded Gibraltar, Minorca, and the asiento de 
negros, the monopoly over the slave trade, to Great Britain in 1713.22 The Treaty also led 
to the establishment of the Bourbon monarchy, which attempted to dismantle the 
previous two centuries of Habsburg rule based on federal autonomous provinces. As a 
result, the new monarchy sought to create a uniform juridical framework for the Spanish 
Empire and its colonies in an attempt to recover the failing empire.  
Looking to exercise control over this area, extract more revenues, and safeguard 
the overall territorial integrity of the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean and South 
                                                
21 AGI, “Restablecimiento del virreinato de Santa Fe.” Santa Fe, 385. 1738. 
22 Consuelo Maqueda Abreu. El Virreinato de Nueva Granada (1717-1780): Estudio Institucional. (Ciudad 
Real: Madrid: Ediciones Puertollano  ; Dykinson, 2007): 170. 
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America, the Spanish empire embraced its most radical territorial reform in centuries.23 
With the establishment of a new viceroyalty between 1717 and 1723, and then again in 
1739, the Bourbon crown laid out a renewed plan for imperial reform in what were the 
northernmost reaches of the viceroyalty of Peru.24 Establishing the viceroyalty of New 
Granada in 1739 was just the beginning of an era of territorial re-arrangements that 
emerged as by-products of the science of political economy, a central component of 
statecraft during the Bourbon era.  
The royal evaluation of the local conditions of New Granada, the larger 
geopolitical context, together with political economy, as doctrine, theory, and practice of 
knowledge production, informed the creation of the viceroyalty in 1717. Imperial 
determination to increase royal revenues locally, and ongoing Spanish responses to 
colonial rivalry in the Caribbean influenced the creation and institutionalization of the 
viceroyalty of New Granada.25 Policy makers in Madrid in the 1730s for example, urged 
colonial administrators to banish illicit trade carried out by foreigners and introduced to 
the hinterlands of the kingdom through the Orinoco, San Juan, Atrato, and Magdalena 
                                                
23 John Elliot argues that the creation of the third viceroyalty was a response to immediate problems of 
defense and administration, rather than part of a larger strategy of reform. Royal interests in developing 
specific economic sectors within the viceroyalty partially undermine Elliot’s generalization. Op. Cit. Elliot. 
231.  
24 The Captaincy General of New Granada—created in 1564—was raised to the status of viceroyalty in 
March 27, 1717. In 1723, due to poor results in containing trans-imperial infiltration and because of the 
high costs of maintaining a viceregal structure in a poor and unpopulated territory such as New Granada, 
the Spanish monarchy extinguished the viceroyalty. 
25 Anthony McFarlane. Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics Under Bourbon 
Rule. Cambridge Latin American Studies 75. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
196. Adrian Pearce has argued that commercial priorities conditioned both the establishment of the 
viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717 and its abolition in 1723. Adrian J. Pearce. The Origins of Bourbon 
Reform in Spanish South America, 1700-1763. First edition. Studies of the Americas. New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 16. 
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Rivers.26 As recent historiography on the creation of the viceroyalty in 1717, its 
elimination in 1723, and its restoration in 1739 has illustrated, the larger context of the 
Hispanic world after the Treaty of Utrecht and European geopolitics are central to 
understand these territorial rearrangements.  
Historian Francisco Eissa-Barroso convincingly demonstrates that the creation of 
the viceroyalty in 1717 came amid a series of reforms introduced by abate Guilio 
Alberoni, the Italian cardinal and statesmen in service of King Phillip V, which 
significantly altered the form of government of the Indies.27 Alberoni’s reform mimicked 
French political economy started in France under Jean-Baptiste Colbert, often regarded as 
the main figure of French mercantilism. Historian Jacob Soll defines ‘Colbertism’ as an 
idea that a large-scale state needs to centralize and harness encyclopedic knowledge to 
govern effectively. This knowledge, which can be formal and practical, he adds, could be 
used to master the material world.28 This type of centralizing drive and the pursuit of 
knowledge is present in the original proposal for the establishment of a new viceroyalty 
presented to Phillip V, which included petitions to map, evaluate, and control the possible 
sources of wealth for the empire.29  
                                                
26 AGI, “Registros cedularios de instrucciones a virreyes de Santa Fe.” Santa Fe, 541. 1737-1817. 
27 Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso. “La Nueva Granada en el sistema de Utrecht: condiciones locales, contexto 
internacional, y reforma institucional.” In: Iván Escamilla González (ed.) Resonancias Imperiales, América 
y el Tratado de Utrecht de 1713. Instituto de Investigaciones Doctor José María Luis Mora Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, México, 2015. For more on the 
reforms of Alberoni see: Alan J. Kuethe. “Cardinal Alberoni and the Reform in the American Empire.” 
Eissa-Barroso, Francisco A. Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era. 
Leiden: BRILL, 2013, 23-38.. 
28 Jacob Soll. The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System. Cultures 
of Knowledge in the Early Modern World. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009. 
29 Op. CIt. Maqueda. 
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The crown perceived that New Granada lacked a strong and effective royal 
authority. The establishment of centralized state and military power in the region sought 
to harness fiscal revenues more effectively by subordinating local and provincial officials 
to viceregal authority. Financial needs to fund wars in Mediterranean Europe, Eissa-
Barroso argues, led Spanish reformers to extinguishing the viceroyalty in 1723 and the 
costs associated with maintaining it. The upsurge of tensions between Spain and Britain 
stemming from the Treaty of Utrecht, in turn accelerated the restoration of the viceroyalty 
in 1739.30 
The creation of the viceroyalty entailed the establishment of a single 
administrative unit ruled by a viceroy—the image of the king in America—that also held 
the titles of governor, general captain, and president of the civil court (audiencia) of 
Santa Fe.31 When the viceroyalty of New Granada was created in 1739, there were three 
civil courts located in the cities of Santa Fe, Panama, and Quito. When the civil court of 
Panama was eliminated in 1751, all court cases had to be brought to the civil courts of 
Santa Fe and Quito. The organization of judicial administration kept shifting throughout 
the century. In 1787 the Spanish crown created the Audiencia of Caracas comprising the 
administration of justice for the provinces of Caracas, Maracaibo, and Guayana, which 
formerly depended on Santa Fe, and the provinces of Cumaná, Margarita, and Trinidad, 
which used to depend on the Audiencia of Santo Domingo. Responding to inter-imperial 
rivalry, the reform of military jurisdictions in coastal locations led first to the separation 
                                                
30 Op. Cit. Eissa-Barroso, 73-74.  
31 The civil courts were the highest court of appeal and advisory board to the president and later on to the 
viceroy. The civil court also denoted the jurisdictional reach of the administration of justice. 
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of the province of Venezuela from Santa Domingo and later on from the viceroyalty of 
New Granada.  
In spite of detaching the territories of Venezuela from New Granada, the 
territorialization of New Granada advanced greatly throughout the century. For instance, 
from the creation of the viceroyalty until the early 1800s, the expansion of imperial 
administrative structures and policies of land redistribution led to an increase in the 
number of provinces or governorships, and within the provinces, new parishes and towns 
were created (See Table 1).32 This territorial reform within the colony stemmed from a 
larger geopolitical context shaping new visions of Spain and its empire. 
 
1739 1793* 
Chocó Chocó 
Popayán  Popayán  
Quito Quito 
Guayaquil Guayaquil 
Antioquia Antioquia 
Rio del Hacha Rio de la Hacha 
Panama Panama 
Portobelo Portobelo  
Veragua Veragua  
                                                
32 Throughout the century, several towns, cities, and settlements petitioned to the Council of the Indies for 
changes in their jurisdiction. For example, beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century, the 
province of Neiva underwent the creation of 14 parishes stemming from local economic projects. For 
instance, the establishment of Neiva in the seventeenth century stemmed from the need of exploiting gold 
and silver mines in the territories of the Pijao Indians. These requests included the creation of new towns, 
the erection of settlements into parishes (parroquias), the segregations or aggregations of territories, and 
the creation of Indian towns. Local populations channeled petitions involving jurisdictional disputes or 
plans to change administrative hierarchies through city councils. These proposals often came from 
governors, priests, corregidores, lieutenants, and inhabitants (vecinos) of towns and parishes. See: 
Humberto Montealegre Sánchez. “Conquista y Creación Del Espacio Urbano en la Provincia de Neiva, 
Timaná y Saldana.” En Revista de Historia Regional y Local, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2013. 
Herrera Ángel, Marta. Ordenar Para Controlar: Ordenamiento Espacial Y Control Político En Las 
Llanuras Del Caribe Y En Los Andes Centrales Neogranadinos, Siglo XVIII. Colección Espiral, título 1. 
Bogotá, Colombia: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia: Academia Colombiana de la Historia, 
2002. 
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Darien Darien 
Trinidad and Margarita Cartagena 
Maracaibo Santa Marta 
Guyana Mariquita 
 Neiva 
 Maynas 
 Girón 
 Tunja 
 Cuenca 
 Santa Fe 
 Los Llanos 
Table. 1. Provinces of the viceroyalty of New Granada, 1739 and1793. Informe del 
Virrey: AGI, Santa Fe, 741 
 
Unlike early Spanish colonialism, which placed particular emphasis on the 
incorporation of its subject population into its vision of Catholic Christianity, the 
Bourbons highlighted what Spanish reformer Jose Campillo y Cossio called the economic 
government of America.33 The strategic plan for the “Economic Government of America” 
written by Minister of the Secretaries of Treasury, the Navy, War, and the Indies José 
Campillo y Cosío in 1743 contained the basic tenets of the reforms. The work remained 
in manuscript form until its publication in 1789, yet it deeply influenced eighteenth 
century reforms. Campillo y Cosío’s text characterized eighteenth-century Spanish 
political economy: his plan was pragmatic, addressed local concerns, and took into 
account successful foreign economic practices.34 Campillo envisioned a “great design for 
                                                
33 Campillo y Cossio describes the economic government as “the good policy, the restoration of trade, the 
ways to occupy men with civility, sow the land, improve its agricultural products, and finally, all which led 
to extract the utmost benefit and utility from a country.” Ibid, 68.  
34 A growing literature on the emulation of political economy across European empires has demonstrated 
that royal official, merchants, and so forth, thought about economic through this idea and formulated 
policies. Working on the Spanish empire, Gabriel Paquette has explored the emulation of foreign political 
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Spanish America” through which the Spanish crown would increase the empire’s 
population and fortify strategic navigation routes and territories.35  
The Council of the Indies—the primary administrative organ of the Spanish 
Empire in the Americas—directed all its efforts to the economic recovery of the overseas 
possessions. Imperial reformers started to consider the colonies of the New World as an 
“integral territory of the Monarchy.”36 This vision of empire tended to base the power of 
the state on acquiring markets, not bullion. In the case of New Granada, a predominantly 
mining economy, the reforms considered both jumpstarting mining, promoting trade, and 
fighting contraband. This territorial reform ignited inter-colonial conflict. While Spanish 
reformers attempted to reduce foreign infiltration in the larger Spanish commercial 
system, the creation of the new viceroyalty generated conflict between Peru and New 
Granada.  
The creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada removed from the viceroyalty of 
Peru a great part of its territory. Peruvian authorities and merchants protested because 
their trade primarily flowed through Guayaquil and Panama. Peru made territorial claims 
over these regions also in terms of their rights to safeguard the region militarily. In 1741, 
                                                                                                                                            
economic ideas in Bourbon Spain in a context of international rivalry. See: Gabriel Paquette. “Views from 
the South: Images from Britain and its Empire in Portuguese and Spanish Political Economic Discourse, ca. 
1740-1810,” in Sophus Reinert (ed.). Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern 
Britain and Its Empire. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. For the British Case and other see: 
Sophus A. Reinert. Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011. 2. See also: Pernille Røge and Sophus A. Reinert (eds.) The 
Political Economy of Empire in the Early Modern World. Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies 
Series; Variation: Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
35 Campillo belonged to a group of arbitristas. See Manuel Lucena Giraldo. “The Limits of Reform in 
Spanish America.” In: Gabriel B. Paquette, Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and Its Atlantic 
Colonies, C. 1750-1830. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009. 310.  
36 Ibid. 181. 
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the Marqués de Villa García, Viceroy of Peru, made a complaint about the 
inconveniences caused by the segregation of certain provinces of Tierra Firme, namely 
Panama and Guayaquil.37 For the viceroy, losing direct control over the provinces of 
Guayaquil and Panama elicited additional burdens for Peruvian trade. According to the 
viceroy, impairments to Peruvian trade emerged in particular from the fact that the port of 
Guayaquil was the only supplier of flour to Peru.38  
Villa García also raised a series of concerns regarding the trade of Peruvian goods 
at Portobelo, located on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus of Panama.39 The Spanish Crown 
held the Portobelo fairs among merchants from Sevilla, Lima, and Panama biannually to 
trade European finished goods for silver. After 1686, however, the fair was interrupted 
for long periods, subsequently leading to a general decay of isthmian trade. The Spanish 
Empire weakened its presence on the Isthmus of Panama due to the constant attacks of 
pirates and general contraband trade.40 Villa García noted that due to the distances and 
broken terrain between Santa Fe and Portobelo, the resources and governmental 
ordinances from Santa Fe would arrive late, to the detriment of Spanish trade.  
The Peruvian viceroy believed that the government of Santa Fe could not provide 
adequate defense to prevent illegal trade and pirate attacks without the subordination of 
                                                
37 AGI, “Inconvenientes de la segregación de las provincias de Tierra Firme”. 1741-1748.” QUITO, 
126,N.32.  
38 Ibid. f. 342v. 
39 Ibid. f. 343v. 
40 Christopher Ward. Imperial Panama: Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian America, 1550-1800. 1st ed. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993, 56. 
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Panama and Guayaquil to Peru.41 Not without reason, Villa García argued that Santa Fe 
did not have enough funds to continue the Portobelo fairs. The last Portobelo trade fair 
was carried out in 1738. The viceroy’s voice was not the only one raised against the 
creation of New Granada. The deputy of trade of Peru, Juan de Berría, also presented his 
allegations in 1739, namely against the segregation of the provinces of Quito and 
Guayaquil for the same reasons.42 Decades later in 1779, the issue was still current. José 
García de León y Pizarro, president of the Audiencia of Quito, attempted to legally 
segregate Guayaquil from the newly created viceroyalty.43 With the annexation of 
Guayaquil by New Granada the city was deprived of the protection that it had received 
from Lima and which the government in Santa Fe failed to provide. In response, in 1804, 
the Spanish crown separated the military government of Guayaquil from New Granada to 
become part of the viceroyalty of Perú in, as in earlier colonial times. 
The disputes over the jurisdiction of Quito and Guayaquil foretell a long-standing 
territorial conflict between Peru, Colombia, and later on, the Republic of Ecuador that 
also included aspirations over the province of Maynas in the Amazon.44 Moreover, as we 
will see in the last chapter, the conflicts over the control of the Pacific region, namely of 
Guayaquil and Panama, remained central to intra-imperial, national, and regional political 
                                                
41 AGI, LIMA,651,N.3. Carta del Marqués de Villagarcía, Virrey de Perú, a José del Campillo, Secretario 
de Guerra. 
42 AGI, QUITO,145, N. 29. Audiencia de Quito, "Juan de Berria: contra segregación de provincias." Mayo 
16 de 1739. 
43 AGI, QUITO,240,N.23, Segregación de Guayaquil, “Carta no. 67 de José de León y Pizarro a D. José de 
Gálvez comunicando que está hacienda las diligencias necesarias para segregar Guayaquil del virreinato de 
Santa Fé.”  
44 As we will see in the next chapter, when the process of independence culminated in the 1820s, the 
jurisdiction over Guayaquil remained contested was predicated upon economic concerns. 
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geography during the first decades of republican rule. To sum up, the invention of the 
viceroyalty of New Granada generated a tension with the viceroyalty of Peru’s territorial 
claims over the Pacific belt uniting Lima and Callao to Guayaquil, Panama and 
Portobello. The creation of the Colombian republic nearly one hundred years later 
unearthed this same conflict.  
After sketching the intra-imperial and inter-imperial territorial and political 
economy tensions involved in the establishment of the viceroyalty, the next section 
examines the act of describing the territory in chorographic texts as a reflection of 
administrative practice. I reconsider these sources and argue that they played a central 
role in Bourbon imperial reform in New Granada.  
 
 
Describing the Territory 
 
All chorographic political economies featured a description of a given provincial 
space, its limits, location, and neighboring provinces. Colonial officials described the 
advantages of each province by specifying the agricultural, mining, and manufacturing 
goods within a given provincial territory. For example, Cayetano Buelta Lorenzana’s 
report on the state of the province of Antioquia in 1776 detailed the “extension, fertility 
of the land, number of rivers and stream, the diversity of the weather, (…) the variety and 
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abundance of agricultural products.”.45 In mapping natural resources, the seemingly 
innocent act of describing the territory turned into propaganda about a specific location’s 
economic potential and happiness. 
In the recent years, historians and literary scholars have turned to look at a more 
inclusive language with which to think about territorial representation.46 The production 
of knowledge about colonial geographies has started to shift attention solely from 
mapping in the Spanish empire to cultural discourses about space and geography.47 
Chorographic texts emerging from eighteenth century culture of political economy should 
be considered central in the literature of Bourbon imperial reform. Using a persuasive 
language that described geographic features, local natural riches, and potential wealth, 
this type of writing about the landscape shaped political claims over space.  
Colonial administrators did not explore the geography of the colonies for its own 
sake; they were applying the framework of political economy to understand how to turn 
the natural riches of their territories into wealth in competitive contexts. They explored to 
exploit. The cartographic value of these texts was to provide Spanish reformers with a 
spatial sense for setting up economic governance. This spatial dimension was associated 
with the possibilities of connecting sources of wealth—crops, fisheries, mines, flour 
mills, textile workshops—to fluvial and terrestrial means of transportation. This would 
energize both domestic trade and the viceroyalty’s links to Spain’s commercial routes. In 
                                                
45 Don Cayetano Buelta Lorenzana. “Relación de gobierno y estado de la Provincia de Antioquia en el 
Nuevo Reino de Granada”, 1776.  
46 Ricardo Padrón. The spacious word: Cartography, literature, and empire in early modern Spain. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004, 71. 
47 Op. Cit. Padrón, 21.  
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the age of political economy, officials interpreted local landscapes in order to assess the 
possibilities of moving commodities, incomes, and people fluidly and efficiently across 
the territory. 
Chorographic political economies in New Granada advanced a notion of linear 
space, one that incorporated time and focused on the experience of traversing a territory 
for the purposes of trade. Antonio de Narvaez’s description of the provinces of Santa 
Marta and Riohacha of 1778, for example, noted that the Magdalena and Cauca Rivers 
among others offered facilities to transport trade to the hinterland provinces of the 
kingdom or bring them to Santa Marta.48 Likewise, an anonymous report about the 
province of San Juan de los Llanos stated that “the province could extract tobacco if it 
found a way to transport it through the Meta River to Guayana and then to Spain.”49 
Topographical obstacles were a major theme in chorographic writings of the Andean 
regions within New Granada. Describing the province of Antioquia, Buelta Lorenzana 
asserted that the majority of the territory was mountainous “making the trails uneven and 
the traffic very risky, expensive, and slow.”50 He added that the territory lacked 
population and the costly transportation hindered the creation of public revenue.51 The 
diagnostics of the state of each provincial space usually featured a proposed idea on how 
to make the province maintain its current wealth or flourish economically.  
                                                
48 Antonio de Narvaez y La Torre. “Provincia de Santa Marta y Río Hacha del Virreinato de Santa Fe”, 
1778.  
49 “Noticias sobre los Llanos del Casanare y San Martín, Nuevo Reyno de Granada”, 1789-1796.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Op. Cit. Buelta Lorenzana.  
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Reporting back to Spain, governors, clerics, oidores, military men, and viceroys 
themselves constantly sought to convey a spatial understanding of particular regions 
within the empire to their peers in Madrid. Less frequently royal administrators 
conceived of the viceroyalty of New Granada as a coherent geographic and commercial 
space vis-à-vis the larger empire. Attempts to do so illustrate the strength of regional 
variations within the viceroyalty. While local political economies set out to advance the 
possibilities of connecting a city or town with certain rivers or sea outlets, larger 
conceptions of New Granada as a colonial space proved difficult to create a sense of 
territorial cohesiveness.  
Writing in 1789, governor of Antioquia Francisco Silvestre presented an ideal 
representation of New Granada as a cohesive space connected through internal trade. He 
evaluated the conditions of governorships (gobierno) and Indian towns corregimientos, 
provided census information, described their economic base (crops and mines), and 
presented possible economic projects to promote each region.52 Silvestre’s political 
economic discourse was geared toward the promotion of agriculture and trade within the 
kingdom and toward opening communication networks to export agricultural products.53 
Silvestre was concerned with opening transportation routes for internal trade and for 
promoting an export economy in the viceroyalty. The provinces east of the eastern 
mountain range, Silvestre contended, battled relentlessly to access the sea. The path 
through the Pacific, via Panamá, was an arduous transit, and the overland path to 
                                                
52 Francisco Silvestre. Descripción Del Reyno de Santa Fé de Bogotá: Escrita En 1789 Por D. Francisco 
Silvestre, Secretario Que Fue Del Virreinato Y Antiguo Gobernador de La Provincia de Antioquia. 
Biblioteca Universitaria de Cultura Colombiana. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1968. 
53 Ibid. 45. 
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Cartagena implied crossing mountainous and broken terrains. Silvestre then gauged the 
possibility of fluvial trade, following the ideas of Jesuit priest José Gumilla, via a fluvial 
exit through the Llanos de Casanare, down the Orinoco River, and then to Cumaná, 
Curazao, and eventually Spain. Silvestre warned that the absence of an exit to other 
markets hindered the economic promotion of the hinterlands, and of the kingdom as a 
whole. Improving trade across the kingdom, Silvestre maintained, required opening 
alternative exits to the sea besides the one that connected Andean environs to Cartagena. 
Silvestre was made anxious by the reality that coastal economic spaces connected to 
trans-imperial economies and were only loosely attached to Andean mining centers.54  
Although Silvestre intended to illustrate the connections and natural dependency 
between the various regions of the kingdom, his narrative portrayed a kingdom 
fragmented along different economic and geographic circumstances. In his depiction, the 
kingdom appeared to be clearly divided into four different regions with different political 
economies: barbaric borderlands, Andean highlands, and Pacific and Atlantic littorals. 
First, the southeastern region that shared a border with the “barbaric Indians,” the 
Peruvian province of Piura, and with the line that divided the Portuguese and the Spanish 
empire in the Amazon. Secondly, the Pacific belt provinces of Guayaquil, Popayan, 
Chocó, Panamá, Atacames, Darien, Veragua and Alange. Third, the provinces of the 
Andean slopes: Santa Fe, Neiva, Mariquita, Latacunga, Otabalo, Riobamba, Chimbo, 
Girón, Antioquia, and Tunja. Lastly, he described the Caribbean shoreline provinces of 
Santa Marta, Cartagena, and Portobelo. Different from their Andean counterparts, which 
                                                
54 Ibid. 
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struggled to access fluvial and maritime networks, coastal regions faced security 
challenges to their economic improvement. In spite of this, Silvestre outlined an ideal 
form of territoriality that connected dissimilar regions in a commercial space through the 
opening of navigation channels and roads.  
Colonial officials invested New Granada’s territories with certain juridical 
conditions but also with meanings around its potential future for wealth and sometimes 
about its geopolitical importance.55 Jurisdictional shifts throughout the century responded 
to the need to establish more fluid communications between centers of power and their 
surrounding territories in order to strengthen the circulation of commodities, food staples, 
fiscal remittances, troops, correspondence, and people. A central aspect of writing about 
the territory also implied a narrative that ordered the space into imperial jurisdictions and 
raised notions of ideal geographic types. 
 
Ordering the Territory and Ideal Geographic Types  
 
Before turning to the workings of chorography as an organizing device of the 
colonial space, some background about spatial jurisdictions and jurisdictional shifts in 
eighteenth century in New Granada is necessary. Normally described in local territorial 
descriptions, royal officials mastered the complexities of the administrative structure in 
place, the relationships among jurisdictions, and the bureaucracies ruling a given 
                                                
55 José García García Bernardo, and Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño Antonio, eds. La Monarquía de Las 
Naciones: Patria, Nación Y Naturaleza En La Monarquía de España. Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2004, 
49. 
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territory. This dual understanding of territory as natural landscape and administrative 
structure is central to understanding the bureaucratic practice of ordering the territory in 
chorographic texts.  
Spaniards organized their territorial empire using a set of categories of spatial 
management derived from peninsular legal traditions.56 They defined colonial spaces in 
relation to administrative functions and institutions found in a given territory. Royal 
officials conceived of New World lands through imperially imposed ecclesiastical, civil, 
fiscal, and military categories of state administration. The division of colonial territories 
into jurisdictions under the rule of priests, governors, viceroys, corregidores, and so 
forth, aimed to manage the population, establish tributes, and extract natural resources. In 
colonial documents, we find countless categories of spatial management such as villa, 
pueblo, ciudad, provincia, gobierno, municipalidad, ayuntamiento, reino, corregimiento, 
plaza de armas, capitanía, presidencia, alcaldía, curato, partido, parroquia, and 
intendencia. Reconstructing and making sense of these formal government structures 
prove challenging because of the lack of uniformity in many cases. This also reflects that 
the sources of authority and the economic administration of the colonies spread out into 
several bureaucratic structures.  
                                                
56 Tamar Herzog states that the criteria for making a territory Spanish, although they varied from time to 
place, involved legal doctrines originating in Roman Law that implied the need to classify actors as 
members of a community. Jordana Dym offers some insights on the origins of the cities and pueblos in 
Roman and Spanish political theory, by which a city was conceptualized as a republic and “its householders 
as citizens who formed a political community.” Op. Cit. Dym, 13-15. See: Herzog, Tamar. Frontiers of 
Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2015.  
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Multiple bureaucracies engaged in the making of chorographic texts that 
organized the colony into administrative spaces (See Table 2). In territorial descriptions 
royal bureaucrats presented the kingdom as an orderly space split in well-defined 
jurisdictions. Civil authorities divided the kingdom into Audiencias57, governorships, or 
provinces. Ecclesiastical ministers imposed categories derived from the head of 
archbishopric power such as bishoprics and parishes. Military men stressed the division 
of the kingdom into captaincies, while Bourbon reformers organized the colonies in fiscal 
districts through the category of intendencias. Across all jurisdictions, colonial officials 
penned descriptions of their territories advancing specific spatial identities that described 
the role of specific cities and regions within the colony. By carving fiscal, military, civil, 
and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, and describing each jurisdiction’s riches and potential 
wealth in detail, colonial officials sought to identify the causes of the backwardness of 
the colonial periphery. 
 
 
 
                                                
57 The audiencia was the highest court of appeal and advisory board to the president and later to the 
viceroy. The audiencia also denoted the jurisdictional reach of the administration of justice. The president 
was the head of the Audiencia of Santa Fe, who exercised judicial functions, designated litigation judges, 
royal officials of the cities and districts under his jurisdiction, as well as governors who depended of the 
Audiencia. The audiencia exercised administrative functions and the president watched over the correct 
functioning of the Royal Treasury and the encomiendas. The encomiendas were a grant of Amerindian 
towns to a creole or peninsular, who had the right to receive a portion of the tribute collected in these 
communities in return for protecting the welfare of the inhabitants. Definition in: Kenneth J. Andrien. The 
Kingdom of Quito, 1690-1830: The State and Regional Development. Cambridge Latin American Studies 
80. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 232. The president also oversaw the visitas 
de las tierra, in which an official visited annually different districts of the audiencia to verify the execution 
of laws and Indian justice. 
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Types of 
Jurisdictions 
Administrative 
functions 
Viceregal period 
Audiencias Justice administration Audiencia of Santa Fe 
 
Audiencia of Quito 
 
Audiencia of Panama* 
 
Audiencia of Caracas** 
 
Comandancias 
and capitanías  
Military functions Comandancia de Cartagena 
 
Comandancia de Panama 
 
Comandancia de Caracas 
 
Arzobispados (A) 
and obispados 
(O) 
Secular and religious 
government 
Santa Fe (A) 
Panamá (O) 
Cartagena (O) 
Santa Marta (O) 
Quito (O) 
Cuenca (O) 
Popayan (O) 
Antioquia (O) 
*Suppressed in 1752  
** Created in 1786 
Table 2. Territorial jurisdictions, 1549-1808 
 
Manuel de Anguiano’s geographic-military description of the province of 
Cartagena in 1805 is a good example of the working of chorography as an organizing 
device of the specific geographical types of military jurisdictions.58 The Spanish military 
engineer crafted a chorographic political economy portraying Cartagena’s long-standing 
function as defensive safeguard (antemural), port, and plaza de armas of the kingdom. 
Cartagena became a military jurisdiction because of colonial decisions to endow the 
                                                
58 “Descripción geográfica militar y política de la provincia de Cartagena de Indias”, Archivo del Depósito 
de Guerra, Servicio Geográfico del Ejército, Archivo de Planos, (Madrid), El Taller de Historia, vol. 7, no. 
07, Programa de Historia, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Universidad de Cartagena de Indias, 2015, 459-
472. 
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strategically located city with the functions of defending South America from foreign 
intruders. Together with the defense of the kingdom, Cartagena was a site of the 
inquisition. In regards to the economic government of the province, the port city held a 
state customs house and later in the eighteenth century the merchant’s guild 
(consulado).59 The customs office was central for Cartagena’s role as mercantile city and 
center of slave distribution. Anguino described the city as the only and main plaza de 
guerra—war plaza—of the kingdom of New Granada.60 He then went on to delineate the 
administrative division of the province into ten war captaincies.61 Beyond the larger 
jurisdictional ordering, chorographies endeavored to explain the complex system of 
overlapping jurisdictions that characterized the Spanish colonial system.  
The reorganization of New Granada set a new territorial hierarchy for war and 
trade matters. The reform included a politico-military division in which the governors of 
Caracas, Cartagena, and Panama were appointed as general commanders. The provinces 
of Santa Marta and Riohacha were now subordinated to Cartagena; Veragua, Portobelo, 
and Darien to Panama; and, Cumaná, Margarita, Trinidad, Maracaibo, and Guayana to 
                                                
59 The merchant guild’s function was three-fold: economic growth, efficient administration, and the 
eradication of contraband. Gabriel B. Paquette. “State-Civil Society Cooperation and Conflict in the 
Spanish Empire: The Intellectual and Political Activities of the Ultramarine Consulados and Economic 
Societies, C. 1780-1810.” Journal of Latin American Studies 39, no. 2 (May 1, 2007): 263–98. 
60 The governor of the plaza of Cartagena was also the sub-director of the troops and general commander 
of the province, reuniting the military and the administration of justice under a single administration. The 
governor also exercised the functions of corregidor, and the capitanes de Guerra and alcaldes are 
subordinated to him, and exercise ordinary justice in its partidos. The alcaldes pedáneos are subordinated 
to the war captains, although they act with judicial independence. 
61 The ten captaincies are: Barranquilla, Santo Tomás, Mahates, Barranca del Rey, María la alta, María la 
baja, Magangué, San Benito, Lorica, and Ayapel. In the captaincy of war of Magangué there is the villa of 
Mompox with a cabildo which names annually two ordinary alcaldes that exercise jurisdiction in the whole 
partido and the war captain. This does not happen in the Indian towns. In the captaincy of Lorica there was 
the villa of Tolú with a cabildo that names alcaldes. 
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Caracas.62 Later in 1777, with the creation of the general captaincy of Caracas, the 
provinces of Maracaibo, Cumana, Trinidad y Guayana were segregated from New 
Granada.63 The General Captaincy of Venezuela depended for judicial issues on the 
Audiencia of Santo Domingo until the creation of its own independent Audiencia of 
Caracas in 1786.64 Territorial management was split among the different jurisdictional 
orders. 
Let us examine Anguino’s explanation of the split between civil authorities 
(alcaldes)65 and military officials (capitanes de Guerra) in the jurisdiction of the 
captaincy of Cartagena. The war captaincies comprised three villas with “ordinary 
jurisdiction” and two without it. The ordinary jurisdiction meant that the administration 
of justice consisted of a municipal council (ayuntamiento) that appointed two ordinary 
alcaldes with power over the jurisdiction of the partido as well as over a war captain. A 
partido represented civil power in the parishes and comprised small territories that 
depended for administrative matters of the cabildos of villas and cities. The war captain 
did not exercise jurisdiction over Indian towns. For example, the villa of Tolu was part of 
the war captaincy of Lorica that had a municipal council, which named two alcaldes, one 
                                                
62 The year before, in 1776, the crown established the Intendencia de Ejército y Real Hacienda; later in 
1786 the Civil Court of Caracas was established, the Real Consulado de Caracas started to work in 1793 
and the archbishopric of Caracas was established in 1804. Ibid. 
63 Guayana rose in 1768 to comandancia general with the incorporation of the new settlements of Alto and 
Bajo Orinoco and Negro River. AGI, “Segregación del Virreinato de Nueva Granada las provincias de 
Maracaibo, Cumaná, Trininidad y Guayana”, Real Cédula de 5 de Mayo de 1768 y Real Cédula de 8 de 
septiembre de 1777, Santa Fe, 385.  
64 A captaincy was a territory in which a general captain exercised jurisdiction, namely the organization 
and administration of an army. In New Granada, the city of Cartagena played a central role on the military 
defense of the kingdom. 
65 The alcaldes ordinarios were named by the ayuntamientos and the alcaldes pedáneos were named by the 
cabildo and governorship of Cartagena. The alcaldes often limited their faculties to their sitios de 
residencia.  
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of which resided in Lorica and the other in Tolu, both with ordinary jurisdiction in the 
partido. The villas of Maria la baja and Ayapel did not have a municipal council, 
although both were war captaincies. The city of Simití, which belonged to the jurisdiction 
of Mompox, lacked a municipal council as well. In some cities and towns, military 
authorities existed in place of municipal councils. Royal officials often articulated this 
type of jurisdictional mapping with geographic-economic information, in this case, 
regarding the military protection of the kingdom. 
On top of administrative structures, natural features of the landscape such as 
rivers acted, as Lauren Benton has argued, “as corridors and enclaves that imperial agents 
harnessed in expanding territorially and counteracting foreign intruders.”66 Anguiano’s 
territorial description, for example, emphasized the usefulness of rivers such as the Atrato 
for connecting populations, but also their dangers as facilitators of the entrance of foreign 
intruders.67 In light of a long history of repeated Dutch and British incursions in the gold 
rich province of Choco, Anguiano interpreted the landscape in relation to strategies to 
defend the kingdom. For example, Anguiano asserted that the province of Urabá, 
populated by the same indigenous groups of the Darien, “is the only bordering province 
of the kingdom that demands a geographic-military description relative to the defense 
against such indios gentiles.”68 The military man also expressed his anxieties regarding 
the passage through the Atrato River in Chocó. Although the river was not part of the 
                                                
66 Op. Cit., Benton, 2-3. 
67 Anguiano for example, invests the rivers with specific qualities, “the rivers that flow through the 
province from south to north, and the dam that traverses it from east to west facilitate invasions.” 
68 Ibis. 461. 
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jurisdiction of Cartagena, its protection generated great concern because of possible 
foreign incursions into the kingdom through the river.  
Anguino departed from his military meditation on the landscape to explicate the 
causes of the decline of agriculture in the province and propose some economic projects. 
He went on to explain that the population in the vecindarios de gente libre—free people 
neighborhoods which are called sitios—and the neighborhoods of tributary Indians—
pueblo—was very low for the size of the territory.69 Expanding the crops of cacao, 
indigo, cotton, sugarcane, and yucca could help promote the economy. Anguiano also 
lamented that, except for textile looms in Corozal and some potteries in Mompox, no 
manufacturing existed in the province. In his assessment of the province of Cartagena, 
Anguino recognized that some partidos were more hardworking than other and described 
the chains of foodstuffs supply that connected the city with other cities and towns within 
the province. Anguiano’s text ultimately is a typical local chorography, which blended 
spatial conceptions with a diagnosis of the causes of the backwardness of Cartagena to 
then offer some solutions. Another facet in these narratives is the depiction of ideal 
territorial models.  
Let us explore Vicente Basilio de Oviedo’s book of 1761, Cualidades y Riquezas 
del Nuevo Reino de Granada, for an example both of jurisdictional ordering and ideal 
geographic types.70 Oviedo developed his natural history in eleven volumes which 
                                                
69 Op. Cit. Anguiano, 470. 
70 Jesuit Basilio Vicente de Oviedo wrote the text in 1761. Born in the province of Boyacá in 1699, Oviedo 
received his education in the Colegio de San Bartolomé in Santa Fe, and became priest in the Seminary of 
Popayán. He worked as priest in several towns: Guane, Nemocón, San Gil, Mogotes, Curití, Paipa, Charalá, 
Paya, etc.  
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consisted of inventories of the riches produced within the ecclesiastical jurisdictions of 
the kingdom namely within its curatos—parishes.71 In each territory under control of a 
bishop, the bishoprics had a council (cabildo) formed by members of the clergy. Each 
bishopric had a number of dependent curatos—parishes administered by secular clergy—
in urban centers and towns.72 Although Oviedo’s text follows Pliny’s classic natural 
history as earlier natural histories did, he was certainly more concerned with the material 
wealth of New Granada than with the spiritual salvation of the souls, indicating a clear 
separation from earlier colonial natural history traditions.73  
Establishing the division of the kingdom into smaller units was fundamental for 
Oviedo’s objective of diagnosing the state of New Granada’s political economies. For 
this aim, he started by presenting a classification of the ecclesiastical jurisdictions based 
on a hierarchical order. New Granada was divided ecclesiastically into the Archbishopric 
of Santa Fe, which had 344 curatos, divided into 24 cities, 7 villas, 90 parishes, 195 
pueblos de Indios, and 98 reservations of Indians.74 This meant that a city could have 
several curatos within its jurisdiction. In addition, Oviedo portrayed the most important 
urban centers of the kingdom, starting with Santa Fe, which the Jesuit identified as head 
                                                
71 The original text is in the Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid and forms part of volumes 59 and 60 
of the collection of documents compiled by Juan Bautista Muñoz for the “History of the New World” 
(Historia del Nuevo Mundo). 
72 Some of the curatos were dismembered into parishes to cope with the vast territories and high number of 
people under the jurisdiction of large curatos, which were overload in their capacity to grant spiritual 
guidance. 
73 Sabine MacCormack has analyzed sixteenth and seventeenth century natural histories and found their 
recourse to Pliny and other ancient authorities, and the merging of natural and moral history. Vicente 
Basilio de Oviedo’s maintains references to Pliny, but departs from the merging of moral and natural 
histories to incorporate the spatial organization of the ecclesiastical state along with characteristics of 
arbitrista traditions and eighteenth century political economy, Sabine MacCormack. “On the Wings of 
Time: Rome, the Incas, Spain, and Peru.” Acls Humanities E-Book. Accessed March 20, 2015.1 
74 A reducción is a town of Native Indians who have been converted to Christianity.  
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both of the Archbishopric and Viceroyalty. This dual administrative partition is indicative 
of the constant overlap of administrative functions within the colonies.  
Oviedo’s chorography outlined ideal colonial spaces. In light of the importance of 
binding wealth creation to territory, the Jesuit sketched in his writing the hierarchy and 
geographic assessment of all the curatos of the kingdom. Basilio de Oviedo’s text 
assessed the situation of each one of the curatos of the kingdom. Starting with the curato 
of the Archbishopric of Santa Fe, Oviedo depicted the natural riches of the kingdom, 
defined the status of each curato, how much it produced, its weather, geography, the ease 
or difficulty of its administration, distance between the neighborhoods and the parish, the 
trails, and so forth. In Oviedo’s territorial hierarchy, a first class curato was a viable 
territory, which matched the spirit of Bourbon economic improvement and increased 
revenue collection for the crown. “First order curatos,”, he claimed, enjoyed healthy 
weather, devout parishioners, a well-ornamented church, a location that facilitated trade 
with the main cities of Santa Fe, Mérida, and Tunja, and an income of at least 1000 
pesos.75 Different from first class curatos, second, third, fourth, and fifth class curatos 
lacked income, healthy weather, number of white dwellers, crops, and tributary Indians. 
Oviedo’s writing linked the viability of the religious spaces to ideal principles of trade, 
income, weather, population, and agriculture. Unlike other texts of the time, however, 
Oviedo sought to advance his own personal prestige with the king, expressing his 
gratitude to the monarchy. While Oviedo’s text was a response to ordinances requesting 
information for the king about the situation of the newly created viceroyalty and was not 
                                                
75 Op. Cit. Oviedo. 
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crafted in the form of a petition for aiding territorial projects, other chorographic texts 
functioned more clearly as tools for strengthening colonial territorial control.  
Within each jurisdiction, royal officials penned local territorial descriptions, 
which played specific roles in advancing territorialization both as a spatial and discursive 
practice. With these insights in mind, the next two sections, elaborate this argument in 
more detail using the cases of the Orinoco borderlands and the province of Quito. 
Because of its geopolitical importance, royal officials penned a high number of 
chorographic texts about the Orinoco during the eighteenth century. An equally important 
number of chorographic texts are found for the province of Quito because of colonial 
provincials’ obsession with restoring the once opulent economy of the province.  
 
Political Economy and Territorialization in the Orinoco Borderland  
 
Along with the articulation of trade as a strategy for territoriality in the 
borderlands during the eighteenth century, the goals of conversion in religious missionary 
efforts increasingly coincided with projects to improve local economies.76 Missionaries 
became key actors in Spain’s economic government and authors of numerous 
chorographic texts, which described the riches of New Granada and how to exploit them 
more efficiently. A blend of traditional natural history, geography, and proyectismo, the 
                                                
76 As Tamar Herzog points out, the presence of soldiers, scientists, settlers, and civic authorities in 
American hinterlands increased during the second half of the eighteenth century. Among them were some 
engaged in enlightened projects “motivated by the wish to improve the local economy.” Tamar Herzog. 
Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2015. 
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texts of Jesuits and Franciscans illustrate the role of clerics within Spanish colonial 
structure, which went well beyond the usual roles of conversion and education.  
Changes in missionary efforts throughout the eighteenth century corresponded to 
a degree of secularization within Spanish imperial relations with borderland Indians. As 
historian David Weber has demonstrated, it is important to remember that by the second 
half of the eighteenth century, the number of Indians who lived independently in the New 
World remained considerable.77 Semi-incorporating independent Indians via trade 
appeared to be a possibility for Spanish reformers. For instance, Campillo identified two 
stages in his economic governance in America in relation to “independent Indians.”. The 
first stage consisted in turning Indians into useful vassals (vasallos útiles). A second stage 
projected increased consumption deriving from Indian incorporation—first via trade 
networks—which would be enjoyed only by Spain “without the participation of any 
foreign nation.”78 Campillo recommended specific strategies for the establishment of 
trade between Spaniards and “independent Indians.”79  
In the effort to expand colonial power, a myriad of chorographic political 
economies rendered utopian representations of the kingdom and pragmatic projects of 
economic improvement, which resonated with reformers in Madrid, Creole intellectuals, 
and republican leaders. Franciscan and Jesuit images of the Orinoco basin as a land of 
economic opportunities influenced Madrid’s policies toward the borderlands of New 
                                                
77 Ibid. Weber, 12. 
78 Op. cit. Campillo y Cossio, 93.  
79 José del Campillo y Cosío. Nuevo Sistema de Gobierno Económico Para La América. 2. ed. Mérida: 
Venezuela, Universidad de Los Andes, Facultad de Humanidades y Educación, 1971, 172-175. 
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Granada. Spanish officials, merchants, military engineers, and so forth, became 
susceptible to the centrifugal forces generated in this process.  
 
The Orinoco River   
 
Within the Jesuit father Jose Gumilla’s image of the agricultural riches and the 
Orinoco River, we discover the inception of a discourse of political economy that 
conceived of New Granada as a center of agriculture and trade. In the influential and 
widely read El Orinoco Ilustrado published in 1741, Gumilla called attention to the 
agricultural and commercial possibilities of the Orinoco basin in the kingdom of New 
Granada.80 Determined to raise awareness of the agricultural potential of New Granada, 
Gumilla encouraged Spaniards to populate the fertile lowlands of the Orinoco River to 
establish villages and cattle ranches.81 Located in the eastern part of the newly created 
viceroyalty, the region comprised the provinces of Casanare, Orinoco, Cumaná, Meta, 
and Guayana. Jesuit fathers had established the earliest missions in the region around 
1576.  
                                                
80 During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the Orinoco Ilustrado was edited five times, first in Spain 
and then in Colombia and Venezuela. It was also translated to French. The edition of 1772 switched the 
name to “Historia, natural, civil y geográfica situadas en las riveras del Río Orinoco.” Ibid, 172. Joseph 
Gumilla. El Orinoco Ilustrado; Historia Natural, Civil Y Geográfica De Este Gran Río. Bogotá: Editorial 
ABC, 1955.  
81 Gumilla’s work is a clear departure from the typical mission history which starts with the history of 
conquest of the territory and its early missions, the reducciones established in a region and the progress 
they reached, with the goal of convicing the reader about the importance of missions. See for example: Juan 
Rivero. Historia de Las Misiones de Los Llanos de Casanare Y Los Rios Orinoco Y Meta, 1736. Bogota, 
1883.  
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Gumilla attempted to persuade the Spanish crown of the value of the natural 
resources of the Orinoco region in the search for further missionary and military 
support.82 He noted that in those lands “everything invites cultivation, and this country 
offers rich and abundant fruits everywhere.”83 A pressing issue in his work as royal 
administrator he dealt with the violent plundering and incursions of trans-imperial agents 
that affected imperial trade and evangelization in the region. The Spanish crown faced the 
challenges of incorporating Indian polities into Spanish territory while fighting with other 
empires over control of them. 
The struggle for control of the northeastern frontier of New Granada corroborates 
that empires were “leaky containers.”84 Dutch, French, and Spanish imperial claims for 
territory converged in this area. Right before publishing his book and returning to Spain, 
Gumilla sent a report to the Council of the Indies as member of the Society of Jesus, chief 
of the missions of Casanare, Meta, and Orinoco, and general spokesman (procurador 
general) of the provinces of New Granada.85 The report denounced the hostilities of the 
                                                
82 Gumilla’s manuscript was evaluated and approved by several crown officials, starting with Jesuit fathers 
both in Quito and Spain, members of the Council of the Indies, and even the governor of the province of 
Quito, Dionision del Alcedo y Herrera. Alcedo y Herrera’s report on the book “Dictamen de D. Dionisio de 
Alcedo y Herrera, Gobernador y Capitán General que fue de la provincial de Quito, y Presidente de la Real 
Audiencia de dicha ciudad, en orden al contenido de esta historia.” In Gumilla, El Orinoco Ilustrado. 
83 Ibid. “todo convida al cultivo, y por todas partes ofrece el país larga correspondencia en ricos, y 
abundantes frutos.”  
84 Lauren Benton argues that empires did not cover space evenly and that “an empire’s spaces were 
politically fragmented; legally differentiated; and encased in irregular, porous, and sometimes undefined 
borders.” Lauren A. Benton. A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-
1900. Cambridge [UK]  ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2. 
85 The avarice of Dutch slave raiders and traders and the “cruel character” of the Caribe Indians, Gumilla 
asserted, have “destroyed in one day the missionary efforts of the whole year.” 
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“Indios Caribes” (Carib Indians), and of the Dutch in the Capuchin and Jesuit missions of 
the great Orinoco River. He asked the king for a solution.86  
 Gumilla’s territorial description was a device that rhetorically offered the king a 
solution to block intruder’s access to the riches of New Granada. In order to fix the leaks 
that Gumilla described as an “open door” that offered foreigners a “free pass” to the 
provinces of New Granada, Gumilla proposed to build a door, a fortification on the island 
of Faxardo in the river. The keys of such a door, Gumilla asserted, would be “held in the 
hands of your Majesty.”87 (See Figure 2).88 Gumilla’s metaphor sought to persuade the 
king to provide resources for the defense of the Orinoco. Chorographic texts served to 
represent the territory in question for policy decision-makers across the Atlantic. A 
stronger case for the protection of the Orinoco in front of the king required the 
collaboration of different royal officials.  
 
                                                
86 Gumilla discussed the different projects that governors and lieutenants in the region had proposed for the 
construction of a so-desired fortification of the Orinoco in the Island of Faxardo. Quoting a report of the 
Lieutenant Coronel Marquee of San Felipe y Santiago, Gumilla revealed the Crown’s concern with 
preventing Dutch and French trade in the Orinoco as well as impeding the circulation of the Caribe Indians 
throughout the region. For counteracting this situation, the Marquee of San Felipe proposed and attempted 
a military strategy consisting of having two big boats (piraguas) occupied by military men safeguarding 
and chasing intruders through the river. Another proposed measure consisted in improving military 
presence in the coasts of Cumana. Namely having a sloop (balandra) and a frigate (fragata) navigate the 
shoreline, in addition to the two piraguas to counteract foreign trade. Archivo Histórico Nacional de 
Madrid, “Informe sobre hostilidades en el Rio Orinoco,”Padre José Gumilla, 1733. Colección Documentos 
de Indias, Diversos-Colecciones, 28,N.1. ff. 1-2. 
87 Gumilla denounced that the Dutch went to the Orinoco after Indian slaves to sell in the Dutch colonies of 
Esquivo, Berbijs and Surinama east of the mouths of the Orinoco River, and also looking for aceyte de 
Maria, an “admirable balsam”, and the achote that they extract from the Orinoco. Gumilla adds that the 
Dutch provided weapons and munitions to the Caribe Indians and encouraged them to attack the 
“defenseless Indians of the Orinoco”. Ibid. 
88 Military contingents often carried out expeditions through the Orinoco, Gumilla argued, but were 
temporary and in various occasions only directed at escorting the situado, which was conducted annually, 
from Santa Fe to Guayana. The situado was an annual subsidy that the cajas reales of regions across the 
empire sent to other provinces for military expenditures. 
 70 
 
Figure 2. “Plano de una parte del Orinoco.”89  
  
  Members from the clergy, the military, and the civil administration worked in 
conjunction to establish Spanish territorial control of the region and attract royal support. 
For example, royal official Julián Arriaga sent a dossier to the Council of the Indies 
                                                
89 Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid, “Informe sobre hostilidades en el Rio Orinoco,”Padre José 
Gumilla, 1733. Diversos-Colecciones,28,N.1. 
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gathering a set of documents concerning the grievances of the Dutch over the behavior of 
the Spaniards in the frontier between both crowns.90 The dossier illustrated the 
combination of different administrative structures to defend Spanish sovereignty in the 
region. The report contained a geographic description and a map crafted by the governor 
of Cumaná, a number of reports penned by the Catalan Capuchins who were in charge of 
the missions of the region, and a number of letters by José de Iturriaga, military leader of 
the Limits Expedition for the demarcation of borders between the Spanish and Portuguese 
crowns.  
 A fundamental milestone of the territorialization of the Orinoco emerged out of a 
new Bourbon politico-scientific policy. After Spain and Portugal signed the Treaty of 
Madrid in 1750, a military-scientific expedition sought to demarcate the limits between 
the two crowns. With time, the goal of tracing the frontier line was outgrown by projects 
to establish new settlements, which in the words of Manuel Lucena Giraldo relied on a 
“theory of natural resources”. This meant both the extension of a network of Spanish 
settlements and the application of a scientific plan for the evaluation and exploitation of 
animals, minerals, and plants.91 As Lucena Giraldo has explained, the Limits Expedition 
and its head José de Iturriaga endured because they were part of the project of the 
Command Headquarters of New Settlements of the Orinoco and Negro Rivers 
(Comandancia de Nuevas Poblaciones del Orinoco y Río Negro). The comandancia was 
                                                
90 “Sobre los Límites de Cumaná y Guayana y derecho que pretenden tener los Olandeses a la pesca en la 
embocadura del Orinoco.” AGI. Julián de Arriaga sobre la colonial holandesa de Esquivo. Estado,62,N.2. 
Baudot Monroy Maria, La defensa del imperio: Julián de Arriaga en la Armada (1700–1754). Colección 
Cátedra de Historia Naval. Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa; Murcia, Spain: Universidad de Murcia, 2013. 
91 Giraldo, Manuel Lucena. Laboratorio tropical: la expedición de límites al Orinoco, 1750-1767. Editorial 
CSIC - CSIC Press, 1993, 287. 
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a special administrative circumscription based on strategic plans crafted between 1757 
and 1761 for expedition members. One notable outcome of the administrative 
reorganization of Guayana during these years was the transfer of the head of the 
governorship of Guayana to the narrower part of the Orinoco, the Angostura. The 
creation of a new center of regional power in 1762 and with it the consolidation of spatial 
conceptions that valued the importance of the Orinoco River gained relevance in 
subsequent years and during early republican life.  
 
Resonances of Gumilla’s Imaginary of the Orinoco 
 
 The work of Gumilla certainly influenced Spanish reformers, military men, and 
other clerics engaged in the economic improvement of the colony. For instance, secretary 
of state José del Campillo y Cossio referred to Gumilla’s work in his text on Spanish 
economic government. Campillo assessed the possibilities of establishing fisheries on the 
banks of the Orinoco River, following Gumilla’s testimony about the great quantity and 
quality of the fish that filled the Orinoco.92 Years later, Pedro Rodríguez de 
Campomanes, Spanish reformer and head of the Consejo Real y Supremo de Castilla, 
offered specific reforms to promote the fisheries.93 The publication of Gumilla’s work 
                                                
92 Campillo states: “Si es cierto, cómo así lo creo, lo que dice el Padre Gumilla, que en las inundaciones del 
caudaloso río el Orinoco, que son las regulares de la cantidad prodigiosa de peces que se pueden coger en 
semejantes ocasiones, y de excelente calidad muy superior al pescado que nos traen de Terra-Nova: se 
podrá establecer a la orilla de aquel río en parages cómodos una pesquería de mucha cantidad.” Op. Cit. 
Campillo, Nuevo Sistema de Gobierno Económico…”, 167. 
93 Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Apuntaciones relativas al comercio de las Indias para resolver las 
cuestiones sobre él suscitadas, Madrid, 1779. 
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spawned several other memories about the region written in the colonies. They seemingly 
kept marking out the route toward the territorialization of the Orinoco region.  
 The works of Franciscan priest Antonio Caulín (1719-1802), for example, 
measured the advancement of Spanish territorialization in terms of the increase of the 
number of cities and Indian towns in the region.94 Caulín fought for the spiritual conquest 
of the province of Nueva Andalucía, later named Cumaná, and participated in José de 
Iturriaga’s expedition to demarcate the limits between the Spanish and Portuguese crown. 
Caulín finished his writing in 1758, and the Royal Treasury in Madrid published the 
manuscript in 1779. The publication of Caulín’s work by the Royal Treasury suggests 
that officials in the treasury administration valued chorographic knowledge for 
supporting fiscal policy. The prologue written by Caulín offered some updates on the 
current situation in the region.  
 In comparison to Gumilla’s time, the advancement of territorialization in the 
region as described by Caulín was notable.95 The colonization of Guayana and the 
Orinoco region appeared to have rapidly advanced between the 1740s and the early 
1750s. Caulín noted that in a little over a decade Spanish expansion increased 
dramatically in the region. From having four Spanish towns and twenty-nine Indian 
                                                
94 Antonio Caulín. Historia coro-graphica, natural y evangelica de la Nueva Andalucia, provincias de 
Cumaná, Guayana y Vertientes del Rio Orinoco. 1779 
95 Caulín asserts, for example, that after the Dutch left the region, illicit trade vanished, the city of Guayana 
was moved to the narrowest part of the Orinoco River in 1774, increased by a factor of four its population, 
and Spanish officials were able to establish a hospital, primary schools, and a cabildo. In his descriptions of 
the Orinoco River and the geography of the region and some animals and plants, Caulín relied on Gumilla, 
but the Franciscan took the opportunity to correct some geographic mistakes in the Orinoco Ilustrado. 
Antonio Caulín. Historia coro-graphica, natural y evangelica de la Nueva Andalucia, provincias de 
Cumaná, Guayana y Vertientes del Rio Orinoco. 1779, Lib. I, Cap. I, 5.  
 74 
towns (pueblos de indios) very far away from each other, the region augmented the 
number to eight Spanish towns and forty-four pueblos de indios. Alongside the creation 
of new towns, the population increased, new missions were established, and formerly 
unknown lands were discovered and populated.96 Caulín commended governor Don 
Manuel Centurión, who alongside a number of competent royal officials and following 
provisions from the king, achieved the task of making Guayana one of the most useful 
provinces of the kingdom.97 Centurión, who believed in a civil colonization of Guayana, 
shared his views with former governor of Guayana, Miguel Miarmón, who argued that 
colonization should be carried out through trade.98 This contrasted with long-standing 
territorial strategies in the borderlands directed at incorporating independent Indians 
through conversion.  
 Throughout the century, secular and religious Spanish officials kept producing 
texts about the regional political economies of the Orinoco that were optimistic about the 
great potentialities of the natural resources of the region.99 Francisco Fernández de 
Bovadilla—sergeant of the Spanish army—wrote his account of his travels through 
                                                
96 Caulín refers to the vast regions and valleys of the Caura, Rebato, Parava, Parime, high Orinoco, 
Casquiare, and Negro River. 
97 A noted before, the Spanish secularization process led to territorial strategies in the borderlands based on 
cooperation among ecclesiastical, civil, and military authorities to weaken foreign commercial networks 
while incorporating independent Indian polities via trade.  
98 Miguel Marmión—governor of Guayana—published his Descripción Corográfica-Mixta de la Provincia 
de Guayana in 1788. Lingüística indígena venezolana y los misioneros capuchinos. Universidad Catolica 
Andres Bello, 1981. 
99 As Margaret R. Ewalt has demonstrated, Gumilla’s work represents a model of natural history writing 
that connects missionary evangelization projects with the search for economic progress. Differently from 
others, his work stands out as it was published and widely read in American and Europe. For Ewalt, 
Gumilla’s work exemplifies an alternative pathway to modernity, a blend of modern empiricism with local 
culture. Margaret R. Ewalt. Peripheral Wonders: Nature, Knowledge, and Enlightenmentin the Eighteenth-
Century Orinoco. The Bucknell Studies in Eighteenth-Century Literature and Culture. Lewisburg: Bucknell 
University Press, 2008. 
 75 
Guayana and the High Orinoco in 1764.100 His travels had the objective of examining the 
peanut plants of the region and advancing the instruction of Indians. Fermín de 
Sansinenea—a Basque merchant, captain of a galley of the Royal Guipuzcoana Company 
of Caracas, and a royal official—published his Descripción de la Provincia de Guayana y 
el Río Orinoco in 1779.101 Throughout the century, Spanish administrators, merchants, 
clerics, and governors, pointing out the geopolitical importance of the Orinoco region, 
crafted many chorographic texts about the region.  
 Gumilla’s commercial utopia in his Orinoco Ilustrado and other territorial 
descriptions arose from Bourbon agendas about economic improvement in the 
borderlands of empire.102 They advanced a strong territorial-imaginary around the lands 
of the Orinoco basin as a gateway for trade. This narrative imagined the landscape of 
New Granada through the lens of a commercial political economy, and transcended 
Gumilla’s time to inform Spanish American conceptions of territorial political economies 
during Independence and beyond.103 From the case of the borderland of Orinoco, I now 
turn to the role chorographic political economies played in the province of Quito, a well-
                                                
100 Francisco Fernández de Bovadilla. Relación del viaje que hice desde Guayana al Alto Orinoco, de orden 
del coronel Don Joaquín Saas Moreno de Mendoza, comandante gobernador de esta provincia y Río de 
Orinoco, a recoger el frutos de aquellos cacahuales, instruir los indios de aquel país y traer algunos 
capitanes de las naciones Maquiritare, Amuisana, Urumanavis y Guaipanabis 
101 Sansinenea, Fermín. Descripción de la Provincia de Guayana y del Río Orinoco, 1788.  
102 In her recent book Emily Berquist Soule trace the utopian vision of education, agriculture, and 
commerce of bishop Jaime Martínez Compañón in late colonial Peru. See: Emily Berquist Soule. The 
Bishop’s Utopia: Envisioning Improvement in colonial Peru. 1st ed. The Early Modern Americas. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. 
103 Father José Cassani published the same year as Gumilla, although with lesser impact, his history of the 
missions of the Llanos, Meta, and Orinoco. José Cassani. Historia De La Provincia De La Compañia De 
Jesus Del NuevoReyno De Granada En La America, Descripcion, Y Relacion Exacta De Sus Gloriosas 
Missiones En El Reyno, Llanos, Meta, Y Rio Orinoco, Almas, Y Terreno, Que Han Conquistadosus 
Missioneros Para Dios. Madrid: Impr. M. Fernandez, 1741. His work was republished in 1783.  
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established colonial jurisdiction that had once enjoyed economic prosperity but faced 
economic decline during the eighteenth century.  
 
Territoriality and the Reinvention of Quito’s Political Economy  
 
Royal officials used territorial knowledge and political economy discourse in Quiteño 
narratives of economic revival and territorial configuration. Through a blend of 
chorographic writing, arbitrismo, and proyectismo, local bureaucrats and intellectuals 
reinvented Quito’s political economy. This reinvention impacted territorial 
configurations.  
Like no other province of New Granada, priests and royal administrators in Quito 
produced countless chorographic texts in the eighteenth century. Administrators, state 
officials, intellectuals, and ecclesiastical authorities advanced their proposals for 
economic improvement through this genre.104 In a province with great economic 
challenges and with royal officials obsessed with returning Quito to its former prosperity, 
chorographic thinking and political economy discourse merged around a myriad of local 
                                                
104 Some of the general writings about Quito: “Breve Descripción de la Provincia de Quito”, Juan Magnin 
(1740); “Descripción Compendiosa Histórico Corográficas y Eclesiástica Política de las Ciudades, Villas, 
Asientos, Pueblos, Número de la habitantes comprendidos bajo la jurisdicción de la Real Audiencia de 
Quito.” Juan Romualdo Navarro, 1761; Plano geográfico e hidrográfico del distrito de la Real Audiencia de 
Quito y descripciones de las provincias, gobiernos y corregimientos que se comprenden en su jurisdicción, 
y las ciudades, asientos y pueblos que ocupan sus territorios”, Dionisio de Alsedo y Herrera, 1766; 
“Descripción Histórico-Física De La Provincia De Quito De La Compañía De Jesús”, Mario Cicala, 1771; 
“Historia Del Reino De Quito En La América Meridional”, Juan de Velasco, 1789; “Idea del Reino de 
Quito”, Juan Romualdo Navarro, 1806. About Esmeraldas: “Descripción de la Provincia de Esmeraldas”, 
Pedro Vicente de Maldonado, 1788. About Guayaquil: “Compendio Histórico De La Provincia, Partidos, 
Ciudades, Astilleros, Ríos, Y Puerto De Guayaquil En Las Costas De La Mar Del Sur”, Dionisio de Alsedo 
y Herrera, 1741. 
 77 
improvement projects. Although royal officials looked for inspiration in successful 
foreign political economic practices, an accurate knowledge of the local spatial and 
administrative contexts proved fundamental for this endeavor. The pursuit of useful 
knowledge in these texts had both an interest in demonstrating scientific credibility and 
prestige, but more importantly, they sought to advance on-the-ground measures to escape 
economic decline. To illustrate this, I highlight a dossier of documents presented by royal 
official Juan Romulado Navarro to the Royal Council in 1761.  
In the winter of 1761, Juan Romualdo Navarro decided to travel from the city of 
Quito to Lima, then sail around Cape Horn and on to Cádiz. Determined to inform the 
king in Madrid about the “fatal constitution of such province [Quito],” Navarro, oidor 
(judge) of the Audiencia of Quito, prepared a long dossier, which included a historical, 
chorographical, ecclesiastical, and political compendium of the cities, villages, and towns 
under the city’s jurisdiction. His main focus was to identify the ailments of the province 
and offer possible remedies in order to increase the revenues of the public treasury. He 
also advocated prohibiting the mitas—forced Indian labor—and “conserving the liberties 
of the miserable Indians.”105 His account contained a set of recommendations to increase 
and safeguard the incomes of the Royal Treasury along with a project to return Quito to 
its former economic dynamism as a clothing manufacturing economy.  
Although in Navarro’s depiction, jurisdictions appeared fixed, in reality colonial 
jurisdictions were unstable. In order to organize his narrative, Navarro partitioned the 
                                                
105 AGN, Descripción Compendiosa Histórico Corográfica y Eclesiástica Política de las ciudades, villas, 
asientos, pueblos, número de habitantes comprendidos bajo la jurisdicción de la Real Audiencia de Quito. 
Archivo Histórico José Manuel Restrepo, rollo 54.  
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space of the Audiencia into smaller administrative units. He described the limits and 
jurisdictions of the provinces of the Audiencia of Quito, which comprised five 
governments (Popayán, Quijos, Jaen, Esmeraldas, and Maynas) and ten corregimientos 
(Pastos, Ibarra, Otábalo, Quito, Tacunga, Riobamba, Chimbo, Guayaquil, Cuenca, and 
Loja).106 Instability in colonial jurisdictions occurred not only because of the difficulties 
in the demarcation of borders with other empires, but also in the definition of the limits 
between different colonial cabildos. For example, during the construction of the road of 
Esmeraldas in the late 1730s which required work to demarcate the governorship, 
governor Pedro Vicente de Maldonado engaged in a controversy with the cabildo of 
Quito around the jurisdiction over the town of Nono as well as a dispute over the port of 
Santa Barbara with Barbacoas in Popayan.107 The advancement of local political 
economy projects often led to disruptions in established intra-colonial frontiers leading 
royal officials to claim jurisdiction over strategically located territories. Having correct 
geographical information was imperative for this aim. 
Navarro not only relied on former accounts and maps to build his chorography, 
but also held the ambition of correcting previous geographic mistakes. Navarro warned 
that an important number of inaccuracies, erroneous calculations, and conjectures “have 
                                                
106 Navarro described another territorial division, in which sixteen tenencias which exercised ordinary 
jurisdictions in Cali, Buga, Raposo, Iscuandé, Barbacoas, Almaguer, Pasto, Ambato, Alausi, Babaoyo, 
Baba, Daule, La Purvá, Yaguache, Puerto Viejo, and la Purita. 
107 “Representación de Pedro Vicente Maldonado a la Audiencia de Quito, en que hace la defensa de la 
jurisdicción del gobierno de Esmeraldas sobre el pueblo de Nono, en contra del cabildo de Quito, diciembre 
de 1739, Quito.” “Representación a la Audiencia de Quito de Estasio Amaral, Teniente de Barbacoas, en 
Popayán, en que se reclama jurisdicción sobre el Puerto de Santa Bárbara, 17 de septiembre de 1740.” 
Rumazo, José. Documentos Para La Historia de La Audiencia de Quito. Madrid: A. Aguado, 1948, 192-
204; 216-217.  
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been found in all antique geographical charts that delineated the course of the [Marañón] 
river.” Navarro also incorporated his own verbal surveys “worthy of all faith,” and in his 
own words, “accommodating myself to the most true and exact of every one of them 
[corrected letters and news, manuscript observations].”108 Navarro bestowed credibility 
on the work of missionary priest Juan Magnin in his description of the province of Quito 
on 1740.109 According to Navarro, the leader of the geodesic expedition to the equator, 
the French scientist Charles Marie de la Condamine, praised this map for its accuracy in 
front of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Paris. Later on, Pedro Vicente de Maldonado, 
scientist, topographer, geographer, royal official, and collaborator of the same expedition, 
produced, according to Navarro, one of the best maps of the river’s course and the 
situation of the province. Navarro used this account to base his compendium about the 
governorship of Esmeraldas.  
Along with his chorography of the different governorships of Quito, the dossier 
that Navarro presented in Spain in front of the Royal Council also contained a project for 
lifting the province of Quito “out of its misery.”110 Before presenting his project, Navarro 
laid out his idea about what the happiness of kingdoms, republics, and provinces meant. 
Such happiness, he argued, consisted in vanquishing idleness and appreciating the work 
of its inhabitants, consuming its agricultural products, and promoting manufacturing. 
                                                
108 Ibid. f. 18r.  
109 Juan Magnín. Breve descripción de la Provincia de Quito, en la América Meridional, y de sus 
Missiones de Succumbíos de Religiosos de S. Franc.o, y de Maynas de PP. de la Comp.a de Jhs. a las 
orillas del gran Río Marañón, hecha para el mapa que se hizo el año 1740, por el P. Juan Magnín, de. 
Quito: Sociedad Ecuatoriana de Investigaciones Históricas y Geográficas, 1989. 
110 Navarro asserted that the situation of Quito was paradoxical, in that “God seems to have endowed the 
land with benevolent weather and fertility,” while its dwellers “live in idleness and show contempt towards 
work.” 
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Pointing toward foreign political economic practices, Navarro claimed that through 
dynamic agriculture and manufacturing, other empires “reached their maximum 
opulence.”111 The only solution for overcoming Quito’s decline, according to Navarro, 
was the establishment of a Royal Company with a monopoly over the manufacturing 
produced in Quito such as woolen clothes, cleaning cloths, linens, and hats (paños, 
bayetas, tocuyos or lienzos, and sombreros). Navarro claimed that artisans (obrajeros), 
landowners (hacendados), and merchants would benefit from the project. In contrast to 
Madrid reformers such as Campillo and Campomanes, and others, which envisioned the 
colonies as mere producers of raw materials, Navarro believed in the revival of Quito’s 
manufacturing economy exporting to Lima, Popayan, and Barabacoas in the province of 
Chocó.112 After outlining in detail the proposed obligations, organization, and projected 
profits of the company, Navarro continued with specific proposals to increase royal 
incomes via a set of arbitrios.  
Navarro’s political economy for Quito took hold of the long-standing tradition of 
Spanish arbitrismo. As part of his extensive dossier, Navarro attached a set of Arbirios y 
medios que se pueden tomar en la presente urgencia sin perjuicio del erario ni de los 
vasallos. An arbitrio was any proposal designed to increase the incomes of a kingdom or 
political entity. Emerging in the context of the bankruptcy of the Spanish empire during 
the reign of Phillip III (1521-1621), arbitristas were known as “friends of novelty” and 
                                                
111 AGN, Proyecto para que la provincial de Quito salga de su miseria y con el cual se aumentará el Real 
Erario considerablemente y a un tiempo se evitarán los crecidos quebrantos que padecen sus rentas, las 
que sufragan a la manutención de las importantes plazas de Cartagena y Santa Marta. Rollo 54, f. 37. 
112 This stance is also clearly depicted in an statement by viceroy Antonio Caballero y Góngora (1782-
1789), in which he observed that the decline of Quito’s textile industry was entirely fitting, because 
agriculture and mining were “the appropriate function of the colonies”. Op. Cit. Relaciones,  
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included merchants, nobles, urban officials, local authorities, military men, lecturers, 
lawyers, and clerks of all categories.113  
The appropriation of peninsular arbitrismo in Spanish America has received scant 
attention from scholars.114 Historians tend to ignore the context of the American debates 
in regards to the role that Spanish dominions overseas played in the debates of the 
Spanish economic decadence. Research on Spanish political economy, however, has paid 
attention to the ways in which Enlightenment elites vindicated the texts of the 
arbitristas.115 Furthermore, scholars have argued that unconsciously, the arbitristas like 
other European writers of the time, created an economic language that the Enlightened 
inherited.116 Navarro’s eighteenth century arbitrios consisted of a set of specific measures 
to reform aguardiente production, the monopoly over cinnamon and tobacco, taxes over 
agricultural products of the three governorships of Quito, and the issuing of licenses for 
the creation of textiel workshops, among others. While Navarro believed in maintaining 
the circulation of Quito’s manufacturing for other provinces, by the end of the century 
other officials believed that Quito’s new political economy required adjusting the 
                                                
113 E.M. García Guerra. Entre la teoría y la práctica: el pensamiento arbitrista castellano durante la Edad 
Moderna en Castilla - V Jornadas Científicas sobre documentación de Castilla e Indias en el siglo XVII, 
Madrid, Departamento de Ciencias y Técnicas Historiográficas, Universidad Complutense de Madrid - 
vol.V, 2006, 186. Elena Maria García Guerra. El arbitrismo en sus inicios y su tratamiento por la 
Ilustración y el Liberalismo - La Monarquía de Felipe III - vol.III - 2008 - 6pp. 
114 Marc Eagle. “Restoring Spanish Hispaniola, the First of the Indies: Local Advocacy and Transatlantic 
Arbitrismo in the Late Seventeenth Century.” Colonial Latin American Review 23, no. 3 (September 2, 
2014): 384–412. doi:10.1080/10609164.2014.972701. 
115 Seeking to break down the stereotype established by Adam Smith by which Spanish authors of the time 
were bullionists who identified wealth with precious metals, Enlightenment intellectuals and reformers 
considered themselves as heirs of the arbitrista reformism. Salvador Albiñana.“Notas sobre decadencia y 
arbitrismo, en Estudis 20. En torno al XVII hispánico, Valencia 1994, 9-28. 
116 Semperes y Guarinos (1754-1830) for example examines the old Spanish authors that had focused on 
the economy. See: Op. Cit. García Guerra, Entre la teoría, 188. 
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territorial reach of its jurisdiction. Awareness of the difficulties of connecting its 
provincial spaces to other markets became the heart of explanations about the economic 
decline of Quito. 
During the last part of the century royal administrators generally came to believe 
that empowering colonial trade was the main prerequisite to lift Quito out of poverty. 
One of the most important projects that the elite of Quito promoted since the seventeenth 
century was the construction of a road to link the city of Quito with the Pacific Ocean. 
The Camino de Malbucho was finally authorized by a royal ordinance in July 4, 1792. 
The promotion of the new road, however, required jurisdictional adjustments to bring 
about active trade. They expected that once the camino of Malbucho was completed and 
a set of small towns established, the next step would be to promote its use for commerce. 
The authorities of Quito looked forward to this, vis-à-vis the King’s ten-year free trade 
favor granted in 1796 to the Pacific ports of Guanchaco, Pazmayo and Limones on the 
Santiago River. Over the years, the authorities of Quito insisted on annexing portions of 
the province of Popayán. 
Quiteños petitioned for a jurisdictional reform that altered the jurisdictions of both 
Quito and Popayan. They promoted circulation and integrated transportation as sources of 
wealth. From Navarro’s description, we learn that the governorship of Popayan was split 
between Santa Fe and Quito.117 For instance, it depended on Santa Fe for government 
                                                
117 It is intriguing that Navarro described the province of Quito as a “main portion of the kingdom of Peru 
in South America,” since starting in 1739, the jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Quito was transferred the 
newly created viceroyalty of New Granada. Maybe this is due to the fact that the allegiance of governors 
within Quito to the viceroy in Santa Fe was not immediate, and it took a few years for the Audiencia in 
Quito to finish redirecting all representaciones and other official documents to Santa Fe. 
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issues. The split jurisdictions of Santa Fe and Quito over parts of the government of 
Popayan dated back to the sixteenth century. By 1575, Santa Fe exercised jurisdiction 
over seven towns of the government of Popayán: Santa Fe de Antioquia, Caramanta, 
Arma, Anserma, Cartago, San Sebastián de La Plata, and San Vicente de Paéz.118 For the 
administration of justice, however, it depended on the Audiencia of Quito, which 
received the litigation processes from Popayán.119 During the seventeenth century, 
Popayán depended on Quito for justice administration but held its own ecclesiastical 
structure. By the late eighteenth century, the Audiencia of Quito still exercised appellate 
jurisdiction over most of Popayán. The Audiencia of Santa Fe, however, ruled over the 
portion of Popayan situated north of the Cauca River.120  
This complicated overlapping administrative structure was a seedbed for 
jurisdictional conflicts. In 1792, the president of the Audiencia of Quito, Luis Antonio de 
Guzmán, requested the annexation of Popayán to the audiencia.121 Guzman’s petition 
featured information regarding territorial organization, and distances between towns and 
main cities to raise arguments about the natural dependence between Quito and Popayán. 
The governor of Popayán, Don Diego Antonio Nieto, responded to Quito’s territorial 
claims defending the integrity of his province. He tried to convince the Council of the 
                                                
118 Fernando Mayorga García. Real Audiencia de Santafé en los Siglos XVI - XVII Historia, Visitas, Quejas 
y Castigos del Primer Tribunal con Sede en la Ciudad. Bogotá: Imprenta Dis, n.d., 122.  
119 The description of the province of Maynas, located in the limits between the Portuguese and Spanish 
crowns, proved the most challenging. Ibid. f. 17v. 
120 The fragmentation of administrative functions between the two provinces speaks of the complexity of 
colonial territorial and administrative partitions. For example, the ecclesiastical and often the military 
jurisdictions supposed an overlapping power structure that superposed to the kingdom’s secular territorial 
structure. John Leddy Phelan. The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century; Bureaucratic Politics in 
the Spanish Empire. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. 166. 
121 AGI, QUITO, 223. No. 37. “Carta del Presidente de Quito.” Abril 18 de 1792.  
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Indies of the harms of such a decision. In a letter dated July 15, 1793, the governor of 
Popayan sent to the Council a set of documents and a geographical chart of the region to 
illustrate the inconvenience and prejudicial effects of annexing Popayán to Quito.122 (See 
Map 3) Using the map to state the extension of the province and government of Popayan, 
Nieto then assessed the impact for the neighbors and miners of Vega de Supía, Anserma, 
and Quiebralomo of the annexation of Popayan to Quito. Since the territories situated at 
the edge of the jurisdiction of Popayan were abundant in minerals, Quito’s pretensions 
threatened to affect a centerpiece of Popayan’s autonomous mining political economy. 
Using an argument about the difficult circulation between the two provinces, he 
contended that if Quito annexed Popayan, miners would have to travel great distances—
through diverse weathers, hot and cold– to Quito in order to get their mining licenses. 
The richest mines of Popayan were situated, according to Nieto, too far away from Quito. 
He wondered about the reasons the President of Quito found for making the jurisdictional 
shift convenient, and suggested that the absence of practical knowledge could have 
influenced the erroneous belief in the usefulness of the aggregation.123  
Quiteños kept insisting on jurisdictional shifts not of the scale of annexing the 
whole province of Popayán but certain territories such as Esmeraldas, Atacames, 
Limones, Tola, and Tumaco. Having jurisdiction over these places would allow Quiteño 
authorities to open fluid trade networks for flour, meat, and foodstuffs with the province 
of Chocó located in the Pacific basin. In 1800, the Baron de Carondelet, President of the 
                                                
122 AGI, Cartas de Autoridades Delegadas, QUITO.223. “Carta del gobernador de Popayán al Consejo de 
Indias,” Julio 15 de 1793. 
123 Ibid. 
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Audiencia of Quito, sent a lengthy reflection to the king about the causes of the 
decadence of Quito.124 According to the Baron, if such annexations became a reality, the 
towns of Ibarra, Pasto, and Otavalo would finally have a direct link to the sea, and the 
province “will breath with the active trade of flour, meat and foodstuffs.”125 The closest 
fluvial arteries to Ibarra, Pasto and Otavalo (the Santiago and Esmeralda Rivers, and the 
ports of La Tola, Atacames and Limones), however, were located in the jurisdiction of 
the Province of Popayán. The authorities of Quito declared that those territories should 
return under the control of Quito, from which they were divided in the past to aggregate 
them to the government of Popayan.126 The restoration of Quito’s economic prosperity, 
Quiteños claimed, strongly relied on acceding fluvial navigation through the 
aforementioned rivers and ports.  
Although the crown did not authorize the annexations, after Peru annexed the 
province of Guayaquil at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the leaders of Quito 
kept pressing for the opening of a trail between Quito and the port of Esmeraldas in the 
Pacific. Carondelet hired the service of the renowned astronomer and naturalist from 
Popayán and member of the Botanical Expedition, Francisco José de Caldas, to trace the 
desired Malbucho path. Caldas traveled from Quito to the coasts of the Pacific Ocean 
between July and August 1803. The Creole astronomer wrote the text as part of the larger 
project to connect the province of Quito with the Pacific. His observations of the region 
                                                
124 Ibid. 
125 AGI, QUITO, 223. No. 4. “El Presidente de Quito propone los medios de restaurar las Provincias 
arruinadas de Quito, cumpliendo con las órdenes reiteradas de SM y llenando las piadosas y reales 
intenciones sobre el particular sin perjudicar, antes bien con proporcionar el incremento del Real Erario.” 
Noviembre 24 de 1800. 
126 Ibid. 
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were directed at solving the “difficult problem of political economy” of a sea outlet for 
Quito. In the spirit of Enlightenment science, his observations blended astronomical and 
barometric measurements of the different cities and towns across the Audiencia of Quito 
with observations about the plants of the region. The science of political economy 
nurtured from the empirical method that conceived of the territory not only in a 
descriptive fashion but through a series of scientific measurements of distances, altitudes, 
latitudes, and longitude.127 The Camino de Malbucho was finally built 1804, albeit by 
then the Spanish crown was still in discussion whether or not to restore the towns of 
Esmeraldas, Atacames, Limones, Tola, and Tumaco to Quito.128  
 
                                                
127 Francisco José de Caldas. “Carta del camino de Malbucho desde Ibarra hasta la embocadura del rio 
Santiago i bahia de San Lorenzo.” Anales de la Universidad Nacional de los Estados Unidos de Colombia. 
Vol. 6, Núm. 43-44, 1872.  
128 “Conslato del Consejo sobre la conveniencia del restituir al gobernador de Quito los pueblos de 
Tumaco, Esmeraldas, Atacames, Limones y Tola.” Madrid, 7 de junio de 1805. Catálogo de la colección 
Mata Linares. Vol. IV. Real Academia de la Historia, n.d, 596.  
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Figure 3. Carta Geográfica de la Provincia de Popayán y términos de su jurisdicción.129 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows that emphasizing chorographic thinking as political economy 
discourse provides a new perspective for understanding the contested nature of inter-
provincial frontiers and empire building. Colonial provincials administrative work was 
deeply influenced by their understanding of the land and the administrative divisions that 
organized it in legible and manageable units for advancing the doctrine of economic 
                                                
129 AGI, QUITO,223, MP-PANAMA,220. 
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government. Through their chorographic writings, they influenced the perceptions and 
reform ideas of Spanish reformers in Madrid while at the same time advancing 
territorialization. While Spanish officials could never fully control territorialization and 
successfully exercise territorial control through sheer military, religious, and economic 
muscle, they crafted utopias and the sense of a possible prosperous future while outlining 
regional particularities. This type of imaginary mapping gave definitive purpose to 
ongoing governance and imperial aspirations, which in practice were often quite fragile 
illusions. 
The meanings that colonial provincials gave to their territory merged different 
intellectual traditions and state building practices and also privileged the Bourbon 
framework of an economic government for America. The administrative partition of 
space structured the region into a complex system of overlapping jurisdictions, while 
provincial reflections on political economy gave meaning to local spaces and their ideal 
role within the economic government, as gateways for commerce, as safeguards, and 
loyal possessions. Promoting fluid trade among the viceroyalty’s provinces often 
appeared as the elusive glue that would link the different and diverse spaces of New 
Granada. Lastly, specific circumstances related to foreign infiltration and the presence of 
independent Indian polities influenced the actions of frontiersmen in the Orinoco; while 
the circumstances of economic decline shaped state officials’ actions in Quito.  
If local territorial landscapes thrived across eighteenth century chorographic texts, 
presumptions of viceregal territorial unity emerged along understandings of New 
Granada as a fiscal networked space.  
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Chapter 2: Mapping the Fiscal State: Legibility, Bureaucratic 
Networks, and Local Autonomy  
 
Introduction 
In addition to military, civil, and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, the fiscal-political 
ordering was equally important. This chapter studies the intersections among Bourbon 
fiscal structures, territoriality, and geographical imagination in eighteenth century 
colonial reforms in New Granada. Understanding the Bourbon reorganization of the 
colonial state in New Granada requires conceiving of fiscal matters both spatially and 
epistemologically. State administrators represented their territories, described them, and 
imagined efficient ways of imposing tributary structures and trade networks on them. I 
trace the spatial dimensions embedded in the works of royal administrators to make of the 
colony a legible canvas for matters of taxation, administering production, and collecting 
tribute and custom duties.  
The Bourbon reforms led to the expansion of local fiscal bureaucracies and 
attempted to circumscribe provincial territorial wealth into fiscal districts, or 
intendancies. For some provinces, Bourbon fiscal networks cemented provincial 
bureaucracies into a coordinated revenue system, which generated dependence on fiscal 
remittances, as in the case of Cartagena. For other provinces, fiscal pressures contributed 
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to deepening imaginings and aspirations of local autonomy, as in the case of El Socorro.1 
The different impact that fiscal territoriality had on the provinces of the colony illustrates 
three aspects of New Granada’s spatial configuration. Local power structures in the 
Andean hinterlands developed inwards towards a regional economy. The achievement of 
some economic prosperity aided the development of strong local autonomy and 
governance, as in the case of El Socorro. Secondly, coastal territories, especially in the 
Caribbean, looked outwards for trade, but inwards for royal currency, as in the case of 
Cartagena. Lastly, the outcomes of fiscal reform demonstrate that the core of fiscal policy 
in New Granada attempted to contain contraband, but on the premise of developing a 
strong domestic economy. Besides social rebellion, territorial administration via 
overlapping and often non-uniform bureaucratic structures hindered the establishment of 
the intendancy system.  
 Spanish officials’ drive to turn the viceregal space into a legible natural 
landscape in the interest of revenue, control, and management, rendered cartographic and 
statistical representations of the viceroyalty.2 I analyze the Plan Geográfico del 
Virreinato de Santafé de Bogotá of 1772, the only known eighteenth century cartographic 
representation of the viceroyalty as a whole. I reflect on the process by which royal 
                                                
1 Due Spain’s loose control over New Granada’s borderlands, the Royal Treasury carried extraordinary 
burdens. In the time of Solis, fiscal surpluses from the cajas of Honda and Mompox, together with the 
fiscal remittances defrayed the costs of improving fortification system of Cartagena and the costs of the 
Limits Expedition. Don José de Solis, “Relación del Estado del Virreinato de Santa Fe, presentada por el 
Excmo. Señor Don José de Solis a su successor el Excmo. Señor Pedro Megia de la Zerda en 1760,” En: 
Relaciones de los vireyes del Nuevo reino de Granada: ahora estados unidos de Venezuela, estados unidos 
de Colombia y Ecudor. Impr. de Hallet & Breen, 1869, 7.  
2 James C. Scott. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. 
Yale Agrarian Studies. New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 1998. 1-8. 
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officials crafted the geographic knowledge, fiscal, and demographic statistics contained 
in the map and other chorographic texts. Participating along a network of empirical 
scientists, local royal officials crafted knowledge about their territories to serve the 
purposes of increasing the collection of royal revenues. This type of knowledge was 
created within the framework of the economic government of America, discussed in 
chapter 1, and along the policy of the fiscal-military state, a state capable of sustaining 
large-scale warfare through taxation and fiscal innovation. 
Historians have advanced the thesis of the construction of a fiscal military state in 
the eighteenth century with a strong mercantilist overview.3 The growing 
interdependence between metropolis and colonies through commercial and fiscal flows 
has provided a global understanding of state reform. Historian Regina Grafe argues that 
historians’ interpretation of Spanish mercantilism has underscored the crown’s failure to 
dismantle the preeminence of urban and regional interests over national ones.4 In doing 
so, she continues, this literature has failed to understand the structure of governance in 
early modern Spain.  
For Grafe, this historiography fails to incorporate Eli Heckscher’s comment that 
mercantilism was “primarily an agent of unification.” In the words of Grafe, 
                                                
3 Rafael Torres Sánchez. El precio de la guerra: el estado fiscal-militar de Carlos III (1779-1783). Marcial 
Pons, 2013. P. G. M.Dickson and Christopher Storrs, eds. The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century 
Europe: Essays in Honour of P.G.M. Dickson. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009.  
http://www.UTXA.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=438941. 
4 Grafe criticizes Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein. Apogee of Empire: Spain and New Spain in the Age 
of Charles III, 1759-1789. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. See: Regina Grafe. 
“Polycentric states: the Spanish reigns and the failures of mercantilism”, in Mercantilism Reimagined: 
Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2014. Also: Alejandra Irigoin and Regina Grafe. “Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to Nation-
State and Empire Building.” Hispanic American Historical Review 88, no. 2 (May 1, 2008): 173–209. 
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“Heckscher’s notion of mercantilism was that of a set of ideas and practices, which were 
not principally directed at international competition but inwardly at state formation and 
the creation of an integrated domestic market.”5 The challenge of creating an integrated 
domestic market within the colony of New Granada occupied the attention of royal 
administrators. Historians have paid the most attention to the impacts of the Spanish 
commercial system’s reforms in New Granada and the connection of the Caribbean basin 
to a Caribbean trans-imperial space.6 They have paid little attention to the construction of 
policies and narratives of intra-provincial interdependence in the colonies through the 
lens of fiscal administration.7 This chapter follows Grafe’s critique of scholarly 
overreliance on the foreign trade dimension of mercantilism, to expand the conversation 
about colonial territoriality and state building through the lens of the intersections among 
military defense, internal trade, fiscal interconnection, and territory.  
 
Fiscal Networked Space, Inter-provincial Trade, and Even Imperial Jurisdictions 
 
During the eighteenth century, royal officials reimagined New Granada’s space in 
relation to imperial aspirations to enhance revenue collection for the Spanish crown. In 
                                                
5 Eli F. Heckscher. and Mendel Shapiro. Mercantilism. London: G. Allen & Unwin ltd, 1935. 
6 Anthony McFarlane. Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics under Bourbon 
Rule. Cambridge Latin American Studies 75. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Ernesto E. Bassi Arevalo. “Between Imperial Projects and National Dreams: Communication Networks, 
Geopolitical Imagination, and the Role of New Granada in the Configuration of a Greater Caribbean Space, 
1780s--1810s.” Ph.D., University of California, Irvine, 2012.  
7 Iain Black. “Geography, Political Economy, and the Circulation of Finance Capital in Early Industrial 
England.” Journal of Historical Geography 15, no. 4 (October 1989): 366–84.  
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the royal instructions given to viceroy José Pizarro (1749-1753) in 1749, the crown 
expressed its goals to centralize the economic and fiscal administration in the newly 
created viceroyalty. Bourbon fiscal reforms attempted to centralize the administration of 
the Royal Treasury in the hands of the viceroy, who resided in the capital city of Santa 
Fe.8 To do so, the crown appointed the viceroy as general superintendent 
(superintendente general) of the Royal Treasury with absolute control over the 
“inspection of all its divisions.”9 An improved management of the Royal Treasury 
represented one of the main concerns of royal officials in Madrid, even more so in a 
colony whose income did not represent significant wealth for the empire, in comparison 
to Peru and New Spain. Fiscal reform was twofold. On the one hand, it consisted of an 
expansion of local fiscal bureaucracies across the territory. On the other, it sought to 
weaken corruption within the administration. In spite of the intention to centralize fiscal 
administration in Santa Fe, collecting revenue throughout New Granada’s poorly 
connected provinces required strengthening the network of treasury officials across the 
colony. 
A strong and reliable local fiscal bureaucracy was necessary for efficient revenue 
collection. This bureaucracy consisted of an accountant (contador), income collector 
(factor), and treasurer (tesorero or veedor), who held the responsibility of administering 
the finances of the colonial state in local treasury offices. This group of bureaucrats 
                                                
8 Consuelo Maqueda Abreu. El Virreinato de Nueva Granada (1717-1780): Estudio Institucional. 
Puertollano (Ciudad Real), Madrid: Ediciones Puertollano; Dykinson, 2007, 117. 
9 Instruzión reservada dada al Virrey de Sta. Feé Dn Jph. Pizarro el año de 1749, AGI, "Correspondencia 
de virreyes y comandante del Orinoco", Santa Fe, 575. 
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operated the cajas reales10, which were in charge of bookkeeping, and of the collection, 
management, custody, and administration of royal revenues (quintos reales, taxes, 
tributes). Another set of royal incomes, derived from the ecclesiastical tithes (diezmo), 
was collected within the parishes and bishoprics of the viceroyalty. Starting in the late 
1740s, the crown directed resources to increase this fiscal bureaucracy. The royal 
instructions of 1749 ordered the creation of new mint houses (Casas de Moneda) in 
Popayán and in Mompox. Later on, surprised by the scant attention that revenue 
administration, collection, and expenditure had received from colonial officials, viceroy 
Solis (1753-1761) executed a set of measures to attack fiscal fraud.11 Solis promoted 
reforms to the royal treasury (cajas real) of Panama and created a customs house in 
Guayaquil to levy royal taxes formerly controlled by corrupt officials. In order to 
improve revenue collection across the kingdom, Solis established Royal Treasuries in 
Ocaña (part of the government of Santa Marta), Cartago, and Barbacoas in the mining 
district of the province of Popayán. Solis attempted to strengthen a weak fiscal apparatus 
in the kingdom by increasing the number of local royal treasuries. For instance, by 1760 
there were at least twenty cajas reales across the kingdom.  
Taking a more radical approach, but still augmenting the fiscal bureaucracy, 
viceroy Pedro Mejía de la Cerda (1761-1772) advanced measures to clean up fiscal 
administration from corrupt practices. He stated that the improvement of the fiscal 
structure depended on the fidelity and efficacy of its administrators. Like Solis, Mejía de 
                                                
10 The cajas reales referred literally to a treasury strongbox, a metal or wooden box with three locks. These 
boxes were administered by a set of royal officials. 
11 John J. TePaske, Herbert S. Klein, Kendall W. Brown, and Alvaro Jara. The Royal Treasuries of the 
Spanish Empire in America. Volume 4, Ecuador. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1982. 
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la Cerda identified fiscal fraud as one of the most pressing problems in New Granada, 
particularly in the province of Quito. One of the solutions that the viceroy decreed to 
bring order to the accounting books was to appoint new fiscal administrators in the city of 
Cuenca. The same measure was implemented in the city of Quito, where royal officials 
arrived directly from Spain to take over the city’s accounts.12 According to Mejía de la 
Cerda, the lack of trustworthy officials in fiscal administration, as in the recently 
established Caja Real of Cartago, hindered the sound administration of royal incomes. 
The integrity and trustworthiness of royal treasury officials in local treasury offices was a 
basic condition for the good government of fiscal districts. The increase of colonial 
revenues in New Granada, however, was complicated by the loose control that the crown 
had over New Granada’s borderlands.  
Due to Spain’s loose control over New Granada’s borderlands, the Royal 
Treasury carried extraordinary burdens. The cajas reales collected revenues not only for 
local improvement projects, but for larger imperial needs: wars in Europe, the Limits 
Expedition, fortifications, and military sustenance.13 For example, during the early 
eighteenth century a considerable situado from Lima was necessary to maintain the 
troops and fortifications of Panama and Portobelo. The Spanish crown had established 
the situado, which consisted of a number of intra-imperial periodical transferences of 
money for the sustenance of strategic military outposts such as Cartagena, Santa Marta, 
                                                
12 In general, administrative reform during the Bourbon era attempted to decrease the number of creoles in 
important administrative positions within the audiencias and royal treasuries.  
13 The Spanish empire sponsored a set of limits expeditions to demarcate the limits between the Portuguese 
and Spanish empires in the Orinoco and Amazon regions. The incomes of the royal treasuries paid for the 
salaries and endowment of royal officials, and for the expenses of maintaining the troops and the costs of 
fortification.  
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and Guayana. In the time of viceroy Solis, fiscal surpluses from the treasuries of Honda 
and Mompox, together with the fiscal remittances from Quito and Santa Fe, defrayed the 
costs of improving the fortification system, sustaining the troops of Cartagena, and the 
costs of the Limits Expedition.14 Fiscal burdens also included expenses related to the 
prison of Guayaquil, the councils of priests and missionaries, coast guard vessels, and the 
extraordinary expeditions such as the one against the Indians of Riohacha.15  
The remittance of surpluses from local treasury houses to cities such as Cartagena 
was a fundamental feature of the fiscal structure that allowed the colonies to defray their 
own military expenses. Cartagena, like the rest of the Caribbean shoreline of New 
Granada, established important communication networks with British, French, Dutch, 
and Danish colonies in the Caribbean. Ernesto Bassi has argued that trade and migration 
greatly shaped the changing connections between the coastal city of Cartagena and the 
Greater Caribbean space.16 The ever-changing nature of these connections, however, does 
not explain why Cartagena, a cosmopolitan city strongly connected to Caribbean trade, 
remained part of the Gran Colombian republic once the independence wars ended. An 
understanding of the fiscal networks linking Cartagena with the Andean hinterlands can 
shed light onto this question. 
                                                
14 Ibid. Relación Solis, 7.  
15 Spanish authorities had attempted repeatedly to pacify the Guajiro Indians and achieve their spiritual 
conquest, political and economic control. During the administration of viceroy Mejía de la Cerda, the 
Guajiros rebelled against the Capuchin missionaries in 1769 what left viceroy Mejía de la Cerda 
questioning the efficacy of the Capuchins and promoting military expeditions to solve the Guajiro problem. 
Lance Grahn. “Guajiro Culture and Capuchin Evangelization: Missionary Failure in the Rihacha Frontier.” 
In Erick Detlef Langer and Robert H. Jackson, eds. The New Latin American Mission History. Latin 
American Studies Series. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995, 130-156. 
16 Op. Cit. Bassi. 
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The problem of safeguarding the Caribbean city from foreign arracks contributed 
to the emergence of Cartagena as a city fiscally dependent on the interior provinces of the 
viceroyalty. After the British captured Portobello in 1739, Cartagena started a golden age 
in the construction of military fortifications that lasted throughout the entire century.17 
The crown directed considerable amounts of money to several fortification projects in the 
city. The Spanish authorities established a system by which the surpluses of local 
provincial economies circulated through a fiscal network that sustained the crucial 
military defensive structure on the Caribbean coast.  
 An examination of the money remitted from Quito between 1700 and 1803 to 
Cartagena and Santa Marta—including tax surpluses from Cuenca and Guayaquil—
proves that the situado was by far the biggest expenditure in eighteenth-century Quito.18 
Although the records lack uniformity, the tendency is clear. In 1763 alone, Cartagena 
received 291,582 pesos from Quito out of the 428,753 pesos collected during that year in 
the province. Between 1761 and 1767, Quito sent an average of forty percent of its total 
income to contribute to Cartagena’s defense (See Table 3). In addition, according to 
historian Rodolfo Meisel, an analysis of Cartagena’s fiscal incomes between 1751 and 
1808 demonstrates that “the situado became the vital sustenance of the public finances 
                                                
17 In 1741, the king appointed engineers Lorenzo de Solís and Juan Bautista Mac-Evan, and later on 
Antonio de Arévalo, to advance the military infrastructure. These works resulted in the construction of a 
myriad of fortifications such as: the fort of San Sebastian de Pastelillo, the castle of El Boquerón, the 
fortification of the canal of Bocachica, the fort of San Fernando, the battery of Santa Barbara, the 
breakwater of the Marina, the dam of Bocagrande, the battery of Ángel San Rafael, and the wall between 
the strongholds of Santa Clara and Santa Catalina. Enrique Marco Dorta. Cartagena de Indias; Puerto Y 
Plaza Fuerte. Cartagena, Colombia: A. Amadó, 1960. 
18 John J. TePaske, Herbert S. Klein, Kendall W. Brown, and Alvaro Jara. The Royal Treasuries of the 
Spanish Empire in America. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1982. 
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and economy of Cartagena.”19 Although Cartagena held a monopoly over the 
viceroyalty’s foreign trade and its royal treasury collected customs taxes, military 
services financed by hinterlands provinces constituted the greatest base of its local 
economy. 
Year Remittances to Cartagena 
Total surpluses in 
Quito 
Percentage of 
surpluses sent to 
Cartagena 
1761 44319 170196 26.0 
1762 148777 234015 63.6 
1763 291582 428753 68.0 
1764 80245 232001 34.6 
1765 49034 164632 29.8 
1766 42375 163362 25.9 
1767 72611 263761 27.5 
Table 3. Percentage of Surpluses sent to Cartagena between 1761 and 1767. 
 
The fiscal network that linked the Andean hinterlands with the Caribbean coast 
did not only carry money. Until 1795, merchants from Quito in charge of transporting the 
royal safes bought and sold products along the way, fueling local economies from Quito 
to Cartagena.20 Other situadistas carried commodities from Quito to trade for products 
from Castilla upon their arrival to the coast.21 However, while officials in the Andean 
hinterlands recognized the importance of Cartagena’s role as safeguard of the viceroyalty, 
                                                
19 Adolfo Meisel Roca, “Crecimiento a Través de los Subsidios: Cartagena de Indias y el Situado, 1751-
1810.” Accessed November 19, 2014. http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/crecimiento-traves-subsidios-
cartagena-indias-y-situado. 
20 Carmen Dueñas de Anhalzer. Marqueses, cacaoteros, y vecinos de Portoviejo: (cultura política en la 
Presidencia de Quito). Editorial Abya Yala, 1997. 
21 Luis Suárez Fernández. Historia general de España y América. Ediciones Rialp, 1992. 
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throughout the years Quiteños suffered and sometimes resented the burdens that the 
yearly situado imposed over local economic development.22  
Despite this, the principle of integration via the fiscal network of the situado 
placed distant provinces with fiscal hubs in communication with each other. For 
provinces such as Guayana, located far away from colonial centers, the arrival of yearly 
fiscal remittances signified establishing contact among royal officials. For instance, fiscal 
official Antonio Moreno y Escandón explained that the only information that the royal 
administration in the capital received from the province of Guayana came from the 
officers conducting the situado to that region.23 These transfers of money created an 
intra-imperial fiscal network, which helped connect distant regions to each other and 
generate a tenuous sense of territorial cohesion in the kingdom. Throughout the century, 
this fiscal network became stronger with the arrival of new fiscal bureaucracy and the 
opening of new local fiscal institutions. Strengthening fiscal administration, however, 
went hand in hand with restructuring the crown’s commercial policy.  
Hand in hand with fiscal policy, Spanish administrators in Madrid considered it a 
priority that New Granada achieve fluid trade among its provinces. Viceroy Mejía de la 
Cerda claimed that the deficient trade of taxable goods across the viceroyalty occurred 
not because they were not available, but because there was no circulation and 
                                                
22 Earlier in the century, between 1713 and 1721 the royal treasury of Quito stopped sending the situado to 
Cartagena given the economic difficulties that the region was facing. Royal treasury officials hoped to 
release the province of such a burden but the president of the Audiencia Dionisio Alsedo y Herrera pressed 
the issue and reestablished the fiscal remittances. Víctor Peralta Ruiz. Patrones, clientes y amigos: El 
Poder Burocratico Indiano En La Espana Del Siglo XVIII. Editorial CSIC - CSIC Press, 2006. 
23 Op. Cit. Estado del virreinato.  
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commerce.24 On top of the problems with the fiscal structure viceroy Mejía de la Cerda 
pointed out 
 
(…) the lack of commerce is so excessive, that no trade is active, except 
a few ordinary manufacturers that serve the hinterlands of the places in 
which they are consumed, and those of Quito, that in other times were 
estimated and traded with Peru, and now experience total decline.25  
 
Viceroy Manuel Guirior (1772-1776), stated, as Mejía de Cerda did, that in the kingdom 
there was no active trade, the navigation was lacking, its inhabitants were poor, and they 
could not produce enough to enrich the public treasury. In his opinion, the economic 
decline of the viceroyalty resulted in part from the lack of domestic commercial 
reciprocity, that is, the scarce exchange of foodstuffs and other products among different 
provinces in the kingdom. According to Guirior, the small amount of gold extracted from 
the colony was transported to the coastal areas to pay for commodities coming from 
Europe instead of remaining in the viceroyalty to invigorate domestic trade. In June of 
1773 viceroy Manuel de Guirior wrote a report entitled: “Reasons for the general poverty 
of the kingdom; a shortage in its royal incomes, and lack of naval forces. Means to 
elevate it to opulence.”26 In the text, Guirior argued that contraband was the cause for 
                                                
24 Op. Cit. “Relación del Estado del Virreinato de Santa Fe, presentada por el excmo. Señor Don Pedro 
Mejía de la Cerda... 95. 
25 Ibid. 97. 
26 The title in Spanish is: “Causas de que procede la pobreza general del Reino; la cortedad de Rentas 
Reales y la falta de fuerzas navales. Medios de elevarlo a la opulencia, y a su majestad al mayor poder, 
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New Granada’s economic stagnation and the poverty of its agriculture, livestock raising, 
industry, commerce, and mining. For Guirior contraband sank the trade of Spanish and 
Hispanic American goods and the geographic characteristics of the Caribbean coastal 
area facilitated the infiltration of smugglers. Guirior pointed out that controlling and 
guarding New Granada’s extensive shorelines and ports in both the Atlantic and the 
Pacific seas entailed great difficulties. This was the cause, Guirior added, of the 
impossibilty of royal officials to cut off illicit trade, as in the case of the Bay of Honda in 
Rio del Hacha.27 If geographic features, poor internal trade, and contraband hindered the 
strength of the royal treasuries, for other viceroys the territorial organization of the 
central and eastern highlands of the viceroyalty greatly influenced the ineffective revenue 
collection.  
In viceroy Caballero y Gongora’s opinion, royal officials’ self-interest and an 
uneven distribution of power hindered the advancement of government’s economic 
policy. The viceroy referred namely to the eastern region of New Granada which 
comprised a network of cities connected to each other which required correcting their 
boundaries. The region was the most urbanized part of colonial New Granada and was 
subdivided into three regions: the area of Bogota and Tunja, the area of Velez, San Gil, 
and El Socorro, and lastly Giron and Bucaramanga. According to the census of 1777, the 
majority of the population of New Granada was concentrated in these areas. The 
importance of this economic circuit had nothing to do with export or gold mining 
                                                                                                                                            
como corresponde a las riquezas, producciones de las tierras de sus dominios, y a las proporciones más 
ventajosas para el fomento de la navegación de sus vasallos.” 
27 Guirior ordered the fortification of the bay and advanced measures to increase its population also as part 
of the provisions for the pacification of the Guajiro Indians in the province of Riohacha. 
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economies. According to Anthony McFarlane, the network of settlements running north 
from Santa Fe encompassed a series of local agricultural and cattle economies that 
included highland settlements in cold, temperate, and hot lands.28 Viceroy Caballero y 
Góngora’s (1782-1789) concerns with fixing the limits of the corregimientos and 
governments of this region which were unequally distributed, led to territorial and tax 
reforms.29 
The reform of the spatial organization followed a logic of spreading urban centers 
evenly throughout the territory which implied modifying the internal demarcation of 
some provinces. The uneven distribution of corregimientos, often with unknown borders, 
led royal administrators to propose measures to aggreggate small corregimientos and 
divide those that were too big into smaller territorial units. The measures also aimed at 
defining the limits of territories in dispute. The Recopilación de las Leyes de las Indias 
had established in its fifth book, title 1, that “for the best and easiest government of the 
West Indies”, viceroys, audiencias, governors, corregidores, and alcaldes should 
“observe the limits of their jurisdictions.”30 The law established that “one of the means by 
which good government is more easily facilitated, is the distinction of the limits and 
territories of the provinces, districts, partidos, and head-municipality, so all jurisdictions 
are contained into them, and our ministers administer their justice, without overstepping 
                                                
28 Op. Cit. McFarlane, 49. 
29 Viceroy Flores (1776-1781) had expressed his concern with creating a new demarcation for all 
corregimientos of the kingdom and created three corregimientos in Cartagena, Mompox, and Villeta. 
According to Caballero y Góngora these three corregimientos ceased to exist. Op.Cit. “Relación del Estado 
del Virreinato de Santa Fe, presentada por el excmo. Señor Antonio Caballero y Góngora …”, 211. 
30 Recopilacion de leyes de los reynos de las Indias. A. Ortega, 1774, 142. 
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their duties.”31 In the context of the eighteenth century, the interpretation of this law 
privileged not only the administration of justice but the economic government of the 
colonies. For the viceroy, reforming territorial jurisdictions was a way to organize the 
management of the provinces, hindering the capability of corregidores to monopolize 
“the natural productions that are extracted from the provinces, and the tradeable goods 
that are introduced into them.”32 The reform was expected to facilitate revenue collection 
and the correct functioning of the network of treasuries grouped around a center of 
revenue collection.  
According to Caballero y Góngora, mismatches and an uneven balance of power 
characterized the Indians towns within the corregimiento of Tunja. These settlements 
comprised seven cabildos in a well populated and vast extension. In comparison, the 
government of Giron in the northeeastern region only had three small settlements. 
According to the viceroy, another issue to fix was that the corregimiento of Sogamoso, 
which was very close in distance to Tunja and at the very center of its jurisdiction, was 
not subjected to Tunja in fiscal terms. At the same time the more distant city of 
Pamplona, which was closer to the government of Maracaibo, belonged to Tunja’s 
jurisdiction. Another example was the villa of Guaduas, which claimed to belong to the 
jurisdictions of the cabildos of Santa Fe and Honda, a fact that resulted in Santa Fe and 
Honda fighting over the territory in the court system. The task of reordering jurisdictions 
                                                
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid. 212. 
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was complicated as it implied the assignation of new salaries to the judges, and since the 
Royal Treasury lacked funds, it struggled to fund these expenses.  
Caballero y Góngora proposed a new spatial political economy consisting of 
fixing the limits of each governorship and corregimientos and creating a tax in the towns, 
directed to the salaries of the judges. He also proposed the division of the corregimientos 
into first, second, and third class, encouraging royal officials to advance in the bureacratic 
ladder and fostering a more sound and less corrupt administration. Along with the 
preocupation to reorder internal territorial jurisdictions, royal officials attempted to 
advance the economic and territorial viability of New Granada as a cohesive viceregal 
unit. In the next section, I examine the centrality of territorial knowledge in the formation 
of a cohesive representation of the viceroyalty of New Granada by examining the case of 
the administration of viceroy Mejía de la Cerda who pursued an aggressive approach to 
fiscal reform in which the procurement of local chorographic knowledge was central.  
 
Chorography, Empirical Science, and the Representation of the Whole 
 
In December of 1770, the viceroy Pedro Mejía de la Cerda requested that local officials 
across the kingdom produce reports about the territories under their command, their 
pueblos, cities, villas, and places within the limits of its jurisdiction. The request asked 
officials to specify any variation in borders in regards to ecclesiastical and spiritual 
jurisdictions. The viceroy also requested approximate calculations of the number of 
inhabitants and their circumstances, the incomes of each province, and if possible a map 
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to “facilitate the knowledge of the places described.” This information was rendered 
necessary to assess the situation of the kingdom first in its smaller territorial units and 
later as a whole.  
Relying on a network of informants, the production of a comprehensive territorial 
description of the viceroyalty occurred in collaboration with the local governors and 
officials who crafted their own reports. It is not entirely clear, however, how many local 
officials sent in their chorographic reports. Some local reports such as the “General State 
of the Cities and Towns of Cauca, 1771” were created in response to the viceroy’s 
request. On January 31, 1771, in Popayan, governor Joseph Ignacio Ortega redirected the 
viceroy’s petition to local officials in the province. Ortega circulated the request among 
lieutenants and municipal judges (alcaldes ordinarios) of the cities and places within the 
governorship of Popayán. Within the cities, the alcaldes ordinarios, tenientes 
gobernadores y justicia mayor, and corregidores responded to the petition. From the 
cities, the same request was sent to the royal mines (reales de minas) of Quiebralomo, 
where the priest (cura doctrinero) answered the petition. Several local bureaucrats 
participated in this network of chorographic knowledge that circulated from the 
peripheries of the colony to Santa Fe, the administrative center.  
The typical local chorographic text offered vague descriptions of provincial 
borders. For example, Juan Joseph Gutierrez, alcalde ordinario of the mining city of 
Anserma in the province of Antioquia penned a text about the territory under his rule. 
The 1771 text started with a description of the reach of the city’s jurisdiction, “from the 
creek of Hidumque, that divides the jurisdiction from the city of Toro, until the passage 
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of Caramanta, that divides the jurisdiction and governorship of Antioquia.” The 
calculations of the distances in the report were rather vague, “in longitude there could be 
forty leagues more or less,” Gutierrez contended, while “in latitude in some parts half a 
league, in other parts almost two more or less.”33 Another way of explaining the division 
lines between provinces was in reference to rivers and mountains as natural boundary 
markers.34 At the local level, it was very improbable to use the expertise of surveyors and 
geographers. In addition, moving across New Granada was a costly and difficult 
endeavor. Therefore, most of the local chorographic texts presented information about 
local territories, which was gathered through the experience and observations of local 
administrators from different jurisdictions. Relying on the information provided by local 
administrators, the viceroy Mejía de la Cerda attempted to craft his relación de mando.  
The viceroy however, felt that his report lacked detail. For this reason, he 
commissioned the crown attorney protector of Indians, judge, and preserver of royal 
incomes (fiscal protector de Indios, juez y conservador de rentas reales) of the Real 
Audiencia, D. Francisco Antonio Moreno y Escandón, to write another compendium of 
the state of the viceroyalty regarding civil, political, economic, and military matters. In 
tandem with the report, Moreno y Escandón proposed the formation of a geographic plan 
“that corresponded to the specific notice of all the kingdom, each one of its provinces, 
                                                
33 “Estado general de la ciudades y pueblos del Cauca en 1771.” Victor Manuel Patiño (ed.), Relaciones 
geográficas de la Nueva Granada (siglos XVI a XIX), suplemento 4ª, Cespedesía (Cali, 1983), 410. 
34 Unexplored lands with unknown animals sparked the imagination of colonial provincials, like in the case 
of Gutierrez, in whose depiction tigers, lions, and bears inhabited the unpopulated lands of Anserma and 
threatened the survival of the livestock. 
 107 
plazas, and main cities.”35 As a result, Moreno y Escandón produced the text entitled 
“State of the Viceroyalty of Santa Fe, Kingdom of New Granada” (Estado del Virreinato 
de Santafé, Nuevo Reino de Granada). Along with the report, Moreno y Escandón 
directed the creation of a map of the viceroyalty entitled “Geographic Plan of the 
Viceroyalty of Santa Fe de Bogota, Kingdom of New Granada” in 1772. Some of the 
topics on viceroy Mejía de la Cerda’s relación de mando appear as well in Moreno y 
Escandón’s report. For the latter, it seems that he spent more time gathering information 
for his report and therefore faced the difficulties of collecting reliable information about 
distant provinces.  
Moreno y Escandón was clear that in order to turn New Granada into an 
economically viable polity he required reliable information about the territory and its 
peoples. He constantly complained about the lack of “substantial knowledge” and 
information about the kingdom.36 Royal administrators often complained about the 
scarcity of accurate information, which led to failures in political decision-making and 
hindered economic government. Moreno y Escandón, for instance, stressed the 
“defective” nature of the kingdom’s settlements. Having no information such as the 
number of inhabitants, “qualities, class, funds, and way of life” and not knowing the state 
of commerce, hindered good government, he added. This disorganization is also reflected 
according to Moreno y Escandón, on the fact that “the houses, streets, and public places 
                                                
35 Ibid. 107. 
36 (Colmenares, Relaciones e Informes, 153) 
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are not numbered.”37 One of the central problems of colonial state building was precisely 
what James Scott has defined as legibility.38 Making local space legible consists of 
ordering the population and the landscape in ways that help simplify state functions such 
as taxation and the prevention of rebellion. For instance, the principle of partitioning the 
urban landscape into numbered individual registries simplified the work of officials in 
charge of assuring tax collection.  
Viewing fiscal policy as the mere organization of resources in order to yield 
optimal returns, Moreno y Escandón reconstructed the fiscal structure of the viceroyalty 
in his report. He presented an inventory of the twenty royal treasuries (cajas reales or 
cajas matrices) of New Granada. For some of them, Moreno y Escandón provided 
information about the network of cities for which each royal treasury collected incomes 
and the annual average of tax collection. For example, the royal treasury of Santa Marta 
received all of the incomes from the neighboring cities and towns of Valledupar, Pueblo 
Nuevo, Tamalameque, Salina de la Ciénaga, and Tenerife. The main treasury of the 
viceroyalty received the incomes of Neiva, Opón, Muzo, Ibagué, San Juan Giron, La 
Palma, Provincia de los Llanos, Salazar de las Palmas, and villa de Purificación. The 
incomes from Tunja’s tobacco, and the incomes from liquor and the alcabalas were 
administered as separate branches. For more than half of the main provincial royal 
treasuries, however, the attorney lacked information about the local networks that linked 
cities and towns to a treasury center. He then calculated the total annual incomes of the 
                                                
37 Moreno y Escandón, Estado del Virreinato de Santa Fe, 163.  
38 James C. Scott. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed. Yale Agrarian Studies. New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 1998. 1-8. 
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Royal Treasury in the viceroyalty as approximately one million pesos. In his effort for 
legibility, the attorney faced countless difficulties in translating local resource 
exploitation into reliable estimates for the yielded revenue.  
Moreno y Escandón criticized the methods of the Royal Treasury. Royal 
dispositions failed to establish a uniform organization of accounting books. For instance, 
Moreno complained that royal officials frequently ignored the origins of the taxes in their 
accounting reports, leading to confusion in the accounting. Incomplete information and 
non-uniform accounting registration procedures challenged the sound management of 
royal incomes. This also makes more difficult the work of historians trying to decipher 
whether there was a fixed system for recording fiscal information. In analyzing the Royal 
Treasury accounting records for the province of Quito during the eighteenth century for 
example, expenditures are often placed in the same column with incomes. Seeking to 
render both peoples and landscapes legible, Moreno y Escandón proposed measures to 
facilitate the work of the royal treasuries by establishing standardized general tables or 
books organized by each central treasury office. For the attorney, the need for a more 
reliable accounting system and more complete information about the people affected 
New Granada’s path to economic prosperity. A more structural reason, however, 
according to the crown’s attorney, explained the kingdom’s economic languor.  
According to Moreno, New Granada’s disorganization had its origins in the 
principles by which Spain chose to organize its empire. In contrast to Lima and Mexico, 
New Granada failed to flourish, according to Moreno y Escandón, because “this kingdom 
lacked the favorable principles of the others, which erected from their origin in 
 110 
viceroyalties, advanced their society, government, and commerce.” The structuring of the 
territory under a viceregal structure early on, according to Moreno y Escandón, 
represented a significant advantage for the richest colonies. For him, early viceregal 
administrative structures provided Mexico and Peru with sufficient bureaucrats and 
militia through which to advance colonial expansion and economic improvement, or in 
other words, advance in legibility.39 Such a contradiction was made more apparent, 
according to the attorney, because “nature placed the kingdom of New Granada at the 
center or heart of northern and southern America, and deposited in it the most abundant, 
yet hidden treasures of its opulence.”40 Considerable treasures are hidden in its 
agricultural products, mines, and woods, Moreno y Escandón asserted, making the lands 
of New Granada, “without a doubt, more opulent and rich than those of Lima and 
Mexico.”41 With this framework in mind, Moreno y Escandón crafted his report and map 
of the viceroyalty.  
In a detailed work of synthesis, Moreno y Escandón put together his report on the 
state of the viceroyalty of New Granada and the map of the viceroyalty. Moreno y 
Escandón did not travel across all of the kingdom’s regions nor did he base his report on 
his own empirical observations. At the most, he could have gathered information from 
the region surrounding the city of Santa Fe. In crafting the map and statistical charts, 
Moreno y Escandón did not acknowledge the data gathered from royal officials, but cited 
                                                
39 Scott describes disparate practices such as the creation of permanent last names, the standardization of 
weights and measures, the establishment of cadastral surveys and population registries, the standardization 
of language and legal discourse, and the design of cities. Ibid. 2. 
40 Ibid. 154. 
41 “Estado del Virreinato de Santa Fe,” Colmenares, Relaciones e Informes, 153-154. 
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a more reliable base of credible informants. When describing the limits of the kingdom of 
Santa Fe, a name used indistinctly to refer to the viceroyalty of New Granada, Moreno y 
Escandón gives some insights about the information that he used to locate the limits of 
New Granada on the map:  
 
I have formed [the map] with some notes, longing to satisfy the order of 
your excellence, with more exact demarcations founded partly from my 
own visual reconnaissance, and from that of expert engineers, and 
partly from the most secure observations of nautical experts and 
geographers dedicated to this important occupation, from which good 
judgment in government depends, moreover in ignorant, remote, and 
lesser known countries.42  
 
 
                                                
42 Op. Cit. “Estado del virreinato de Santa Fe”, Colmenares, Relaciones de los gobernantes, 155. 
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Figure 4. Detail of the top right cartouche from the “Geographic Plan of the Viceroyalty 
of Santa Fe de Bogota, Kingdom of New Granada, 1772. 
 
Moreno y Escandón synthesized a number of observations gathered from the 
works of engineers, nautical experts, and geographers. This suggests that the attorney had 
access to older maps, nautical charts, and geographic descriptions. For instance, the 
cartouche at the top right corner of the map depicts King Charles III at the very top. 
Beneath him, we find viceroy Mejía de la Cerda observing a map of New Granada with 
the help of an archangel. A terrestrial globe rests aside several books and maps. Among 
them, we can read “Carta de Maldonado,” a monumental map of the Audiencia of Quito, 
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created by cartographer and explorer Pedro Vicente de Maldonado in 1750.43 As the 
recent work by Andre Wakefield has demonstrated, the context of fiscal administration is 
central to the production of knowledge of political economy.44 In the case of Moreno y 
Escandon’s map, the reference to a number of scientific expeditions and the use of former 
geographic knowledge situates the Plano within Bourbon Enlightenment science. Royal 
bureaucrats put Enlightenment science to the service of the fiscal state. As we saw in 
Chapter 1, royal official Navarro utilized Maldonado’s maps in his assessment of the 
province of Esmeraldas. The cartouche of the Plano also showcased the “Carta del 
Orinoco” (Orinoco Plan), referring to Gumilla’s work on the Orinoco, which was also 
discussed in Chapter 1. These representations illustrate the crown’s intentions to use 
empirical knowledge about the territory to increase economic wealth in the colonies.45 In 
the 1770s, earlier sources converged in the hands of a local administrator working to 
improve the economic government of New Granada. 
                                                
43 Quito became the focus of major scientific research during the first half of the eighteenth century. In 
1735, the joint Spanish and French scientific expedition to determine the length of the meridian near the 
equator brought a dozen European scientists to the peripheral province of Quito, by then part of the 
viceroyalty of Peru. The exchange between European astronomers, naturalists, local populations, and 
cartographers, among them Spanish American geographer Pedro de Maldonado, gave birth to the famous 
Carta de la Provincia de Quito. Neil Safier has described the participatory process by which the map came 
into being, emphasizing the workings of the image of Quito like a “transatlantic journey” rather than a 
European vision or a local territorial vision. Paradoxically, while this cartographic representation of the 
kingdom of Quito circulated widely across Europe, it did little to depict the economic stagnation that the 
province suffered throughout the century. Modified, edited by European cartographers in Paris, the map 
was published after the death of Pedro de Maldonado in 1750. Neil Safier. Measuring the New World: 
Enlightenment Science and South America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008, 127. 
44 Andre Wakefield. The Disordered Police State: German Cameralism as Science and Practice. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009. 20. 
45 Recent accounts in the history of knowledge production in the eighteenth-century Spanish Atlantic are 
concerned with demonstrating that the Spanish empire was an active participant in the practices of science 
in the early modern world. These approaches have underscored the scientific practices of leading scientists 
leaving the linkages between science, bureaucracy and political economy in the background. See for 
example: Daniela Bleichmar (ed.). Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, 1500-1800. Stanford, 
Calif: Stanford University Press, 2009. 
 114 
 The production of the “Geographic Plan” of 1772 coincides with the monarchy’s 
attempt to identify the physical area containing the fledgling viceroyalty of New 
Granada.46 More broadly, it reflects the Spanish monarchy’s interest in forming a 
homogenous image of the totality of American possessions (See Map 2).47 This map is 
the first known cartographic material to depict New Granada as a single unit clearly 
drawing a thick line that separated the viceroyalty from those of Peru and New Spain.48 
 Moreno y Escandón’s attempt to craft a map responded to the idea that the 
cartographic representation was a more efficient vehicle to represent and advance state 
interests. Although cartographic representations usually aim to become an economical 
way of presenting the physical space, Moreno y Escandón added a fair amount of text on 
the map. His additions to the map contributed to an administrative mapping, in which he 
as a record-keeping bureaucrat charted urban and rural spaces, and translated them into 
fiscally relevant numbers along a narrative of potential wealth.49 The map depicts royal 
                                                
46 Valverde and LaFuente disregarded the Plan Geográfico of 1772 when dealing with the cartographic 
representations of American viceroyalties. They state that New Granada’s “first modern small-scale general 
map” was a map commissioned by Viceroy José Ezpeleta, that arrived in 1790 at the court in Madrid. 
Maybe this is because the type of representations they are interested in tracing are those which reflect a 
transformation in the geographic paradigm. This shift replaced the rhetoric of description with a 
formalization and scientific rationalization of the information traditionally represented in maps, leading to 
the representation of empty spaces. 
47 Ibid. 199. A good example is the map of geographer Juan de la Cruz Cano y Olmedilla (1734-1790) 
produced in 1775 and for the first time representing South America as a whole. 
48 The Geographer Joseph Aparicio Morata executed the map.  
49 Contributing to the creation of efficient spaces for the enhancement of royal revenues, years later in 
1781 Moreno y Escandón led the demolishment of a number of Indian towns in the provinces of Tunja and 
Santa Fe. The Indian towns that had a low number of Indians were demolished to be turned into parishes. 
This aggregation of resguardo lands to a great extent diminished the functioning costs in order to extract 
more utilities for the Royal Treasury. For a thorough analysis of this process in the highland plateau of 
Santa Fe see: Diana Bonnett Vélez, “De la Conformación de los pueblos de indios al surgimiento de las 
parroquias de vecinos. El caso de Altiplano cundiboyancese.” Revista de Estudios Sociales, no. 10, octubre 
de 2001. Diana Bonnett Vélez. Tierra Y Comunidad: Un Problema Irresuelto: El Caso Delaltiplano 
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conceptions about colonial space and its revenue-producing districts and potential sources 
of natural riches for mounting imperial wealth in an increasingly competitive context. 
 The spatial conditions for turning New Granada into a revenue-producing colony 
for the crown started with representing its material conditions. Nature as presented in 
maps and chorographic texts was imagined and subjected to human intervention.50 So, 
instead of showing what the territory of New Granada was like in a standardized 
scientific fashion, the map shows the realm of possibility for the viceroyalty’s space.51  
 The main legend at the bottom of the map stated that its main objective is to 
illustrate the current state of the viceroyalty and its potential, to discern the most 
appropriate measures for its improvement. In doing so, the map assesses the causes and 
origins of the backwardness of the viceroyalty. The geographical chart also describes the 
“deterioration of [New Granada’s] trade, its plentiful and precious agricultural fruits, and 
mines.”52 New Granada as a differentiated space of empire took form on the map. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Cundiboyacense (Virreinato de La Nueva Granada) 1750-1800. Colección Espiral 2. Bogotà? Instituto 
Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, Universidad de los Andes, 2002. 
50 Blackburn, 74.  
51 Nuria Valverde and Antonio LaFuente, “Space Production and Spanish Imperial Geopolitics”, Science in 
the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, 1500-1800. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2009. 
52 Ibid. 
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Figure 5. Plan Geográfico del Virreinato de Santafé de Bogotá Nuevo Reyno de 
Granada.53 
 
 Thick well-marked borders gave the illusion of a bounded space, a space claimed 
for Spain, yet in constant risk of foreign dislocations. The map gives the impression of 
fixed viceregal borders, a stabilized colonial space, but included spaces of potential or 
                                                
53 Complete title: “Plan Geográfico del Virreinato de Santafé de Bogotá Nuevo Reyno de Granada, que 
manifiesta su demarcación territorial, islas, ríos principales, provincias y plazas de armas;” (…)Por el D. D. 
Francisco Moreno, y Escandòn, Fiscal Protector de la Real Avdiencia de Santa Fe y Juez Conseruador de 
Rents. Lo delineo D. Joseph Aparicio Morata año de 1772. Gouernando el Reyno el Ex[elentísi]mo 
S[eñ]or. Bailio Frey D. Pedro Messia de la Cerda. Reproduction from the original, elaborated by the 
Instituto Geográfico Militar de Colombia a solicitud de la Academia de Historia. -1936- Dibujaron J. 
Restrepo Rivera- A. Villaveces R. - O. Roa A. – R. García P.- Biblioteca National de Colombia, Fondo 
Mapoteca, 262, F. Restrepo 36.  
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ongoing conflict and loose imperial control. The Plano portrays the extension of New 
Granada from the province of Veraguas on the westernmost border with Mexico, to the 
vast province of Guayana (comprising the government of Caracas and Cumaná) that 
limited Dutch and French colonies east of the mouth of the Orinoco River and bordering 
the coast. The northernmost province limited by the Atlantic was Riohacha and the 
southernmost border of New Granada was the Amazon province of Maynas in Amazon, 
which bordered Peru and Portuguese territories. The map signals the places where the 
territory could suffer foreign invasions, such as the coast of Veraguas, “where the pirates 
of the Mosquito enter, fish for tortoiseshell, and plunder the province.”54 This reflects 
royal concerns with New Granada’s vulnerability vis-à-vis the strength of other empires 
in alliance with independent Indians.  
 As stated in his longer report, Moreno y Escandón stressed that Indian rebellions 
impeded the kingdom’s progress and the dangers of English friendship with Indians on 
the Mosquitos coast. The Plano incorporated a section devoted to the missions of New 
Granada and expressed that most provinces of the viceroyalty suffered the harms caused 
by “barbaric Indians, (…) which hinder trade”, and often established friendships with 
foreign enemies.55 In the report, he quoted the information provided to Spanish 
authorities by an Englishman captured on the coast near Cartagena under the false 
Spanish name of Alejandro Velasco. As Neogranadian authorities learned from 
foreigners themselves about the establishment of trade networks and English settlements 
                                                
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
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in the Mosquito Coast, concerns with their expansion into the region of Calidonia and the 
Gulf of Darien grew stronger. From this region, Moreno y Escandón prognosticated, 
Englishmen could easily invade the gold producing provinces of Choco and Antioquia. 
The fear was mostly justified by the fact that gold mining “is the only product from 
which the maintenance of the whole viceroyalty depends”, Moreno y Escandón 
asserted.56 The dynamism of New Granada’s royal incomes and trade relied on gold 
mining and its centrality becomes visible from the map.57 Symbols locating gold mines 
and mines in general span various sections of the map, namely the governorships of 
Chocó, Panamá, and Antioquia. The map also depicts mining districts and repositories of 
gold (named “oro”) not yet turned into mines in the banks of the Napo River in the 
government of Maynas. In short, the persistence of sovereign Indian polities, their 
alliances, and foreigners represented one of the most serious threats that, according to 
Moreno y Escandón, New Granada’s political economy of mining faced.  
 In this regard, Moreno y Escandon’s chose to represent a landscape that is ready 
for human intervention, one that is quantifiable in incomes, partitions, and peoples. In his 
                                                
56 Op. Cit. Moreno y Escandón, 232. 
57 Several mines in the kingdom ceased activities in the course of the eighteenth century in part because of 
the prohibition of the mitas—forced Indian labor—having a negative impact on the available workforce in 
the mines. Notwithstanding, according to Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, until 1780 mining production represented 
almost the totality of the exports of the colony of New Granada. During the last two decades of the 1700s, 
the Spanish crown made an effort to diversify external income, what caused a slight reduction of mining 
exports as the engine of external trade. Still, by the end of the eighteenth century, New Granada’s exports 
were estimated to be 90% gold, and 10% a combination of products such as cotton, cacao, sugar, and 
cinchona bark. The existence of haciendas around mining centers was merely subsidiary to the mineral 
extraction centers. Other types of economies, however, coexisted in the kingdom; for example the coastal 
cacao-exporting economies of Guayaquil and Venezuela that were linked to overseas markets. Jaime 
Jaramillo Uribe. El Pensamiento Colombiano En El Siglo XIX. 2. ed. Bogotá: Editorial Temis, 1974. 
Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo. Historia Económica de Colombia. 1a ed. Economía 
y Demografía. Bogotá: Fedesarrollo: Siglo Veintiuno Editores de Colombia, 1987. 
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attempts to systematically organize the kingdom’s accounting information, the map 
featured “Notes relative to the state of the Royal Treasury” (Notas relativas al estado de 
la Real Hacienda). A set of statistical charts, which framed the map, showcased the 
territorial divisions of New Granada, revealing the imposed administrative order. The 
chart pertaining to the military governments (Cartagena, Panama and Darién, Portobelo, 
Santa Marta, Maracaibo, Riohacha, and Guayana) contains calculations of the salaries 
(sueldos) assigned to each military jurisdiction. In addition, the chart quantifies the 
number of cities, villages (villas), towns (pueblos), places (lugares), and Indian towns 
(corregimientos). The section also assembles information on each mission (Casanare, 
Guayana, Santa Marta), the religious order in control of each mission, the number of 
tows, missionaries, Indians, and the cost of maintaining each mission. Lastly, the chart 
provides data on the number of tributary Indians from each jurisdiction and the number of 
inhabitants (vecinos). The same data, salaries, number of cities and towns, etc., appear on 
the map for each of the political governments within the Audiencia of Santa Fe and the 
Audiencia of Quito. The written narrative in the charts and the geographic representation 
of New Granada helped traverse and organize the geographic space of the colony in a 
contained and ordered manner.  
 The cartography of the Plano is a military and economic affair that influences the 
way in which we see New Granada not only for what it depicts, but also for what it 
erases. Take, for instance, the fact that the map presents no connections between New 
Granada and the Greater Caribbean space. The maritime borders with the British, French 
and Dutch empires in the Caribbean that so deeply infiltrated New Granada’s economic 
 120 
culture were absent not only from the physical representation but also from the text. The 
report characterized the kingdom as void of “active trade” and limited to the extraction of 
some agricultural products such as cacao in a very low quantity.58 Nowhere on the map or 
the accompanying text is there a reference to illegal trade and the wealth that it brought to 
colonial provinces, or the harms it represented for the Royal Treasury. In the 
accompanying report, Moreno y Escandón, however, shortly reflects on the traffic of 
foreign flour to the kingdom, which had become an excuse to introduce contraband. His 
limited attention to coastal trans-imperial commercial flows is a result of his interest to 
convey a vision of territoriality and viceregal power that is centripetal; this is, looking 
inwards to the creation of an integrated internal market and towards the symbolic and 
bureaucratic core of the viceroyalty located in the city of Santa Fe. 
 
Santa Fe at the Center 
 
The vision of New Granada in the Plano places Santa Fe as center of the kingdom’s 
viceregal, ecclesiastical, and fiscal power. The highlands plateau of Santa Fe housed the 
largest number of muisca indigenous populations by the time of the conquest. First 
dependent on Lima, the need for the administration of justice in the Andean hinterlands 
led to the establishment of the Audiencia of Santa Fe in 1550.59 At the center of viceregal 
                                                
58 Ibid. 
59 Fernando Mayorga García. Real Audiencia de Santafe En Los Siglos XVI - XVII Historia, Visitas, Quejas 
Y Castigos Del Primer Tribunal Con Sede En La Ciudad. Bogota: Imprenta Dis, 2013. 
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rule, the site of the Audiencia, Tribunal de Cuentas (Court of Audit)60, and Archbishopric 
of the viceroyalty, the capital city reunited the largest number of royal bureaucrats: 
magistrates, clerics, lawyers, and treasury officials. Surrounding the city, a large number 
of Indian towns provided the city an important income from Indian tributes. The city also 
served as a hub for distributing imports brought from Cartagena to the rest of the colony.  
 The prominent role of Santa Fe, as an administrative and learning center and an 
ideal European-like landscape, is depicted on the map. The map showcased a panoramic 
view of the urban center in the right bottom section. The cordillera surrounds a valley 
full of well-organized houses and buildings. The city’s coat of arms featured a golden-
crowned black eagle with a pomegranate on each claw bordered by several 
pomegranates.61 An inventory of over twenty urban spaces, the Main Plaza, the site of 
Real Audiencia, and a number of churches and religious orders, make clear Santa Fe’s 
central place in the kingdom (See Figure 6).62  
 By the end of the century, Santa Fe had consolidated its place not only as an 
administrative core but also as a center of learning. Moreno y Escandón was a proponent 
of education curriculum reform. His reform replaced scholastic theological philosophy 
with Enlightenment natural philosophy. The promotion of useful sciences and the 
incorporation of secular teaching led Moreno y Escandón to propose a new study plan for 
the schools of El Rosario and San Bartolomé in the city of Santa Fe. As the epicenter of 
the movement for incorporating Newtonian sciences into education, the city also became 
                                                
60 I use the translation of Anthony MacFarlane.  
61 Royal Decree, Valladolid, December 3, 1548. 
62 Ibid. “Vista por la parte occidental de la ciudad de Santa Fe de Bogota.” 
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the site of the Royal Botanical Expedition (1783-1808) and the first Astronomical 
Observatory in the Americas built in 1803. A group of Creole intellectuals in the capital 
also led the expansion of the public sphere and local discourses of political economy.63 
The concern with economically developing the colony’s provinces was shared among 
Spanish Americans and Spaniards alike.  
A well-studied topic in Colombian historiography, the construction of Creole 
representations of enlightened political economy and geography has served as 
explanation for the rise of an American identity. This distinctive identity, ambiguous in 
nature, reflected Eurocentric values while separating itself from the casta society.64 This 
underpinning of a distinct American identity has overshadowed the central role of royal 
bureaucrats. Through their administrative and intellectual works, both Americans and 
Spaniards linked political economic discourse to spatial realities foregrounding narratives 
of local wealth and the unity of the whole.  
 
                                                
63 Through the publication of several newspapers such as the Papel Periódico de Santa Fe (1797-1797), 
the Correo Curioso Erudito, Económico y Mercantil (Feb.-Dec. 1801), and the Semanario del Nuevo Reino 
de Granada (1808-1809) knowledge of political economy and the geography, climate, and population of 
the kingdom circulated in a nascent public sphere. The learned elite of the kingdom also founded the 
Economic Society of Friends of the Country (Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País) in 1802.  
64 Mauricio Nieto Olarte. Orden Natural Y Orden Social: Ciencia Y Política En El Semanario Del Nuevo 
Reyno de Granada. Bogotá D.C: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales-CESO, 
Departamento de Historia, 2009. 
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Figure 6. Detail of the Geographic Plan of Santa Fe, City of Santa Fe, 1772. 
 
 While representations of a fiscal territoriality advanced an imagination about the 
qualities and preeminence of certain urban spaces over others and the kingdom’s 
potential revenue collection, fiscal policy also advanced centralization. As fiscal policy 
and territorial reform increasingly went hand in hand, the quintessential institution of 
fiscal spatiality, the intendancy reform, arrived to New Granada after being successfully 
established in the viceroyalty of New Spain.  
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Fiscal Territoriality, Local Autonomy, and the Intendancy System 
 
Policymakers in Madrid hoped that instituting the intendancy system in New Granada 
would diminish provincial autonomies and positively impact revenue collection. The aim 
of the monarchy was to favor the Bourbons’ centralization project, especially during 
Charles III’s reign between 1759 and 1788. As J.H. Elliot asserts, in the authoritarian 
centralized monarchy of Charles III there was no room for the semi-autonomous 
kingdoms and provinces preeminent during the Habsburg composite monarchy.65 
Although the decrees for creating new fiscal districts and assigning bureaucratic posts 
were dictated from the center, recent research has demonstrated that Spanish imperial 
revenue collection was decentralized and jurisdictionally fragmented into a large number 
of tax-collecting districts66 (See Table 4). There was a great amount of autonomy in the 
workings of the colonial treasury districts. In addition, in regulating the economic life in 
the colonies, local contingencies such as the Comunero rebellion escaped the control of 
imperial political economies dictated from Madrid. The Comunero rebellion hindered the 
Bourbon centralization reform causing the establishment of a more robust territorial 
hierarchy on the municipal level. The dispute between San Gil and Socorro is among the 
                                                
65 John Huxtable Elliott. Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 321. 
66 The so-called cajas, Grafe and Irigoin argue, collected taxes from a variety of taxpayers differentiated by 
status, ethnicity, corporate bodies or individuals, urban/rural residence, and geographical demarcation. 
Regina Grafe and M.A. Irigoin, “A Stakeholder Empire: The political economy of Spanish imperial rule in 
America”, The Economic History Review Vol. 65 (2), 2012, pp. 609-651. 
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countless examples of the process by which several parishes and towns across the 
kingdom demanded autonomy from the dominant cities of their provinces.67  
Table 4. Governorships and corregimientos, cabildos, and Royal Treasuries, New 
Granada, 1739-1808.68 
Governorships and 
corregimientos (or provinces) 
City councils (Cabildos)  Royal Treasuries (Cajas 
Reales) Main (m), 
dependent (d) 
Government and capitanía of 
Santa Fe 
Santa Fe Santa Fe (m) 
Kingdom of Quito Quito 
Ibarra 
Riobamba 
Quito 
Loja (d) 
Government and general 
command headquarters of 
Cartagena 
Cartagena 
Villa de Mompox 
San Antonio de Toro de Simití 
Cartagena (m) 
Ayapel 
Corozal 
Mompox 
Loba (d) 
Pantanos (d) 
Retiro (d) 
Cáceres (d) 
Guamozo (d) 
Simití (d) 
Government and general 
command headquarters of 
Panamá 
Panamá 
Nata de los Caballeros 
 
Government of Popayán Santiago de Cali 
Buga 
Pasto 
Nuestra Señora de la 
Consolación del Toro 
Anserma 
Barbacoas 
Cartago 
Anserma, Cali y Buga (d) 
Vega de Supía (d) 
Toro (d) 
Governorship of Cuenca Cuenca  
Governorship of Guayaquil Guayaquil  
                                                
67 During the interregnum, this process was exacerbated, as I illustrate in Chapter 3.  
68 This table was created using the following sources: Zamira Díaz López, Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila, 
Roberto Luis Jaramillo Velásquez, Armando Martínez Garnica, and María Teresa Ripoll. “Quién Es Quién 
En 1810. Segunda Parte Guía de Forasteros Del Virreinato de Santa Fe Para El Segundo Semestre de 1810 | 
Banrepcultural.org.” Accessed May 2, 2015. 
http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/historia/guia_de_forasteros_segunda_parte/indice.htm. Francisco 
Silvestre. Descripción Del Reyno de Santa Fé de Bogotá: Escrita En 1789 Por D. Francisco Silvestre, 
Secretario Que Fue Del Virreinato Y Antiguo Gobernador de La Provincia de Antioquia. Biblioteca 
Universitaria de Cultura Colombiana. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1968. Tax-Collecting 
Districts. 1728-1815. Source: AGI, “Contaduría del Consejo de Indias”. Portal de Archivos Españoles,  
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Governorship of Santa Marta Santa Marta 
Talamaleque  
Ocaña 
Valledupar 
Villa de Tenerife 
Santa Marta 
Valledupar 
Ocaña 
Governorship of Antioquia Santa Fe de Antioquia 
Rionegro 
Villa de Nuestra Señora de la 
Candelaria de Medellín 
San José de Marinilla 
Antioquia 
Rionegro, Arma y 
Marinilla (d) 
Medellín (d) 
Zaragoza 
Los Remedios, San Martín 
de Cancán, San Bartolomé 
y Yolombo 
Governorship of Portobelo   
Governorship of Riohacha Riohacha Rio de la Hacha 
Govenorship of Darién del Sur   
Governorship of Veraguas y 
Alange 
  
Governorship of Chocó 
(provinces of Nóvita and Citará) 
 Nóvita 
Citará 
Governorship of los Llanos Pore 
Santiago de las Atalayas 
Chire 
 
Corregimiento of Tunja Tunja 
Muzo 
Tunja 
Leiva 
Los Muzos 
 
Corregimiento of Pamplona Pamplona 
San Juan de Girón 
Villa de San José de Cúcuta 
San Juan de Girón 
Pamplona 
 
Corregimiento of El Socorro Villa del Socorro 
Villa de San Gil 
Ciudad de Vélez 
Socorro 
Corregimiento of Mariquita Ibagué 
La Palma 
Tocaima 
Villa de San Bartolomé de 
Honda 
Honda 
Ambalema 
Governorship of Neiva Neiva 
Villa de Timaná 
La Plata 
Villa de Purificación 
Neiva 
Continuation of Table 4. 
 
The strong urban character of governance in Spain hindered the translation of 
mercantilist thought into an integrated colonial economy. Grafe has argued that fiscal 
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regulation was never unified in the colonies and the reason lay in the contractual nature 
of Spanish governance, which allowed towns to object to mercantilist strategies.69 
Attempts to unify the economy threatened the traditional channels of representation, 
which was strongly based on regional and urban structures. In addition to understanding 
the strength of municipal politics to explain the failure of centralizing Bourbon policies, I 
suggest we keep in mind the intricacies of Spanish fiscal and administrative-territorial 
structures—which the intendancy system sought to make uniform. The strength of 
regional autonomy in cities and towns was possible not only because of the strength of 
cabildos, but also that of the local revenue-collecting bureaucratic structures. This 
emphasis gained relevance, moreover in the last three decades of colonial rule, which 
signified the strengthening of a network of fiscal territoriality across the kingdom.  
Royal monopolies over sumptuary commodities (playing cards, tobacco, 
gunpowder) had existed in the colonies since the sixteenth century when the crown leased 
their operation to individuals.70 The reorganization of the monopolies starting in the 
1740s, however, shifted control of the system to direct royal administration. During 
Solis’s administration, the Spanish crown started to set up the rules and ordinances for 
the creation of the aguardiente monopoly in the territory under the jurisdiction of the 
cajas of Mompox. Viceroy Mejía de la Cerda characterized the state monopolies of 
                                                
69 Grafe asserts that although Spanish intellectuals developed a mercantilist body of theory, this theory did 
not translate into real life economic and political mercantilism. She describes Spain and its empire as a 
polycentric polity characterized by political participation through municipal, local, or regional institutions. 
Op. Cit. 257. 
70 John Leddy Phelan. The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1978. Phillip II created the Consulado de Mexico in 1592 and the one in 
Lima in 1613. Op. Cit. Phelan. 19. 
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aguardiente and tobacco as the “most useful and lucrative of the kingdom.” 
Paradoxically, the liquor monopoly was highly contested from moral and religious 
stances due to public health problems related to liquor and its harmful effects among 
Indian populations. For instance, a royal decree asked royal administrators about the 
convenience of ending the collection of revenue from producing this beverage and 
prohibiting it for the spiritual and physical benefit of the crown’s vassals.71 Mejía de la 
Cerda assessed the convenience of the aguardiente monopoly and recommended that the 
king keep this source of income because without this income it would be impossible to 
sustain the burdens of the viceroyalty.72  
The Royal Treasury of New Granada started to derive an important source of 
income from crown monopolies. Beginning during the rule of Viceroy Pedro Mejía de la 
Cerda (1761-1772), the monopoly system was modeled after the successful royal tobacco 
monopoly that the visitor-general José de Gálvez established in Mexico (1765-71).73 In 
1776, Viceroy Manuel Antonio Flores advanced the centralization of the monopoly by 
managing overproduction, eradicating the illegal cultivation of tobacco and promoting 
the high-quality production of tobacco.74 The next year, the king appointed the fiscal 
                                                
71 Ibid. 91. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Susan Deans-Smith’s study of the tobacco monopoly in Bourbon Mexico remains the most 
comprehensive study of royal monopolies in the Spanish empire. Susan Deans-Smith. Bureaucrats, 
Planters, and Workers: The Making of the Tobacco Monopoly in Bourbon Mexico. 1st ed. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1992. 
74 John Leddy Phelan’s works remains one of the most influential studies of Bourbon fiscal reforms and the 
Comunero Rebellion. Arguing that the crisis of 1781 was “a constitutional clash between imperial 
centralization and colonial decentralization,” Phelan diverges from interpretations that understand the 
rebellion as a protest that prefigured political independence or as a frustrated revolution from below. John 
Leddy Phelan. The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1978. 21. 
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reformer Juan Francisco Gutiérrez de Piñeres the Visitor General of the Tribunals of 
Justice and the Royal Treasury to take charge of the economic government of particular 
territories and to rationalize fiscal policy through the institution of the intendancy system. 
In the case of the liquor monopoly, the reform consisted of direct state administration of 
the monopoly in the kingdom, and its division into districts. John Phelan has described 
the vertical integration of this monopoly as follows: “the monopoly bought the raw 
material from the producers, manufactured the liquor, and sold it to the consumers.”75 In 
New Granada, the first steps towards establishing the intendancy plan included restricting 
of the areas of tobacco cultivation while increasing its price for the consumer. The system 
sought to increase administrative control over all provinces in both the collection of taxes 
and in promotion of regional economies. An intendancy was a territorial division under 
the rule of an intendant. The idea of intendencia and the intendente has it origins in the 
Spanish renaissance and the concerns with establishing central control over dispersed 
fiscal administrative activities.  
The intendancy system also sought to put into place a more uniform 
administrative system. As we saw in Chapter 1, multiple administrative systems ruled the 
kingdom of New Granada. A central characteristic of the intendancy system was 
therefore to substitute for administrative schemes that were not uniform. The local Royal 
Treasury offices (Cajas Reales) had jurisdiction over a territory demarcated in terms of 
public finances. This demarcation of financial jurisdiction could be general or 
particular—ascribed to a concrete area of the administration of a certain branch of the 
                                                
75 Ibid. 25. 
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treasury. When the branch is general to all treasury branches, it is called the Royal 
Treasury, and when it is of a particular income, the treasury administration divided it into 
separate sectors, e.g. playing cards, tobacco income, and liquor, among others. Adding to 
the special rules for the diverse tributary branches, an important source of revenue was 
collected from ecclesiastical tithes. The existence of this multiplicity of revenue-
collection systems was also at odds with Bourbon attempts to exercise effective central 
control.76 However, while the reform concentrated fiscal duties over an intendant in 
charge of clearly demarcated economic districts—regardless of their civil or ecclesiastical 
character—it also restricted the authority of the viceroy to political and military matters.77  
For the fiscal and territorial reform of the intendancy system to work, Gutierrez de 
Piñeres needed to centralize fiscal information about the kingdom’s cities and towns. He 
created a general superintendence office in Santa Fe that had jurisdiction over the royal 
monopolies. According to the royal degree for the establishment of an intendancy in 
Caracas in 1776, the intendants “most have knowledge of all the incomes, branches, or 
duties that belong to the best income administration of the Royal Treasury and the militia 
with the aim of promoting the population, agriculture, and commerce.”78 Therefore, upon 
his arrival, Gutiérrez de Piñeres sent requests to all governorships, corregimientos, 
cabildos, and royal treasuries within the Audiencia of Santa Fe asking for a report on the 
incomes that each administrative unit collected.79 The general superintendence started 
                                                
76 Fernando Floris Margadant. La Ordenanza de Intendentes para la Nueva España; ilusiones y logros. 
Libro: Memoria del IV Congreso de Historia del Derecho Mexicano (1986), t. II. 1988. 
77 Ibid. 6. 
78 AGI, Real Cédula de Intendencia de Ejército y Real Hacienda, Caracas. Legajo 470. 
79 AGN-Colombia, Miscelánea, SC.39,60,D.34. 1777-1795. “Ordenes despachadas a los gobiernos, 
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receiving such documentation in 1777 and the flow of correspondence lasted until 1782. 
Officials from the villa of Honda, the royal treasury of Quibdó, and the governorship of 
Popayan among others, sent reports stating the nature of the taxes levied in their 
jurisdictions. In the case of the customs office of Cartagena, royal officials reported back 
with information on the tariff that Spanish and foreign ships paid in the port city. Other 
officials such as the royal treasury of Portobelo responded that their governorship was 
void of Indians so no tributes could be collected.80 The decree also pointed out that the 
rulings to establish the intendancy system would have to vary in some aspects, as not all 
general dispositions are adaptable to local conditions. Gutiérrez de Piñeres’s orders 
reflected the broader attempt to shift the fiscal territoriality of New Granada in search for 
a more efficient tax collection system. Mapping out the state of local fiscal incomes was 
central for Gutierrez de Piñeres mission to impose a new tributary regime, which 
consisted mainly of strengthening the monopolies over aguardiente and tobacco.  
Gutiérrez de Piñeres’s measures caused popular discontent. The Comunero 
rebellion hindered the establishment of the Bourbon state’s prime structure of economic 
government for the Americas, which had been extremely successful in New Spain. The 
rebellion of 1781 began in Socorro, a settlement that gained autonomy from the town of 
San Gil and rose to the status of “town” in 1771. El Socorro’s agriculture, trade, 
population, and manufacturing economy grew throughout the century, animating its 
                                                                                                                                            
corregimientos, cabildos y cajas reales de la Real Audiencia de Santafé para que presten auxilios de 
informaciones al visitador general D. Juan Francisco Gutiérrez de Piñeres.” 
80 AGN, Caciques e Indios, 4, D. 49. “Carta de Tomás Díaz Barragán, Melchor Torres y Antonio Molina a 
Juan Francisco Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Regente Visitador, en que le notifican que en su gobierno no hay 
indios a los que se pueda exigir derecho alguno por su tribute”, Portobelo, 1780. 
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dwellers to pursue not only political but also economic autonomy.81 El Soccoro had 
become a commercial epicenter in New Granada. The status of town warranted Socorro 
an administrative structure, a cabildo. In addition, Socorro leaders negotiated the limits of 
the new jurisdiction with San Gil and justified control over a number of parishes 
(parroquias) with arguments that linked economics with geography.82  
The rebellion also exemplifies the extent to which local populations impacted the 
course of Spanish economic government in the colonies. More importantly, it is crucial to 
consider the consequences of the failed intendancy reform on the political and economic 
structure of New Granada. Phelan argued that Socorro’s aspirations of economic self-
determination planted the seeds of nineteenth-century federalism.83 I would add that it is 
not necessary to go farther into the nineteenth century to encounter the maximum 
expression of autonomic aspirations emerging from regional patrias in New Granada. 
The period of the interregnum (1808-1816) discussed in the next chapter can only be 
understood in light of this articulation between political economy and territorial shifts in 
the eighteenth century. New Granada was the only colony in which the Spanish 
monarchy was unable to apply this innovation in the 1770s. Although in 1783 the king 
ordered royal officials in New Granada to reintroduce the intendancy reform, viceroy 
Caballero y Góngora suggested that the kingdom was not prepared “to receive such 
                                                
81 Like Quito once, El Socorro became a center of manufacturing based on the cultivation of cotton, for the 
production of linens and blankets; the villa was also a producer of tobacco and cigarettes.  
82 Ibid. 41. 
83 Ibid.  
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innovation [the intendancy system].”84 The project remained in the minds of royal 
administrators as more iterations of the proposal emerged during the upcoming years. 
In its first version, the intendancy reform mapped out an economic geography that 
divided the viceroyalty into fiscal districts to further rationalize and centralize the royal 
monopolies of tobacco and liquor. The visitor general proposed the formation of five 
administrative districts in the cities of Santa Fe, Popayan, Honda, Panama, and Cartagena 
that were divided into a series of crown monopolies, which coincided with the territories 
of the parishes.85 The project to establish the intendencias was revisited in the 1790s after 
the heat of the Comuero revolution decreased. In a document of 1790, a royal report 
instructed how to establish intendancies in New Granada.86 As in the original project, all 
of the kingdom’s provinces should be subordinate to the General Intendancy of the 
province of Santa Fe and the superintendence of the Mint House. This proposal added 
new districts to the original proposal of Gutiérrez de Piñeros. In addition to Santa Fe, 
Cartagena, Popayan, and Panama, the proposition included Santa Marta, Riohacha and 
Cuenca and eliminated Honda. For Cartagena, the project suggested the appointment of a 
member of the military as an intendant. For instance, viceroy Caballero y Góngora had 
suggested the year before that an intendant should be appointed at least to the city of 
Cartagena, where “all products of the Royal Treasury are consumed in troops and 
                                                
84 Op. Cit. Relaciones e Informes, 471. 
85 John Leddy Phelan. The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1978, 23. 
86 AGN-Colombia. Virreyes, SC.61,17, D. 28.“Informe instructivo de los Puntos que para el 
Establecimiento de las Intendencias de este Virreinato con arreglo de la soberana voluntad del Rey y a la 
oportuna adopción de sus Reales disposiciones de que es comprehensiva la Real ordenanza que se rige las 
de Buenos Aires; me ha parecido deber proponer a SM a fin de que se digne decidir lo que fuere de su Real 
agrado”, 1790. 
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armaments.”87 This concern with the amount of resources that Cartagena absorbed from 
the total incomes of other provinces further supports evidence that points towards 
Cartagena’s dependence on the situado.  
This second proposal shifted the focus from the mere reorganization of the liquor 
and tobacco monopolies to offer local nuances, such as military expenditures, to the 
project to increase royal revenues. Different from Gutiérrez de Piñeres’s proposed plan, 
the later report proposed the establishment of an intendancy of the military government 
of Santa Marta and Riohacha. In terms of geographic demarcation, the proposed 
intendancies of Panama and Cartagena were modeled after the district of their bishoprics. 
The criteria for establishing intendancies in the coastal provinces responded to the 
interest to safeguard revenues collected from internal and external trading operations.  
Changes in jurisdictions had to take into account the distribution of resources to 
maintain a continued flow of revenue sufficient to support the main administrative 
functions. The proposal for the endowment for the intendant entailed the formation of a 
fund deriving its incomes from unifying the civil and military governments of the 
viceroyalty with the salaries of the Mint Houses and local royal treasuries. The separation 
of the provinces of Quito and Popayan proved the most challenging because of the 
blurred demarcation of their territories. How were they to separate the incomes of 
provinces such as Popayan and Quito? As we saw in Chapter 1, parts of Popayan 
belonged to the bishopric of Quito and other parts of Popayan depended on Santa Fe for 
civil matters. For instance, the tithes deriving from the Indian town of the city of Pasto, 
                                                
87 Op. Cit. Relaciones e Informes, 471. 
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the lieutenancy of the island of Tumaco, and the districts of Barbacoas and Iscuandé 
belonged to the bishopric of Quito, while the other non-ecclesiastical incomes belonged 
to the royal treasury of Popayan. The intendancy proposal sought to create two 
intendancies, one in Quito, and another one in Popayan, and slightly modify the territorial 
limits of both to aggregate the civil jurisdiction of Pasto to Quito.88 That is, matching the 
jurisdiction of Quito’s bishopric with that of the newly created intendancy. The 
imaginings of fiscal territoriality in this case attempted to solve the long-standing 
problem that overlapping jurisdictions posed for the management of the incomes of Quito 
and Popayan, a central problem for the good economic government of the colony.89 
 
Conclusion 
 
As this chapter demonstrates, fiscal reform unleashed a series of spatial reforms across 
New Granada. The reforms implied the expansion of fiscal bureaucracies, the attempted 
establishment of a new territorial organization for fiscal matters, and the elimination of 
non-viable territorial units. While all reforms sought to make the colony more legible for 
the purpose of increased revenue collection, their influence varied across the different 
regions within the viceroyalty. For the defensive coastal spaces, the dependence on yearly 
fiscal remittances helped maintain a tie with the Andean hinterlands. For the Andean 
                                                
88 Op. Cit.  
89 Within the jurisdiction of New Granada, the only intendancy that was established was that of Cuenca in 
1786. Santa Fe and Quito were to be next but their intendancies were never established.  
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hinterlands, the search for equality in the distribution of settlements provided a way to 
strengthen the already existing domestic economic circuits in the region. For provinces 
such as El Socorro, fiscal pressures conflicted with aspirations of economic and political 
autonomy built upon the prosperity of its manufacturing economy throughout the 
eighteenth century. All in all, Spanish revenue collection strategies clashed or helped 
deepen expectations about regional spaces.  
Lastly, as seen with the Plan Geográfico of 1772, cartographic representations 
aided the advancement of a narrative of geographic and administrative unity in New 
Granada that looked inwards towards Santa Fe and ignored Caribbean New Granada’s 
belonging to the Greater Caribbean space. Ernesto Bassi’s argument of early republican 
explicit strategies to decaribbeanize the nascent Colombian republic was long in the 
making. Moreno y Escandon’s representation of an unified New Granadian space that 
looked inwards towards Santa Fe, ignoring the Caribbean space, presents evidence of the 
colonial origins of this decaribbeanization strategy.90  
Bourbon landscapes of diverse political economies and jurisdictions defined the 
terrain of the revolutionary era in the kingdom of New Granada. The values that colonial 
provincials invested into their territories in defense of political autonomy and sovereignty 
were long in the making. Grasping these understandings of territory and political 
economy is crucial in order to further understanding the political economy of the 
fragmentation of New Granada into countless sovereign states during the French 
occupation of Spain starting in 1808.
                                                
90 Op. Cit. Bassi. 
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Chapter 3: Knowledge of Political Economy and the Search for Order 
during the Interregnum, 1808-1816 
 
Introduction 
 
As a response to the formation of the Spanish Supreme Council that was to rule after 
Napoleon invaded Spain, the New Granadian, Creole lawyer Camilo Torres, wrote the 
Memorial de Agravios or Memorial of Grievances in 1809.1 The Spanish Council was 
created in September 1808 to retain the colonies under Spanish rule, and under the threat 
of a French invasion of America. It established a principle of equality between Americans 
and Spaniards. Spanish liberals in the Peninsula called American deputies to participate 
in the deliberations of the Spanish junta. Torres complained of what he saw as a 
ridiculous number of Spanish American deputies on the council, which represented 
overseas Spanish dominions in the Peninsula.2 The Spanish Council instructed Americans 
to elect half the number of deputies that were allowed in the Peninsula. In the memorial, 
Torres condemned the different degrees of representation and expressed his desire to end 
inequalities between provinces across the empire.3 For him, the provinces of the Spanish 
                                                
1 Camilo Torres wrote his memorial after the Quiteños had erected an autonomous government council in 
August of 1809, that was overthrown violently by viceregal authorities a year later. 
2 Torres’ writing was never sent to the Spanish Junta, and in fact was not published until 1832. 
3 Francois Xavier-Guerra has demonstrated that the problem of representation was from the very beginning 
of the unrest in the Peninsula, the central problem of the Hispanic revolution. François-Xavier Guerra. 
Modernidad e Independencias: Ensayos sobre las Revoluciones Hispánicas. Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 
16. Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1992. 
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empire were essential and constitutive of the monarchy, and the number of deputies for 
the national council should derive from each province’s unique situation.4 
 Torres argued that American representation in the Spanish courts should take into 
account each colony’s population, territory, and wealth. For comparison he contrasted the 
most populated province of Spain, Galicia, which had around one million inhabitants, 
with the over two million people in the viceroyalty of New Granada. He then compared 
the extension of Spain with that of the viceroyalty, to point out that New Granada was 
three or four times larger than all of Spain in size. Next, he described the administrative 
partition of the viceroyalty, which was divided into twenty-two governments and 
corregimientos, over seventy towns (villas) and cities, around one thousand settlements, 
and seven or eight bishoprics.5 Torres’s intention was to demonstrate the significance of 
the country’s population, extension, and territorial jurisdictions in comparison to Spanish 
provinces in the Peninsula. The core of Torres’ argument, however, focused on the 
necessity of a government based on justice and equality between colony and metropole in 
light of America’s natural riches and potential wealth. 
Torres also highlighted the commercial and agricultural potential of the kingdom 
in an effort to advance a vision that conceived of New Granada as a cohesive territory. 
He underscored that New Granada had mastered the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and 
owned the Isthmus “that one day will receive ships from the East and South, and from the 
                                                
4 Camilo Torres, Representación del Cabildo de Bogota capital del Nuevo Reino de Granada a la Suprema 
Junta Central de España en el año de 1809. Imprenta de N. Lora, 1832. 8. En internet: 
http://www.banrepcultural.org/bicentenario/documentos/memorial_de_agravios.pdf 
5 Ibid. 11-12. 
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West and North.”6 He went further to state that New Granada occupied a prominent place 
within the scale of Spanish provinces, and suggested that without dependency on the 
Peninsula, it could become a powerful state in the world. Camilo Torres’ writing also 
suggests a shift in collective Creole imagination away from a predominantly extractive 
economy based on mining, to one that emphasized the importance of New Granada’s 
agricultural products and geographic advantages for trade. Torres warned that “the 
precarious wealth of metal” was not the cause of European high esteem for America7.  
Instead, he thought, the fertile soil, with inexhaustible potential for natural production, 
along with the weather, was among the incontestable advantages that made New Granada 
“the barn, the reservoir of all Europe.”8 In Torres’s view, the interdependence of Europe 
and America was predicated on existing economic relations and the potential of New 
Granada to contribute to a massive trading network in the New World.  
Torres’ writing is just one example of the variety of ways colonial provincials 
connected the maintenance of New Granada’s territorial integrity, and the search for a 
political order during the crisis, to visions of political economy and territory.9 During 
independence, Spanish Americans expanded this rhetoric to redefine the relationship 
between metropolis and colonies, and to renegotiate their place in the administrative and 
territorial hierarchy of the viceroyalty. Historians of independence have studied Torres’s 
Memorial, and other texts of the period, to highlight the genesis of a national 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 Op. Cit. Camilo Torres, Memorial de Agravios. 9. 
8 Ibid. 10. 
9 The idea of New Granada’s economic potential, however, was long in the making, and I trace it back to 
the creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739, in the first chapter of my dissertation. 
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consciousness and its importance as inspiration for American emancipation.10 For 
decades, historians focused on Torres’ representation of pervasive resentment among 
Spanish Americans toward Spaniards, and on the way in which Torres’ rhetoric shaped 
the ideology of independence from Spain and the birth of the Colombian nation.11 When 
Torres wrote the memorial in 1809, however, the majority of the Spanish American 
lettered elite of the kingdom did not expect the crisis to result in complete independence. 
Torres’s views were hardly a manifesto of a new nation.12 He urged real union and 
fraternity between Europeans and Americans under the principle of equality. The 
unexploited riches of the colony, Torres asserted, granted him the right to demand greater 
participation of Americans in the Spanish Council, and to define their own destiny.13 He 
blended his discontent about American political representation in Spain with ideas that 
praised the untapped wealth of America’s natural resources. 
 The historiography has not paid attention to this dimension of Torres’s memoir, or 
of the memoriales produced by those like Torres all around the continent. Territoriality 
and economic representations of New Granada’s provinces punctuated discussions about 
                                                
10 Luis Evelio Álvarez Jaramillo, “Del Memorial de agraviosa la carta política”, en Diana Soto Arango, 
Miguel Ángel Puig-Samper y Justo Cuño Bonito, eds., Ilustración y educación: comentario de textos, 2ª 
ed., Tunja/Madrid, Doce Calles, 2009, p. 18. Alberto Saladino García. “El americanismo de los 
independentistas como fuente de nacionalismo.” Cuadernos Americanos, 136 (México, 2011/2). Rafael 
Gómez Hoyos has adverted that the Memorial de Agravios has been misinterpreted as “the real codification 
of the inspiring principles of the American emancipation.” See Rafael Gómez Hoyos. La Independencia de 
Colombia. Colección Independencia de Iberoamérica 11. Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1992. 
11 The advent of an ideology of equal political representation in Torres, however, transpired a sustained yet 
ambiguous critique of the monarchical order. 
12 The Independence of Spanish America as an unexpected outcome of a sudden collapse is a fundamental 
thesis proposed by François-Xavier Guerra that takes distance from nationalistic historia patrias. Op. Cit. 
Guerra. 
 13 Jaime Jaramillo Uribe. El Pensamiento Colombiano En El Siglo XIX. 2. ed. Bogotá: Editorial Temis, 
1974, 110.. 
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the nature of the interregnum’s political order and territorial configuration. As the crisis 
grew into a quest for complete independence from Spain, notions of freedom and wealth 
became entrenched into narratives about geographical interdependence among New 
Granada’s regions. Interregnum territoriality was not only expressed in the constant 
redrawing of administrative boundaries, economic and fiscal reform, but also in symbolic 
values by which colonial provincials imagined the relations among distinct geographic 
regions within the political frameworks of centralism and federalism.14 
In this chapter, I examine the ways in which aspirations to maintain and expand 
the sources of revenue and secure access natural and geographic resources shaped city-
states’ projects to guarantee the political existence of their sovereign autonomous states. 
The crisis urged the political and economic elites of cities such as Cartagena, Socorro, 
Quito, Santa Fe, Loja, etc., to advance in the definition of their projects of economic 
improvement while engaged in disputes about the desired political order. Local 
reflections on political economy organized territorial conceptions in New Granada, 
leading to a number of inter-provincial conflicts. The revolutionary councils of New 
Granada constantly reassessed the situation in the colony, promoted economic reforms, 
and evaluated the threats to territorial integrity and access to resources when engaged into 
debates about political representation, sovereignty, autonomy, and the nature the political 
system.  
                                                
14 David Blackbourn states that there are two ways in which history occurs in space. He distinguishes 
between the real space, as the physical reality, and the imagined space as a cultural construct framed by the 
observer in which people invest landscape with symbolic values. See David Blackbourn. The Conquest of 
Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany. 1st American ed. New York: Norton, 
2006. 
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Relentlessly seeking to shift their borders and establish relations with one another, 
the revolutionary governments saw the political turmoil as the perfect opportunity to 
advance the promises that Enlightenment reform had failed to deliver.15 In my approach, 
I trace the emergence of potential regions and how the crisis and wars created an opening 
to reimagine local, regional, and viceregal political economies. In the midst of the crisis, 
this reimagining created new possible centers making evident that New Granada was 
deeply fragmented along geographic, economic, and geopolitical lines. Late colonial and 
early republican struggles for sovereignty and political centralization in New Granada 
were the result of both the political contingencies of the revolutionary era, its interrelated 
spatial practices, and claims to territory in political economy discourse. Spanish 
Americans symbolic and real claims over natural and geographic resources in New 
Granada, therefore, offer a window through which to explore the political economy of 
space in a crumbling colonial society.  
By bringing into the forefront the interaction among political economy and 
territoriality in local independence discourses, my research reveals that the central 
preoccupation of the revolutionary rhetoric was much more than the legitimization of the 
rebellion against Spain.16 The struggle for independence was also an inter-provincial 
                                                
15 Advancing significantly our understanding of the failed search for unity during interregnum Daniel 
Gutierrez Ardila has demonstrated that process of fragmentation of New Granada in provincial 
sovereignties, resulted in the conformation of an inter-provincial diplomacy that worked as foreign 
relations. Gutiérrez Ardila, Daniel. Un Nuevo Reino: Geografía Política, Pactismo Y Diplomacia Durante 
El Interregno En Nueva Granada, 1808-1816. 1a. ed. Colección Bicentenario / Centro de Estudios En 
Historia. Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2010. 
16 Rebecca Earle. “Creole Patriotism and the Myth of the ‘Loyal Indian.’” Past & Present, no. 172 (August 
1, 2001): 125–45. Rebecca Earle. The Return of the Native: Indians and Myth-Making in Spanish America, 
1810-1930. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007. 
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skirmish for the real and symbolic control of the land and its resources. For instance, a 
leading territorial unit such as Santa Fe justified its status as the capital and sought the 
incorporation of neighboring territories. Santafereños did so in order to bolster their 
chances of political survival and economic advancement, taking hold of arguments of 
geography to support their city’s role as center of an economy of knowledge.17 For the 
case of Cartagena, its territorial strategy factored circulation and free trade into a political 
economy that revolved around its role as defense center of the kingdom. On the other 
hand, Quito’s pretenses of autonomy were inextricably tied to the reinvention of its 
political economy and territorial configuration as explained in Chapter 1. Local patriotic 
visions about how best to integrate disparate territories into unified wholes rendered new 
representations of the future and the territory that most scholarship of the enlightenment, 
mostly centered in Santa Fe, has overlooked. The kingdom of New Granada was 
characterized by an asymmetry in the centers of political and economic power and the 
advancement of arguments involving rights over space lies a the core of independence 
debates.18 
In the first part of this Chapter, I illustrate how the crisis of representation led to 
an opening in the creation of local discourses of political economy using the cases of 
                                                
17 Altering colonial policy on territorial organization, santafereños allowed smaller territories to rise to the 
status of towns and cities, creating their own territorial assemblies, and controlling their natural resource 
exploitation and local revenues. “Suplemento al Diario Político de Santa Fé”, Escrito de Ignacio de 
Herrera.” Septiembre 25, 1810.  
18 Jonathan Amith definition of spatial practices is two fold. On the one hand, spatial practices can involve 
the “reconstruction of space (and place)” through the movement of people and objects across a landscape. 
On the other hand, spatial practices can involve political and discursive practices such as the definition of 
administrative boundaries or arguments involving rights over space. Jonathan D. Amith. The Mobius Strip: 
A Spatial History of Colonial Society in Guerrero, Mexico. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 
2005, 11. 
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Tunja, El Socorro, and Loja. The second section reconstructs ideas of geographical and 
economic interdependence, and legal autonomy, as arguments adopted by both centralists 
and federalists in their attempts to recompose political power. The third section 
reconstructs colonial provincial strategies, rhetoric, and imaginings of their cities (Santa 
Fe, Quito, Cartagena—and to a lesser extent Mompox and Santa Marta) as centers of 
regional political economy, or as cores of the kingdom. The last section recreates the 
spatial practices that the leaders of the state of Cundinamarca utilized to legitimize an 
expansionist policy that aimed at recovering the lost unity.  
 
 
Early Aspirations of Local Territorial and Economic Reform 
 
In January of 1809, the Supreme Spanish Council invited Spanish Americans to elect 
their own deputies. In order to ensure the colonies remained under Spanish rule and that 
Spain retained access to American resources to fight the French enemy, the Spanish 
Council proclaimed equality between Americans and Spaniards. The Council declared 
that thereafter, Spanish overseas dominions would be treated not as colonies but as “an 
essential and integral part of the Spanish monarchy.”19 Consequently, the Council granted 
Americans “national representation” and asked them to send deputies to participate in the 
                                                
19 “Real Orden de la Junta Suprema Central Gubernativa del Reino organizando la representación de las 
Indias en ella.” In: Ángel Rafael Almarza Villalobos y Armando Martínez Garnica (eds.). Instrucciones 
para los diputados del Nuevo Reino de Granada y Venezuela ante la Junta Central Gubernativa de España y 
las Indias. Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2007, 52-53. 
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deliberations of the Central Council. Francois Xavier Guerra has argued, however, that 
when the Spanish Council spoke about the “dominions” of Spain, it established the idea 
that the Indies would not be dependent on the king—which was the usual consideration 
within the monarchical pact—but on the territory of the Spanish Peninsula.20 In this 
sense, the Spanish Council appealed to an ambiguous norm of political equality that 
although predicated an equality, ended up foregrounding a principle of territorial 
subordination. 
 Linked to this territorial subordination, the Central Council conceded the limited 
right of political representation to Americans. Each viceroyalty and all capitanías 
generales could elect a deputy to represent American territories in the Spanish temporary 
government. As we saw with Camilo Torres’ complaints, representation was unequal. 
While the number of elected Spanish deputies was 32, the council only allowed American 
provinces to elect 9 deputies. After a number of local elections held within the members 
of the cabildos of cities and towns across New Granada, each cabildo created a shortlist 
of three possible deputies, and then lots were drawn to define one deputy per each 
cabildo. Once each cabildo elected its representative, the names of the deputies were sent 
to the capital city where the oidores of the Audiencia created a shortlist of three deputies 
for the whole kingdom. Once again, lots were drawn and Antonio de Narvaez became the 
representative of the whole kingdom on September 16 of 1809. The deputy was to 
represent “a pyramid of territorial communities: the kingdom, city-provinces, and through 
                                                
20 Op. Cit. Guerra. 
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them, secondary cities and towns of lesser importance”.21 Spanish authorities asked the 
different city councils to craft a set of instrucciones (instructions) to express the 
“branches and objects of national interest that have to be promoted” by the deputy of 
each kingdom in the Spanish Council.22 In the following months, the different cabildos of 
the kingdom prepared the document.  
The instrucciones dealt with the most pressing reforms that different provinces 
requested of the Spanish Council while maintaining a sustained loyalty to the 
monarchical order. The cabildos in charge of crafting the instructions acted as 
representatives of the towns, villages, and the urban territorial order under their control. 
For New Granada, there are six surviving instrucciones penned by the cabildos of 
Popayán, Quito, Loja, Tunja, Socorro, and Panamá. Other texts penned during the same 
months are Camilo Torres’ memorial and the memorial by lawyer Ignacio de Herrera y 
Vergara, which instead of focusing on one particular province, presented a general vision 
of the kingdom in relation to the Spanish empire. The judicial advisors of the councils of 
each provincial capital wrote the instrucciones.23 Therefore, they reflect the interests of 
both Spanish and Creole urban bureaucrats, landowners, merchants, and members of the 
clergy both who responded mostly to local concerns. 
 City and town councils also used the instrucciones to bargain for reforms that 
derogated Bourbon alterations on provincial jurisdictions. A case in point is in the 
                                                
21 Guerra studied the instrucciones of New Spain. Op. Cit. Guerra, 227-228. 
22 Op. Cit. “Real Orden.” 
23 Annino underlines the importance of reconstructing the urban dimension in the birth and development of 
liberalism. Annino, Antonio. “Prácticas criollas y liberalismo en la crisis del espacio urbano colonial.” El 
29 de noviembre de 1812 en la ciudad de México. Secuencia, Norteamérica, 0, ene. 1992. Disponible en: 
<http://secuencia.mora.edu.mx/index.php/Secuencia/article/view/5084>. Accessed: 05 dic. 2014. 
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instrucción of the Tunja province. At the end of the eighteenth century, the cabildo of 
Socorro devised a strategy to control and protect its taxable income and trade operations 
from other dominant territorial units. In 1795, the cabildo of Socorro achieved autonomy 
not only from San Gil, as I discuss in the first and second chapters, but from the 
corregimiento of Tunja, becoming the capital of its own corregimiento.24 Consequently, 
the cities of Giron and Velez saw their status decline while cities such as Socorro and 
Pamplona achieved administrative autonomy.25 As a result of late century territorial 
reforms, the cabildo of Tunja not only lost control over Socorro but also over vast 
territories such as Mérida, Barinas, Pamplona and Sogamoso.26  
The call for a representative of the kingdom and the instruction documents 
presented the opportunity for provinces such as Tunja that had lost territorial jurisdictions 
during the eighteenth century, to petition for territorial reform. In Tunja’s instrucción of 
October 6 of 1809, the cabildo petitioned for the erection of a Royal Treasury in the city 
to improve tax collection in its territory.  In doing so, Tunja could gain autonomy from 
                                                
24 The corregimiento was the territorial jurisdiction of the Corregidor who collected the Indian tribute, 
administered justice, and organized labor supply for public and private works. 
25 Martínez Garnica, Armando, “La independencia en Pamplona y el Socorro”, en Revista de Santander, - 
Segunda Época, ed: División Editorial Y De Publicaciones UIS, Universidad Industrial De Santander 
v.5 fasc.n/a, 2010, 18.  
http://www.uis.edu.co/webUIS/es/mediosComunicacion/revistaSantander/revista5/indepPamplonaSocorro.
pdf 
26 Federica Morelli for example demonstrates that is not coincidence that in the territories in which the first 
revolutionary councils were formed, were precisely those cities that, like Quito, had lost control over its 
territory during the Bourbon Reforms. Federica Morelli. Territorio o nación: reforma y disolución del 
espacio imperial en Ecuador, 1765-1830. Historia de la sociedad política; Variation: Historia de la 
sociedad política. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2005. 13. 
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the capital of the kingdom, Santa Fe, and the right to collect Indian tribute.27 
Additionally, the cabildo promoted the creation of a bishopric in its province, and 
justified the appeal by citing the province’s extension, its important number of 
inhabitants, and an income that surpassed 90 million pesos.28 Establishing a bishopric 
implied the addition of another layer of fiscal administrative muscle to manage, collect, 
and centralize the revenue in ecclesiastical tithes within the jurisdiction of Tunja.   
Eloy Valenzuela, a well-respected figure of the region that encompassed the cities 
of Socorro, Girón, Bucaramanga, and Pamplona, sharply criticized the plan of Tunja for 
considering tithe collection a superficial solution for increasing economic wealth. 
Valenzuela was a Franciscan priest in the city of Bucaramanga and had worked as a 
disciple of Jose Celestino Mutis in the Botanical Expedition. During the elections of 
1809, the councils of Antioquia and Mariquita nominated Valenzuela twice for deputy of 
the kingdom. The council of Antioquia highlighted Valenzuela’s knowledge of the 
political economy and the geography of the kingdom. The council considered that 
Valenzuela’s insights about commerce, navigation, and agriculture allowed him to judge 
the interests of each territory and trace the paths for exports and imports.29 Valenzuela’s 
criticisms to Tunja’s aspirations stemmed from his belief that although the erection of 
bishoprics could encourage an increase in public income, it did nothing to stimulate 
production. 
                                                
27 “Instrucción que el Cabildo de la ciudad de Tunja da al excelentísimo señor Antonio Narváez, diputado 
para la Suprema Junta Central de España por el Nuevo Reino de Granada de los puntos que ha de promover 
en beneficio público, cuando lo estime por conveniente y oportuno.” Ibid. Instrucciones. 
28 Ibid. “Instrucción que el Cabildo de la ciudad de Tunja…”, 142. 
29 Op. Cit. Gutiérrez Ardila, 128. 
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Amid the political crisis, Valenzuela published his opinions in 1810 about the 
principles of political economy that should govern the kingdom. The objects of natural 
history, its diffusion, and the promotion of its application to the necessities of a “mighty 
and flourishing industry” in the kingdom, became the core of Valenzuela’s reflections.30 
Valenzuela revealed the contrasting political economies in the kingdom when he alluded 
to the content of the 1809 instrucciones. He stated that none of them mentioned anything 
about manufactures. He criticized the imperial economic model because it was only 
interested in the colonial economy as source of growth and development for the 
metropole through the exploitation of raw materials. Valenzuela’s stance reveals a Creole 
shift from unquestioned support of the monarchical order towards an attitude that probed 
Spain’s overreliance on mining. Valenzuela composed a list of economic principles for 
the benefit of the kingdom, emphasizing that mines by themselves and without the aid of 
the arts, “promote idleness, luxury, licentiousness, and do not encourage the increase of 
population.”31 In his stance, Valenzuela distanced himself from the traditional 
mercantilist approach, in which European empires saw the colonies as suppliers of raw 
materials and consumer goods to imagine New Granada as a producer of manufactured 
goods.32 Valenzuela’s utopia was a new way of looking at the role of the colonies and 
ultimately advocated a departure from traditional colonial economies.  
                                                
30 “Principios de economía”. Valenzuela, Eloy. Juan Eloy Valenzuela Y Mantilla: Escritos (1786-1834). 1st 
ed. Bucaramanga, Colombia: Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2006. 52. 
31 Op. Cit. Valenzuela. 53. 
32 José Luís Cardoso. “Free Trade, Political Economy and the Birth of a New Economic Nation: Brazil, 
1808–1810.” Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 
(Second Series), 27, 2009, 183-204.  
185-186. 
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Coming from the northeastern region where a flourishing manufacture economy 
was on the rise, Valenzuela believed that promoting manufactures and trade was the right 
way of making the whole colony prosper. Replicating some of Valenzuela’s ideas, the 
cabildo of Socorro, namely Creole Tadeo Gómez Durán—formerly nominated as deputy 
of the kingdom—outlined its economic projects in its instrucción of October 20, 1809.33 
Similarly to Tunja, the leaders of El Socorro expressed their aspirations to improve their 
territorial economies. The instrucción began with a description of the territorial limits of 
the province and its jurisdictions, which was divided into three territorial units: villa del 
Socorro (the capital) villa of San Gil, and the city of Velez. In arguing their case, city 
leaders in Socorro imagined an extended territory that connected trade networks through 
improved communications. The cabildo pointed out that opening the roads of Carare, 
Opón, and Chucurí would extend the limits of the province from the eastern part of the 
Guacha mountain range to the Magdalena River—the main link between the Caribbean 
coast and the capital city of Santa Fe.34 Besides ideas for promoting internal trade, the 
cabildo of Socorro advanced an anti-slave trade stance and advocated free foreign trade. 
The liberal ideas of Gómez Durán were well expressed when he stated that “Being the 
trade of Negroes was degradation of human nature”, “we beg the deputy to solicit the 
prohibition of such commerce.”35 He further expressed “ideas of humanity and justice” 
                                                
33 Born in 1769, Gómez Durán had received his education in Santa Fe, and became a prominent figure in 
the central eastern region of New Granada. Renán Silva. Los ilustrados de Nueva Granada, 1760-1808: 
genealogía de una comunidad de interpretación. Universidad Eafit, 2002, 171. 
34 “Instrucción que da el Muy Ilustre Cabildo, Justicia y Regimiento de la Villa del Socorro al Diputado del 
Nuevo Reyno de Granada a la Junta Suprema y Central Gubernativa de España e Indias, 1809”, in 
Instrucciones…130. 
35 Ibid. 133. 
 151 
when he asked the deputy of the kingdom to petition for the distribution of the lands of 
the Indian resguardos on equal parts, making them owners and exempt from tribute. The 
members of the cabildo of Socorro were perhaps among the liberalist-oriented leaders of 
New Granada. Defender of a regional political economy that safeguarded their local 
economic and administrative autonomy, Gómez Durán took stances that tapped into the 
global political economy concerns of the era of slavery and free trade.36  
The opening of local discourses of political economy during the crisis is also 
visible in the instrucción of the cabildo of Loja, part of the Audiencia of Quito, which 
promoted measures to liberalize the trade of the cinchona bark (quina) in Loja. After 
countless controversies by 1808, the Crown only allowed quinine extracted from Loja to 
be exported to the Royal Pharmacy.37 Discontents around the management of the 
cinchona production appeared as the most pressing issue for the members of the cabildo 
of Loja.38 The first article of the instruccion of Loja pointed out that Loja produced the 
best quinines, which were sent to the Royal Pharmacy in Madrid.39 The vecinos of this 
province, the instrucción stated, sought economic subsistence through the production and 
trade of the bark. On the eve of independence, the cabildo of Loja petitioned that the 
                                                
36 Ibid. 132. 
37 Before 1790 before the 1790s was a government affair. However, as Matthew Crawford illustrates, after 
the 1790s a new free trade policy allowed private individuals to cultivate cinchona trees. See Matthew 
James Crawford. Empire’s Experts the Politics of Knowledge in Spain’s Royal Monopoly of Quina (1751-
1808). [La Jolla]: University of California, San Diego, 2009. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/fullcit?p3358583 
288. 
38 The members of the cabildo included the Corregidor and oidor of the city of Loja, Tomás Ruiz Gómez 
de Quevedo, and the recently named deputy for the kingdom of New Granada for the Spanish council, the 
Creole José Mejía de Lequerica. 
39 “Instrucción que se forma el ilustre Cabildo de Loja para que se dirija al diputado representante del 
virreinato, en que se comprende esta provincia, y promueva sus artículos ante la Suprema Junta Central 
(…).” In Instrucciones, 157. 
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quinines that were not sent to the Royal Pharmacy were left for free trade, under the 
condition that the chief of the customs reviewed them before shipment.40 As in the case 
of Socorro, the cabildo of Loja seized the opportunity to present an instrucción to the 
Spanish junta in search of redefining the province’s territorial economy within 
aspirations of free trade.  
In the instrucciones of 1809, different visions of territory echoed long standing 
provincial aspirations of economic, political, and territorial reform. The instrucciones of 
Tunja and Socorro reveal deep tensions amongst cities-villas, which took the political 
opening as an opportunity to scramble the map and boundaries of territorialities. The 
projects of Tunja, El Socorro, and Loja highlight local aspirations to strengthen their 
regional political economies. Another set of projects re-created new centers within the 
kingdom, in order to reconstruct New Granada’s integrity as a whole. The crisis of 
representation of the interregnum planted the seeds of local discourses of political 
economy, which questioned the territorial hierarchy of the viceroyalty within empire and 
of different cities across the kingdom. The different provincial councils that deposed 
viceregal authorities starting in 1809 showcased these discourses in justifying their 
autonomous sovereign states using arguments of geographical interdependence to support 
both federalist and centralist views.  
                                                
40 This petition also revealed a tension between the Corregidor Tomás Ruiz Gómez de Quevedo and the 
botanist-chemist in charge of overseeing the shipping of the bark. The sixth article of the instrucción 
denounced the work of botanist-chemist Vicente Olmedo. Olmedo had been appointed in 1790 to oversee 
the collection and preparation of cinchona bark in quinine, and to respond to the problem of scarcity of the 
tree. The text denounces Olmedo for having smuggled the barks, harming the “bark collectors and peons” 
by no paying them, and discarding great quantities of bark to please his own commercial interests. For the 
members of the cabildo of Loja, Olmedo’s exaggerated salary and idleness stood in the way of making 
quinine extraction more productive and faithful to the interests of the crown. Ibid. 164. 
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Geographies of Centralism and Federalism 
 
In very few months, the authority formerly held by the king and his delegates in the 
colony was divided amongst a number of provincial entities.41 New Granadians 
questioned the legitimacy of the Spanish Central Council and later the Consejo de 
Regenecia and exercised the alleged rights of popular sovereignty vis-à-vis the absence of 
the king. Several cities, including Quito, Caracas, Cartagena, and Santa Fe declared 
autonomy from the Consejo. The first city to create an autonomous council was Quito on 
August of 1809 although this attempt lasted less that three months. Caracas followed on 
April of 1810, then Santa Fe followed on July 20, Cartagena on August 14 and Quito 
reinstated its junta on September 19. During the first months of the revolution, all newly 
created autonomous councils (juntas) crafted new constitutions and declared sustained 
loyalty to King Ferdinand VII. In their exercise of political power, Spanish Americans 
attempted to transform their long-standing political economy discourses and territorial 
aspirations into actual policies, while they struggled to reach consensus on the best way 
to reconstruct political unity from within.  
Different views on how to organize New Granada in political and economic terms 
which brought imaginings of the kingdom’s geographical interdependence, set 
monarchists, centralists, and federalists against each other. In different degrees, both 
federalists and centralists promoted a redefinition of the relationship between Spain, its 
colonies, and the provinces of the kingdom. The lengthy negotiations that led to the 
                                                
41 Under pressure from the French army in Iberia, the Spanish Central Council dissolved in January of 1810 
and was replaced by the Consejo de Regencia (Regency Council). 
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creation of centralist and federalist plans in the kingdom are complex and is not my aim 
to reconstruct them here.42 In this section, however, I focus on discussing arguments 
related to political economy and territoriality that animated the debates between those 
advocating for a centralist government and their counterparts who supported the 
federation.  
Lawyer Ignacio Herrera y Vergara who advocated for Bourbon centralism sharply 
critiqued political systems characterized by multiple sovereignties. In his “Reflections 
from an Impartial American to the Deputy of the Kingdom” of 1809, he expressed 
apprehension about the fragmented nature of power and law in New Granada. Spanish 
legislation was often contradictory and split into distinct provincial legal codes. In 
America, Herrera asserted, each province demanded particular laws, and “this is contrary 
to a nation that is subjected to one monarch”. By advocating for the development of 
uniform legal codes, Herrera anticipated the clash among federalists and centralists, 
which spanned the interregnum and several decades of republican rule.43 One of the 
strongest proponents of centralism in the years to come was Antonio Nariño (1765-1824), 
formerly accused of and incarcerated for translating and publishing the Déclaration des 
droits de l'homme et du citoyen, (“Rights of Man and of the Citizen”) in 1793 and an 
advocate of complete independence from Spain. 
In his satirical newspaper La Bagatela, Nariño projected a hypothetical situation 
in which he was a sovereign ruler with full powers throughout the kingdom. “My idea is 
                                                
42 Daniel Gutierrez has thoroughly described the development of the negotiations that led to the creation of 
the first congress. See Gutierrez, 281-339. 
43 Ignacio de Herrera y Vergara “Reflexiones que hace un Americano imparcial al diputado de este Nuevo 
Reino de Granada para que las tenga presentes en su misión.” In Op. Cit. Instrucciones…61. 
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not to govern as I wish”, he asserted, “but that my beloved Neogranadians govern 
themselves”. In his supposition, Nariño requested the presence of the deputies of all 
provinces to present their will in front of him, “in a Congress over which I will preside.” 
Nariño then described that the general will of the provinces consisted in establishing 
sovereign states that were independent not only from Spain and other European nations, 
but also from their old capitals. The provinces would establish the limits of their new 
polities guided by their old provincial limits, he added. In his hypothetical scenario, 
Nariño supported the creation of sovereign states and sarcastically encouraged all 
provinces to recognize each other and made a call for “other powers in Europe, the 
Chinese emperor, and the Great Kan of the tartars to recognize them as well.”44  
Ridiculing the union of the kingdom in a federative congress of sovereign provinces, 
Nariño criticized the president of the state of Cundinamarca—the name given to the 
province of Santa Fe—Jorge Tadeo Lozano, defender, alongside Camilo Torrres, of a 
federal political organization for the kingdom.  Nariño defended a centralist political 
organization and therefore the incorporation of towns and provinces into a new state, with 
its center at Santa Fe, disregarding their current capitals and cabeceras.  
Nariño judged the situation of the interregnum and described it as a selfish dispute 
for territory.45 He observed that the atomization of provincial polities and the ongoing 
revolution resembled “more a dispute over lands, than a real political transformation to 
recover freedom”. He criticized the course that the revolution had taken, pointing out that 
                                                
44 Antonio Nariño, La Bagatela, “Mi dictamen sobre el Gobierno que conviene al reino de la Nueva 
Granada” (Santa Fe, domingo 28 de julio de 1811, tomo 1, núm. 3), 19.  
45 Territoriality is the activity of defending, controlling, excluding, and including against others. Op. Cit, 
Cox, 1. 
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“daily, there are more papers in New Granada about the boundaries of the provinces, than 
there were in the old audiencias about the limits of the haciendas.”46 Not only was Nariño 
opposed to dividing the kingdom in sovereign states, but also condemned New Granada 
provincial leaders’ overemphasis on the right to sovereignty. He sharply criticized the 
preeminence of elite Creole economic interests over the general force that should drive 
emancipation: a return to the lost freedom.47 Interregnum discourses about freedom 
frequently opposed this idea to the despotic Spanish government that for centuries 
hindered the realization of the kingdom’s potential. Nariño described the revolution 
exalting great virtues such as freedom that would eventually banish Spanish institutions 
such as the Inquisition and slavery from America. Nariño’s freedom concretizes in a pact 
or law sanctioned through the general will. All state decisions in Nariño’s model should 
emanate from Cundinamarca as the center of the republic.48  
Nariño’s centralist government stemmed from an understanding of the strength of 
New Granada in relation to merging into a single polity all its territories, population, 
wealth, and enlightenment.49 For Nariño, the efficient exploitation of land and natural 
resources was the first step in achieving the construction of a new political system. The 
federal project, he argued, ignores the gap between law and reality. In real life, the 
provinces fell short, lacked income, tribunals, militia, schools, and universities. If the 
provinces united, the great variety of products in different altitudes, Nariño sustained, 
                                                
46 La Bagatela, April 12 of 1812. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
49 La Bagatela, Num. 5, domingo 11 de agosto de 1811, “Continuación de mi dictamen sobre el gobierno 
de la Nueva Granada”, 40.  
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will support the prospect of integrating the provinces through commerce. To make sure 
would each province’s provisions were met, he foresaw a system in which Andean 
regions demanded foodstuffs such as plantain and sugar cane from coastal and warm 
weather provinces. In return, highland and cold weather provinces could supply coastal 
areas with wheat, potatoes, and artichokes.50 Nariño found that the diversity of ecological 
regions made the integration and centralization of the kingdom possible. 
In contrast to Nariño’s stances, the council of the coastal city of Cartagena 
justified federalism by taking hold of particular interpretations of territory and natural 
resources. They supported the existence of different provincial legal codes to rule the 
kingdom. The commercial elite of Cartagena did not conceive of the kingdom as a 
“natural” unit. Different political economies needed different legal frameworks. 
Legislators, the Cartageneros explained, should become familiar with the localities of the 
country and with its natural wealth. In their opinion, general laws were not suitable for a 
kingdom with countless provinces whose character and interests differed. A philosopher, 
they pointed out, referring to Russia, asked if “an extensive empire that embraces all 
kinds of climates, from the coldest to the hottest, would oppose a powerful obstacle to 
legislators? Could the same code be advisable to such different regions?” They claimed 
New Granada presented a similar situation, because “its opposite temperaments influence 
the character of its dwellers”, and that the differences between “the man that inhabits the 
snowcapped peaks of the Andes, and the one that lives in the burning weather of our 
coasts” overrode other concerns. The colonial elite of Cartagena, therefore, warned that a 
                                                
50 Ibid. 
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general law would fail to promote prosperity in provinces of differing, and even 
opposing, necessities.51 José Fernández Madrid and Manuel Rodríguez Torices, both 
members of Cartagena’s elite, surmised that coastal locations surrounded by sterile lands 
needed laws to promote commerce and navigation, whereas provinces with fertile lands 
and well-populated areas should stimulate agriculture and arts.52  
 A group of Creoles in Santa Fe supported federalism and presented a similar 
argument to that of Rodríguez and Fernández. They summarized their political ideas in a 
set of principles of political economy. Joaquín Camacho, former Corregidor of 
Pamplona, professor of philosophy and public law, and member of the Botanical 
Expedition, published his serialized “Principles of Political Economy” (Principios de 
Economía Política) in the Diario Político between 1810 and 1811. Over several issues of 
the newspaper, the principles of political economy transformed into the principles of a 
representative government. In the first issues, the principles referred to issues of trade 
before beginning to reflect on aspects of the good government of the colony. Referring to 
the negotiations taking place among different provinces for establishing the terms for a 
general congress, the “Principles” then justified the reunification of a general congress of 
the United Provinces of New Granada for creating a federation.53  
 Another facet of Camacho’s thinking about the urgency of starting negotiations 
                                                
51 El Argos Americano: Papel político, económico y literario de Cartagena de Indias, 12 de nov. Tom. 1 
no. 9, 1810. 36-38. 
52 Ibid. 
53 An intriguing publication of a commented translation of J.J. Rousseau’s treaty of political economy was 
published in the Aviso al Púbico presumably by the Augustine priest Fray Diego Padilla. Oreste Popescu. 
Un tratado de economía política en Santa fé de Bogotá en 1810; el enigma de fray Diego Padilla. Bogota: 
[Impr. E. Salazar], 1968. 
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among councils was correlated to adopting homogenous fiscal measures across New 
Granada during the crisis. What would happen, he asked, “if in one province, the 
abolition of state monopolies is decreed but in the neighboring ones, they remain so as to 
carry the fiscal burdens of the state? What would happen if the commerce that is taxed in 
one territory is made free in another?”54 From the Santafereños’ point of view, the 
freedom of some provinces would harm the restrictions of the others and could result in 
constant clashes inside the kingdom. As we saw in chapter 2, uniform fiscal policies were 
a condition for exercising effective revenue collection. The practicality of maintaining a 
consensus on the workings of the fiscal structure led supporters of the federation to 
conceive the crumbling viceroyalty as a “national body” that shared funds, interests, 
laws, and religion. Therefore, the measures adopted during the crisis, according to them, 
required a consensus via a representative government. This way, any decision taken by 
provincial leaders in their sovereign states should follow some general principles. 
 In spite of forming a consensus around basic fiscal measures within the polity, 
and as the council of Cartagena had argued, Camacho’s “Principles” supported the notion 
that a particular state or province might require laws that were not applicable to other 
provinces. This premise, Camacho argued, was only compatible with a public 
administration based on a representative government and a federal system in the colony.55 
The individuals who exercise power, one of the principles stated, “should be appointed 
                                                
 54 “Suplemento al Diario Político”, Diario Político de Santafé, Banrepcultural.org.” Accessed January 29, 
2015. http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/historia/diario-politico/indice.htm. 
55 Diario Político de Santafé de Bogotá, No. XXXV, 25 de diciembre de 1810. 
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by the electoral councils, formed by the votes of the citizens in the primary assemblies.”56 
In a federal system, each provincial assembly would have the competence for creating 
adaptable legal systems concurrent to its local realities and needs. Furthermore, any 
province could assume its own political authority without needing to establish alliances 
with other provinces.57 In economic matters, Camacho believed in the importance of 
some level of interdependence. 
 Outlining a territorial hierarchy within the kingdom, Camacho believed that the 
economic prosperity of certain provinces modeled the health of the whole kingdom. 
Small towns needed liaisons to sustain their rights, and territories under certain political 
departamento (territorial unit equivalent to a state) must unite under a common center, 
which was not Santa Fe, but their closest city or municipal head within their 
departamento.58 Camacho referred to administrative connections among towns and cities 
following an economic logic. For instance, to finance the Congress, Camacho argued that 
each province should choose an economic sector (tobacco, gold mining, textiles, etc.), 
concentrate the province’s resources to promote the sector, and make equal contributions 
to New Granada’s economy.59 Camacho also reflected on measures that hindered 
economic improvement and those that promoted it.60 For Camacho, prohibiting “entrance 
to those coming to buy our productions” was impolitic and barbarous. For an enlightened 
                                                
56 Ibid. No. XXXIX, Diaron Político, January 8, 1811.  
57 Ibid. No. XLII. January 18, 1811. 
58 Ibid. No. XLI, 15 de enero de 1811. 
59 Ibid. 
60 He pointed out that the Crown’s monopolies excited contraband. Agriculture is the foundation of society 
he asserted and emphasized the issue of uncultivated lands and the importance of opening exits to the sea 
for trade. Op. Cit. Diario Politico. N. XLIII, January 22, 1811. 
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bureaucrat and lawyer like Camacho, a government that prohibited the export and import 
of agricultural staples, violated property rights and “closed the doors of abundance.”61  
He suggested this idea for trade between New Granada and friendly nations other than 
Spain. For Camacho the economic model for the kingdom should not only stimulate 
agricultural production but also industry. Like Valenzuela, Camacho described the 
English model—with no gold or silver mines or fertile land—which appropriates raw 
materials from all around the world, transformed them into manufactured goods and 
expanded them across all seas. The underlying principle was that goods were spread 
across the different climates of the Earth and that what was unnecessary for one nation 
was necessary for another, and the exchange of goods was a link that nature had 
established between all nations.  
The geographical and economic interdependence among New Granada’s 
provinces became an argument for both centralists and federalists in their attempts to 
recompose political power. The model proposed by Nariño looked inwards towards 
Cundinamarca, center of a proposed central state from which general laws should 
emanate protect the kingdom from a possible Spanish Reconquista and around which all 
provinces should gather its enlightenment, riches, and strength. In Nariño’s political 
economy the diversity of agricultural products in different altitudes was the foundation 
for a strong internal market. On the other hand, Camacho and others in Santa Fe defended 
the multiplication of sovereignties and their organization in a federation but some general 
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principles were necessary to coordinate fiscal and commercial policy across different 
regions. For supporters of federalism such as Rodríguez Torices and Fernández Madrid 
insofar as geographical conditions dictated the need to differentiate policy, the 
administration of the territory should not be centralized. This way, each territory would 
have the right to interact with foreign powers without legal obstacles from a center.  
An assessment of the territorial projects of Quito, Santa Fe, and Cartagena 
illustrates in more detail how Spanish Americans articulated these views to specific 
economic and geographic imperatives during the crisis. Each of these cities advanced 
federative projects within the ongoing projects to establish a larger federation of the 
whole kingdom.  
 
The Project of Quito 
 
Quito’s long-standing aspirations to revive its stagnant economy became instrumental in 
the developments of the creation of the first revolutionary councils of New Granada. By 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, Quito had lost its once prominent economic 
prosperity and control over several territories of its jurisdiction. The creation of the 
viceroyalty in 1739 with Santa Fe as its capital had upset the quiteños who believed that 
Quito deserved the status of capital. In the later part of the century, while Caracas 
achieved autonomy by becoming a capitanía, Quito lost ecclesiastical, financial, and 
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military control over some of its provinces.62 In 1802, the government of Maynas became 
part of the bishopric of Perú. The next year Quito suffered even greater territorial loss 
when Perú regained military and commercial control over Guayaquil.63 As Federica 
Morelli has demonstrated, it was not a coincidence that the cities in which the first 
revolutionary councils were formed were precisely those urban centers, that, like Quito, 
had lost control over parts of their territory during the Bourbon Reforms.64 Quito’s long-
standing political economy aspirations operated as organizing zn principle of interregnum 
territoriality. 
Quito’s pretenses of autonomy were inextricably tied to aspirations of economic 
improvement by gaining access to the Pacific Ocean. As we saw in chapter 1, its project 
involved territorial rearrangements in order to incorporate within its jurisdiction the 
territories of Pasto and the mining zone of the Pacific basin controlled by the government 
of Popayán. The new council sent an invitation to the provinces of Guayaquil, Popayán, 
Pasto, Barbacoas and Panamá, dependencies of the viceroyalties of Lima and Santa Fe, to 
                                                
62 During the rule of the baron de Carondelet as president of the Audiencia of Quito (1799-1803) he 
attempted to transform the audiencia into an independent kingdom or at least a general captaincy with its 
own consulado. Jaime E. Rodríguez O. "Los orígenes de la Revolución de Quito en 1809". Procesos: 
revista ecuatoriana de historia. 34 (II Semestre, 2011): 110-111. 
63 In 1806 Guayaquil was subscribed to the merchant guild of Lima instead of Cartagena. In 1810 viceroy 
Abascal in Lima incorporated Guayaquil into the district of the Audiencia of Lima. Dora León Borja y 
Adam Szászdi, “El problema jurisdiccional de Guayaquil antes de la independencia”, en Cuadernos de 
Historia y Arqueología, vol. XXI, 1971, pp. 13-146. 
 64 The quiteños had also reacted strongly to the burden imposed by the Bourbon reforms during the 
Barrios’ rebellion in 1765. Morelli, Federica. Territorio o nación: reforma y disolución del espacio 
imperial en Ecuador, 1765-1830. Historia de la sociedad política; Variation: Historia de la sociedad 
política. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2005. 13. Federica Morelli. “La 
Revolución de Quito: el camino hacia el gobierno mixto.” Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos. Nouveaux 
mondes mondes nouveaux - Novo Mundo Mundos Novos - New world New worlds, May 18, 2008. 
 164 
form an interim government.65 The council decided to implement a plan formulated years 
before by the president of the audiencia, the baron of Carondelet, to annex to the 
kingdom of Quito the coastal region north of Esmeraldas as far as Panamá.66 The control 
over the Pacific belt of the kingdom meant to the leaders in Quito the possibilities to 
return to the past opulence, via the control of the eastern trade networks of the kingdom.  
 Early on, the quiteños attempted to redefine the pact between the local power and 
central Spanish power, although they declared loyalty to Ferdinand VII.67 At the onset of 
the crisis, the fear of a French government in America, Quito’s long-standing pretenses of 
becoming an autonomous kingdom, and tensions among Spanish Americans and 
Spaniards, paved the way for the creation on August 10 of 1809 of the autonomous 
council of Quito. The newly formed council replaced viceregal authorities and elected 
American representatives for every barrio (neighbor) of the city and for each one of the 
cabildos that were subjected to the Audiencia of Quito. The council of Quito governed 
for three months and decreed a number of economic reforms. Among them, the council 
eliminated the monopolies over tobacco and aguardiente and ended the situado to 
Cartagena (fiscal remittances sent yearly from Quito for the defense of the kingdom in 
                                                
 65 Gustavo Pérez Ramírez. El acta de la Independencia de Quito 1809. 1a ed. Quito: FONSAL y Trama 
ediciones.  
 66 Carlos Manuel Larrea. Barón Luis Hectór de Carondelet; El Vigesimonono Presidente de La Real 
Audiencia de Quito. Quito: Corporación de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1968. 
 67 Kenneth J. Andrien, The Kingdom of Quito, 1690-1830: The State and Regional Development. 
Cambridge Latin American Studies 80. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. John 
Leddy Phelan. The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century; Bureaucratic Politics in the Spanish 
Empire. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. 
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the Caribbean).68 The dismantlement of the networked fiscal territoriality that once linked 
Quito with Cartagena endangered the sustenance of the defense structure of the kingdom 
and premised a Quiteño pan-Pacific territoriality.69  
At the earliest stage of independence, Quito’s search for autonomy from the 
Spanish council endangered the subsistence of colonial fiscal networks with Cartagena 
and the commercial relations with Popayán.  Quito invented a new political economy to 
reconstitute the viability of its territory through its access to the Pacific and the freedom 
to trade the quina surplus. Quito’s objectives also necessitated detachment from the fiscal 
obligations to Cartagena. For advancing these projects, Quito required autonomy not only 
from the Spanish council, but also from Santa Fe and Lima while keeping its central role 
as main city of the old Audiencia for its proposed federation. As Quito’s pretensions 
jeopardized the territorial integrity of jurisdictions under the control of New Granada and 
Peru, the viceroys and governors reacted quickly against the autonomist movement in 
Quito and shut down the revolution militarily, sending troops from Lima and Panama.70 
The Quiteños had underestimated long lasting provincial rivalries when they unleashed 
their revolution and naively expected that the cities of Popayán, Cuenca and Guayaquil 
would accept subordination to Quito. Similarly, Santa Fe’s territorial aspirations triggered 
                                                
68 “Manifiesto de la Junta Suprema de Quito”, en Alfredo Ponce Ribadeneira, Quito 1809-1812 , pp. 136-
139. 
69 Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila has advanced the thesis that Quito sought an alliance with Cartagena and 
Antioquia but has not taken into account Quito’s dismantlement of the situado. Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila. 
“Revolución y diplomacia: el caso de la primera Junta de Quito (1809).” Fronteras de la Historia, 2007. 
See Edwin Muñoz Rodríguez. “Estructura del gasto y del ingreso en la Caja Real de Santafé, 1803-1815.” 
Anuario Colombiano de historia social y de la cultura., 37 (2), 2010, 67. 
70 Popayán, Cuenca, and Guayaquil feared that the supremacy of Quito affected their own economic 
interests. See: Op. Cit. Gutiérrez, “Revolución y Diplomacia”, 349.  
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unrest among several cities that resisted accepting the continuation of this city as capital 
and administrative center of the transitioning polity.  
 
Santa Fe: The Center of an Economy of Knowledge 
 
The surge in new government councils across the kingdom endangered the preeminence 
of the capital city as the center of power.71 The leaders of Santa Fe who supported 
federalism struggled to reinstate the capital city as the center of political and economic 
power in the kingdom (or at the very least as site for the General Congress of the 
kingdom.) Leaders in the capital attempted to persuade the different provinces of the 
convenience of Santa Fe as the center of the federation. Only deputies from the provinces 
of Tunja, Pamplona, Socorro, Mariquita, Neiva and Nóvita, however, attended the first 
congress. The capital city grappled to maintain its influence as the economic and political 
center of the kingdom, while cities such as Quito and Cartagena rejected Santa Fe’s 
leadership. By then, the disproportion in size and population between Santa Fe and other 
important cities such as Quito, Cartagena, and Popayan was not apparent. For the leading 
figures of those cities, there was no reason to accept the preeminence of Santa Fe.72 In 
arguing their case, leaders in Santa Fe raised geographical arguments and ideas of 
civilization to convince other cities to accept the re-composition of the kingdom with the 
city at the center. 
                                                
71 Op. Cit. Gutiérrez Ardila. 
72 Op. Cit. Gutierrez, Un Nuevo Reino, 50.  
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According to the lettered elite in Santa Fe, the men in the capital were the ones 
required to lead the liberal revolution in New Granada. Alluding to a discourse of 
civilization, Creole intellectuals argued that, differently from coastal cities such as 
Cartagena and Caracas with their military and commercial vocations, the capital of the 
viceroyalty and its natural environment resembled that of European centers of learning. 
In 1803, the editors of the newspaper Diario Político, Joaquín Camacho and the 
renowned Creole scientist Francisco José de Caldas—director of the Astronomical 
Observatory of Santa Fe—published a collection of letters of an anonymous European 
traveler identified as “L.R.” The Santa Fe elite stressed geographical hierarchy, subtlety 
alluding to arguments of Andean supremacy in the voice of an anonymous European 
authority. These letters praised Santa Fe and described its advantages in terms of its 
landscapes and weather. They were published serially in five issues of Diario Político. 
Presumably, the author was French physician Luis Rieux, a foreign supporter of the 
autonomist movement who lived in Santa Fe.73 
 The reproduction of L.R’s letters attests to learned elites of the capital city who 
held the privilege of inhabiting the one place in the kingdom where enlightenment 
thought had spread. Unlike other important main cities such as Popayan and Quito, Santa 
Fe held two important institutions of science, the Botanical Expedition and the 
                                                
73 Pedro Ibáñez, Crónicas de Bogotá. 30. “El enigma de las iniciales que autorizan estas opiniones sobre 
formaciones geológicas, que acogió Caldas en el Diario Político, casi lo ha arrancado del dominio de la 
hipótesis el publicista don Luis Orjuela, anunciando la fundada pretensión de que ellas corresponden al 
nombre del médico francés Luis Rieux, quien para ese tiempo ya había vuelto a Bogotá, después de un 
forzado viaje a España a causa de sus complicaciones en el proceso de Nariño, en 1794.” 30 . 
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Astronomical Observatory. In letters published only a few months after the declaration of 
autonomy from the Spanish junta of Santa Fe, Rieux praised the capital, saying that the 
temperate weather was beneficial for the learned elite. He then added: “If the sciences 
were to emigrate to America, they will certainly establish their empire here.” He 
acknowledged the capacities of the learned elite to become the standard-bearers of 
universal sciences.74 Santa Fe was thus the reservoir of educated people of the kingdom 
and therefore claimed the authority to direct the polity’s destiny in scientific, political, 
and economic matters. They presented the capital city as a space ‘naturally’ destined to 
rule the whole kingdom in magisterial, legislative, and scientific fields.  
The potency of Santa Fe’s political and economic rhetoric became stronger as the 
crisis continued. According to the Creoles of Santa Fe, unifying the juntas movement in 
the capital was essential in order to collect all the parts of the kingdom under the 
umbrella of Enlightenment. In the same issue as L.R’s first letter, Frutos Joaquin 
Gutierrez, the Creole ideologist of independence, expressed his frustration with the 
atomization of provincial aspirations, which proved an impediment to unification in Santa 
Fe.75 In this passage, he expressed the strength of provincial identities: 
 
I call homeland (Patria) not the place where I was born, neither the 
department nor the province where I belong. (…) The son of Cartagena, 
                                                
74 Diario Político de Santafé, October 19, 1810, num. XVII, 67. 
75 Joaquin Camacho had adverted the difficulties of maintaining unity vis-à-vis the intentions of several 
towns to separate from their original provinces as in the case of Mompox. Real Academia de Historia, 
“Carta de Joaquín Camacho a don Juan Agustiín de la Rocha en la que de nuevo hace hincapié en los 
acontecimientos de los pueblos que se intentan separar de la provincia originaria.” Santa Fe, 11 de febrero 
de 1811. Sig. 9/7648, leg. 5, a), ff. 17-17v. 
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El Socorro, Pamplona, and maybe that of Popayan, has not looked at 
the limits of the Kingdom of New Granada, as limits of his own 
homeland. Instead, it has tightened his glance to the province.76 
 
When several provinces refused to send their representatives to Santa Fe, Gutierrez 
argued, they also ignored a call to “spread schools of sciences and geography to impart 
the necessary lights to every town.”77 Gutierrez depicted Santa Fe as the center of 
Enlightenment in the kingdom, and suggested that the only way to achieve freedom and 
prosperity was if the provinces gathered around the capital city. He asserted that the 
capital city upheld the cause of the whole kingdom, and worked to bind up all its parts to 
form a robust body with an energetic spirit.  
Gutierrez’s political geography of the kingdom was based on a principle of 
knowledge distribution, a form of political economy rooted in the monopoly of expertise 
and knowledge located in the center. This was a project to create institutions of learning, 
train experts, develop new industries, and export this model to other regions.78 As his 
frustration grew, Gutierrez claimed that Santa Fe should view itself as independent from 
                                                
76 Diario Político de Santafé, 13 de octubre de 1810, numero XVI. 5-7. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Frank Safford has argued that although Colombia’s elite held aristocratic values, a development-oriented 
political elite tried to introduce forms of technical education. Caldas’ and Gutiérrez discourses speak of the 
strength of this elite, which took the reins of the crumbling empire and nascent republic. Safford points out 
that the extension of science in New Granada was inhibited by the lack of a clear economic function for the 
scientifically trained. The discourses of the interregnum, however, suggest otherwise, an increased Creole 
consciousness on the role of science for the construction of an autonomous wealthy republic. Frank 
Safford. The Ideal of the Practical: Colombia’s Struggle to Form a Technical Elite. University of Texas 
Press, 2014. 
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the projects of the other provinces.79 He continued by avowing the prerogatives of the 
city to be a capital. Geographically, the city was located in the center, Gutierrez 
contended, and was endowed with benign temperatures, embellished by fertile soil and a 
sizeable population. This view positions Santa Fe as holder of the necessary institutions 
of learning through which New Granada can realize its economic potential. The city of 
Santa Fe came to be defined in relation to ideal geographical types associated with the 
Metropole.80 These images of Santa Fe and its geographical greatness and role as center 
of knowledge, civilization, and wealth creation, found their way into the visual 
imaginings of the political project of the free state of Cundinamarca, created by members 
of the junta of Santa Fe in March of 1811.  
The newspaper Diario Politico insisted the year before on the need to produce an 
accurate geographical chart of the kingdom.81 The article pointed out that the 
circumstances of the crisis necessitated the production of knowledge about the 
geographical disposition of the kingdom in order to defend the country from foreign 
attacks. In addition to the urgency of the defense of the kingdom which justified the 
creation of the map, the Atlas gave a new meaning to the old province of Santa Fe by 
adopting its original indigenous name, Cundinamarca.82 In a remnant of the dispute of the 
                                                
79 Ibid. 5. 
80 Lauren Benton has explained this idea of Europe as “the place of accumulated knowledge about, and the 
home of, ideal-typical geographies.” Lauren A. Benton. A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in 
European Empires, 1400--1900. Cambridge [UK] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 18. 
81 “Astronomia”, in Diario Político, No. XXXII, Dic. 14, 1810, 117-118. 
82 “La Representación, libre y legítimamente constituida por la elección y consentimiento del pueblo de 
esta provincial, que con su libertad ha recuperado, adopta y desea conserver en su primitive y original 
nombre de Cundinamarca, convencida y cierta de que el pueblo a quien representa ha reasumido su 
soberanía, recobrando la plenitud de sus derechos, (…) ordena y manda la presente.” Lozano, J.T, 
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New World in 1809, Creole naturalist and writer José Maria Salazar had also used the 
name Cundinamarca in his defense of the city of Santa Fe from the unjust opinions of the 
French scientists Jean-Baptiste Leblond.83 The recognition of the old name of the 
territory is also seen in the Fauna Cundinamarquesa, the zoological work of the president 
of the state of Cundinamarca, Jorge Tadeo Lozano, in the framework of the Botanical 
Expedition of New Granada.84 Evoking the indigenous past can be read as an attempt to 
convey that the territory had a natural history before the arrival of Spaniards and as a 
strategy by which Creoles justify the recovered sovereignty. Spanish Americans, 
however, actively recognized their belonging to the Spanish nation, which speaks of their 
ambiguous position during the crisis.85  
The representation of Cundinamarca in the cartography of the time, for instance, 
appealed to this European identity, but incorporated indigenous allegories. In the 1811 
Atlas of Meridional America, the president of Cundinamarca commissioned renowned 
Creole scientist Francisco José de Caldas—now named Captain of Engineers and 
Cosmographer of the State—to produce a set of maps for the new government. (See 
                                                                                                                                            
Camacho, A., y Acevedo, José. “Constitución de Cundinamarca, 1811”, en Humberto Cáceres. Jorge 
Tadeo Lozano: vida, obra y época.,166.  
83 José María Salazar, (1809), “Memoria descriptiva del país de Santa Fe de Bogotá en que se impugnan 
varios errores de la de Mr. Leblond sobre el mismo objeto, leída en la Academia Real de las Ciencias de 
París, por D. JOSÉ MARÍA SALAZAR, Abogado de esta ciudad”, en Francisco José de Caldas (1942), 
Semanario del Nuevo Reino de Granada, Bogotá, Editorial Minerva, pp. 226-227. 
84 María José Afanador. “La obra de Jorge Tadeo Lozano: apuntes sobre la Ciencia Ilustrada y los inicios 
del proceso de Independencia.” Historia Crítica, 2007.  
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Discurso que ha de pronunciar en la aperture del sersísimo Colegio Electoral de Cundinamarca el C. 
Jorge Tadeo Lozano, Brigadier del ejército, y Representante del Distrito de Chocontá, Bogotá, Imprenta 
del Estado, 6.  
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Figure 7) The frontispiece portrayed Santafereños’ imaginings of Cundinamarca and the 
new polity. New Granada is symbolized as a mountain with a crowned eagle on top 
holding a ribbon with the name Cundinamarca. This imagery showed a constitutional 
monarchy united by the loyalty to the King Ferdinand VII, yet the quiver of arrows 
suggests American autonomy.86 The image also depicts typical emblems of the 
Enlightenment: astronomical instruments, books, maps, and a globe. Meridional America 
also appears as a fusion of ecological regions, as represented by the high mountain, which 
certainly mirrors Caldas’s depictions of the geographical distribution of plants and his 
profiles of the Andes.87 This representation also resembles Humboldt’s Geography of 
Plants.88 For instance, Lozano as president of Cundinamarca had proposed to divide the 
kingdom into four great departamentos, Quito, Popayán, Cundinamarca, and Cartagena, 
which altogether represented distinct ecological regions: the Andean hinterlands, the 
Pacific basin territories, and the Caribbean plains.89  As Santa Fe continued to advance its 
aspirations to become the center of the General Congress of the kingdom and capital of 
the nascent polity, the leaders of Cartagena questioned where the real center of the 
                                                
86 In Rebecca Earle’s analysis of insurgent iconography during independence the Indian princess with her 
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of the History of Science in the Iberian World. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2006. 152.  
89 Jorge Tadeo Lozano. Documentos importantes sobre las negociaciones para que se divida el reino en 
departamentos, Bogotá, Imprenta Espinosa, 1811. 
 173 
kingdom lay and presented an alternative vision. 
 
Figure 7. Cover of the Atlas of Meridional America, 1811.90  
                                                
90 “Cover of the Atlas de una parte de la América Meridional que comprende desde el Istmo de Panamá 
hasta las bocas del Amazonas, y desde las costas de Maracaibo y Venezuela hasta la orilla austral del río 
Marañón.” Francisco José de Caldas. AGN, Bogotá, Archivo Histórico Restrepo, rollo 53, 1811. 
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The Project of Cartagena 
 
Cartagena’s leaders’ goals concerning the establishment of the Federal General Congress 
of the kingdom involved the reconstruction of New Granada’s space through the 
movement of provincial deputies across the landscape. The leaders of Cartagena 
proposed Antioquia, instead of Santa Fe, as the point in the kingdom where the general 
congress should take place. The Cartageneros delivered this message to all the provinces 
through the Royal Treasury. In their opinion, “the appropriate place to gather the 
kingdom’s general congress is the province of Antioquia, and specifically the Villa de 
Medellín due to its position”. Because of its population, “between 16 and 18 thousand 
souls”, and its temperature and position “almost in the middle of the kingdom”, Medellín 
appeared as that place of the kingdom perfectly suited to bring together all provincial 
deputies.91 The junta of the port city examined the distances from the different parts of 
the kingdom, and described the routes that every deputy should take in order to arrive in 
Antioquia. In geographical terms, Antioquia’s location at the center appeared as an ideal 
place for the convocation of deputies.  
                                                
91 Archivo General de Indias, SANTA_FE,747, Expedientes e instancias de partes. Cartas y expedientes 
1810-1816, “La Provincia de Cartagena de Indias a las demás de este Nuevo Reyno de Granada”. 
Cartagena, 9 de septiembre de 1810. 
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 Cartageneros proposal created an image of geographical interdependence among 
New Granada’s provinces alluding to circulation as a principle of healthy government.92 
The members of Cartagena’s council carefully delineated the proposal by approximating 
the distance and time it would take every deputy to get to Medellín. Demonstrating their 
geographic knowledge, they described the ports, rivers, and roads that connected 
Antioquia with the rest of the territory. For example, provinces in the East, like 
Pamplona, Girón and Socorro, could gather at the wharf of the Sogamoso River. They 
could then embark through the main artery of the kingdom, the Magdalena River, and 
then take the roads though Santo Domingo, or Marinilla and Rionegro. According to 
coastal leaders, it would take the deputies between 11 and 16 days total to get to 
Medellín.93 In this assessment, it was much easier for every provincial deputy to travel to 
Medellín than to Santa Fe. The traveling time between Cartagena and Santa Fe was 
somewhere between 25 to 30 days depending on the season making communications 
between the two lengthy and difficult.  
The junta of Cartagena also considered it extremely important to invite the gold 
mining province of Chocó to elect a deputy to send to the confederation. Although Chocó 
was denied the right of political representation because it did no have a cabildo, the 
council of Cartagena considered that its natural riches were reason enough for granting 
                                                
 92 John Ziman conceptualizes science as a public knowledge that takes the form of practical informal 
knowledge about nature. (…) Geography is very much part of it: knowing where things are, is logically 
prior to the set of instructions of how to go from here to there. Quoted in Mokyr, Joel. The Gifts of Athena: 
Historical Origins of the Knowledge economy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002. 5.  
93 Ibid.  
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political rights to Chocó.94 The Cartageneros also proposed to invite Guayaquil and 
Maracaibo to the federation because of the strategic geopolitical location of these 
provinces for accessing Pacific and Atlantic trade networks respectively.95  
Placing the different regions of the kingdom in communication was imperative for 
restoring the lost unity and establishing the federal congress. The arguments made by the 
junta of Cartagena justified the meeting of the general Congress in Medellín and attest to 
a vision of the different regions lineally connected to each other, rather than as a natural 
unit that shared the same geographical traits. The elite of Cartagena believed Medellín 
was a connecting hub for all the provinces of the kingdom. As a result, the Cartageneros 
took roads, navigable rivers, ports, and settlements into account when conceiving of the 
rising political project. The depiction of New Granada as a coherent space that possessed 
the quality of connectedness contrasted with a reality of geographical isolation and 
extremely difficult communications among the different parts of the kingdom. With this 
paradoxical proposal, the leaders of Cartagena deliberately attempted to alter the 
presumably unbalanced and centripetal power relations that the Andean city had 
promoted. In doing so, it became clear that Cartageneros were also claiming a central 
role within the kingdom as defensive ante-mural and commercial hub connecting both the 
Greater Caribbean trans-imperial space and local regional economies.96 Within New 
                                                
94 AGI, “La Provincia de Cartagena de Indias a las demás de este Nuevo Reyno de 
Granada.”SANTA_FE,747, Expedientes e instancias de partes. Cartas y expedients. 1810-1816, 19 de 
septiembre de 1810. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ernesto Bassi’s dissertation argued that New Granada’s major and minor ports in the Atlantic 
participated in lively trade networks with Jamaica creating a trans-imperial geographic space defined as 
such by the peoples and commodities that connected New Granada to the Great Caribbean. This space was 
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Granada, the coastal city of Santa Marta challenged Cartagena’s commercial 
preeminence during the interregnum. 
The commercial elite of both cities advanced contrasting political projects in order 
to advance their economic interests. The authorities of the province of Santa Marta 
struggled during the eighteenth century to turn the province into a flourishing commercial 
and agricultural hub. The leaders of Santa Marta saw the preeminence of Cartagena as an 
obstacle for the province’s economic promotion. As the crisis unfolded, while Cartagena 
declared autonomy from the Spanish council, Santa Marta remained royalist. The leaders 
of the coastal city of Santa Marta established a counterrevolutionary council on 
December 22, 1810. Cartagena lamented Santa Marta’s decision to remain in royalist 
hands. By the end of 1810, the council of Cartagena recognized the “interim and 
temporary” sovereignty of the Spanish courts, but retained total control of economic 
governance and the interior administration of the province. In 1811, as the pressures of 
Atlantic warfare increased, the political leaders and merchants in Cartagena pushed for 
declaring complete independence from Spain.  
Overall, the danger of an internal schism of the kingdom threatened Cartagena’s 
fiscal dependence on the situado that interior provinces sent yearly to the port city to 
                                                                                                                                            
defined by the constant flow of commodities and sailors from Jamaica, to Cartagena, Riohacha, and Santa 
Marta, and the other way round. Ernesto E. Bassi Arevalo. “Between Imperial Projects and National 
Dreams: Communication Networks, Geopolitical Imagination, and the Role of New Granada in the 
Configuration of a Greater Caribbean Space, 1780s--1810s.” Ph.D., University of California, Irvine, 2012.  
http://search.proquest.com/pqdtft/docview/1024148523/abstract/13C120E55883A2F0CE7/1?accountid=71
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maintain the defense system.97 As mentioned earlier, the council of Quito of 1809 ended 
the situado to Cartagena.98 In a vulnerable fiscal condition, the leaders of Cartagena 
struggled to sustain their autonomous government. The Cartageneros contended that 
their public treasury was exhausted and that their autonomist project was not possible 
without the support and cooperation of other provinces of the kingdom.99 Added to this, 
the disruption of normal trade patterns from the wars led to other reflections among 
Cartagena’s elite about the overall nature of the Spanish commercial system. Keeping up 
the flow of commerce with other colonies and opening formerly closed ports trade was 
imperative while Spanish Atlantic trade was interrupted during the wars. As the 
revolution progressed, free trade became a milestone of the redefinition of the 
relationship between Spain and its colonies.100  
 Cartagena led the way by proposing and enacting permanent legislation in 
liberalizing trade on the assumption that commodities would flow through its ports. In 
December 1810, the council of Cartagena decreed a set of liberal economic principles. 
Specifically, the council declared that the port of Cartagena would be open for trade with 
Spain’s allied and friendly nations (with exception of France). The decree also 
                                                
97 Rodolfo Meisel makes the argument that the workings of Caribbean coastal economy in New Granada by 
the end of the nineteenth century are the subsidies that supported the economy of Cartagena. During 
independence Cartagena faced financial restrains because many provinces restricted the situado. Adolfo 
Meisel Roca, “Crecimiento a Través de los Subsidios: Cartagena de Indias y el Situado, 1751-1810.” 
Accessed November 19, 2014. http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/crecimiento-traves-subsidios-cartagena-indias-
y-situado. 
98 Jaime E. Rodríguez O., “Revolución de 1809: Cinco cartas de un realista anónimo”, en ARNAHIS. 
Órgano del Archivo Nacional de Historia, No. 19, 1973, pp. 57-58 
99 AGN –Colombia. Archivo Histórico José Manuel Restrepo. Manifiesto de la suprema Junta de Cartagena 
sobre los sucesos de Santa Marta. Rollo 1. 
 100 Michael P. Costeloe. “Spain and the Latin American Wars of Independence: The Free Trade 
Controversy, 1810-1820.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 61, no. 2 (May 1, 1981): 209–34.  
 179 
established a tariff on imported manufactured goods, suppressed the prohibition to trade 
foreign cotton goods, and allowed the export of gold and silver.101 A further decree in 
January 1811 alluded to the arbitrary measures of the former government that had posed 
obstacles to the exploitation of the natural abundance of the country.102 The decree 
established free trade of all agricultural products and commodities and opened 
commercially the ports of Sabanilla and Zapote, both hidden ports conducting illegal 
trade with Jamaica.103 Later on, with the Constitution of 1812, Cartagena prohibited the 
import of “slaves as object of trade”, which had been steady decline since the latter part 
of the eighteenth century.104 Aligning with the impulse of the abolitionist movement 
emerging from England, the leaders of Cartagena followed a radical position against the 
slave trade already expressed by the deputy of Socorro Miguel Tadeo Gómez Durán in 
the 1809 instrucción discussed earlier.  
 The economic measures of the council of Cartagena moved steadily towards 
gradations of free trade and dismantled unpopular Spanish economic institutions and alter 
regional political geographies for the needs of the war. Such was the case of the 
monopoly over aguardiente.105 By November 1811, Cartagena declared complete 
independence from Spain. Later on, Cartagena’s leaders issued the constitution of June 
14, 1812, and established a representative republic. In order to put the new measures in 
place, the council of Cartagena divided the province into five administrative districts: 
                                                
101 AGN, Bogotá, Archivo Histórico Restrepo, “Documentos sobre Cartagena, Santa Marta y Panamá. 
Rollo, 5. Junta de Cartagena, diciembre 10 de 1810.” 
102 Ibid.  
103 Op. Cit. Bassi, 20. 
104 Constitución de Cartagena de 1812, Const. 1812, Disposiciones varias, art. 2 y 3. 
105 Ibid. “Edicto de Noviembre 13 de 1813.” 
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Cartagena, Tolú, San Benito, Mompox, and Simití. Later in 1813, the council of 
Cartagena issued a decree raising the settlement by the cove of Sabanilla to the status of 
villa with the name of Barranquilla. Strategically located right in the middle between 
Santa Marta and Cartagena and close to the mouth of the Magdalena River, the new 
coastal villa facilitated the introduction of weapons, munitions, and supplies during 
independence. The leaders of Cartagena also raised Magangué to the status of villa in 
1813.106       
Santa Marta, on the other hand, rejected the revolutionary governments of Santa 
Fe and Cartagena and saw the crisis as an opportunity to promote economic claims.107 
Leaders in Santa Marta pushed their long-standing economic aspiration to increase its 
role as the port of entry for Spanish imports. To make their case, the leaders of Santa 
Marta sent a report to the Spanish Junta in October 1811, arguing that the port city 
needed to become the kingdom’s center of trade. The report highlighted Santa Marta’s 
importance for European commerce.108 The port of Cartagena, the report stated, had 
absorbed all trade, became more opulent and “diminished and obscured the trading 
potential of Santa Marta.”109 The report then turned to the geographical features of Santa 
Marta: “it is only 50 leagues from Cartagena, and has direct connection with the 
Magdalena River, through which trade is conducted to Santa Fe.”110 The report also 
                                                
106 Jorge Enrique Caballero Leguizamón. Barranquilla y la modernidad. Un ejercicio histórico. Cuadernos 
PROA 16. Univ. Nacional de Colombia, n.d. 
107 Ibid. 
108 AGN-Colombia. Archivo Anexo, Sección Historia, tomo 13. “Informe sobre la utilidad de los puertos de 
Santa Marta y Cartagena”, 26 de Octubre de 1811. ff. 164-166. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid.  
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detailed the trade routes from the Atlantic coast of Tierra Firme to the capital city. This 
description played a dual role for the royalist leaders of Santa Marta. It emphasized the 
positive qualities of the port, but also introduced military opportunities to fight the 
insurrection government in Santa Fe.111 
Santa Marta attempted to establish its own consulado (merchant guild), searching 
for a foothold in a commercial system dominated by Cartagena and Caracas.  In search of 
economic autonomy, in December 1811, Santa Marta sent an official petition to the 
Spanish council requesting the establishment of a Merchant Guild, independent from 
Cartagena. The petition noted that Cartagena had “hoisted the banner of rebellion, calling 
itself an independent and free province.” 112  The petition added that “the port of Santa 
Marta had an advantageous situation over all the ports of the viceroyalty, and it seems 
that it was called by nature to become the main port, and therefore to have a 
consulado.”113 Cartageneros raised discourses against the pretenses of Santa Marta, 
claiming that Cartagena “promoted industry, protected agriculture, and unfettered trade”, 
while Santa Marta “suffocates all these branches and submerges us in misery.”114 Seeking 
to bolster its authority and economic power vis-à-vis Cartagena, Santa Marta sought 
access to trans-Atlantic patronage networks through its petition to the Spanish courts.  
The tensions between Cartagena and Santa Marta led to a stalemate in 
communication and both closed their ports to traffic from one another, ended 
                                                
111 Ibid. 
112 AGI, “Expediente sobre la solicitud de que se establezca en Santa Marta un Tribunal de Comercio 
Independiente del de Cartagena. 2 de diciembre de 1811.” Cartas y Expedientes de Consulados y 
Comercios . SANTA_FE_961. 
113 Ibid.  
114 Ibid. 
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correspondence during the interregnum. Military confrontations followed the disputes.  
Although Cartagena formed part of the Greater Caribbean trans-imperial space and its 
communication with Jamaica only increased during the crisis, its economic and political 
survival depended of sustained alliances with its Andean counterparts, namely Santa Fe 
and Quito. In addition, as Santa Marta disputed Cartagena’s preeminence as ante-mural 
of the kingdom, it became clear that the territorial project of Cartagena made sense 
insofar as its neighboring city of Santa Marta also declared autonomy from Spain. As in 
the case of several city-states’ reluctance to accept the allegedly natural preeminence of 
Santa Fe, Cartagena faced the rejection not only of Santa Marta but also of Mompox.  
The villa of Mompox declared autonomy from the Spanish council on August 5 
1810. Later that year, Mompox questioned the legitimacy of Cartagena as head of the 
province, separated from Cartagena to create a province of its own, and recognized the 
council of Santa Fe in October 8, 1810.115 Changing the territorial borders with 
Cartagena, Mompox proclaimed autonomy and justified its decision, arguing that its 
location is the “scale of commerce, the throat of the kingdom, and the true key with 
which the entrances of Riohacha, Santa Marta, and the cove of Sabanilla, and Cartagena, 
can be closed.”116 Contraband in the Caribbean coast of New Granada kept mounting and 
for the council of Mompox, its geographical location on the riverbanks of the Magdalena 
would allow it to close other Caribbean ports.  
                                                
115 “Exposición de la Junta de Cartagena de Indias, sobre los sucesos de Mompox, encaminados a formar 
una provincia independiente." Ezequiel Corrales, Documentos para la historia de la provincia de 
Cartagena de Indias, M. Rivas, 1883. 201-209.  
116 Ibid. 232.  
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The leaders of Mompox predicated their territorial utopia also on its importance as 
a center of trade and knowledge of political economy. The newly created city-state held 
commercial relations with Santa Fe, Quito, Popayan, Antioquia, and Pamplona. Lastly, 
similarly to Santa Fe, the Momposinos pointed out that Mompox was well known within 
the kingdom and in Europe because of its “vast population, commercial riches, its local 
situation, and recent school, university, and hospice of the poor.”117 José Maria Gutiérrez 
de Caviedes, lecturer of Philosophy from the Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del 
Rosario in Santa Fe, was appointed vice-dean of the Colegio San Pedro Apóstol founded 
in Mompox in 1806. Gutiérrez de Caviedes became a central figure in the creation of the 
constitution of the villa of Mompox. Eloy Valenzuela had written the statutes of the 
school specifically for an educative project in a town of merchants. Valenzuela advanced 
the plan to turn the school of Mompox into a patriotic body in charge of collecting vital 
statistics of local trade, the balance of mercantile movements, climatic variations, and 
fiscal incomes.118 The establishment of these institutions of learning invested the newly 
created province with arguments to defend its independence from Cartagena and central 
place in the Caribbean region. Santa Fe’s struggles to advance its territorial and economic 
project rendered similarities with Cartagena’s alteration of Caribbean political geography. 
In Santa Fe, however, two main factions within the city shaped the scramble for territory. 
 
                                                
117 Ibid. 209. 
118 Valenzuela published in the Semanario del Nuevo Reino de Granada statistical tables such as a 
summary of the chinchona bark exports through the port of Cartagena between 1802 and 1807. See: Juan 
Eloy Valenzuela Y Mantilla: Escritos (1786-1834). 1. ed. Colección Temas Y Autores Regionales. 
Bucaramanga, Colombia: Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2006. 
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From Cundinamarca’s Expansionism to the Landscapes of the Federation  
 
When the state of Cundinamarca was created in June 1811, the city of Santa Fe continued 
to expand its jurisdiction via military and diplomatic means.119 Several city councils, 
including that of the city of Honda (part of the corregimiento of Mariquita), created 
autonomous governments, endangering Santa Fe’s access to resources. A viable and 
autonomous state in Cundinamarca required access to reliable, rich, and populated areas 
to guarantee its economic viability. Yet, a military campaign achieved the annexation of 
the tobacco-rich province of Mariquita. This province contained territory with great 
geopolitical importance for Santa Fe’s project. The fluvial access to the Magdalena River 
would assure the capital’s constant control of a crucial trade route to circulate 
commodities and foodstuffs.120 The spatial dimension was always present in early 
republican leaders’ search for ordering the crumbling polity. 
The leaders of Santa Fe had reformed Spanish procedures regarding changes in 
the jurisdictional status of provincial settlements. Under the old government, raising a 
vecinario (neighborhood) to the status of town or city implied a lengthy process that 
involved a process in the audiencias and then in the courts in Madrid. The council of 
                                                
119 Op. Cit. Gutierrez Ardila, 254-254. 
120 “Tratado sobre la incorporación del territorio de Mariquita al Estado de Cundinamarca.” In: 
Documentos Importantes Sobre Las Negociaciones Que Tiene Pendientes El Estado de Cundinamarca 
Para Que Se Divida El Reino En Departamentos. Santa Fe de Bogotá: Imprenta Real, por Bruno Espinosa 
de los Monteros, 1811. 
 185 
Santa Fe saw the creation of a new government as an opportunity to dismount the old 
system. “Now, there is no need to ply the seas or wait for ten or twenty years to obtain 
the grace which is the natural right of the peoples”, the members of the council of Santa 
Fe stated.121 The creation of cities and towns entailed the establishment of a cabildo 
through which the vecinos (neighbors) watched over their judicial, administrative, 
economic, and military issues. Therefore, Santa Fe’s strategy sought to strengthen local 
power structures. The council also indicated that a geographer of each of the new towns 
should demarcate their limits to allow for a more efficient administration of justice. 
The alteration of the political geography of the kingdom led in many cases to 
granting rights of economic autonomy to cities and towns via changes in the territorial 
status of settlements surrounding Santa Fe. The council of Santa Fe issued a new decree 
to raise the administrative status of several places in the environs of the capital to the 
status of villa (town).122 Among them were Zipaquirá, Ubaté, Chocontá, la Mesa de Juan 
Díaz, Guaduas, Cáqueza, Tensa, Sogamoso, Turmequé and Chiquinquirá. The promotion 
of Zipaquirá to the status of city in August 1810 for example, responded to long-standing 
aspirations of the vecinos of the locality to exercise control over the extraction and 
production of salt. The new city would now have a cabildo that would administer its 
economic resources and restore the power formerly held by Administrador de Salinas 
(administrator of the salt mines) since the early eighteenth century.123 The leaders of 
                                                
121 “Noticia”, Diario Político de Santa Fe, Septiembre 25, 1810, 40. 
122 Ibid. “Villas erigidas por acta de seis de Agosto de 1810.” 
123 Fabio Castro González. “Historia de Una Independencia: Sociedad Y Poder Local En Zipaquirá 1810-
1816.” Boletín de Historia Y Antigüedades 97, no. 848 (2010): 73–112. 
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Cundinamarca attempted to gain the support of different provinces around the capital in 
order to accumulate military, political, and economic strength and make a stronger case 
for a centralist regime with Santa Fe at the center.  
The proposition of Cundinamarca, which divided the kingdom into four states, as 
mentioned earlier, was not well received by Cartagena and Popayán. Ultimately 
Cundinamarca failed in its political project. In the meantime, the formation of a 
federative government was approved in the federative declaration of November 27, 1811. 
By the end of that year, after lengthy debates and military disputes within the different 
factions of the kingdom, New Granadians established a federal pact embodied in the first 
congress of the kingdom, which established a republican government. The congress 
established a confederation of provinces entitled Provincia Unidas de la Nueva Granada 
(United Provinces of New Granada), which existed between November 1811 and June 
1816. The new confederacy the United Provinces of New Granada, failed to recognize 
the authority of the Council of Regency, and remained loyal to the king. It recognized all 
the provinces of New Granada as equal, independent, and sovereign, and guaranteed the 
integrity of its territories.124 Camilo Torres, one of the main supporters of a federal order, 
established the site for the United Provinces in the city of Tunja. Leaders of Santa Fe, 
such as Jorge Tadeo Lozano and Antonio Nariño, who proposed the establishment of a 
central government, had created the Free State of Cundinamarca in April 1811 and 
                                                
124 Acta de Federación de las Provincias Unidas del Nuevo Reino de Granada. En el nombre de la 
Santísima Trinidad, Padre, Hijo y Espíritu Santo, Amen. Santa Fe de Bogotá, en la imprenta de D. Bruno 
Espinosa, 1812.  
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rejected the federal pact.125 The disagreements between centralists and federalists led to 
military hostilities between 1812 and 1814. 
After lengthy discussions, the supporters of the federal congress gathered all 
deputies, including those from Cundinamarca in a general congress on October 4, 1812. 
But this agreement was short-lived and the disagreements between centralists and 
federalists led to violent confrontations that ended with the siege of Santa Fe by 
federalists and the surrender of the centralist polity of Cundinamarca in 1814. The 
government of Tunja unified New Granada in a federal polity. In support of the new 
political system, the members of the general congress celebrated the consolidation of a 
general government by establishing an emblem to symbolize the union of all 
provinces.126 The coats of arms approved during the sessions of the congress of the 
United Provinces represented the alliance and integration of the scattered provincial 
sovereignties into a federal polity. In 1815, the representatives of the junta of the United 
Provinces of New Granada decided that the federation should be represented not by the 
“factitious insignias of despotism,” but with symbols of the natural landscape.”127 A 
confederation of four regions is represented by natural wonders with a pomegranate at is 
very center. The Tequendama Falls, located in the highlands near Santa Fe, the 
                                                
125 Congreso de Las Provincias Unidas, 1811-1815. 2. ed. Documentos, no. 26-27. Bogotá: Fundación para 
la Conmemoración del Bicentenario del Natalicio y el Sesquicentenario de la Muerte del General Francisco 
de Paula Santander, 1988. 
126 Ibid.  
127 “(…) deseando vívidamente que en lugar de las insignias facticidas del despotismo aparezca esta nueva 
República con los sencillos y preciosos adornos que le concedió la naturaleza; ha venido en decretar el 
escudo de armas de la República en la forma siguiente.” Law of July 14th of 1815, Provincias Unidas de a 
Nueva Granada, in Ortega Ricaurte, Enrique (1954). Heráldica Nacional. Banco de la República, Bogotá: 
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Chimborazo volcano in the central present day Ecuadorian Andes and the Panama 
isthmus in the union between Central and South America, in present-day Panama are all 
featured in the new insignia. (Figure 8). 
 The three natural wonders figured among the most celebrated natural landmarks 
in New Granada. Caldas and the Creole poet and scientist José María Salazar for example 
wrote about the suitability of economic development, describing the Tequendama Falls as 
a privileged spot to witness the microclimates of the region. They claimed that one could 
find from the top to the bottom of its surroundings the vegetation of a variety of 
climates.128 The interdependence between different altitudes and geographies was 
precisely what made of nature landmarks an allegory for integration. Caldas described the 
Chimborazo volcano as a “colossal mass, (…) whose paths unites Quito and the port of 
Guayaquil” and “presents all the extension and all imaginable comfort to observe the heat 
of the water from the snow-point line to sea level.”129 The Isthmus of Panama Caldas 
noted and Camilo Torres did in his Memorial de Agravios, is a proof of Nueva Granada’s 
geographic disposition for commerce.130 Lastly, the pomegranate stands for a federation 
of seeds and what holds each of the four natural wonders together.   
 
                                                
128 José María Salazar, “La cascada del Tequendama”, en Salazar, José María, “La cascada del 
Tequendama”, en Museo De Cuadros De Costumbres. Bogotá: F. Mantilla, 1866. “El influjo del clima 
sobre los seres organizados, Santafé, (10 de mayo de 1808), Francisco José de Caldas, Obras Completas. 
Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1966: 103-104. 
129 Ibid. Caldas. 112. 
130 Vasco Núñez de Balboa was the first explorer to document the existence of an isthmus connecting the 
Pacific and Atlantic oceans during the early sixteenth century. 
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Figure 8. Coat of Arms of the United Provinces of New Granada, 1815.131  
 
Conclusions 
 
Spanish Americans’ articulation of political economy thinking and territoriality when 
confronting the vacuum of power and the geopolitical developments of the interregnum 
sheds light on the spatial dimensions of local political projects during the transition from 
                                                
131 AGI, Mapas y Planos, Panamá, Santa Fe y Quito, 233. 
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colony to republic in New Granada. I presented a territorial perspective of political 
economy and how it developed and played itself out in a myriad of territorial conflicts 
and debates during the interregnum. Provincial leaders redrew their administrative 
boundaries, and longed for economic reforms, while forging their own spatial identities. 
These spatial identities and territorial projects were long in the making as Chapters 1 and 
2 demonstrated. 
Political actors crafted discourses in which they expressed and understood 
sovereignty, political representation, and autonomy in relation to on-the-ground and 
imagined appropriations of the territory and its resources.132 Constantly seeking to shift 
their borders and establish relations with one and other, the revolutionary councils of 
cities such as Quito, Cartagena, Santa Fe, and Mompox imagined themselves and 
struggled to become centers of their territories in reason of their cultural, economic, and 
geographical capital. The debate over the type of political organization, federalist or 
centralist, confronted different factions in New Granada, demonstrating that political 
economy thinking and reflections on geography were central tools for legitimating or 
undermining different political projects. The outcomes in New Granada of the 
Napoleonic invasion to Iberia not only demonstrate that the viceroyalty was not a 
geographic or political unit, but reveal that the actors themselves assessed the spatial 
                                                
132 Juan Carlos Chaparro. “Ideas y experiencias en la independencia de la Nueva Granada: la crisis de la 
monarquía y las vicisitudes del nuevo orden.” In: Fundación Polar, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, and Universidad Michoacana. Las Independencias de Iberoamérica. Edited by 
Tomás Straka, Agustín Sánchez Andrés, and Michael Zeuske. Caracas: Fundación Empresas Polar : 
UCAB : Fundación Konrad Adenauer : UMSNH, 2011, 531. 
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dimensions of New Granada in discussing and imagining the best way to recompose 
political power.  
 The negotiations between provinces during the interregnum led to wars between 
provinces, and between royalists and patriots. The logistics of the war dislocated 
territorial control, communications, and commercial networks. Wartime territoriality was 
about the movements of troops, supplies, agricultural products, weapons, maps, 
geographical descriptions, and other documents across New Granada. The contest for 
territorial sovereignty developed not only as the quest for the physical occupation of 
space, but also as its figurative control through the appropriation of geographical and 
natural knowledge. 
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Chapter. 4. War Strategies, Natural Knowledge, and Territory during 
the Spanish Restoration in New Granada, 1815-1819 
 
 “While destructive, war is a generative force like no other.” 
                       Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton1  
 
Introduction 
 
Military marching across territory entails a disruption of the spatial order. For instance, 
the first act of asserting control over territory is to move, use, reside within, and 
experience a particular space.2 Spanish General Pablo Morillo and the Expeditionary 
Army of Costa Firme marched across Venezuela and New Granada in order to re-conquer 
the lost colonies. The returning Spanish monarch, Ferdinand VII, ordered a military 
campaign known as the pacificación to extinguish the revolution in America.3 The 
Spanish military campaign to regain control over the colonies was a fight over who ruled 
the territory, its resources, and peoples, and the knowledge about the territory.  
 In this chapter, I reconstruct the itineraries of the Expeditionary Army of Costa 
Firme to reveal the intersections between territorial strategy, political economy, and 
chorographic knowledge behind wartime mobilization. I examine the strategies of the 
Spanish Expeditionary Army of Costa Firme in the territorial reorganization, control, and 
                                                
1 Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton. “Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and Critique.” International 
Political Sociology 5, no. 2, June 1, 2011. 
2 Yi-Fu Tuan. Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience. 5th or later Edition edition. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2001, 177. 
3 The forces of the Spanish Reconquista Army ascended to 10,642 men. 
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symbolic appropriation of New Granada’s nature during the Reconquista. The restoration 
of the monarchical order implied a series of wartime policies, which led to the 
establishment of military governments. By reconstructing the rationale behind the 
Spanish pursuit for sovereignty, this chapter is distinct from the dominant narratives that 
stress anti-Spanish myths around the terror and cruelty of the Spanish reconquista.  
 By militarizing statecraft, the Spanish army attempted to re-create the colonial 
space within a geographical and economic epistemological framework. The importance 
of decades of production of chorographic knowledge gathered to advance the 
territorialization of New Granada represented a crucial arena in the fight for sovereignty. 
The question of who owned the natural knowledge of New Granada became central as the 
Spanish military set out to regain physical and symbolic control of the territory and 
reinvent the colony’s political economy during the war. 
 As the reconquista campaigns resulted in the establishment of military 
governments across New Granada, Spanish General Pablo Morillo weakened the power 
of quintessential Spanish institutions such as the audiencias. He altered colonial 
jurisdictions in the Northeastern region of the kingdom in order to decrease the power of 
local councils. Beyond wartime urgency for financial resources, foodstuffs, cattle, 
ammunitions, and so forth, the military government advanced a policy of economic 
improvement along with a political economy discourse that placed the city of El Socorro 
as a center of trade in the viceroyalty. 
The revolutionary actors themselves understood that their struggle had a profound 
spatial and economic dimension. Although it is often said that military caudillos shaped 
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the politics and warfare of the 1810s, we cannot possibly understand the politics of war 
without understanding the spatial practices embedded within it. The military campaigns 
that led to the imperial recovery of New Granada’s provinces affected the spatial 
configuration. New regional political geographies and administrative structures emerged 
as by-products of the war. The actions of the reconquista army reveal that the contest for 
territorial sovereignty developed both as a quest for the physical occupation of the 
rebellious territories and as its figurative control through the appropriation of 
geographical and natural knowledge. The negotiation of space occurred both in the 
physical and epistemological realms.  
 My approach places economic aspirations, territoriality, and the quest for 
knowledge as driving forces of wartime strategies, and defining features of the struggles 
and debates of the transition from colony to republic. The actions of the Expeditionary 
Army of Costa Firme resulted in bloodshed that split into two the seemingly brilliant 
trajectory of a generation of intellectuals, lawyers, naturalists, writers, and military men 
who led the revolutionary councils and later, the war. Under the tragedy of the killing of 
the most brilliant minds in the kingdom at the hands of the Spanish firing squad, 
nationalistic accounts are full of depictions of Morillo as a pacifier and a tyrant. 
Historians have not really asked about the non-violent mechanisms by which the 
Reconquista army regained sovereign power over New Granada and the nature of the 
spatial practices that were put into motion during the military campaigns. Scholarship has 
yet to unravel the nature of statecraft when the military takes over political and economic 
endeavors.  
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The first section of this chapter provides the background to understanding the 
larger Reconquista plan that Spanish imperial agents devised and implemented in New 
Granada along with an overview of the different territorial strategies that the 
Expeditionary Army of Costa Firme put in place during the military campaign. The 
second section analyzes the army’s policy of confiscation of geographic descriptions and 
maps of the kingdom. Section three studies the geopolitical importance of the 
northeastern region of New Granada and the implications of the military refurbishment of 
local jurisdictions. The next section deals with the Reconquista war as a spatial practice 
that crafted particular political economy visions and policies. Then I turn to analyze the 
enactment of a new type of geo-military territoriality in a crucial theater of the war in the 
region that extends from northeastern New Granada to the province of Guayana in the 
Venezuelan Orinoco region. Lastly, the chapter turns from the practicality of imperial 
military strategy and territoriality to the symbolic control over the natural inscriptions of 
New Granada’s Botanical Expedition by the Spanish army.  
 
The Reconquista Territorial and Economic Strategies  
 
Originally, the Spanish king contemplated starting the recovery of the insurrected 
American colonies through Rio de la Plata but the plan changed. The Ministero Universal 
de Indias in Madrid gave General Pablo Morillo a set of instructions for the expedition to 
Costa Firme—the coastal areas of Venezuela and New Granada—on November 18, 1814. 
King Ferdinand VII explained this change of opinion, arguing that the  
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(…) pitiful situation of which the provinces of Venezuela found 
themselves and the importance of establishing an important standing 
defense in the Isthmus of Panama, the key of both Americas, made me 
decide to direct the expedition to Costa Firme.4  
 
The Spanish authorities decision to start the military campaign in Venezuela and New 
Granada might have seemed surprising given that until very recently, these territories 
were peripheral to the empire and did not represent the bulk of American wealth. In the 
latter part of the century, however, Venezuela emerged as a cacao export economy with 
broad connections with British outposts in the Caribbean. Another reason that explains 
why the king switched the first stop of the campaigns from Montevideo to Tierra Firme 
was related to the reports on the possibility of racial warfare in Venezuela where the 
revolutionary government had declared complete independence from Spain since 1811. 
The decision to start the military campaign in Venezuela—first in Margarita Island, then 
Cumaná, Caracas, and Cartagena—also made sense strategically. (See Figure 9.) This 
plan sought to safeguard the Caribbean coast and the Isthmus of Panamá from corsairs 
and to protect commerce. Securing the coast was also central since American exiles were 
acquiring arms from the English and other foreign powers.5  
                                                
4 “Decreto de Fernando VII referente a la expedición del General Morillo, 9 de Mayo de 1815.” Antonio 
Rodríguez Villa. El teniente general don Pablo Morillo primer conde de Cartagena, marqués de La Puerta 
(1778-1837): Documentos justificativos: guerra de la independencia y primer año, 1815, de la expedición 
á Costa firme. 1908. Est. tip. de Fortanet, 1908, 462-463.  
5 Op. Cit. Brown; Racine. 
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Figure 9. Itinerary of the Expeditionary Army of Tierra Firme From Puerto Rico to 
Cartagena, 1815. 
  
 The military strategy for reconquering Venezuela and New Granada included 
different tactics that varied slightly depending on the territory in question. The one aspect 
that the Expeditionary Army replicated in the whole kingdom was the centralization of 
power via military government. In the case of Venezuela, as historian Stephen K. Stoan 
illustrates, General Pablo Morillo regained control of Venezuela by establishing War 
Councils, ad hoc appeal tribunals to replace the Audiencia, police courts, and confiscation 
 198 
councils.6 Differently from the old colonial regime, the acceptance of authoritarian 
methods that concentrated power in the military state was superimposed over the other 
colonial jurisdictions. When Morillo’s forces took possession of the island of Margarita 
in April 11, 1815, for example, he performed a series of authoritarian acts directed at 
recovering the political legitimacy of the king. He declared himself Captain General of 
Venezuela, governor of Caracas, and president of the Audiencia. Later on, as the exercise 
of power passed from civil to military hands, the Real Audiencia was suspended.7 After 
reworking the institutional setting, the Spanish armies implemented various measures to 
help the precarious economic situation in the cities and towns they occupied. In the 
process of regaining control of the different colonies, the General Captain usually 
gathered the cabildo, parish priests, and clerics. The army proceeded to “burn the acts of 
the revolutionary government,” and administer an oath of fidelity and pledge fealty to the 
sovereign Ferdinand VII, extending the hands over the “holy Gospels at the feet of Our 
Lord crucified.”8  
Soon after this act of fidelity to the king and establishing the new military 
institutions, Morillo’s police turned to reviving regional political economies, which had 
suffered greatly during the wars. In the case of Venezuela for example, Morillo attempted 
to legitimize the reestablishment of royal rule by redrawing Venezuela’s path to 
agricultural wealth. Morillo urged Venezuelans to “search for the wealth of your old 
                                                
6 Stephen K. Stoan. Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815-1820. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1974, 64. 
7 Article 13 of the instrucciones. 
8 Ibid. 449. 
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agriculture” and remember “the opulence of your ports and towns.”9 Military officials 
had told Morillo in several letters that the commercial relations between the inhabitants 
of the kingdom and the British had dramatically increased during the rebellion.10 Morillo 
insisted “the steel had been distracted from the crops to be used against each other,” and 
that Venezuelans should now become invested in agriculture to “let the arms pluck 
wealth from the earth.” He added that the only way that Venezuelans could be happy was 
by returning to farming which “is the base of your abundance.”11 Morillo urged 
Venezuelans to restore the economic order in the face of short term needs to fund the war 
and long-term imperial economic interests.12 Morillo also advised Spanish Americans to 
forget the discord in the name of the king, declared all who failed to take the loyalty oath 
as traitors to the king, and confiscated all of their property. The policy of confiscation 
extended beyond seizing the properties of the rebels to the pursuit of information.  
A key strategy emerged out of the necessity of knowing the features of the 
landscape, its rivers, trails, passages, mountains, and towns. This required a plan to 
collect information to guide an army composed mainly of Spaniards setting foot in New 
Granada for the first time. Upon controlling Cartagena, for example, the army took over 
the archives, correspondence, library registries and acts, memoirs, books, drawings, and 
plans held in local archives housed in old colonial institutions. The confiscation of these 
documents of diverse nature from the insurgents’ archives occurred mainly in two ways. 
                                                
9 “Proclama de Morillo a los habitantes de Venezuela”, Caracas, 11 de Mayo de 1815.” Ibid. Rodríguez 
Villa, 465-466. 
10 “El Sr. Douglas al General Morillo, 17 de mayo, 1815.” Ibid. 468.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Op. Cit. Stoan, 95. 
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The first one was part of the larger set of instructions that General Morillo gave to his 
officials to find useful documents to advance the military itineraries in the kingdom. For 
instance, the steps to follow when taking control over a town or city, Morillo instructed, 
was first to take over the archives, second to restore the police, third to stockpile 
provisions, and lastly to open trails.13 The other way of confiscating documents entailed 
the raid of documents during specific military actions. For example, Morillo confiscated 
several documents of the archives of patriot insurgents during a raid on the military 
headquarters of Simón Bolívar.14  
The military actions that allowed Morillo to successfully restore monarchical rule 
in New Granada must be understood also as a quest for information not only for the short 
term purposes of military reconquest but also for the long term objectives of 
reincorporating American colonies into the Spanish imperial economy. In his march 
towards Santa Fe, Morillo states his interest not only in military knowledge of the 
country, but in “knowing about its natural productions, state of prosperity, its 
inhabitants.”15 The war strategies of the Reconquista can be considered a meditation on 
                                                
13 “Oficios dirigidos por el general Pablo Morillo a don Miguel de la Torre”, Leg. 8717. Archivo Histórico 
Nacional (Spain). El Ejército Expedicionario de Costa Firme: Documentos Del Conde de Torrepando 
Conservados En El Archivo Histórico Nacional. Edited by Pilar León Tello and Miguel de la Torre 
Torrepando. Conmemoración Del V Centenario Del Descubrimiento de América, 1492-1992 7-. Madrid: 
Real Academia de la Historia, 1985, 13. 
14 “El General Morillo remite al secretario de Estado de España varios documentos del archive de Bolívar 
tomanos en algunos movimientos militares.” Cuartel general de la Villa de Cura, 17 de marzo de 1818. In: 
José Félix Blanco, and Ramón Azupurú. Documentos para la historia de la vida pública del libertador de 
Colombia, Perú y Bolivia ...: “Publicados por disposición del general Guzmán Blanco...” Vols. XI-XIV. 
"Por disposición del ejecutivo nacional de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, presidido por el gran 
demócrata, general Francisco L. "La Opinion nacional, 1876, 350-351.  
15 “Comunicado de Morillo al Ministerio de Guerra, donde describe las acciones militares que permitieron 
la ocupación de la Nueva Granada”, No. 48, Ministerio Universal de la Guerra. Reservado. Mayo 31 de 
1816, 102-104. In Bonilla, Heraclio, Marco Manuel Forero Polo, Carlos Daniel Pérez Ruiz, Ignacio Castán 
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the landscape in both the pragmatic ways, for optimizing the marches across the territory 
and improving local economies, and well as in the symbolic realms as the confiscation of 
the materials of the Botanical Expedition illustrates.  
The Expeditionary Army confronted the challenges of disseminating their forces 
across a vast and unknown country. Military leaders contemplated different routes to 
deploy the militia all of which, according to General Francisco Warleta, presented 
paramount difficulties for the armies. “Constant rains stop the march often; the terrain is 
rough, high, and steep”, Warleta added, also pointing out that in many places the armies 
had to open the trails to be able to pass through.16 The geographic strategy conceived of 
the country, in this case New Granada, as a political unit that should be re-conquered as a 
single country. This meant spreading several military columns across the territory at the 
same time to shut down the insurgent governments, recruit new military forces, and 
secure food supplies for advancing towards ousting the revolutionary government in the 
capital Santa Fe. Venezuela’s reconquest laid the financial and strategic groundwork for 
the campaigns in New Granada, which started soon after Caracas fell to royalist forces. 
The plan to besiege Cartagena was plotted from the royalist city of Santa Marta.17 The 
Expeditionary Army blocked Cartagena from receiving food supplies, which the city 
                                                                                                                                            
Andolz, and Real Academia de la Historia (Spain), eds. Pablo Morillo: Documentos de La Reconquista de 
Colombia Y Venezuela: Transcripciones Del Fondo Documental “Pablo Morillo.” 1. ed. Bogotá: Centro 
Cultural y Educativo Español (C.C.E.E.) Reyes Católicos : Universidad Nacional de Colombia : Grupo de 
Investigación en Historia Económica y Social : Gas Natural S.A. E.S.P, 2011. 
16 AGI, “Francisco Warleta a Pascual Enrile sobre la apertura del camino de Anchicará.” Popayán, 18 de 
septiembre de 1816. 
17 “Instrucciones dadas a Morillo para su expedición a Costafirme—Ministerio Universal de Indias—Muy 
Reservado—Madrid, 18 de Noviembre, 1814.” Ibid. Rodríguez Villa, 437-448. 
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obtained through traffic in the Magdalena and Sinú rivers, until they defeated the patriot 
forces in control of the port city.  
When the situation in Venezuela was stable and Cartagena had fallen into royalist 
hands, Morillo advanced towards Andean environs. He first deployed several military 
columns towards the hinterlands of the kingdom. The first column ascended the 
Magdalena River to occupy the province of Neiva. The second group marched from 
Venezuela to Ocaña, to recover the provinces of northeast New Granada; the third one 
led by General Francisco Warleta reached the northwest province of Antioquia from 
Cartagena. The fourth column entered the environs of the western part of New Granada 
through the Atrato River to occupy the province of Chocó. Once royalist control over 
Cartagena was secured, Morillo marched towards Mompox to reconvene with the rest of 
the royalist army in Ocaña to continue marching towards Santa Fe. Simultaneously, in 
support of Morillo’s troops who had already occupied New Granada and marched 
towards the hinterlands, the Spanish military appointed General Juan Sámano to advance 
the military Reconquista of the southern cities of Popayán and Pasto from Quito. (See 
Figure 10)  
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Figure 10. Itinerary of the Expeditionary Army of Tierra Firme to the Andean 
Hinterlands, 1815-1816. 
 
The Spanish strategy to spread across New Granada contained an implicit view of 
different regions. The first region is the one where Neiva is located, comprising the 
valleys between the central and eastern cordilleras south west from Santa Fe in the 
margins of the Magdalena River. The second region comprises the cities and towns over 
the eastern cordillera such as Ocaña, Bucaramanga, El Socorro, Vélez, and San Gil. The 
third region corresponds to the province of Antioquia located over the western cordillera. 
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The fourth region is located between the western cordillera, the riverbanks of the Atrato 
River, in the gold producing province of Chocó, and the Pacific littoral. The fifth region 
comprises the southern province of Popayán and Pasto located in the valleys between the 
western and central cordilleras and lastly, the high plateau of the city of Santa Fe located 
in the eastern cordillera. The Topographic Table of the Expeditionary Army started the 
arduous task of reconstructing the topographic features of this fragmented territory for the 
task of recovering the colonies. 
 
Chorographic Knowledge and Military Strategy 
 
The army unleashed the policy of confiscation across local archives in order to seize 
geographic descriptions and maps of the kingdom. These documents had been produced 
in different government offices and centers of learning since the late eighteenth century. 
The plan emphasized gathering detailed data about the territory then aggregating it into a 
complete representation of the country. The topographic papers, essential to know the 
country, Spanish military leaders asserted, required the adoption of a uniform system to 
coordinate the acquisition of documents that would in turn aid in accomplishing 
successful military operations. Possessing topographic information of the kingdom was 
paramount to opening paths to surprise the enemy, continue the military campaigns to the 
south, and reach all regions including the capital city. Spanish forces appropriated 
knowledge about the topographical features, trails, and roads of New Granada and used it 
to plan their marches across New Granada. Military leaders understood that gathering as 
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much geographic information as possible would eliminate for the royalist army the 
disadvantage of moving for the first time across an unknown territory.  
 Military warfare occurred in the physical space; therefore, the management and 
pursuit of topographic and geographic knowledge was at the heart of any army’s strategy. 
The campaign, as devised for New Granada, was based on the defense strategies planned 
for the Peninsula during the French occupation. In order to direct the military operations 
successfully, the Spanish army penned a text of instructions about the best system for the 
“military-topographic works,” their use, and organization in a repository.18 As an 
inspiration for Spanish military needs, Lieutenant Coronel D. Salvador Manzanares 
translated a French topographic-military memorial published by the War Deposit of 
France.19 “The skeleton of the country, its mountains, its waters,” the instructions stated, 
are the basis for military operations in any country. For this reason, the memorial added, 
these features should be expressed from one single point of view through a physical 
map.20 To centralize the acquisition of information of New Granada, General Pablo 
Morillo established the Mesa de Topografía del Ejército Expedicionario de Costa Firme.  
 The Expeditionary Army confiscated documents from local archives to form a 
                                                
18 Archivo Histórico Nacional, “Memorias del Depósito Topográfico sobre los datos que se aportan de los 
trabajos topográficos, geográficos, itinerarios, etc. para poder dirigir al Ejército.” Diversos-
Colecciones,112,N.2. 
19 The other objective of the memorial was to reflect on ways to make the transportation of maps and plans 
easy. 
20 As we saw in chapters 1 and 2, royal officials constantly grappled with the problem of map inaccuracies. 
The memorial explains that problems of scale made it difficult to link maps to sketches, and were among 
the motives that have discredited physical maps. 
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collection of itineraries, routes, and staging posts.21 The documentation contained in the 
file Itinerarios, derroteros y postas del Nueva Reino de Granada y documentación varia 
del Ejército Expedicionario de Costa Firme, 1814-1818 of the Archivo General de Indias 
in Seville contains almost fifty documents, reports, planimetry documents, and other 
documents.22 The Expeditionary Army put together this file as a consequence of its 
military activities and sent them later to Cuba and then to Seville. The archive contains 
travel accounts, eighteenth-century military plans to attack the Indian populations in the 
borderlands of Panama, economic and administrative plans, geographical descriptions of 
the different provinces, descriptions of communication networks within the kingdom, 
accounts of expeditions across the Atrato river, and reports about the Orinoco river. 
Eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century chorographic texts served as the basis for the 
process of reinterpreting the landscape of New Granada in military terms. In short, the 
army gathered the chorographic texts, which were central to advance New Granada’s 
territorialization as discussed in chapter 1.  
Using eighteenth-century chorographic texts for inspiration, royal officials knew 
that these texts held the key to unlock New Granada’s potential to achieve fluid inter-
provincial communications, find natural riches, and know its geographic features. One of 
the documents that the Spanish army confiscated was a travel account from Quito to the 
coasts of the Pacific Ocean through the Camino de Malbucho between July and August 
1803. Creole astronomer and geographer Francisco José de Caldas wrote the text as part 
                                                
21 AGI, “Itinerarios, derroteros y postas del Nueva Reino de Granada y documentación varia del Ejército 
Expedicionario de Costa Firme." 1814-1818. 
22 See Appendix B. Ibid. AGI, Itinerarios, “Diligencias actuadas sobre el gobierno de Neiva, Popayán y 
Margarita, 1777.” 
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of the larger project to connect the province of Quito with the Pacific. His observations of 
the region were directed at solving the “difficult problem of political economy” of a sea 
outlet for Quito. His observations blended astronomical and barometric measurements 
with observations about the plants of the region. Paradoxically, while the Spanish army 
confiscated Caldas’s texts, he became the head of the military engineers in the patriot 
army where he produced fortification plans and maps to aid the revolutionary cause. 
Therefore, the military re-conquest of New Granada not only triggered the confiscation of 
natural knowledge, but also promoted the production of plans, itineraries, topographic 
descriptions, and maps of the kingdom on both the patriot and royalist fronts.  
In the case of the patriots, the works led by Caldas within the School of Military 
Engineers of Antioquia resulted also in the production of maps of the kingdom and 
topographic charts. Caldas, a strong proponent of military geography, had started to work 
during the interregnum in the service of the revolutionary government for the production 
of a general Atlas of the kingdom in 1811 as we saw in chapter 3. Caldas revisited this 
project in 1815 sponsored by the United Provinces of New Granada and initiated a 
campaign to collect the available maps of New Granada.23 By the time Morillo started his 
military march across New Granada, Caldas was at the service of the leaders of Antioquia 
who saw the need to organize the military defense of the territory.24 As part of his works 
as military engineer, Caldas led the design of plans and construction of forts and trails to 
                                                
23 “Invitación”, in Argos de la Nueva Granada, no. 102, 1815, 615. 
24 Iván Felipe Lozano Suárez. “Francisco José de Caldas y la geografía militar en la provincia de Antioquia 
(1813-1815).” Apuntes. Revista de estudios sobre patrimonio cultural 26, no. 1 (2013).  
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protects strategic passages in the Cauca River, in the western region of New Granada.25  
This emphasis on the Cauca River sought to devise a strategy to detain General Juan 
Sámano’s military expansion towards the Popayán. In comparison to the royalist 
territorial strategy, however, patriot efforts to produce and affect the territoriality of the 
war were reduced to Caldas’ fragmented plans for the region of Antioquia and Popayán. 
Although the government of the Provincias Unidas asked Caldas to open in Santa Fe a 
similar academy to the one in Antioquia, the Reconquista army hindered this project. In 
contrast, the strategies of the royalist armies to recover topographic information about 
New Granada resulted in an all-encompassing confiscation strategy to collect documents 
about all regions. This strategy derived in the production of plans of defense and attack 
for the whole kingdom during the wars.  
 The assembly of the royalist chorographic archive illustrates this territorial logic. 
The collection gathered by the Spanish army contains several late eighteenth-century 
texts from diverse origins and all the regions. (See Appendix B) In the interest of 
gathering information about the borderlands of New Granada, military officials 
confiscated several territorial descriptions, such as the description of the Orinoco River 
(1783), the description of the province of Darién (1794), and the description of the Llanos 
del Casanare and Santa Martín (1796). About the borderlands, we also find a document 
                                                
25 Recently, Colombian historians recovered a collection of patriot army military maps, namely of Caldas, 
in Spanish archives. In their work, Díaz, Múñoz, and Nieto speculate that the abilities of Caldas in 
geography and astronomy evident in the materials confiscated by the Spanish army “preoccupied the 
Spanish military men” who were surprised by the Creoles’ abilities, and they add, “were probably a good 
reason for his execution by firing squad.” Sebastián Díaz Angel, Santiago Muñoz Arbelaez, and Mauricio 
Nieto Olarte. Ensamblando La Nación: Cartografía Y Política En La Historia de Colombia. 1a ed. Bogotá: 
Ediciones Uniandes, 2010, 46-47. 
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about the plans to conquer the Darien Indians from 1784. The collection also features a 
number of documents about the opening of trails. Among them is a text about the opening 
of the path of Orrao (1794), a diary of the discovery of the path of Opón (1793), the 
course of the city of La Playa, (1783), and the description of the new path from Quito to 
the port of La Tola (1806). Another genre, key to crafting the itineraries for the 
Expeditionary Army to follow, are travel documents such as the journey from Quito 
already mentioned and the journey from the Upper Orinoco to the Negro River (1800). 
The army also collected defense and attack plans such as the ones for the Sinú River, Rio 
Hacha, Santa Fe, Cartagena, and Guayana (1806).  
 This overview of the composition of the archive illustrates the royalist army’s 
intention to gather information of all the regions across the kingdom. Although this vision 
conceived of New Granada as a single unit to be re-conquered, a crucial geopolitical 
space for the success of the campaigns was the border between New Granada and 
Venezuela. The next section explains where the geopolitical importance of these regions 
lay and reconstructs the territorial strategies to restore Spanish control in this region via 
local jurisdictional reordering and geo-military spatial interpretations. 
 
Jurisdictional Order and the Reconquista in the Venezuela-New Granada Border  
 
During 1816, General Pablo Morillo established a number of military 
governments across New Granada and altered colonial jurisdictions already in place. As 
seen for the case of Venezuela, in the provinces of northeastern New Granada the same 
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institutional change took place. After naming Colonel Antonio Fominaya military 
governor of El Socorro, Morillo ordered modifications to the jurisdictional arrangements 
of the Northeastern region of the kingdom, which had been in place since 1795. The new 
military government, headed by Fominaya, a former army official in charge of the 
garrison of El Socorro, advanced measures to curb the independence of the cabildos and 
rearrange the political geography of the region. Morillo’s stance reflects in the great 
paradox shown in the Bourbon centralization project. Although the crown endeavored to 
centralize economic, political, and social authority in order to extract resources more 
efficiently from the colonies’ municipal councils, such as the one in El Socorro, remained 
the center of city level politics and achieved abundant levels of autonomy during the 
eighteenth century.  
El Soccoro was formed of three partidos26, San Gil, Socorro, and Velez. 
According to Morillo, each partido was different in ideas and interests and was looking 
to separate from the others.27 Since the inhabitants of the town of Velez—part of the 
province of El Socorro—rebelled against Fominaya and refused to pay contributions to 
the royalist army, Morillo decided to separate Velez from El Socorro, to which it had 
belonged since 1795, and named Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Carmona to rule over Velez. 
From then on, Velez and its partido remained segregated from Socorro.28 Along with 
Morillo’s decision of establishing hard military rule to regain obedience in the restless 
                                                
26 A partido is a district or territory of a jurisdiction or administration that has a main town as its head. 
27 Horacio Rodríguez Plata. La Antigua Provincia Del Socorro y la Independencia. Biblioteca de Historia 
Nacional, v. 98. Bogotá: Publicaciones Editoriales Bogotá, 1963. 313.  
28 “Letter from Pablo Morillo to Antonio Fominaya.” Velez, 25 de mayo de 1816. Horacio Rodríguez 
Plata,. La Antigua Provincia Del Socorro y la Independencia. Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, v. 98. 
Bogotá: Publicaciones Editoriales Bogotá, 1963. 313.  
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province of Velez, his territorial reorganization reflected the long-standing tensions 
between Spanish centralization projects and colonial local rule.  
 The Comunero revolt had left a trail of suspicion among royal officials. Spanish 
anxieties over controlling the restless town of El Socorro, the place of origin of the 1781 
revolt, continued to linger in the imagination of the members of the expeditionary army. 
The rebellion of El Socorro was the strongest regional threat to the government, due to its 
violent, popular, and anti-Spanish character.29 El Socorro had a long history of social 
unrest and vehement defense of economic and political autonomy. It is not surprising 
then that the reconquista campaigns invested numerous administrative and military 
resources to establish a military government in that region. Cultivating fidelity to the 
crown while weakening local power in the region, Morillo made new administrative 
partitions.  
General Morillo’s jurisdictional and administrative reforms suggest a concern 
about the extent to which the power invested in municipal councils (cabildos) had 
hindered the metropole’s ability to centralize power. Continuing with the policy initiated 
in Venezuela to limit the power of the cabildos, Morillo reformed the municipal 
government in the northeast. Morillo felt that three neighboring cabildos with opposing 
ideas should not be a part of the same province. Morillo therefore decided to divide the 
province into three military command headquarters.30 In his report, Morillo further 
explained his decision by claiming that the cabildos of the provinces’ capitals ruled over 
                                                
29 Op. Cit. McFarlane, 342.  
30 The military government of San Gil would control the path that from the Magdalena River connected the 
towns of Zapatoca and Barichara, and then the town of El Socorro. 
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the towns in each province, the same way a general captain could rule in his district. 
Morillo’s justification for establishing new military jurisdictions was merely a reflection 
of an already existing civil bureaucratic structure. Spanish territorial organizations 
operated as a hierarchy in which the main cities of a region exercised jurisdiction over a 
set of villages and towns.31 For Morillo, despite there being towns that held greater 
strategic importance than the ones where the cabildo resided, in reality the cabildo should 
not be a municipal body (ayuntamiento) to rule over a certain population, but a civil or in 
this case a military governor should be the one governing entire provincial territories.32 
Morillo openly opposed giving power to a corporation such as the cabildo, “which met 
every Monday without the rule of a government chief.”33 Governors should preside over 
any cabildo meeting, he asserted, assuring that a higher-ranking official sanctioned the 
decisions that affected an entire provincial territory. The establishment of a military 
government in the Northeastern region of New Granada illustrates the ways in which 
Spanish military governments reconfigured provincial spaces while reforming their 
political economies.   
 
                                                
31 Antonio Annino and François-Xavier Guerra. Inventando la nación: Iberoamérica siglo XIX. Fondo de 
Cultura Economica, 2003, 144. 
32 The quote in Spanish is: “Es preciso, Excelentísimo Señor tener en cuenta que los Cabildos de las 
capitales de provincia mandan a los demás pueblos de ella, como podría hacerlo un Capitán General en su 
distrito, a pesar de que haya pueblos de mayor centro que el de la residencia del Cabildo, de manera que en 
realidad no es un cuerpo de Ayuntamiento para una población sino un gobierno para todo un término o 
provincia.” “Informe que Pablo Morillo rinde al ministro de guerra de su majestad después de su llegada a 
Santafé”, en Antonio Rodríguez Villa. El Teniente General don Pablo Morillo, tomo III. Madrid. 1908. pp. 
164-167.  
33 Ibid.  
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Wartime Political Economy  
 
The leaders of the Expeditionary Army constantly evaluated the characteristics of 
the territory for advancing military campaigns and reflected on the economic potential 
and infrastructure needs of the regions under their control. In a number of letters 
exchanged between General Antonio Fominaya and General Lieutenant Pascual Enrile 
during 1816, it is clear that the Spanish armies played a significant role in the 
construction of infrastructure. The role of Enrile, Fominaya, and Morillo as promoters of 
public works during the reconquista has been treated by anti-Spanish nationalist 
historiography as an enterprise that sought to punish and frighten people.34 In his Historia 
Eclesiástica y Civil de Nueva Granada published in 1891, José Manuel Groot accused 
Morillo and Enrile of opening roads within mountains, a costly and useless effort, in 
which many peasants were exploited working under the direction of ruthless Spanish or 
foreign officials.35 This is the narrative that has persisted about the Expeditionary Army’s 
campaigns, one of senseless cruelty and brutality.  
The intersections of war territoriality with visions of political economy shaped 
royalist military strategy. A close reading of the military government and Expeditionary 
Army leaders’ letters illustrates, however, the Crown’s interest in controlling and 
promoting any activity that could generate wealth for the crumbling empire in the long 
term. In the correspondence, the construction of trails, roads, and bridges in the northeast 
                                                
34 Op. Cit. Rodríguez Plata, 326. 
35 José Manuel Groot. “Historia eclesiástica y civil de Nueva Granada, escrita sobre documentos 
auténticos,” 1889, 407-408. http://repository.javeriana.edu.co/handle/10554/67. 
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were no longer attached to an ephemeral military campaign.36 Spanish military men 
referred often to these works as important for the “happiness of the province.”37 For 
instance, army leaders founded the parish of San Vicente de Chucurí as a colonization 
and supply center, to continue the trail until the port of Botijas on the Lebrija River, 
facilitating quick communication through the Magdalena River with the Atlantic coast.38 
(Figure 11.) Extending the military reconquest across New Granada merged with the 
financial needs of maintaining the campaigns while improving economic development 
particularly in El Socorro, located in the region between Venezuela and New Granada. 
 
                                                
36 Among the most important trails of the kingdom, Spanish officers opened the ones from Zapatoca to 
Magdalena, from Santa Fe to the Eastern Plains, the one of Quindío, from Cali to the Port of Buenaventura, 
and the ones from Sonsón to Antioquia, and Honda. Opening these paths was paramount for the broader 
objective of reaching the capital city. 
37 Ibid. 322-323.  
38 Along with the projects to open trails, Spanish military leaders advanced strategies to promote trade. For 
example, in a letter from General Pascual Enrile to Governor Fominaya, Enrile asks him to animate the 
peoples to promote and enlarge the little town of San Vicente, asking the wealthy to extract their 
commodities to Mompox. Starting this traffic and taking efficacious and active measures the bongos and 
canoes of the river would increase leaving the port in good shape for trade. (7 de agosto de 1816, 325-328) 
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Figure 11. New town of San Vicente de Chucurí, trail to the Lebrija River, and 
communication to the Magdalena river. 
 
In August of 1816, Pascual Enrile expressed concern with the region’s 
development and laid out his political and economic vision for El Socorro in a letter to 
Antonio Fominaya. Enrile promoted a vision of El Socorro as the center of trade in New 
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Granada.39 He described El Socorro as the most populated province of the viceroyalty 
“(…) rich, prone to agriculture, and naturally industrious, similar to Galicia.” Enrile 
pointed out that the development of El Socorro had been obstructed “because it has been 
accused of being rebellious.” In spite of this, he adds, the population has increased and 
the cotton fabrics produced in the province continued travelling all the way to Maracaibo. 
The province initially lacked a trail to connect it to the Magdalena River, but the trail was 
built. The population was gradually increasing, he stated, and the province was gradually 
progressing.40 His vision, however, did not conceive of El Socorro as independent but as 
an entity geographically and economically dependent on other regions.  
Enrile believed that the different provinces should aid each other with the 
productions of which some abounded and others lacked.41 Of equal concern, Enrile 
constantly asked different military governors across the kingdom to send news about each 
province’s natural products. Enrile also stressed the importance of coal and extracted 
samples to send to Spain.42 He acknowledged that the infrastructure works were 
producing some economic results. The linen and flour trade was reviving, signaling that 
Socorro was becoming more economically active. Enrile instructed Fominaya to promote 
the trade of linen between Socorro and Antioquia, Dimití, and Mompox. He imagined the 
                                                
39 Op. Cit. Rodríguez Plata , 326.  
40 “El general Enrile al Ministro de la Guerra sobre el curso de las operaciones del Ejército Expedicionario 
y medidas que deben adoptarse, según Morillo, para obtener el resultado que el gobierno se propuso con su 
envío a América—Madrid, 19 de Junio de 1817. 310. In: Antonio Rodríguez Villa. El teniente general don 
Pablo Morillo primer conde de Cartagena, marqués de La Puerta (1778-1837): Documentos justificativos: 
Años 1816 á 1818 inclusives de la expedición á Costa firme. 1908. Est. tip. de Fortanet, 1908. 
41 Ibid. Carta de Enrile a Fominaya de 17 de agosto de 1816. 
42 In a letter from September 6, 1816, Enrile mentions to Fominaya the existence of some salt and coal that 
needed recognition, opening a trail that was capable of constant transit, so Spanish officials could examine 
the benefit of those mines. The extraction of coal to Cartagena and Santa Marta could become the wealth of 
the regions of Socorro and San Gil. Ibid, 326.  
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formation of a company that could transport commodities and foodstuffs to the 
kingdom’s ports. Enrile asked Fominaya to get rid of the general laziness in the province 
and recommended the reconstruction of the path to Pamplona in order to transport 
commodities and food staples. This was all for the benefit of Socorro that was a supply 
center for all of the settlements across the Andean mountain range. The Expeditionary 
Army leaders’ ideas shaped the space of the northeastern region within the larger 
objective of promoting economic viability and legitimizing imperial rule.  
Regaining military control over the disobedient provinces and promoting their 
economy went hand-in-hand with reinforcing Spanish imperial symbols. The work of 
Fominaya was recognized and celebrated with monuments. Morillo ordered the 
construction of a custom-made stone fountain in the main plaza of the city of Socorro 
symbolizing a renewed imperial rule concerned with bringing happiness to the colony. 
Fominaya also ordered the creation of two stone monuments, which signaled the 
distances between Socorro and Santa Fe and to the port of Botijas, the only existing route 
to travel from Socorro to the Atlantic coast.43 In asserting imperial sovereignty, Spanish 
officials attempted to retain El Socorro as an imperial outpost. Marking the territory with 
monuments reflected one of many strategies of imperial repossession of the lost 
territories enacted during the military governments. 
Wartime territoriality re-arranged the spatial structure of the kingdom in order to 
advance military campaigns. In the documents containing the military memories of the 
re-conquest of New Granada, Spanish officials stress the importance of the trails and 
                                                
43 Ibid. “Carta de Morillo a Fominaya, en 15 de julio de 1816.” 
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roads to facilitate and succeed in the operations.44 Acknowledging their importance, the 
leaders of the Expeditionary Army ordered the opening of several trails following the 
physical formation of the country. In the military mindset, the opening of trails played a 
role not only for the short-term military marches but also for the sustained circulation of 
commodities, correspondence, cattle, and foodstuffs. The task of opening trails, described 
by military leaders as “cutting down forests, breaking down crags, and defeating other 
obstacles of nature”, was carried out with the aim of making them passable for many 
years not only for military reasons, and postal communication, but also for commercial 
purposes.45 
This section makes clear that for the Expeditionary Army, El Socorro represented 
a pivotal strategic post for military and commercial reasons. The plans to transform the 
northeast into a key economic hub, however, must be contextualized in the larger 
wartime strategy to control the region connecting Venezuela and New Granada. Besides 
the territorial logic that sought to curb the autonomy of the cabildos and the advancement 
of new visions of political economy for the northeastern region, military rule refurbished 
territorial partitions based on the geo-military importance of both the northeastern region 
of New Granada and the neighboring province of Guayana in Venezuela. These localities 
remained a pivotal theater in wartime strategies, a definitive point in the definition of the 
wars. 
                                                
44 “Conclusiones de la memoria militar de la Reconquista de la Nueva Granada”, in Op. Cit. Real 
Academia de Historia de Madrid. Ejército Expedicionario, f. 378r. 
45 Ibid. f. 381r. 
 219 
Geo-Military Territorialities and the Orinoco Theater 
  
Strategically located on the borders between Venezuela and New Granada, the 
northeastern region became a fundamental outpost for the military campaigns and 
economic growth halfway between Caracas and Santa Fe. Controlling the province of 
Guayana became a priority for the Expeditionary Army who understood the strategic 
advantage of dominating the Orinoco River for regaining New Granada. For this among 
other reasons, Morillo placed particular importance on the northeastern region of New 
Granada, which bordered Venezuela. The Expeditionary military and information 
strategy that Morillo and other military leaders devised for this area shed light on 
conceptions of territory linked to military interpretations of the landscape. In addition, 
when repurposed for military, chorographic political economies of New Granada reflect 
the changing nature of spatial relationships during war. 
 Morillo’s attempts to re-establish colonial rule, concentrate political power, and 
militarize state administration resulted in an interpretation of the Northeastern partidos’ 
geographic and economic imperatives. For example, when describing the territorial 
structure of the region and under the pressures of the war, Morillo decreed that the town 
of Giron, which used to be part of Pamplona, should be separated, leaving it as it was 
before 1786, and appointed a military commander. To justify the segregation of the town, 
Morillo stressed its geopolitical importance. The Sogamoso and Lebrija rivers—both 
tributaries of the main river of the kingdom, the Magdalena—met in Giron. The 
Sogamoso River, for instance, marked the border with the “vast, populated, and restless 
 220 
province of El Socorro,” whose territory was less rough and abounded with excellent 
military positions, Morillo added. According to Morillo, when the travelers journeyed 
from Pamplona to Santa Fe, El Socorro was an obligatory passage, as it was also for 
those coming from the eastern plains and Venezuela.  
Morillo deemed the town of Ocaña located north of Socorro as a crucial point in 
geo-military terms. Ocaña had been an important commercial town, which became a 
geostrategic location during the wars and a patriot enclave where patriot military leader 
Simón Bolívar spent time when he fled Caracas. Possessing Ocaña, Morillo pointed out, 
was very important because it was the passage to break through the kingdom of New 
Granada and to the valleys of Cúcuta. These valleys connected New Granada to 
Venezuela. Morillo’s interpretation of the potential of different locations in New Granada 
for military positions render an image of a larger geographic area comprising 
northeastern New Granada and the Venezuelan province of Guayana in the riverbanks of 
the Orinoco River.   
The use of a chorographic text about the province of Guayana during the military 
campaigns by General Morillo is an example of the political and military leaders’ 
awareness of the economic and spatial dimension of reconquest.46 One of Morillo’s 
officers, Nicolás María Ceruti, sent him a letter with a description of the province of 
Guayana, written by the engineer Miguel de Marmion, who was governor of the province 
                                                
46 “D. Andrés de la Rua y Figueroa, Gobernador de Guayana, al General Morillo, comunicándole 
reservadamente varias noticias interesantes sobre aquella provincial.—Guayana, 20 de mayo de 1815.” 
Ibid. 469-489. 
 221 
in the eighteenth century.47 The Descripción corográfico-mixta de la provincia de 
Guayana, dated 1788, helped the royalists’ to design a plan for reconquering portions of 
the province of Guayana that had fallen into patriot hands.48  
The document aided military men who used the geographic descriptions of 
vulnerable locations through which the province could be invaded, the distances between 
those risky points, and their distance from the Orinoco River. The memoir was handy as 
well when it came to mapping wood resources for the construction of canoes and the 
transportation of troops and food supplies from the missions of the Catalan priests. Given 
the importance of knowing the territory, the plan for recovering Guayana proposed to rely 
on officials who were already knowledgeable about navigating the river and about the 
Indians of the region. The Spaniards’ main goal was to achieve the adherence of the 
Indians to the monarchical cause.49 Due to the geopolitical situation of Guayana and the 
access to the Orinoco River, controlling the province provided military advantages for 
regaining control over the whole kingdom. The Expeditionary Army understood that 
securing control over the province of Guayana was essential in order to cut off the 
progress of Simon Bolivar’s armies. 
The eighteenth century chorographic text about Guayana served as inspiration to 
produce a new military text entitled Refllexiones sobre la Reconquista de la Provincia de 
Guayana in 1815. The royalist strategic plan contended that all of Bolívar and his army’s 
                                                
47 “El official de Estado Mayor D. Nicolás María Ceruti a Morillo, enviándole adjunta una descripción de 
la provincial de Guayana, escrita por el ingeniero D. Miguel de Marmion, gobernador que fue de ella a 
fines del siglo XVIII, 10 de Julio de 1815.” Ibid, 505-557.  
48 “Reflexiones sobre la reconquista de la provincial de Guayana.” Ibid. 558. 
49 Ibid. 559. 
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progress depended on Guayana, the “only port and point that facilitates the military 
expeditions against this large continent.”50 In the march towards the capital, Santa Fe, the 
Spanish army understood that taking away the Orinoco fluvial pathway from the 
insurgents would acutely harm Bolivar’s intentions to reach the capital. According to the 
Spaniards, marching by land towards Santa Fe with an army of six or eight thousand men 
was an impossible endeavor. Those who have geographic knowledge of the river, the 
plan stated, knew that controlling the river would ease the transportation of artillery and 
cavalry. As all of Venezuela flanks the Orinoco, all of its plazas and forts, as well as the 
kingdom of Santa Fe, would succumb to whoever controlled Guayana.  
Several months later Venezuelan military patriot Manuel Piar was also convinced 
that control of the interior was the only way to attain victory. In this case, the interior of 
Venezuela referred to Guayana and the llanos (plains or lowlands). In a letter from 
November 1816, Piar states that Guayana was the key to the lowlands, the fortresses of 
Venezuela and that “Guayana has been the center and refuge of our enemies.”51 It was 
only a month later that Piar together with patriot Manuel Cerdeño besieged Angostura, 
starting a military confrontation with the royalist armies. After Simón Bolívar joined the 
forces of Piar and Cerdeño, the city of Angostura fell to the patriots in August 1817. This 
gave the patriots a headquarters with an exit to the exterior via the Orinoco River. The 
new geopolitical situation allowed the patriots to stabilize political power while ousting 
the Spanish military government in Guayana to establish new power structures. Bolívar 
                                                
50 Op. Cit., Refllexiones sobre la Reconquista de la Provincia de Guayana, 560. 
51 Ineke Phaf-Rheinberger. The “Air of Liberty”: Narratives of the South Atlantic Past. Rodopi, 2008. 
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convened the Congress of Angostura, later renamed Ciudad Bolívar, in early 1819 to 
install the constitutional congress as the main chief of the new republic of Venezuela.  
As we saw in chapter 1, the Orinoco River held a geopolitical importance that not 
only determined the preeminence of Spain’s imperial control over a region constantly 
besieged by the Dutch but also gave way to the production of countless chorographic 
texts of the region. The description of the natural features and the territorial advantages of 
Guayana in Miarmon’s chorography were put into pragmatic use by the Expeditionary 
Army. Previous descriptions of Guayana, as seen in chapter 1, were not so concerned 
with military occupation but with expansion of Spanish political geography to hinder the 
influence of the Birtish, Dutch, and sovereign Indian nations. Morillo’s quest for 
chorographic knowledge and its interpretation for military purposes rendered a new 
conceptualization of space. Within these many texts, the documents to help advance the 
campaign to control the eastern region of Guayana became central in the geostrategic 
military mind.52 
While the scramble for the northeastern region and the Orinoco riverbanks 
advanced, the quest for the natural knowledge of the kingdom continued upon the arrival 
of the Expeditionary Army to the center of learning and the capital of the kingdom, Santa 
Fe, in May 1816. When Morillo arrived to Santa Fe in May 1816, he confiscated an 
eagle. The bird had been kept, according to Morillo, at the Congress of Santa Fe as a 
                                                
52 When Venezuela declared independence from Spain in 1811, the province of Guayana remained mostly 
a royalist enclave.  
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symbol of its power.53 The bird became a trophy of the Spanish Reconquista that Morillo 
and his officials presented to the king as a gift at the House of Birds and Wild Beasts of 
Madrid (Casa de Aves y Fieras).54 The appropriation of the eagle speaks of the imperial 
officials’ larger intent to control the colony’s symbolic and practical inscriptions of the 
natural world. These actions of the Reconquista armies reveal that the contest for 
territorial sovereignty developed not only as the quest for the physical pragmatic 
occupation of space, but also as its figurative control through the seizure of geographical 
and natural knowledge. In times of clashing sovereignties, the question of who owned the 
natural history and geographic representations of the kingdom arose forcefully.   
 
Who Owns the Natural History of New Granada?  
The newly established military rule in Santa Fe set out to recover all of the goods that 
belonged to the treasury. Spanish concerns with the lavished Royal Treasury led to a 
decree which established exceptional norms that all inhabitants of the kingdom were 
mandated to obey. The military government demanded the confiscation of all the wealth, 
jewelry, machines, books, and movable and immovable property that the inhabitants of 
the kingdom had received from the Royal Treasury. The purpose behind this was to assert 
imperial authority and ownership over objects that the fiscal Spanish state had funded 
                                                
53 “Comunicación de Pablo Morillo al Secretario de Estado desde el Cuartel General de Santa Fe”, 
septiembre 2 de 1816, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Archivo del Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales, Madrid, 
Fondo Expedición Botánica de la Nueva Granada, ref. 423.  
54 “Comunicación de Antonio Van Halen al Secretario de Estado”, Madrid, 28 de agosto de 1817, Archivo 
del Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales, Madrid, Fondo Expedición Botánica de la Nueva Granada, ref. 
423. 
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throughout the years. In addition, in the original instructions given to Morillo before the 
campaign, the Spanish crown proposed taking advantage of the universities, schools, and 
scientific establishments to defray war costs.  
The dispute over the ownership of the natural history of the colony represented a 
key aspect of the contestation for sovereignty in the capital and the kingdom’s center of 
learning.55 The confiscation decree therefore included all of the goods of the Botanical 
Expedition.56 The management and possession of the empirical explosion of inscriptions 
about New Granada’s nature became relevant once the crown had lost control over its 
colonies.57 The armies directed their attention to the materials produced by the Botanical 
Expedition of New Granada. The Botanical Expedition, which had started in 1783 
directed by the Spanish physician José Celestino Mutis, was the main scientific initiative 
and institution of learning in charge of mapping, cataloguing, and describing New 
Granada’s fauna, flora, and mineral riches for finding new sources of wealth for the 
benefit of the Spanish crown.  
The death of Mutis in 1808 coincided with the Napoleonic invasion and the 
scrambles for territoriality and economic reform as seen in chapter 3. Morillo sent a 
report on September 2, 1816 to the State Secretary in Madrid informing that one of his 
                                                
55 Charles W. J. Withers. “Natural knowledge as cultural property: disputes over the ‘ownership’ of natural 
history in late eighteenth-century Edinburgh.” Archives of Natural History. Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 289-
303, ISSN 0260-9541, Available Online October 1992. 
56 The confiscation policy also included all the proclamas, bulletins, books, constitutions, and any writing 
penned by the rebels. Real Academia de Historia. “Bando de Morillo a todas las provincias y lugares del 
Nuevo Reino de Granada citando una serie de normas que están obligados a cumplir todos sus habitantes. 
Cuartel General de Santa Fe, 6 de junio de 1816.” [Sig. 9/7650, leg. 7, e), ff. 248.] Biblioteca Digital.  
57 Sociologist Bruno Latour has defined “immutable mobiles” as inscriptions. By this, he means the marks, 
signs, prints, and diagrams made by humans. Bruno Latour, and Steve Woolgar. Laboratory Life: The 
Construction of Scientific Facts. Princeton University Press, 1979, 63. 
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objectives when he occupied the city of Santa Fe was to clarify the results of the 
Botanical Expedition, the reason why he ordered his subalterns to craft an inventory of all 
natural history materials.58 Along with this collection of materials, Morillo also ordered 
the incorporation of the papers of Mutis, the astronomical works and travel accounts of 
Francisco José de Caldas, and some volumes about “curious matters” gathered by 
Archbishop Baltasar Martínez Compañón.59 Because of Mutis’s application and wisdom, 
a letter sent to Spain on September 17 reported, this natural history enterprise contained 
botany manuscripts, a herbarium of 209 plants, a seedbed, a wood collection, shells, 
skins, minerals, and oil paintings that naturalistically represented the animals of New 
Granada. Asserting power over the recently regained colony and challenging Creole 
revolutionaries and bearers of the legacy of the botanical repository of the kingdom, the 
Expeditionary Army exercised their claimed right to seize the natural history of New 
Granada. After all, as Paula Findlen states for the case of the collections of natural history 
                                                
58 In a report about the status of the expedition of September 17, 1816, sent to the Secretary of the 
Treasury, members of the military recounted a history of the scientific enterprise of New Granada. The text 
narrated that Mutis started the Botanical expedition in Mariquita, close to the Magdalena River, where he 
collected innumerable plants, and crafted great illustrations. The expedition was moved to the city of Santa 
Fe in which Mutis continued his work and wrote a treatise of Quinalogía or history of the cinchona trees, 
with fifty perfectly depicted illustrations of New Granada’s flora. Mutis “found hidden secrets about the 
polygamy of plants,” the report stated. In 1801, he received astronomical instruments from the government 
and with them formed an astronomical observatory in the capital. 1816, septiembre 2, Santafé de Bogotá, 
423.  
59 Emily Berquist Soule has demonstrated that Father Martínez Compañón’s work on the natural history of 
Perú and its economic improvement envisioned a utopia that undermined the dystopia of Spanish colonial 
rule. Martínez Compañón arrived in Santa Fe as archbishop in 1791 after spending over 20 years in Perú. 
He became friends with Mutis in Santa Fe or at least some historians have argued that he had a collegial 
relationship with him. This relationship might explain why within the documents of interest from Mutis, the 
crown mentioned those collections gathered by Martínez Compañón. He died in Santa Fe in 1797. Emily 
Berquist Soule. The Bishop’s Utopia: Envisioning Improvement in Colonial Peru. 1st ed. The Early 
Modern Americas. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. See also: Daniela Bleichmar and 
Peter C. Mancall. Collecting Across Cultures: Material Exchanges in the Early Modern Atlantic World. 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, 240. 
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objects in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italy, nature was the largest object one 
could possess.60  
As discussed in the last chapter, the city of Santa Fe had created for its own a 
reputation of being a center of enlightenment and scientific knowledge and many of the 
well-known enlightenment elite led the revolutionary councils of the interregnum. For 
instance, with orders from King Ferdinand VII, General Pablo Morillo crafted a list of the 
insurgents of the capital Camilo Torres, José Miguel Pey, Antonio Nariño, Antonio 
Baraya, Francisco José de Caldas, José María Carbonell, Nicolás Ballén de Guzmán, 
among others, in order to impound their properties. During the occupation of the city that 
started on May 6, 1816, General Morillo accused this group of enlightened Creoles--some 
of them members of the Botanical Expedition of New Granada--of treason and ordered 
their arrest. A decree of the crown also ordered the embargo of the goods from the 
Botanical Expedition and the good of all insurgents in the cities that underwent a liberal 
revolution in absence of the king.  
Some Spaniards considered that the work of Mutis, funded by the Spanish 
monarchy, represented both the enlightenment of the Spanish nation and the disobedience 
of the patriot insurgents. Although the Spanish physician José Celestino Mutis had started 
the expedition before his death in 1808, Spanish American naturalists occupied the main 
positions within the institution. Creoles Francisco José de Caldas and Jorge Tadeo 
Lozano, for example, who were in charge of the astronomy and zoological sections of the 
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expedition, respectively, had participated in and led the establishment of Santa Fe’s 
revolutionary government. Therefore, the expedition’s materials were considered to be 
the effects of colonial disobedience, which had cost large amounts of money to the Royal 
Treasury.61 As Morillo sought to dismantle the capital city’s revolutionary councils, he 
came after its leaders, who eventually faced the firing squad for treason to the king. 
Spanish officials also denounced a patriot plot to sell the expedition’s collection in 
England. The pressing circumstances of the war led patriots to conceive of the materials 
of the expedition in utilitarian terms, while Morillo’s and other Spaniards conceived of 
them as symbolic ownership of the land. Some Spaniards, however, also expressed their 
concern with recovering the results of over twenty years of economic investment in the 
expedition.  
Spaniards both in New Granada and Madrid advanced this claim for the right of 
possessing the natural collection. The First Secretary of Estado y Despacho in Madrid, 
Pedro Cevallos, sent repeated royal orders to royal officials in Santa Fe asking for the 
remittance of Mutis’s works. Cevallos complained in several letters he sent from Madrid 
to Viceroy Juan Sámano in Santa Fe (1817-1819) about the failure to transport the 
materials of the expedition back to Spain. He contended that in spite of large royal 
investement in the expedition, a great house in Santa Fe, many instruments, and a library 
with books about botany, physics, and astronomy, the Spanish court did not possess any 
                                                
61 Upon arrival of the collections of the Botanical Expedition to Spain, the Gaceta de Madrid described the 
arrival of a collection that had cost the crown “immense amounts” as a triumph of the Expeditionary Army. 
Opt. Cit. Amaya, 43. 
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of it.62 According to the commission that was named to decide the future of the 
expedition’s staff and endowment, everything in the institution, even the Astronomical 
Observatory, belonged to the state. Royal officials described the expedition as an 
establishment which  
 
Could not recognize an owner other than the one who with his capital 
and funds created the Expedition, and acquired the beautiful things, 
instruments, books, plates, and tools, that reached the amount of two 
hundred and fifty thousand pesos disbursed by the Royal Treasury.63 
 
Madrid officials’ urgency to ship the materials of the Botanical Expedition to 
Spain must be understood also in light of the length, prestige, and expectations that the 
expedition had generated among Spanish learned men and in Europe. Mutis advanced his 
expedition with financial and scientific autonomy from the Royal Botanical Gardens in 
Madrid. He even argued for the secrecy of his endeavor when he declined to provide 
financial or scientific statements about the state of the expedition to anyone but the 
viceroy or the king himself.64 Spain’s claim of ownership of New Granada’s natural 
                                                
62 AGN, Colombia.” Documentos relacionados con el destino, arreglo, términos y conclusión de la Real 
Expedición Botánica como consecuencia del fallecimiento de José Celestino Mutis.” Madrid, Septiembre 
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63 Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia, “Carta al señor virrey de Santa fe, Juan Sámano de Pedro 
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64 The expedition functioned also in part due to private financial support. For instance, Jorge Tadeo Lozano 
head of the zoology section in the expedition claimed to have defrayed the costs of his endeavor from his 
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history, however, also featured a criticism of Mutis’s enterprise. After an assessment of 
the current state of the Expedición, the result would be that, Cevallos stated, “the world 
and the learned people in Europe who had lived under the expectations and hopes that 
this establishment offered, become convinced that for the most part it has been an 
illusion.”65 Inexplicably, by the time of his death, Mutis had not published his famed 
Flora of Santa Fe, reflecting that the crown neither supervised the finances of the 
expedition nor required Mutis to present his scientific results to provide more funding.66 
Downplaying the importance and significance of Mutis’s work appears to have worked in 
Cevallo’s thought as a strategy to pronounce the expedition illegitimate, since once Mutis 
died, Spanish Americans became the bearers of the expedition. Continuing with the 
original plan, however, in the following months, the expeditionary army catalogued and 
packed manuscripts, instruments, drawings, natural specimens, and books. 
Transporting the expedition materials to Spain was imperative, according to 
General Pascual Enrile, vis-à-vis the risks that they faced under the threat of the 
revolutionary wars. Morillo’s forces launched a raid at the Astronomical Observatory—
the headquarters of the Botanical Expedition and recently established site of the 
revolutionary council of Santa Fe--to confiscate all of the Expedition’s materials. 
Officials of the Ministry of Grace and Justice in Madrid received the seized manuscript 
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works, herbals, and other expedition materials.67 The Royal Officer, Antonio Van Halen, 
was designated to receive all of the boxes containing natural knowledge and specimens, 
and guard them in a ship to Spain, where they allegedly belonged.68 Mariana Lagasca, 
Director of the Botanical Garden in Madrid, had warned General Pascual Enrile of the 
importance of recovering the treasures of Mutis’ expedition, arguing for preserving the 
natural treasure away from the dangers of the war. For instance, a few months later in 
March 1817, army leader Pascual Enrile sent a letter to the Council of the Indies 
observing that the rebel army leader Simón Bolívar destroyed the Astronomical 
Observatory and only a few instruments remained in shape.69  
The reconquista of Santa Fe ended the Botanical Expedition and repurposed some 
of its human resources in support of the ongoing wars. The Expeditionary Army and 
newly appointed Viceroy Juan Sámano had started to dismantle the institution and paid 
all pending salaries to the painters and naturalists of the expedition. Cevallos reflected on 
ways to repurpose the human capital of the Expedición after its demise. For example, he 
proposed that some painters occupied positions in the public education system which “is 
the one which conducts the most to the happiness of the peoples”, and that they could 
                                                
67 Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia, “Carta al señor virrey de Santa fe, Juan Sámano”, Madrid, 
17 de octubre de 1816. f. 1167. Documentos relacionados con el destino, arreglo, términos y conclusión de 
la Real Expedición Botánica como consecuencia del fallecimiento de José Celestino Mutis. 
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materials “if no legitimate cause that hindered him of doing so.” General Morillo also recommended Don 
Eloy Valenzuela, priest of Bucaramanga and correspondent of Mutis, to undertake this task. 
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The report also pointed out that the insurgents had crafted a map of the viceroyalty based on the 
observations of Caldas, Humboldt, and the map of Talledo. Report of Pascual Enrile, March 4, 1817. 
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form a drawing academy ascribed to the schools. By November 1816, the painters of the 
Botanic Expedition had been deployed to work on making copies of the army’s 
topographic plans.70 Later on in 1818, Viceroy Sámano considered it necessary that the 
painters of the Botanical Expedition continued working as part of the general staff of the 
third division of the Expeditionary Army.71 For instance, Sámano actually hired a group 
of six painters to work on the production of maps and plans of the kingdom.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The military strategies of the Expeditionary Army included a number of actions to 
regain control over urban areas and strategic military passes, such as fighting in the 
battleground, occupying cities, blocking supply chains to cities, and arresting 
revolutionary leaders. Once the army was in control of a city it established a number of 
institutions such as ad hoc justice tribunals, police courts, confiscation councils, and war 
councils. After the military took over civil power, some regions underwent jurisdictional 
rearrangements and new improvement projects to reenergize the economy. While this 
chapter discussed some of these strategies to reconstruct the territorial strategies of the 
Expeditionary army, its main focus was on the creation of new wartime territorialities, 
                                                
70 Ibid. Signed by painters: Francisco Xavier Matis, D. Antonio Barrionuevo, D. Francisco Escobar, D. 
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pintores de la Expedición Botánica”, carta de Juan Sámano a los ministros y oficiales de la capital, 
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the confiscation of eighteenth century chorographic texts as military strategy, the creation 
of new political economies, and the symbolic control of New Granada’s inscriptions of 
nature.  
 The search for any useful news about New Granada’s topography and natural 
history illustrate that recovering sovereignty meant much more than spreading military 
force throughout the territory. Considering natural knowledge as an asset for refurbishing 
the political economy of New Granada and controlling its territory, the Expeditionary 
Army collected local writings penned between 1777 and 1808. Exploration, mapping, and 
surveying were central in order to identify and control resources, reconfigure property 
relations, and generate knowledge of the territory during wartime.72 Appropriating 
chorographic texts and repurposing them for war and economic advancement was a 
central aspect of the military campaigns.  
 An army also came later to confiscate the riches contained in collections of 
natural history, gathered over nearly thirty years during which the expedition functioned. 
The restoration of Spanish rule in the city shook Santa Fe’s position as an administrative 
center and core of Enlightenment learning in the kingdom. The military control of the 
capital city would forever disrupt the political economy of knowledge that Santafereños 
had adamantly defended during the interregnum’s inter-provincial skirmishes. The claim 
of ownership of the Botanical Expedition was part of the Spanish strategy to oust the 
revolutionary government and then punish those implicated in it.  
                                                
72 Real Academia de Historia de Madrid. “Ejército Expedicionario: Campaña de la reconquista del Nuevo 
Reino de Granada en 1816.” Sig. 9/7651, leg. 8, 1, ff. 351-385. 
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 First, by redrawing and building new trails the armies transformed the landscape 
and secondly by altering colonial institutions of power they imposed military jurisdiction 
in turn. The echoes of the war persisted well into the 1820s. The militarization of 
statecraft as enacted during the Reconquista campaign was replicated in many senses 
during the first decade of republican rule under the government of patriot military men 
Simón Bolívar and Francisco de Paula Santander. Assessment of New Granada’s 
geographic features and political economy aspirations served early republican deputies to 
justify both unity and territorial separateness. Ownership of the right to rule over New 
Granada was defined on the battleground in a series of celebrated battles, which became 
the core of the narrative of the birth of the Gran Colombia nation. 
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Chapter 5. Colombia’s Ambivalent Landscapes: Geographic 
Imagination, Republican Geopolitics, and the Pursuit of Inter-Oceanic 
Trade, 1819-1830 
 
Introduction 
 
On December 17, 1819, President Simón Bolívar took the floor and thanked God for the 
fact that the Congress of Angostura recognized the need of uniting the republic, which 
had toppled the unfortunate provincial spirit that characterized the interregnum era and 
created what he called “the largest nation of the world.”1 On this day, the congressmen 
approved the law that united Venezuela and New Granada—thereafter to be called 
Cundinamarca—under the name of Colombia.2 The deputies signed the law and stood up 
as Bolívar proclaimed: “The Republic of Colombia has been constituted, ¡Viva la 
República de Colombia!”3 The provinces of Panamá and Quito were to join the republic 
over the next three years, completing the geographic frame of the new nation. Historians 
have already underscored Bolivar’s vision, leadership, and will that brought Quito, 
Venezuela, and New Granada together.4 These narratives of Bolívar as a strong-willed 
                                                
1 Simón Bolívar has expressed his desire to create the “largest nation of the world” in his celebrated Carta 
de Jamaica of August 29, 1815.  
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between 1820 and 1830. “Ley fundamental de la República de Colombia.” In: José Manuel Restrepo. 
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Dirección de Divulgación Cultural. Publicaciones. Bogotá: Impr. Nacional, 1969, 391-392. 
3 “Creación de la República de Colombia.” Ibid.  
4 Marco Palacios, and Frank Safford. Colombia: país fragmentado, sociedad dividida. Editorial Norma, 
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and visionary statesman, however, obscure the dissenting voices and agitated debates that 
characterized this fundational period, leading modern readers to ignore the geo-political 
dimensions and contentious nature of this nation-building endeavor.   
The leadership of the new nation grappled with pressing problems that imagining 
and creating a new nation posed. Their debates sought to answer questions on how to 
integrate and organize an extensive, diverse and mountainous landscape, and its peoples, 
into a coherent polity and how to legitimate the new polity both internally and externally. 
This chapter demonstrates that republican leaders’ discourses of political economy and 
interpretations of the natural landscape shaped the ideals of the revolution and the 
imagination of a Colombian national space. Early republican statesmen’s aspirations to 
incorporate the republic into a modern commercial political economic space led to 
constructions of a chorographic identity that linked Colombia to the Isthmus of Panamá 
and to global trade. In an era of geopolitical realignments, local political economies and 
territorialities needed to be negotiated vis-à-vis national, continental, and global 
geopolitical agendas. 
A trans-national network of deputies, diplomats, and statesmen in Colombia and 
abroad crafted the fiction of Colombia as a colossal nation and bearer of the world’s 
commerce and agriculture. Differing regional visions and economic realities contrasted 
with this representation, demonstrating a sharp gap between the country’s economic and 
political reality and the foreign imagination of Colombia, between a national discourse 
and on-the-ground challenges of uniting a large and regionally fragmented territory.  
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The wars of independence generated broad interest among merchants, diplomats, 
and military men in Britain and the United States, who sought to establish a commercial 
foothold in the region. This led to an unprecedented interest in the natural history, 
geographic features, and commercial potential of the region.5 Papers, compilations of 
official documents, and histories of the revolution appeared in foreign media along with 
accounts of the country’s geographic characteristics. Such was the desire for information 
on Spanish America that journals across England translated Humboldt’s travel 
experiences in the region between 1799 and 1804. These publications about Colombia 
powered the foreign imagination, stoking curiosity about the possible outcomes of 
Spanish American revolutions for the larger world.  
The explosion of texts describing the new nation’s geography marked the end of 
the self-contained chorographic-political economy texts presented in previous chapters.6 
The arrival of European and North American travelers to Colombia following 
Humboldt’s journey in the New World prompted travel narratives about the newly 
created Republic and its possible place within the emergent system of representative 
                                                
5 The context of a revolution in print culture in the larger Atlantic world during this era is intimately related 
to Spanish American independences. See: Eugenia Roldán Vera. The British Book Trade and Spanish 
American Independence: Education and Knowledge Transmission of Knowledge in Transcontinental 
Perspective. Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003. 
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1804 had brought the natural landscape of these territories closer to a European and United States 
readership. Some of the British editions include: Alexander von Humboldt. Map of the course of the Rio 
Meta, and a part of the eastern chain of the mountains of New Granada, by Longman & Co. London, 1818; 
Map of the course of the Orinoco from the mouth of the Rio Sinaruco to Angostura, 1818; Personal 
narrative of travels to the equinoctial regions of the new continent during the years 1799-1804 (vol. 5, part 
2). London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, Paternoster Row, 1821; Personal 
narrative of travels to the equinoctial regions of the new continent during the years 1799-1804: with maps, 
plans, &c. London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown ...,1822. Editions in the United 
States include: Personal narrative of travels to the equinoctial regions of the new continent, during the 
years 1799-1804, Philadelphia, 1815. 
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states.7 Periodicals and magazines in Britain, France, and the United States published 
descriptions of the country’s natural landmarks such as the Chimborazo volcano and the 
Tequendama Cataract.8 Assessments of the possibilities of trans-oceanic commerce in the 
borderland of Panamá also circulated constantly in a myriad of documents published in 
Britain, the United States, and Colombia.  
Spanish American independence changed the nature of the age-old debate over 
the geopolitics of inter-oceanic communication through the Isthmus of Panama. In the 
imagination of foreigners and Colombians alike, a major result of this era of geopolitical 
realignments could be the materialization of the project to achieve inter-oceanic 
communication via the Isthmus of Panamá. This project was central to the British and 
U.S geopolitical and commercial agendas, becoming a core concern of the early 
diplomatic and commercial relationships of those nations with Colombia. The 
possibilities of inter-oceanic trade in Panamá also became a larger theme in British and 
US assessments of the possible outcomes of the Spanish American revolutions.  
Historian Rafe Blaufard argues that the historiography on the independence wars 
has paid little attention to the larger geopolitical interests of Britain, France, and the 
United States on Latin American nations during their wars of independence. For 
Blaufarb, Spanish America became a contested space in which opposing local 
populations deployed imperial rivalries to their own advantage. Similarly, historian Greg 
                                                
 7 See Appendix C. Texts About Colombia’s Natural Wonders in Foreign Media, 1810-1830.  
8 “Cataract of Tequendama”, “The Literary Panorama, and National Register: A Review of Books, 
Register of Events, Magazine of Varieties: Comprising Interesting Intelligence from the Various Districts 
of the United Kingdom; the British Connexions in America, Africa, the East Indies, the West Indies, 
Western Asia &c. and from All Parts of the World...”, April 1815. 
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Grandin has argued in favor of placing the debates of the nineteenth century in the 
broader perspective of Greater America. Blaufard and Gradin’s broader perspectives 
allow for a reconsideration of how new nations, like Colombia, dealt with the rights, 
interests, and ideologies of other nations at their borders while advancing their own 
national interests.9  
By departing from a national literature on the Gran Colombian period, mostly 
concerned with tracing the personal skirmishes among republican caudillos or with 
exalting the cult of Simón Bolívar, this chapter seeks to find a middle ground between 
local, national, “Greater American,” or Atlantic perspectives of the early republican 
period.10 It does so by putting the larger geopolitical commercial interests of Britain and 
the U.S. into dialogue with Colombian national-continental interests in and strategies for 
consolidating independence and legitimating the union of New Granada, Venezuela, and 
Quito. These strategies supported both the search for arguments about the regions’ 
coherence as a geographical and economic space and the role of the U.S. and Britain 
within the region.  
Access to the Pacific Ocean was central in this endeavor. Atlantic perspectives of 
the revolutionary era history have mostly focused on the Caribbean basin, leaving the 
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Pacific coast and the connections between both seas widely ignored.11 Moreover, 
discourses about national identity in the context of Colombia’s nation building project 
shifted during the second half of the twentieth century. From a mestizo Andean-based 
identity, these discourses came to emphasize the country’s Caribbeanness. The 
connections with the Pacific basin—including the cacao boom in Guayaquil, the 
importance of the Atrato River, and the commercial networks that linked Callao, 
Guayaquil, and Panamá—have remained largely ignored. The place of the Panama-
Chocó-Guayaquil belt within Colombia has disappeared as national and Atlantic 
narratives came to dominate the region’s historiography.  
The first section discusses a set of ideas that linked notions of nature and political 
economy to the ideals of the revolution in debates about Colombian integration and 
identity. The second section contrasts national utopian national visions with local 
political economy and spatial arguments in Guayaquil and Panama. The third section 
offers a counterpoint to the dominant rhetoric of Isthmian Colombia drawing on a case 
for local economic geospatial and economic aspirations. The last section places the 
construction of a chorographic Colombian identity centered in the Isthmus of Panama in 
a larger international context. By exploring the idea of the connection between the 
Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, I seek to offer new insights about the crisis of the 
Spanish Empire that resulted in the formation of Latin American republics, and the 
                                                
11 The strengthening of Colombian historiography about the Caribbean coast found its turning point with 
Orlando Fals Bordas’s four volumes of the history of the coast published between the 1970 and the 1980s. 
Orlando Fals-Borda. Historia doble de la costa. 1.th ed. Bogotá: C. Valencia Editores, 1979. Alfonso 
Múnera. Fronteras imaginadas: La construcción de las razas y de la geografía en el siglo XIX colombiano. 
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central place of the Pacific Ocean in early diplomatic imagination and the relationships 
between Colombia’s departamentos and the larger world.  
 
Nature, Political Economy, and the Ideals of the Revolution 
 
In terms of its largest jurisdictions, the early republican laws did not alter 
Colombia’s colonial political geography significantly. The Congress of Angostura 
divided the new nation into the three departamentos of Cundinamarca, Venezuela, and 
Quito, which corresponded roughly to the old jurisdictions of the audiencias of Santa Fe, 
Caracas, and Quito respectively.12 Since the territory of Venezuela had separated from 
the viceroyalty in 1777, congressmen of the early republic questioned whether or not 
New Granada and Venezuela should be joined into a single republic. David Bushnell has 
argued that the union between New Granada and Venezuela was a “virtual fait accompli” 
because of the way in which the military struggle for independence had been waged.13 
New Granadians and Venezuelans fought side by side to expel Spaniards and passed back 
and forth over the boundary between the two. The experience of Morillo’s Reconquista 
revealed the great vulnerability of facing a military threat with a polity fragmented in 
autonomous juntas. A joint front to expel permanently the Spanish invader and avoid 
future wars led to the creation of Colombia, a new republic comprising Venezuela and 
New Granada. 
                                                
12 The Republic of Colombia claimed the former territories of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1739-
1777) under the legal principle of uti possidetis. This principle was used to establish the borders of the 
Hispanic American countries after the process of Independence. 
13 Op. Cit. Bushnell, The Making…, 50. 
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In the heat of the moment, a sense of a shared military identity and fear of a new 
Spanish military intervention sufficed for Angostura’s leaders to consider natural that 
Colombia and Venezuela united. What had made sense for the leaders of Angostura in 
1819, however, raised several questions during the Congress of Cúcuta two years later.14 
In a debate about the union of Venezuela and Cundinamarca, deputy Vicente Azuero 
asked: “Shall we unite or not with Venezuela, and if we do, how?”15 Not to be taken 
lightly, this question summarizes a core question of this dissertation: what brings 
territories together, and what in the imagination of early republican leaders—beyond the 
contingencies of war—made of Colombia a nation, a natural political unit?  Legitimating 
the union and agreeing on the nature of a single nation comprising Venezuela and New 
Granada became a central theme in the congressional debates of 1821.  
In order to justify the union between the territories of the old viceroyalty, early 
Colombian officials and diplomats reinterpreted the new nation’s geographic space. 
Deputies discussed and questioned the practicality of the union through natural laws. 
Allegories of nature as material progress for the nation became the dominant tropes in the 
debates to justify the separation from Spain and the union of New Granada, Venezuela, 
and Quito into a single republic. A culture of political economy provided the model that 
early republican leaders utilized to justify the ideals of the revolution and the transition to 
a republican government.  
                                                
14 The law that proclaimed the union in Angostura was rather vague and did not provide any clues as for 
how and under what conditions the union should be achieved. Adding to the few clues as of how the union 
should be created, from the twenty-five deputies that approved the Fundamental Law in the Congress of 
Angostura, only six deputies, out of 57, were present during the Congress of Cúcuta, which sought to ratify 
the pact of the union. 
15 Op.Cit. Documentos importantes… Acta 14ª, sesión del 19 de mayo de 1821, 40. 
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Arguing against or in favor of the union of Venezuela, Quito, and New Granada, 
Colombian congressmen in Cúcuta raised ideas that described the newly created national 
space as a reflection of the natural order. Neogranadian deputy Miguel Tobar claimed 
that the union of Venezuela and Cundinamarca was preordained by nature, as this 
territory was a natural sequence of mountain ranges and geological formations.16 
Following this same argument, José Manuel Restrepo contended that nature dictated this 
union, and added: “What mountain chains, or immense rivers separate them?” José 
Ignacio de Márquez opposed the union of Nueva Granada and Venezuela in a centralist 
government for reasons that mirrored those of Tobar and Restrepo. He argued that it was 
impossible to form a whole nation from such a vast territory. He added: “(…) nature has 
fixed its limits; in the proportion that the political body extends, much more it 
weakens.”17 Márquez questioned the congressional representatives about how 
inconvenient a central government would function, and asked: “How to demand the 
citizens to cross immense distances to implore justice or abandon them to a multitude of 
subalterns?”18 While congressmen acknowledged the fact that communications across the 
territory were difficult and weakened the union, supporters of the union proposed to solve 
this problem by constructing a road to communicate the three main cities of the new 
polity: Caracas, Bogotá and Quito.19 After long hours of parliamentary debates, 
Colombian deputies ratified the union, proclaiming themselves as those called to speak 
                                                
16 Ibid. Acta 13ª, sesión del día 18 de mayo de 1821: 35 
17 Ibid. 41. 
18 Ibid.  
19 At stake in such debates was also the question of who will benefit from the union and what kind of 
government to establish, a centralist of a federalist one. 
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for nature.  
 Political leaders generally came to believe that the consumation of independence 
and the creation of a stable continental order were only achievable by uniting the peoples, 
resources, and territories of the old viceroyalty of New Granada and Venezuela.20 In 
1820, vice-president Francisco Antonio Zea had argued that none of the three 
departamentos, Quito, Venezuela, and Cundinamarca, could become a firm and 
respectable power in its own right “regardless of how immense or rich is their 
territory.”21 A memorial written by the secretary of the Despacho Interior y Justicia of 
the Departamento of Cundinamarca Estanislao Vergara in December 31, 1820, described 
the republic as colossal in size.22 In the imagination of Colombia leaders, the union of the 
republic was predicated upon a principle of a sizable republic with all agricultural 
products of the world and the geographic disposition for global trade. 
Republican leaders imagined a future in which the territory of the colossal 
Republic of Colombia would offer many advantages to all “industrial and commercial 
countries.”23 Zea, repeatedly argued in his discourses and diplomatic endeavors that 
Colombia derived its strength from a geographical situation that suited the commercial 
needs of every country. He depicted Colombia as center of the New World and holder of 
                                                
20 H. J. König, El camino hacia la Nación Nacionalismo en el proceso de formación del Estado y la Nación 
en la Nueva Granada, 1750-1856. Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1994, 330. 
21 “Manifiesto de Zea sobre la Constitución de la República de Colombia. Angostura, January 13, 1820.” 
Op. Cit. Documentos Importantes…400-407.   
22 “Memoria del Encargado del Despacho Interior y Justicia del Departamento de Cundinamarca, 
presentada a Su Excelencia el Vice-Presidente en 31 de Diciembre de 1820.” In: Alexander Walker and 
Francisco Antonio Zea. Colombia being a geographical, statistical, agricultural, commercial, and political 
account of that country, adapted for the general reader, the merchant, and the colonist. London: Published 
by Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy.Op. 1822, 415-449. 
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the best geographic circumstance for the commerce of all the Earth. According to Zea, 
the vastness of Colombia, with one foot on the Atlantic and the other on the Pacific, 
would help Asia and Europe multiply their commodities and populate both seas with 
vessels to trade their goods for the precious metals and gems of Colombia’s fertile valleys 
and jungles. This colossal Republic, Zea contended, held the key to a prosperous future 
of global trade.24 
The geographic space of the newly created republic that more strongly supported 
the realization of this utopia was the Isthmus of Panamá. Addressing his manifesto to 
Colombians, Zea turned to highlight the immense potential and advantages rendered by 
the possession of the “precious isthmus of Panamá, destined by nature to become the 
grand market of the universe.”25 In this vision, Colombia’s incorporation into the 
worldwide commercial world entailed the configuration of overlapping and intersecting 
global, national, and regional spaces.26 The Colombian state had the challenge of 
consolidating these intersecting spatial dimensions into a stable model of territorial 
organization.27  
A central aspect of national territoriality implied creating a set of symbolic 
associations. Allusions to the diversity of agricultural products as a proof of the strength 
of the new republic served as symbolism for the nation. For instance, the law of October 
                                                
24 Op. Cit. “Manifiesto de Zea sobre la Constitución ….” Op. Cit…400-407.   
25 Ibid. 448. 
26 Tobias Ten Brink. Global Political Economy and the Modern State System. BRILL, 2014. 
27 In Lefebvre’s conceptualization the state space comprises a national-territorial space, a social space 
composed of the natural environment, institutional political configurations, and imaginaries, and a ‘mental 
space’ which the state creates in order to secure social consensus and the legitimation of its actions. Henri 
Lefebvre. The Production of Space. Oxford, UK  ; Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 2000m 84-85. 
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6, 1821, established that the symbol of the nation would be “two cornucopias full of fruits 
and flowers from the cold, temperate, and warm lands.” The reference to the products of 
different climates reminds us of Francisco José de Caldas’s ideas of the Andes as a 
system of microclimates and origin of “incalculable goods” where the different flora and 
fauna is found at different elevations.28 Creole views of nature, historian Jorge Cañizares-
Esguerra has argued, were committed to the idea of colonies as a microcosm 
“providentially designed to enjoy unlimited economic potential” and become trade 
emporiums.29 Republican leaders translated these ideas found in the imagination of the 
late colonial creole intelligentsia, into allegories that justified the union of diverse 
landscapes of Colombia into a single republic. The seals of the republic, the decree 
added, will have stamped “this symbol of the abundance, strength and union” with which 
“Colombian citizens are resolved to sustain their independence.”30 (See Figure 12.) 
Moreover, this symbol made of the diversity of climates, geographies, and agricultural 
products of Colombia the source of its strength.31 Nation building in Colombia fed from 
evocations of the natural landscape as a symbolic integration of distinct geographies and 
                                                
28 Francisco José de Caldas. “El influjo del clima sobre los seres organizados, Santafé, (10 de mayo de 
1808), Francisco José de Caldas, Obras Completas. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1966: 103-104. 
29 Jorge Cañizares Esguerra. “How Derivative was Humboldt? Microcosmic Narratives in Early Modern 
Spanish America and the (Other) Origins of Humboldt’s Ecological Sensibilities.” Nature, Empire, and 
Nation: Explorations of the History of Science in the Iberian World. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 2006,  
30 Ley de 6 de Octubre, Que design las armas de la nación, Cúcuta, 4 de octubre, 1821, 11o de la 
independencia.  Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila interprets the perceptions of Colombia as a continental power for 
the extension of its territory and for the fast pace at which it became constituted. Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila. 
2012. El reconocimiento de Colombia: diplomacia y propaganda en la coyuntura de las restauraciones, 
1819-1831, 167. 
31 Andrés Bello’s poem Silva a la agricultura de la zona tórrida published in the Repertorio Americano in 
London, 1826, exemplifies this well within a neoclassic tradition that praises nature and in this case 
described the abundant agricultural products of the torrid zone. La Bibiloteca American (1823) and El 
Repetorio Americano (1826-1827) published by a group of Creoles “significaba alistar y preparar al pueblo 
para lo que venía después de la guerra.” 
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as a source of inexhaustible riches.32 The allegory of the cornucopias, however, also 
identified the material progress of the nation as defined by modern political economy.33  
 
 
Figure 12. Seal of the Republic of Colombia, 1821. 
 
Early national narratives interpreted the independence from Spain as the colony’s 
passport into a political economy predicated upon free trade. In practice, ideas about the 
geographic interdependence among Colombia’s regions translated into new economic 
policies that aimed to make trade a unifying factor. A series of reforms to tariff and 
customs duties in the republic’s ports aimed to regulate the flow of foreign foodstuffs and 
                                                
32 Nature as symbol became the theme of Simon Bolívar’s romantic poem Mi delirio sobre el Chimborazo. 
33 Georges Lomné has traced the evolution of the heraldry of the Gran Colombia Georges Lomné. “El 
Espejo Roto” de la Colombia Bolivariana (1820-1850)”, Annino, Antonio, and François-Xavier Guerra. 
Inventando la nación: Iberoamérica siglo XIX. Fondo de Cultura Economica, 2003. 
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commodities in order to promote internal trade. This new economic framework sought to 
increase the frequency of commercial relations among the citizens of the different 
provinces of the republic. Trade relations were called to forcefully cement the union, 
writers of the discursive platform of the government of Bogotá the Gaceta de Colombia, 
asserted.34 Although the articles of the Gaceta de Colombia do not elaborate on the 
imagined commercial interdependence among Colombian regions, the legislation of the 
first half of the 1820s makes clear that the government hoped to energize internal trade 
utilizing steam boats to navigate through the main rivers of the country, the Magdalena, 
Orinoco, and Atrato.35 As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the routes that followed the 
navigation of these rivers connect different regions to each other.  
The project to configure a national space dedicated to trade never contemplated an 
autarky, but rather new commercial and financial relations with imperial powers other 
than Spain. For instance, the coat of arms of the First Republic of Venezuela adopted 
between 1819 and 1821 to represent Colombia, featured a ship in the back navigating in 
the Caribbean towards the setting sun. The ship that appears in this symbol no longer 
represented the conquest of a mysterious nature, as in earlier emblematic traditions, but 
                                                
34 Alexander Chaparro, Nicolás González, Francisco Ortega, Juan Gabriel Ramírez, Sandra Milena 
Ramírez, Zulma Rocío Romero, and Leidy Jazmín Torres Cendales. “Gazeta [Gaceta] de Colombia (1821-
1826) Banrepcultural.org.” Accessed January 13, 2016. 
 http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/historia/prensa-colombiana-del-siglo-XIX/gazeta-de-colombia-
1821-1826 
35 See for example: Congress of 1824: Cámara de Representantes, Actas. “La comisión de hacienda en la 
representación de Alfred Seton, ciudadano de Estados Unidos y Juan Bautista Ballacorta de Colombia en 
que solicitan privilegio exclusivo por veinte años para navegar el Orinoco y sus ramificaciones en buques 
de vapor, es de concepto que no debe accederse a tal solicitud por haberse ya concedido al señor James 
Aurilthon. La Cámara prestó su deferencia a este informe. (Mayo 14, por la noche) . Administraciones de 
Santander. Fundación para la Conmemoración del Bicentenario del Natalicio y el Sesquicentenario de la 
Muerte del General Francisco de Paula Santander, 1990, vol. 2. 
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the potential for commerce of the new polity. The ship in the coat of arms is heading off 
from the continent, alluding to the exportation of commodities from Colombia.36 (See 
Figure 13) Discourses of Colombia’s nature and disposition for trade sought to 
differentiate the new republic from despotic Spain and became central discourses in early 
republican leaders’ efforts to achieve the recognition of the republic abroad. 
 
 
Figure 13. Coat of Arms of Colombia, 1820. 
                                                
36 The representations of the indigenous populations in early republican emblems was far from being a 
vindication of the original inhabitants of the New World. The Indian princess, which appeared widely 
throughout Spanish America, represented American autonomy rather than indigenous submission. For an 
important study on this topic see: Rebecca Earle. The Return of the Native: Indians and Myth-Making in 
Spanish America, 1810-1930. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.  
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In practical terms the question was how to turn the allegory of abundance and 
trade into a reality. The issue became more pressing in a country economically devastated 
by the wars for independence that left it vulnerable to foreign interventions. One of the 
main concerns of republican leaders was to assure the creation of a stable hemispheric 
order that guaranteed that Spaniards would not return to take re-possession of the lost 
colonies. First and foremost, Colombian leaders needed to reach consensus within the old 
provinces of the viceroyalty to achieve such union. The new republic needed a new set of 
laws that promoted Colombia’s modern political economy and that suited the necessities 
of a diverse range of regions. This was a contentious matter from the very beginning. The 
provinces of Guayaquil and Panamá doubted the possibility of joining Colombia. The 
colossal nation and its fiction of a commercial empire, however, needed real control over 
the Pacific belt connecting Panamá and Guayaquil to fulfill the political economy vision 
of trade and abundance. 
 
Regional Fractures, National Fictions, and the Door to the Pacific  
 
The desire to highlight Colombia’s potential to connect the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans, led to constructions of a chorographic identity that linked the mainland to the 
Isthmus of Panamá. Along with the opening of inter-oceanic communications, the need 
for a port in the Pacific was imperative, first for securing independence in military terms, 
but more importantly, for Colombia’s aspirations to become a continental power and 
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bastion of inter-oceanic trade. This section contrasts this utopian vision with the on-the-
grounds realities that the new government faced in its attempt to integrate Guayaquil and 
Panamá, including the regional challenges and aspirations that tested republican leaders’ 
vision of a Colombian territoriality. This section provides an important perspective from 
which to reflect on the nature and limitations of the republican state and its power in this 
period.  
 
Guayaquil’s Exceptionality  
 
The debates around the annexation of Guayaquil reveal that the presupposed 
natural interdependence between Quito, Venezuela, and New Granada was constantly 
undermined by regional commercial aspirations. Since the Fundamental Law of the 
Republic created the Colombian state mirroring the jurisdictions of the viceroyalty of 
New Granada, president Bolívar and the deputies of Angostura and Cúcuta assumed that 
the republic had imprescriptible rights over the province of Guayaquil. The province had 
formed part of the viceroyalty of New Granada since its creation in 1739. In 1803 the 
Spanish crown separated the military government of Guayaquil from New Granada and 
transferred it to the viceroyalty of Perú, as in earlier colonial times. Treasury and justice 
administration remained subject to the audiencia of Quito and the viceroyalty of New 
Granada. Commercially, however, the port city was connected to Perú. 
In a pamphlet published in Guayaquil presumably between November 1821 and 
February 1822, Francisco María Roca (1786-1846) presented the contours of the debate 
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around whether Guayaquil would unite with Colombia or Perú, or remain independent.37 
A native from Guayaquil and son to a merchant family, Roca realized that the strongest 
arguments in favor of uniting Guayaquil to Perú and not to Colombia lay in the 
province’s jurisdictional history, its regional spatial relations, and its commercial 
economy. Guayaquil was only part of New Granada, he argued, because of an “irrelevant 
demarcation of the Spaniards”.38 According to Roca, some believed on the convenience 
of annexing Guayaquil to Colombia because the Fundamental Law of the Republic based 
the extension of the republic on the demarcation of the old viceroyalty, invoking the 
principle of utis possidetis.39 Roca also pointed out that, at least historically, Guayaquil 
had formed part of the Peruvian viceroyalty, for 227 years, compared to the 63 years it 
has been under the viceroyalty of New Granada. In addition to a past of jurisdictional 
attachment to Perú, Roca’s arguments turned to the perspective of a future with the 
highly militarized Colombian state. 
Roca’s territorial vision advances a critique to the new administrative division of 
the country, doubting that it would render any significant advantage to Guayaquil. The 
collapse of the civil state during the revolutionary wars, which shifted power to the 
military, would became, in Roca’s words, yet another obstacle to Guayaquil’s happiness 
                                                
37 For a detailed analysis of Roca’s pamphlet see: David J. Cubitt, “Economy and Politics in Independent 
Guayaquil: Francisco Roca's "el Amigo Del País", 1822 / El Amigo Del País, O Ensayos Sobre La 
Felicidad De Esta Provincia”. Revista De Historia De América, no. 121. Pan American Institute of 
Geography and History, 1996: 83–129. 
38 Francisco María Roca. El amigo del país, ó Ensayos sobre la felicidad de esta provincia. Guayaquil: 
Imprenta de la Ciudad, 1822. Original at the John Carter Brown Library. 
39 A principle in international law used to stabilize territorial borders of newly created states after 
decolonization. Each state was to be recognized as possessing all territories that were presumed to be 
possessed by its colonial predecessor as of 1810. 
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under the Colombian state. In the current state of affairs, Roca believed that military men 
would occupy all the available possitions across the new jurisdictional order making 
Guayaquil unhappy. Paralleling Colombia as the same old despotic order, Roca argued 
that in the case of Guayaquil, it would be the same to receive its officials from Colombia 
or from Europe, because the same evils from colonial times still hold true. 
Geography provided a natural separation between Colombia—including Quito—
and Guayaquil, Roca suggested. Guayaquil’s exceptional geographic situation separates it 
from Quito by “inaccessible mountains.” The same idea of geographic separation applied 
to accessing New Granada because “the unhealthy coasts of Chocó make 
communications risky, expensive, and difficult.”40 Roca went on to explain that travel to 
several parts of Colombia from Guayaquil could take up to seven months “through 
impassable roads” while in any season, people could reach Perú in only seven days. The 
origin of all ailments of Spanish domination, he contended, was precisely the distance to 
the center of power, and this principle would remain true, he added, if Guayaquil joined 
Colombia. The one difference would be that the new center shifted from Madrid to 
Bogotá.  
Within Guayaquil, some sectors rejected Roca’s project to unite with Perú and 
supported complete independence. In July 1822, father José Coello, for published an 
article in the newspaper El Amigo De la Verdad promoting Guayquil’s complete 
independence. About the pretension of the complete independence of Guayaquil, Bolívar 
had told vice-president Francisco de Paula Santander in a letter earlier that year, that “a 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
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city [Guayaquil] and a river [the Guayas River] cannot constitute a nation” and that the 
province of Túmbez was the “natural limit of Perú” and that Guayaquil was outside of 
it.41 In other words, in Bolívar’s national project the pretensions of some citizens of 
Guayaquil of making of a city a nation mirrored interregnum provincial fragmentation. In 
addition, according to Bolívar, nature had spoken fixing its natural limits thus favoring 
the union of Guayaquil to Colombia.42 For Roca, who unlike supporters of complete 
independence favored the annexation of Guayaquil to Perú, if distance alone was not 
enough to justify a separation from Colombia, hard statistical commercial data provided 
further justification. 
Roca highlighted Guayaquil’s ties to a larger Pacific commercial space 
connecting Perú, Chile and Mexico. The incorporation of Guayaquil to Colombia would 
harm its trade, he contended. In contrast, “Perú is an inseparable body of Guayaquil,” 
Roca argued, supporting the idea that the mercantile space that they already shared would 
expand the port city’s trade and agriculture.43 To prove this, Roca presented a series of 
statistical charts that gauged the value of the natural products of the province in a given 
year and the degree of mercantile relations that Guayaquil had with all relevant 
commercial outposts in America. From the commercial balance of the port city, Roca 
deduced that Quito and Cuenca were not central to Guayaquil’s trading needs. Only 
during six months of every year could Guayaquil establish inland communications with 
                                                
41 “Carta de Simón Bolívar al general Francisco de Paula Santander”, 5 de enero de 1822.  
42 Ibid.  
43 María Luisa Laviana Cuetos. Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII: recursos naturales y desarrollo económico. 
Publicaciones de la Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanosde Sevilla 332 (no. general). Sevilla: Escuela 
de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1987, 163. 
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Quito and Cuenca. Guayaquil, however, maintained sustained commercial exchanges 
with Lima and Mexico. In Roca’s chorographic political economy, Guayaquil could not 
unite with a state incapable of consuming its products. The locality “makes other needs 
arise,” Roca asserted, referring to the idea that the city’s agriculture and trade was 
nothing similar to those of Colombia. In short, Roca’s disparaging opinions of Colombia 
rendered an image of the new country as a non-commercial society. 
This critique unfolded into a condemnation of the Colombian central government 
legislation on state incomes, trade, and navigation. The disconnect between Guayaquil’s 
local imperative and needs seemed constantly dislocated from centralist legislative 
actions. Once Guayaquil formed part of Colombia, the Irish general and aide-de-camp of 
Simón Bolívar, Daniel Florencio O’Leary, visited Guayaquil and reported on the local 
discontent with the laws that emanated from the capital. O’Leary contended that the main 
authorities of Guayaquil often complained of “the multitude of laws, that according to 
them, nobody understood,” adding that, “the current administration is a labyrinth.”44 Two 
contrasting discourses, one regional and the other national, proved the constant clash 
among different views of republican territoriality toppling the fiction of a great and 
unified Colombia from its very inception.  
Guayaquil remained an independent free province between 1820 and 1822, until 
President Bolívar annexed the province to Colombia. With the military victories over 
Spain, Colombian republican leaders saw the opportunity of fulfilling a geo-strategic 
                                                
44 Mariano Fazio Fernández. El Guayaquil Colombiano, 1822-1830. 1st ed. Guayaquil, Ecuador: Banco 
Central del Ecuador, Subgerencia del Centro de Investigación y Cultura, 1988. 77-78.   
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need for advancing the liberation of the last Spanish bastion in Perú. In addition, securing 
a trading outpost on the Pacific would assure a fundamental bastion of the colossal nation 
that embraced both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.45 The other central piece for 
completing this commercial territoriality was the narrowest portion of the hemisphere, the 
one place that would unlock Colombia’s passport into a global commercial space: 
Panamá. 
 
Panama’s Trade Gateway: Local, National, and Global Political Economies  
 
Patriot revolutionaries understood the geopolitical importance of the isthmus during the 
wars and contemplated the province of Panamá as the location for building Ciudad 
Bolívar, the projected capital of the Republic of Colombia honoring the Liberator. In the 
congressional session of May 26 1821, a few months before the emancipation of Panamá, 
a proposed article of the Constitution of Cúcuta stated that because the Colombian 
republic needed expedited communication through both seas with Europe, Asia, and the 
other governments of the Americas, the government would reside in Panamá. Ciudad 
Bolívar would be built in a place called Las Cruces, six leagues distant from Panamá City 
towards the cordillera. From there, all government decisions would circulate with ease, 
from the coast of Esmeraldas and Guayaquil to the provinces of Quito; from the coast of 
Buenaventura to Cauca and the interior of Cundinamarca; and from Portobelo in the 
                                                
45 Merchants from the provinces of Cartagena, Popayán, and Antioquia attempted for decades to extend 
commercial ventures to Guayaquil via the Atrato River.  
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Caribbean, to the coastal states of the departamentos of Cundinamarca and Venezuela.46 
Congress did not approve this article and decided that Bogotá would become the 
provisional capital city of Colombia while the legislature decided the location for Ciudad 
Bolívar.47 The contemplation of the province of Panamá as location for the center of 
government speaks of the revival of the isthmian region’s geopolitical importance both 
for immediate military needs and for Colombia’s national project.  
The Isthmus of Panamá remained a royalist enclave and rearguard of Spain during 
the revolution. After the expulsion of the royalist government from Santa Fe, royalists 
established the seat of viceregal power in Panamá city. This happened first between 
March 21, 1812 and June 2, 1813, and later again in 1819 for reasons that lie at the heart 
of the province’s political economy. By the late eighteenth century, the province was 
undergoing a demographic crisis that caused a decline in agricultural and artisanal 
production. Panamá therefore lacked a lively local Creole population to challenge the 
empire or a significant population base that was decisive in other regions. Furthermore, 
creole merchants in the isthmus remained with the royalists for the sake of saving their 
commercial business.48  
Records suggest that the economic lethargy of the province started to lift by the 
early 1800s thanks to the opening of trade with neutral nations.49 In addition, according to 
                                                
46 “Acta 26, sesión del día 28 de Mayo.” Op. Cit. Documentos Importantes… 
47 “Acta 197, sesión del 9 de octubre.” Ibid. 
48 Olmedo Beluche, “El Istmo de Panamá y la independencia hispanoamericana”, en ALAI, América 
Latina en Movimiento, 4 de enero de 2010, consultado en 27 de febrero de 2013, 
 http://alainet.org/active/37120&lang=es 
49 Celestino Andrés Araúz. La Independencia de Panamá En 1821: Antecedentes, Balance Y Proyecciones. 
Panamá: Academia Panameña de la Historia, 1980, 41.  
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evidence presented by Panamanian historians, between 1800 and 1816 the Isthmus 
became less dependent on annual fiscal remittances from Cartagena and Lima while its 
fiscal incomes increased.50 Another reason for Panamá’s short economic revival was a 
royal decree that derogated a long-term closure of the mouth of the Chagres River, a key 
artery for transporting commodities and peoples from the Atlantic to the Pacific. With the 
expectation of achieving economic advantages from the viceregal government, creoles 
from the Isthmus were more willing to remain loyal to the king that their counterparts in 
other regions and promote their commercial interests. For example, Creoles in Panamá 
sent a proposal to the Spanish council for the establishment of a merchant guild in the 
isthmus. In the meantime, the Spanish crown took advantage of Panama’s geopolitical 
situation, turning the city into a royalist port and placing it at the heart of the military 
campaigns against American insurrections.51  
The liberation and further annexation of the province of Panamá to the new 
republic became a pressing issue. The Liberation Army prepared an expedition at 
Cartagena against Panamá in which English troops were to be principally employed.52 
This expedition never came to fruition because the inhabitants of Panamá, unhappy with 
Spanish authorities who systematically ignored their petitions to create a merchant guild 
in the isthmus, began an insurrection that resulted in the proclamation of independence. 
                                                
50 Ibid. 43. 
51 As we saw in Chapter 3, while the royalists chose Panama as the enclave of Spanish power, the 
insurrectional congress in Santa Fe—in which Panama did not participate-, embraced the Isthmus of 
Panama, among other natural landmarks of the kingdom as symbol of the United Provinces of New 
Granada. 
52 Alexander Walker. Colombia: Being a Geographical, Statistical, Agricultural, Commercial, and 
Political Account of That Country, 1822. 561- 
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Panamanian leaders declared independence first in Panama on November 28, with  
Veraguas and Portobelo following, in early December, 1821. The independence 
movement in Panamá was not a product of Bolívar’s campaign as was the case for New 
Granada, Quito, and Venezuela. In spite of this, Panamanian independence leaders 
decided to join Bolivar’s Colombia.  
In their union with Colombia, the commercial elite of Panamá assured the 
necessary military support to safeguard the province from Spanish military undertakings 
while promoting much-desired economic reforms.53 In spite of Panama’s small 
population, poor terrestrial communication between provinces, and difficulties pacifying 
the indigenous population, Colombian government considered that, given its 
geographical situation, Panama deserved the category of departamento.54 The territory of 
Panamá became the departamento del Istmo in 1824 and was conceded the right to 
appoint senators to Congress.  
As Colombians crafted the laws for the new republic, the liberalization of trade in 
Panama was one of the first approved measures. With the intention of creating a uniform 
commercial legislation the import tariffs to be paid in the ports of Colombia were set to 
be the same, differently from the old Spanish legislation. The representatives for the 
newly annexed departamento of Panamá, however, promoted the Reglamento para el 
Comercio del Istmo de Panamá (Rule for trade in the Isthmus of Panamá) in December 
1821. Only until 1823, however, the congress of Colombia debated and approved the 
                                                
53 The Acta de Independencia of Panamá stated: “The territories if the Isthmus belong to the Republican 
State of Colombia.” 
54 “Memoria que el Secretario de Estado y del despacho del Interior presentó al Congreso de Colombia, 
sobre los negocios de su Departamento.” Colombia. Secretaría del Interior. 1823. 9. 
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rules and tariffs for the transit of merchandise through the Isthmus, but failed to 
incorporate Panamá’s aspiration of a differentiated tariff. Notwithstanding, the new laws 
opened the ports of Chagres, Panama, and Portobelo to ships from friendly and neutral 
nations.55  
Commercial legislation provides an understanding of the limitations of the early 
republican state and its power in this period. In repeated communications between the 
Customs Office of the Isthmus and the central government of Bogotá, customs 
administrators urged the government to establish differentiated commercial regulations in 
the Isthmus, namely lower tariffs. The geographic position of the Isthmus, they argued, 
required a different system than the one applied in other ports of the republic, especially 
those of the Caribbean. This reflects the larger difficulties that the central government in 
Bogota faced in trying to establish a coherent fiscal and economic system that pleased the 
different regional needs. The existing relationships between Panamá and the other Pacific 
nations such as Guatemala, Perú, and Mexico, must be safeguarded, custom’s officer 
Juan José Agote added. The strength of Panamá, the custom’s administrators pointed, lay 
precisely in the usefulness of the Isthmus for the mercantile interests of many nations. If 
merchants experienced delays and hindrances such as high import tariffs in Panamá, 
other nations would prefer Cape Horn to transport their merchandize.56  
In addition, the long-standing petition of the Panamanian merchant elite to 
                                                
55 That same year the congress approved the law that prescribed the rules that nationals or foreigners 
should follow to obtain privileges for the construction of transportation networks in Colombia. Law 1, of 
July 23, 1823.  
56 AGN-Bogota. Sección República, Fondo Congreso, “Documentos relativos a la práctica observada en el 
istmo sobre el tránsito de mercaderías y efectos comerciales por los puertos del Pacífico. Incluye 
reglamento de comercio para el Istmo de Panamá.” Legajo 7, ff. 787-796. 
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establish a merchants guild (Tribunal de Consulado) never came to fruition under 
Colombia’s rule. The same was true for the construction of an inter-oceanic canal. In 
1823, Panameños petitioned the Colombian congress for the creation of a commission of 
geographers and hydraulics experts to dig a canal to connect both seas.57 This was the 
first of many petitions that the leaders of the Isthmus sent to the congress in Bogotá. 
 Panamanians understood the geographical advantage of the province and in 1826 
expressed frustration with Colombia’s centralist commercial legislation and unfulfilled 
liberal promises. In that year the mercantile sector of Panamá, opposing Bolívar’s 
recently established dictatorship, proposed their desire to become a país hanseático, that 
is, becoming part of a global mercantile empire under the protection of foreign powers 
and only loosely associated with Colombia.58 With this tentative bid for autonomy, the 
merchant elite of Panamá longed to return to its old position as a mercantile metropolis. 
In early colonial times, the Portobelo Fair was held in the Isthmus, bringing together 
merchants from Sevilla, Lima, and Panama to trade European finished goods for silver 
but this had ended in 1739.59 The initiative did not go beyond mere intentions after a pro-
Bolivar sector in the Panamanian leading elite subscribed to the Bolivian Constitution of 
1826, which Bolivar drafted seeking to serve for all units of a Spanish American 
confederation. Panama would remain under the auspices of Colombia. 
                                                
57 “ Gaceta Oficial del Departamento del Istmo”, Panamá, Jueves 6 de marzo de 1823. Núm. 10. Quoted in: 
Alfredo Castillero Calvo. “El Movimiento Anseatista de 1826. Primera Tentativa Autonomista de los 
Istmeños después de la Anexión a Colombia.” Tareas. Año 1. Núm. 4, Panamá, mayo-julio, 1960, 10. 
58 See: Juan José Argote: “ Sucinta exposición de las Violencias que produjeron las Actas celebradas el 13 
de septiembre el 13 de septiembre y 14 de octubre de 1826.”  Por José Ángel Santos, Panamá, 1827. 
59 Christopher Ward. Imperial Panama: Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian America, 1550-1800. 1st ed. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993. 
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President Bolivar made contact with British capitalists, and insisted on the project 
to connect the two oceans during the Congress of Panama in 1826.60 In a communication 
from the Camara de Representantes of the Republic of Colombia of January 31, 1826, 
directed to the vice-president Francisco de Paula Santander, the chamber communicated 
its decision to discuss multiple petitions from Colombians and foreigners about the 
exclusive privilege to connect the Atlantic and the Pacific.61 Early in his self-declared 
permanent presidency, in 1828, Bolívar hired the British engineer John Lloyd to explore 
the Isthmus of Panama and ascertain the best way to join the two seas whether by road or 
canal. The work of the engineer started in Panama in 1828, where another officer of 
engineers from Sweden joined him. The Royal Society of London published the resulting 
report from Lloyd’s work in 1830.62 (See Figure 14).   
Although the proposed railroad was not realized during the Gran Colombian 
period (1819-1830), the imagining of its possibility fueled political conflict, influenced 
nationalist discourse, and shaped diplomatic endeavors and continental defensive 
strategies. The larger perspective of opening a fluid trade network that connected 
different provinces within Colombia to inter-oceanic trade also gained importance during 
this era. The commercial aspirations of provinces such as Antioquia, Cartagena, and 
                                                
60 Gonzalo Zúñiga, "Canal interoceánico y la cordillera del Darién", en Revista del Chocó, Quibdó, vol. II, 
núm. 10, noviembre de 1929, pág. 9. 
61 AGN-Bogotá, Fondo Congreso 12, f. 431. 
62 In the map, which accompanies this memoir, the coastline on both sides of the Isthmus is taken from 
previous Spanish authorities’ surveys, and the interior is wholly from Lloyd’s own observations. In Lloyd’s 
opinion the best way to communicate the river Chagres with the Pacific was through a railroad, although a 
small canal from the Chagres River should be opened. J.A. Lloyd. Account of levellings carried across the 
Isthmus of Panama, : to ascertain the relative height of the Pacific Ocean and of the Atlantic at the mouth 
of the river Chagres; accompanied by geographical and topographical notices of the isthmus, Royal 
Society, London, 1830. Original at the John Carter Brown Library. 
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Popayan looked inwards to the Atrato River, not to the Isthmus of Panama, as the desired 
gateway for inter-oceanic trade.  
 
 
Figure 14. Plan of that part of the Isthmus of Panama Eligible for Effecting a 
Communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific.63  
 
Between Local and Global Geopolitics 
 
Local political economies within New Granada tended to favor the opening of 
inter-oceanic communication, not in the Isthmus of Panama, but in the Darién region 
                                                
63 From Observations performed in the Years 1828 and 1829, by J.A. Lloyd Original at the John Carter 
Brown Library. 
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through the Atrato and San Juan Rivers.64 An interoceanic canal through the Atrato River 
was part of a broader project for connecting the provinces of Cartagena, Popayán, Quito, 
and Antioquia with the Pacific basin of Chocó, and opening a commercial gateway that 
mirrored the Magdalena River65 of the westernmost provinces of New Granada. The long 
distances and bad condition of the trails in the mining enclaves across these provinces 
increased the costs of products and commodities coming from Europe. The authorities of 
those provinces attempted repeatedly to pacify, populate, and connect the Chocó with the 
hinterlands across the Andes Mountains, and Atlantic coastal areas of the kingdom.66 
Merchants from Cartagena also sought to reduce the price of their commercial 
transactions and extend commercial ventures to Guayaquil and to Peruvian markets. In 
this way, they would benefit from a canal through the Atrato River to access the Pacific 
mining markets traditionally bound to Guayaquil, Paita, and El Callao.67 
The jungles of the Darién region posed a challenging natural obstacle for 
terrestrial communication between Panamá and the rest of New Granada. In contrast, 
merchants could more easily travel through the Atrato River and establish commercial 
                                                
64 Some Antioqueños were convinced that the happiness of their province depended on opening the Atrato 
path. The Creole José Manuel Restrepo published in the Semanario del Nuevo Reino de Granada in 1809 
his essay about the geography of Antioquia. See: José Manuel Restrepo, “Ensayo sobre la Geografía. 
Producciones, industria y población de la Provincia de Antioquia,” February 1, 1809. Op. Cit. Semanario 
del Nuevo Reino de Granada, 243-284. 
65 The Magdalena was the main river of the kingdom that runs from the Atlantic coast, over 900 miles 
through the eastern inter-Andean valleys. 
66 So are the cases of the projects to build the caminos of Malbucho, Esmeraldas, and la Tola, and so forth. 
For an early story of the attempts to create a port and opening a path in Esmeraldas that was finally opened 
in 1791, see: Phelan, John Leddy. The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century; Bureaucratic Politics 
in the Spanish Empire. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. 
67 Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila. Un Nuevo Reino: Geografía Política, Pactismo y Diplomacia Durante El 
Interregno En Nueva Granada, 1808-1816. 1a. ed. Colección Bicentenario / Centro De Estudios En 
Historia. Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2010, 388. 
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connections with the markets in the provinces of Popayán, Antioquia, and Cartagena. 
Each one of these provinces conceived of the annexation of Chocó to their territories as a 
crucial imperative for economic prosperity and political independence. Moreover, the 
possibility of linking the Atrato and San Juan Rivers provided yet another means for 
inter-oceanic communication. For instance, control over the Chocó led to inter-provincial 
diplomatic conflicts during the interregnum, which persisted later in the nineteenth 
century. Competing commercial agendas in the neighboring provinces of Chocó, 
Cartagena, Valle del Cauca, and Antioquia, unfolded into a dispute over the control of 
this region and its potential for inter-oceanic commerce.68 During the early 1820s 
congressional sessions, the governor of Chocó presented to the Congress a project to 
assess the possibility of the opening an inter-oceanic canal in Chocó.69  
One of the main objectives in the 1820s was to improve fluvial communications 
across the country. Bolívar thoroughly supported the project of inter-oceanic 
communication in Chocó. In 1822, president Bolívar wrote a letter to the governor of 
Chocó, colonel José María Cancino, and ordered him to delineate approximately three 
miles of the canal of Raspadura. This canal would connect the Atrato and San Juan river 
creating an outlet from the region of Darién and Antioquia to the Pacific Ocean. A report 
of the State Secretary of 1823 assured that Bolivar was determined to visit those 
                                                
68 Ibid. 387. 
69 Acta Sesión 165: 17 de Septiembre: representación documentada del gobernador del Chocó, con que 
presenta el proyecto que se ha formado de abrir la comunicación de los mares Atlántico y Pacífico por el 
territorio de aquella provincial, y se mandó pasar a la commission de navegación y caminos. Acta 170, 
Sesión del día 20 de septiembre: Seguidamente se dio cuenta de la solicitud de una compañía establecida en 
el Chocó para abrir por aquel territorio la comunicación de los mares Atlántico y Pacífico, y se mandó 
pasar por la commisión de navegación y caminos.” Op. Cit. Actas del Congreso de Cúcuta, “Actas sesiones 
17 y 20 de Septiembre.”  
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territories to inspect the possibilities and advantages of a canal.70 The report stated that 
such a canal would bring wealth to the province of Chocó and the Pacific coast.71 In spite 
of all the attention that the canal obtained during the early republican years, the 
Colombian government prioritized the project of the Isthmus of Panama, regardless of 
wider local interest in the Atrato outlet to the sea.  
The reasons for the Colombian government decision to favor investment for a 
canal in Panamá and delay the Atrato-San Juan canal are not entirely clear. Local 
difficulties in carrying out the delineation of the canal in Chocó might have influenced its 
delay. Furthermore, ongoing financial relationships with England, and the republican 
leaders’ urge to prioritize inserting Colombia into a global commercial space must also 
be considered. The sources also suggest Colombia’s larger interest in drawing 
international attention towards the Isthmus in light of Bolívar’s proposed American 
confederation.  
Stressing both its importance as hinge between the Atlantic and the Pacific, and 
its ideal situation for Colombia’s continental leadership, Bolivar chose Panama as site of 
the Congress of 1826. He stated that “if the world had to choose its capital,” the Isthmus 
of Panama would be ideal. It is situated at the center of the globe, Bolívar asserted, and it 
looks toward Asia on the west side and toward Africa and Europe to the east. An 
                                                
70 “Memoria que el Secretario de Estado y del despacho del Interior presentó al Congreso de Colombia, 
sobre los negocios de su Departamento.” Colombia. Secretaría del Interior. 1823. 24. 
71 In a number of letters between José María Cancino, the general commander of Chocó, and the general 
secretary of Bolivar in 1822, Bolívar expresses his urge to learn about the possibilities of the inter-oceanic 
communication in the Atrato. See Luis Fernando González Escobar. “Chocó en la cartografía histórica: de 
territorio incierto a departamento de un país llamado Colombia.” Boletín Cultural y Bibliográfico. Número 
43, Volumen XXXIII. 1996. Digital Publication, Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango 
http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/publicacionesbanrep/boletin/boleti1/bol43/b43o.htm 
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argument of geographic distance also justified the choice of the Isthmus, as Bolívar 
stated. The Isthmus is equidistant from the farthest reaches of the continent and could 
thus be the provisional site for the first Congress of the confederated states.72 As we will 
see later, in the interest of positioning Colombia as part of a global commercial network, 
Bolívar offered the Isthmus of Panama in exchange for support during the independence 
wars and in treaties of the government of Colombia.  
The Isthmus as symbol of the Colombian nation persists until today, even though 
Panamá separated from Colombia in 1903. In 1834, after the separation of Venezuela and 
Ecuador from Colombia, congress returned the country to its old name, New Granada, 
and chose the isthmus of Panamá as its symbol.73 The coat of arms of the republic of New 
Granada featured the Isthmus of Panamá with two ships, one at the Atlantic and the other 
at the Pacific together with the cornucopias. The coat of arms reflects an ideal order, one 
in which Panamá is an “integrative part” of the republic. The symbol exalts New Granada 
as the only South American country with access to both oceans, and depicts the sailing 
ships representing a future of trade between New Granada and the rest of the world.  
(Figure 15.) Other countries became increasingly interested in the promises of trans-
Isthmian communication in Panama. This possibility sparked the imagination of British 
and United States merchants and diplomats who expressed their own anxieties and 
expectations in a world that was soon to transform once and forever the geopolitical game 
in the Western hemisphere.  
                                                
72 “Carta de Simón Bolívar, Lima, December 7, 1824.” Bolívar, Simón. El Libertador: writings of Simón 
Bolívar. Library of Latin America. Oxford  ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 160-161. 
73 “Ley que designa las armas y el pabellón de la república.” Mayo 9, 1834. 
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Figure 15. Coat of Arms and Flag of the Republic of New Granada in 1834.74 
 
The Trans-National Narrative of Colombia’s Isthmus 
 
The construction of a chorographic identity that linked Colombia to the Isthmus of 
Panamá became a central aspect of the diplomatic campaigns to achieve military 
independence and the international recognition of the new republic.75 In 1820 vice-
                                                
74 AGN. SMP4, REF. 551 A. “Oficio que Lino de Pombo dirige al Secretario de Despacho de Guerra y 
Marina sobre las armas de la república, según lo dispuesto por la Ley del 9 de mayo de 1834.”  
75 Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila has identified four specific areas in which Colombian diplomats concentrated 
their efforts between 1815 and 1831: the recruitment of mercenaries and the acquisition of war materials; 
the promotion of colonization; the search and negotiation of loans; and the creation of a favorable public 
opinion that prepared the terrain for consolidating treaties of friendship and trade. Op Cit. Daniel Gutiérrez. 
El Reconocimiento de Colombia, 82. 
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president Zea, contended that the issue of an inter-oceanic canal in Panamá was not only 
of the greatest importance to the rest of the world, but should be where the interests and 
relationships for the consolidation of the Colombian republic be concentrated.76 An 
international network of Colombian diplomats in Philadelphia, London, and Paris 
promoted several publications supporting independence and raising territorial visions of 
the new republic tied to the Isthmus and its commercial potential.  
 This process started in the late eighteenth century when a group of disaffected 
creoles in London formed Atlantic networks with the support of the British government 
to spread ideas of emancipation in the Spanish American colonies.77 Spanish Americans 
Francisco de Miranda, José del Pozo y Sucre and Manuel José de Salas, subscribed a 
defensive alliance between England, the United States, and South America known as the 
Act of Paris of 1797.78 The alliance contemplated a trade treaty, discarding monopolies 
but delivering advantages to British manufactured goods in South America in exchange 
for agricultural products.79 British and United States aspirations of inter-oceanic trade in 
Panamá were central to the Act. The passage through the Isthmus of Panama that would 
eventually come into existence would be provided, the Act stated, for a certain number of 
                                                
76 Op. Cit. “Discurso Zea 1820,”  Documentos Importantes….  
77 Rafe Blaufarb. “The Western Question: The Geopolitics of Latin American Independence.” The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 3 (Jun., 2007), pp. 742-763. 
78 “Acta de París de 1797.” Francisco de Miranda, José del Pozo y Sucre y Manuel José de Salas Colección 
Claves de América, “Documentos Fundamentales – Francisco de Miranda”, Biblioteca Ayacucho-1992. 
Two years later in 1799, a pamphlet written by the exiled Peruvian Jesuit Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán 
inviting to support the independence of Spanish America circulated in London. By mentioning natural 
rights, and in the same spirit of Thomas Paine’s “Rights of Men” of 1791, Viscardo argued that natural 
independence was conferred by geographical distance as “Nature has separated us from Spain by immense 
seas.” Juan Pablo Vizcardo y Guzmán. Letter to the Spanish Americans: a facsimile of the second English 
edition (London, 1810). Providence, R.I: The John Carter Brown Library, 2002. 82. 
79 Karen Racine. Francisco De Miranda, a Transatlantic Life in the Age of Revolution. Latin American 
Silhouettes. Wilmington, Del: SR Books, 2003. 136-140. 
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years to England. According to the pact, the transit through the Isthmus of Panamá would 
be equally open to all commodities from the United States. Spanish Americans expected 
that the United States would provide the vessels for exporting the region’s goods. This 
project for emancipation never came to fruition but is proof that early international 
geopolitical agendas revolved around an interest in inter-oceanic trade in South America. 
The tendency to wield territorial rights over Panamá to negotiate help from 
Britain would remain constant in Creole patriots diplomatic endeavors during the 1810s. 
But as historians of independence have well established, independence finally occurred as 
consequence of collapse at the center. After the Napoleonic invasion of Iberia, diplomatic 
relations between Spanish American colonies and European nations began to be forged in 
July 1810, when Andrés Bello arrived to London in company of Luis López Méndez and 
Simón Bolívar, to secure British support for the larger cause of independence.80 They 
promised to relinquish rights over a canal in Panamá to England in exchange for 
weapons, and military support for independence from Spain. The British contribution to 
independence, however, came from mercenaries and adventurers, since the British crown 
and Spain had become allies in the struggle against Napoleon.81 However, interest in the 
outcomes of the revolution in South America fed foreign assessments of its possible 
impacts in the Western Hemisphere and Europe. British commercial aspirations are well 
                                                
80 Holly Faith Nelson, Sharon Alker, and Leith Davis. Robert Burns and Transatlantic Culture. Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd., 2013. 
81 Matthew Brown. Adventuring through Spanish colonies: Simón Bolívar, foreign mercenaries and the 
birth of new nations. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006. Matthew Brown at the University of 
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reflected in a number of geographical descriptions of New Granada with emphasis in 
inter-oceanic trade. 
In Great Britain, support for New Granada’s independence and an interest in the 
history of the revolutions came together with a renewed interest in Colombia’s 
geographical potential to achieve inter-oceanic communication. New commercial 
opportunities and public curiosity motivated the publication of several accounts about the 
crumbling Spanish American colonies in London and Edinburgh. Molding the 
perceptions of readers and possible commercial investors in England, journals such as 
The Edinburgh Review and Quaterly Review became influential among the new 
commercial and industrial British elite. Among the key links between the Spanish 
American revolutionaries and Englishmen who supported independence, John Allen 
(1771-1843), published weekly articles on Latin America between 1806 and 1810 in The 
Edinburgh Review one of the most influential British magazines of the nineteenth 
century. Allen was a key figure in shaping a public opinion on Spanish American 
independence that changed throughout the years, from pro-emancipation ideas to 
supporting the reconciliation among Spanish American colonies and Spain, and again to 
support complete independence.82  
Influential magazines in England constantly referred to the formation of a 
navigable passage across the Isthmus of Panama, the junction of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans, which was considered to be not only practicable, but easy. In 1809, The 
                                                
82 Frank Griffith Dawson has demonstrated the links between English interest in Spanish American 
independence and main figures of the revolution such as Francisco de Miranda, Simón Bolívar, and Andrés 
Bello. The First Latin American Debt Crisis: The City of London and the 1822-25 Loan Bubble. Yale 
University Press, 1990, 141. 
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Edinburgh Review, published an article reflecting on the expected commercial outcomes 
of the Spanish American revolutions.83 The writing, co-authored by Francisco de 
Miranda and the Scot James Mills, turned to the commercial advantages that would result 
from the emancipation of South America.84 A few years later, The Colonial Journal of 
London, published another piece on the importance of the Isthmus of Panama, assessing 
the feasibility of the interoceanic canal.85 In March 1817, in the midst of independence 
wars in South America, an article entitled “Mr. Walton on the Isthmus of Panama, 
considered as affording a Passage to unite the Pacific with the Atlantic or Western Ocean; 
(…)” appeared in the journal. William Walton, a pro-independence English lobbyist, not 
only actively supported the revolution but anticipated the commercial benefit for 
England.  
The English considered that the Isthmus was key to unlocking larger commercial 
markets in the east. British capitalists also considered undercutting U.S. commercial 
expansion in the hemisphere.86 As the United States emerged as a global competitor for 
Britain, the presence of U.S. fishing ships in the Pacific Ocean urged the British to call 
attention of the risks of losing the Isthmus to an enemy nation.87 The Monroe Doctrine of 
                                                
83 Frank Griffith Dawson. The First Latin American Debt Crisis: The City of London and the 1822-25 Loan 
Bubble. Yale University Press, 1990. 
84 The article started by reviewing Viscardo’s letter, and outlined its importance in demonstrating the 
foundations on liberty for Spanish Americans. “Emancipation of Spanish America.” Lettre aux Espagnols 
Americains. Par un de leurs Compatriotes. In Smith, Sydney. The Edinburgh Review. Edinburgh: A. and C. 
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86 Ibid. 
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1823 threatened to hinder British political and economic influence in South America.88  
Public opinion in the United States saw aiding Mexico and South America in their 
independence campaigns as an opportunity to harm British commerce.89 Although lively 
debate about the advantages of Spanish American Revolutions and the possibilities of 
trans-isthmian commerce took place within the US government and public media, this did 
not translate into decisive assistance for independence.90 
During the Napoleonic Wars the United States was concerned with avoiding 
actions likely to provoke military and naval confrontation with Britain, which had allied 
with France.91 Notwithstanding, United States capital spread through northern South 
America in the early nineteenth century, and increasingly stepped into Britain’s 
commercial space. By 1817, as historian Ernesto Bassi has demonstrated, New Granada 
obtained most of its manufactured and imported provisions from the United States, which 
was becoming northern South America’s major commercial partner.92 In spite of U.S. 
increasing commercial connections with Colombia, Spanish American revolutions posed 
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big challenges to United States’ commercial aspirations, primarly in regards to their 
competition with the British.  
The question of who would open an inter-oceanic communication in the Isthmus 
of Panamá raised U.S. concerns with post-Spanish European intervention in America. 
The 1823 Monroe Doctrine’s famous phrase “leave America for the Americans” 
summarizes this concern. The instructions that the U.S. government gave to its 
representatives for the Congreso Anfictiónico de Panamá in 1826 convoked by Simón 
Bolívar shed light on the rhetoric of the US regarding the possibility of opening fluid 
communication through the Isthmus. This position emphasized the American-centered, 
not global, nature of such enterprise.  
The official U.S. position considered that the canal should be constructed for “the 
benefits of the entire America.” A central point for consideration in the Congress was the 
opening of a canal through “the isthmus that unites both Americas” for the purposes of 
navigation. U.S. discourse pointed out that the projected canal should be brought about 
through common means and combined efforts, and not by an isolated foreign power.93 
The instructions to the plenipotentiary ministers to represent the U.S. in the congress, also 
made clear that the ministers should let their counterpart nations know of the vivid 
interest that the United Stated took in the execution of the work, and U.S. desire to be 
treated the same way as European foreign powers.  
Recent interpretations have called the attention on the fact that although the 
                                                
93 “Instrucciones general a los señores Richard C. Anderson, y John Sergeant nombrados enviados 
extraordinarios ministros plenipotenciarios de los Estados Unidos acerca del Congreso de Panamá”. 
Washington, May 8, 1826. Ibid. 42. 
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Monroe Doctrine placed the U.S. economy at its center, and was crafted against Great 
Britain, nascent Latin American republics did not object to it; on the contrary, they 
embraced it as a principle of national sovereignty. For instance, Colombia invoked the 
doctrine in 1824, and asked the U.S. for help against a possible intervention from France 
and Spain in its territory within a larger campaign to assure the preeminence of 
republicanism in the hemisphere.94 Although, while Colombia appeared to be committed 
to resist any intervention of the Europe’s monarchical powers, they seemed compliant 
with British capitalist ventures. As we saw with Bolívar’s support for British engineering 
assessments of the Isthmus, Colombia’s government attempted to turn the foreign 
discourse that linked the country to the Isthmus of Panamá as the key for global trade into 
a reality of inter-oceanic trade.95 
 
 
 
                                                
94 Greg Grandin demonstrates that the United States refused that Latin American nations invoked the 
doctrine as if it were international law. As Latin American countries understood it as a principle of uti 
possidetis, this is, as a prohibition against recolonization, they invoked during the 1820’s under the fear of 
new invasions. (Colombia, 1824, Brazil and Argentina, 1825). Op. Cit. Grandin. 79. 
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Conclusion 
 
Constructions of a chorographic identity that linked Colombia to the Isthmus of 
Panamá and to a global commercial space are windows through which to explore British 
and United States’ aspirations in the region, Colombia’s struggle for national unity, and 
its aspirations as a continental leader. As this chapter has demonstrated, in a new era of 
geopolitical realignments, local political economies needed to be negotiated vis-à-vis 
national, continental, and global geopolitical agendas. The transition from viceregal 
power to republican rule also opened a space to merchants from Panamá and Guayaquil 
to renegotiate a geopolitical place within the new republic. Interpretations of geography 
and assessments of the spatial dimensions of local political economies mattered greatly.  
Few ideas, other than the cult of Bolívar, fueled more the representation of 
Colombia abroad that the project of opening communication between the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans in Spanish America. While imperial powers channeled discourses of the 
commercial vocation of the Isthmus of Panamá to serve their own commercial interests, 
Colombian leaders embraced this idea along with national symbols that stressed 
agricultural diversity and the country’s impressive size as the source of strength of the 
nation. As demonstrated, the appropriation of the Isthmus of Panamá in republican 
rhetoric also corresponded to a larger strategic interest to possess a Pacific commercial 
outpost in Guayaquil. Furthermore, the regional identity of Panamá as hinge that joins the 
Pacific and the Atlantic served a central role in Bolívar’s aspiration to create an American 
confederation with Colombia as continental leader. This agenda, which overemphasized 
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the country’s possession of the Isthmus of Panamá, contrasted with local projects that 
favored inter-oceanic communication not through Panamá but in Chocó. In short, 
Colombia’s transition from colony to republic implied the constant negotiation between 
local and global political economy aspirations and visions of territory. 
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Conclusion: The Dawn of Gran Colombia 
 
In 1830, a Venezuelan observed that the great differences in commerce, customs, 
and climate among Venezuela, New Granada, and Quito justified the creation of three 
separate nations. This way, the observer noted, their distinct governments could govern in 
accordance with their specific local economic and geographical circumstances.1 Early 
republican legislation did not help the economy recover from the devastating effects of 
the wars, and failed to harmonize the needs of these three departamentos. In Venezuela 
and Ecuador, discontent towards the government of Bogotá gradually increased and 
deepened, along with criticism of centralist governance — particularly after Simón 
Bolívar proclaimed himself dictator in 1828, ushering in a set of conservative decrees.2  
Maintaining the relative fiscal cohesiveness that colonial institutions had 
achieved, and reconciling different political economies and territorial views, proved very 
difficult. Regional stances towards issues such as foreign trade and the abolition of 
slavery were often contradictory and divided republican leaders. The debate between pro- 
and anti-slavery groups brought to the fore tensions between regional political 
economies. For example, some Venezuelan political leaders warned about the fate of 
                                                
1 Colección de documentos relativos a la vida publica del libertador de Colombia y del Peru, Simon 
Bolívar: para servir a la historia de la independencia del Suramérica. “Pronunciamiento de la Villa de 
Bococó.” Imprenta de Devisme hermanos, 1830, 266. 
2 Between 1819 and 1825, the Colombian republic experienced a short-lived liberal epiphany, when 
republican leaders took a step back from their overzealous dream of liberal reform. This conservative turn 
resulted in the restoration of the colonial alcabala tax, monasteries, and Indian tribute, and the watering 
down of the manumission law. David Bushnell. The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of 
Itself. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, 68-73. 
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Venezuelan slave-dependent cacao agriculture if slavery were to be abolished. Lower 
trade barriers, for example, tended to privilege the agricultural exporting economies of 
Venezuela, while harming Ecuadorian domestic textile manufacturing.  
The reasons that explain the collapse of the Gran Colombian republic are 
manifold. They include conflicts among divergent local economic elites, different 
regional economic structures, and disagreements over which city should be capital of the 
country. There were also acute difficulties related to geographic obstacles and 
communications across regions, along with specific domestic and international political 
developments in the second half of the 1820s.3 This dissertation has suggested that the 
territorial order that emerged during the second half of the eighteenth century prefigured 
several of the conflicts and tensions that arose during and after the collapse of the 
Spanish empire in South America. The practice and discourse of political economy 
shaped the territorial order and political discourse of this transition. In other words, by 
interrogating the intersections between political economy and territoriality, we can better 
comprehend how the territorial order that collapsed during independence came into being 
in the first place, and therefore understand the colonial origins of early republican 
territoriality. 
A study of the intersections between political economy and territoriality 
                                                
3 New republican measures even included offering free lands to English immigrants, but foreigners never 
arrived. The political circumstances of the country and the financial crisis of England between 1825 and 
1826, impeded, in the words of politician and diplomat Juan García del Río, “this beneficial immigration.” 
Juan García del Río. “Examen politico de la situación de Colombia a fines de 1829. ” Blanco, José Félix, 
and Ramón Azpurúa. Documentos para la historia de la vida pública del libertador de Colombia, Perú y 
Bolivia ...: Puestos por orden cronolólogico, y con adiciones y notas que la ilustran. "La Opinión nacional, 
1878. 411 
 280 
highlights the centrality of different actors’ understandings of territory and wealth in 
shaping political decision-making and influencing political debate. This dissertation has 
traced this relationship from the creation of New Granada and during the eighteenth 
century, through its demise during independence and its re-creation as the Colombian 
republic, to its final dismantling in 1830. Through a close reading of a wide array of 
sources, including chorographic texts, royal correspondence, the writings of viceroys, 
maps, newspapers, manifestos, memorials, congressional debates, foreign magazines, and 
political symbols, it has scrutinized the spatial and epistemological dimensions of the 
transition from colony to republic in contemporary Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Panamá. These sources reveal the visions of political economy and territoriality that 
proved instrumental in imperial reform, revolutionary politics, warfare strategies, and 
republican nation- and state-building.  
The establishment of the viceroyalty in 1739 must be understood as the result of 
state-centered practices of wealth creation that responded to a context of hostile 
international rivalries. This response resulted in the largest territorial reform of the 
Spanish empire in centuries—the creation of a third viceroyalty in New Granada—, that 
came into being as Spanish reformers adopted the science of political economy as the 
framework for good government and economic policy. Using chorographic political 
economy texts, I have reconstructed the impact of Bourbon political economy on the 
territorialization of New Granada. The reform that established the Viceroyalty of New 
Granada incorporated the jurisdictions of modern-day Venezuela and Ecuador into the 
viceroyalty, linking them to the capital and administrative center of Santa Fe. The large 
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volume of chorographic documents produced for the Orinoco region and for Quito speaks 
of these regions’ greater importance in eighteenth-century imperial reform and 
geopolitics. Local administrators devoted many resources to recover economic dynamism 
in the province of Quito; while the Spanish crown directed many more to control the 
Orinoco region, which had historically been coveted by other empires. This suggests that 
the later separation of the Gran Colombian republic had colonial origins: in eighteenth-
century Spanish Bourbon territorialization, both colonial spaces arose as distinctive 
territories with logics of their own.  
The larger question of how to integrate geographically and economically diverse 
territories into a single territorial unit that produced revenue for the crown remained 
unresolved on the eve of independence. Hypothetically, fluid trade across New Granada 
should have worked as a unifying element, but as a result of the topographical features of 
the region and broader geopolitical factors this goal remained elusive. As a result, by the 
end of the eighteenth century the viceroyalty appears as a series of regional patches 
separated by the cordilleras, in need of integration via trade. Although the centralizing 
territorial logic of Spanish reform impacted colonial jurisdictions and sparked inter-
provincial competition and claims of local autonomy, there was a fiscal bureaucratic 
logic that made the colony function as an administrative whole.  
How were the Andean hinterlands connected to the coastal regions of New 
Granada? Central to the workings of the Bourbon economic project and the knowledge 
production policy was the fiscal structure. A network of bureaucrats moving fiscal 
remittances from Andean cities to the defense outpost of Cartagena connected towns to 
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regional centers of revenue collection. Fiscal territoriality explains a certain degree of 
cohesiveness in the kingdom. Royal bureaucrats also crafted representations of New 
Granada as a single administrative and geographic unit that looked inwards towards the 
capital city of Santa Fe — the administrative and learning center of the viceroyalty — 
and ignored the viceroyalty’s coastal areas, seen as belonging to a Greater Caribbean 
space. While in the Spanish bureaucratic territorial view Santa Fe was the unquestioned 
center of the polity, clashing visions of territory and political economy during the Iberian 
crisis of 1808 made plain the aspirations of several areas to become centers of their own 
regions or of the entire crumbling viceroyalty.  
The crisis and collapse of the imperial state resulted in the atomization of New 
Granada into autonomous provincial states, each justifying its projects with visions of 
political economy and territoriality. Political actors crafted discourses in which they 
expressed and understood sovereignty, political representation, and autonomy in relation 
to interpretations of their provincial territories and their economic viability. Constantly 
seeking to shift their borders and to establish relations with one and other, the 
revolutionary councils of the cities of Quito, Cartagena, Santa Fe, Mompox, and Santa 
Marta struggled to become centers of their territories. The debate over the preferred type 
of political organization for the transitioning polity — whether federalist or centralist — 
confronted different factions in New Granada, demonstrating that political economy 
thinking and reflections on geography were central tools for legitimating or undermining 
different political projects. The consequences in New Granada of the Napoleonic 
invasion of Iberia also make clear that the actors themselves assessed the spatial 
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dimensions of New Granada in discussing and imagining the best way to recompose 
political power.  
As Spanish Americans claimed sovereignty over their territories, the larger 
geopolitical context shifted when King Ferdinand VII recovered the throne in Spain and 
sought to regain control over the insurrected colonies through military warfare. In the 
same way that different actors had expressed their political aspirations during the collapse 
of empire, the military re-conquest of New Granada was predicated on specific 
understandings of territory in which visions of different regions emerged. Reading the 
reestablishment of imperial rule in General Morillo’s re-conquest strategy for New 
Granada and Venezuela as a spatial practice that set in motion the militarization of 
statecraft, this study has demonstrated that the pursuit of knowledge about the territory 
was a fundamental tool in Spain’s attempt to re-legitimize imperial rule.  
Political leaders during the early republican period also used narratives about the 
territory and its resources to legitimate the union of New Granada, Venezuela, and Quito 
in a single republic. In conveying national, continental, and global aspirations, early 
republican statesmen crafted discourses that sought to symbolically incorporate the 
republic into a modern commercial political economic space. This led to constructions of 
a chorographic identity that linked Colombia to the Pacific region and especially to 
Colombia’s possibilities of achieving inter-oceanic trade in the Isthmus of Panamá. 
Unifying the new republic was a paramount task that implied reconciling local territorial 
political economies with national, continental, and global geopolitical agendas. 
In the effort to define the genre of chorographic political economy, I studied the 
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production of manuscript documents assembled by vast bureaucratic fiscal, military, and 
ecclesiastical networks of informants during the eighteenth century. Sylvia Sellers-García 
has demonstrated the centrality of documents for the workings of the Spanish empire and 
that documents were used to overcome distance.4 Sellers-García considers the production, 
circulation, and storage of documents and that the quantification of distance in documents 
produced in the Kingdom of Guatemala produced different conceptualizations of space 
and distance. I delve deeper into characterizing a particular genre that merged visions of 
territory with political economy discourse. The genre of chorographic political economy 
seemed distinctive to some of the periods under discussion in these dissertation.  
I have underscored the multiple ways in which these documents served as 
guidelines for bureacrats, intellectuals, and military men to advance in practices of 
occupying and moving through space. In the pursuit of legibility within the Spanish 
imperial framework of the economic government of America these writings contributed 
to transform imagined spaces into familiar places. A central device in writing about the 
land and its potential wealth were a myriad of economic improvement projects that 
became no more than utopian representations of the territory and propaganda for 
attracting crown support. Writing about the territory and its potential natural riches also 
became a rhetoric device in the struggle for provincial and national sovereignty during 
the independence and early national periods.  
The chorographic political economy narratives that fashioned local, imperial, and 
                                                
4 Sylvia Sellers-García. Distance and Documents at the Spanish Empire’s Periphery. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2014, 16. 
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national narratives and shaped political debate in the period examined by this 
dissertation, need to be brought into conversation with the study of nation building post-
1830, particularly with the phenomenon of regionalization in Colombia. In particular, an 
approach that overcomes the chronological barriers —both backward and forward, pre-
1780 and post 1820—can help to conceptualize nation building not as an aggregation of 
hermetically sealed regional spaces, but as the articulation of the gravitational pulls of 
different regions that shifted according to changing geopolitical forces, territorial 
strategies, and political economy discourses.5 A comparison between the pursuit of 
chorographic knowledge that was so central to the territorialization of New Granada 
during the eighteenth century and to nation building projects in nineteenth-century 
Colombia—particularly the Chorographic Commission of the 1850s—can provide a 
fruitful long-term understanding of the colonial origins of regionally differentiated spaces 
within the old viceroyalty and later the nation.6 In addition, future research on the long 
nineteenth-century conflict between federalists and centralists can benefit from 
articulating chorographic political economy framework into the non-spatially oriented 
Colombian political history. 
Having interrogated the impacts of political economy and territoriality in the 
transition from colony to republic in Colombia, my research so far has reconstructed the 
                                                
5 Eric van Young (ed.). Mexico's Regions: Comparative History and Development. San Diego: Center for 
U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD, 1992, 11. 
6 To which Nancy Appelbaum’s forthcoming book will make an invaluable contribution. Nancy 
Appelbaum. Mapping the Country of Regions: The Chorographic Commission of Nineteenth-Century 
Colombia." University of North Carolina Press, in press, Spring 2016. See also: Nancy Appelbaum. 
“Envisioning the Nation: The Mid-Nineteenth-Century Colombian Chorographic Commission,” In State 
and Nation Making in Latin America and Spain: Republics of the Possible, edited by Miguel A. Centeno 
and Agustín E. Ferraro. Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
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visions of imperial bureaucrats, Creole intellectuals, and early republican leaders. 
However, a more democratic approach to the problem of territory also requires the 
reconstruction of visions of territory across other segments of society, including mestizos, 
indigenous populations, black slaves, and free peoples of all colors. This topic opens up a 
crucial space for understanding territorial claims advanced by socially and ethnically 
differentiated communities.7 Moreover, it opens the door to reconstructing the colonial 
dimensions of land tenure and the mechanisms through which different sectors of society 
negotiated their access to land and gave meanings to their territories. Many conflicts 
worldwide have their roots precisely in clashing visions of territory and political 
economy.  
  
                                                
7 Cynthia Radding Murrieta. Landscapes of Power and Identity: Comparative Histories in the Sonoran 
Desert and the Forests of Amazonia from Colony to Republic. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 
2005. 
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Appendix A. Chorographic Texts about New Granada and its 
provinces, 1720-1808 
CITY/ 
PROVINCE 
YEAR AUTHOR TITLE 
Chocó n.d.  Unsigned, 
undated 
account 
Compendiosa noticia de la provincia de Nóvita 
Chocó n.d.  Pedro Muñoz 
de Arjona 
Descripción del Gobierno del Chocó 
Cumaná 1720 Don Jorge de 
Villalonga 
Descripción de la provincia de Cumaná que 
hizo en 20 de noviembre de 1720 el virrey de 
Santafé Don Jorge de Villalonga mediante 
informe de un práctico que la tenía vista y 
trajinada 
General 1730 Antonio de 
Herrera y 
Tordesillas 
Descripción de las Indias Occidentales. 
Casanare-
Orinoco-
Meta 
1736 Jesuit Father 
Juan Rivero 
Historia de las misiones de los llanos de 
Casanare y los ríos Orinoco y Meta 
Quito 1740 Juan Pío 
Montufar y 
Frasco 
Razón sobre el estado y gobernación política 
y militar de la jurisdicción de Quito en 1754 
Quito 1740 Juan Magnin Breve Descripción De La Provincia De Quito 
Darien-
Panama 
1740 Dionisio de 
Alsedo y 
Herrera 
Aviso histórico, político y geográfico, con 
noticias más importantes del Perú, Tierra 
Firme, Chile y Nuevo Reino de Granada 
desde 1535 hasta 1740, por... Gobernador y 
Comandante General del Reino de Panamá y 
Presidente de ambas Audiencias. 
Cuenca 1741 Joaquín 
Merisalde y 
Santistéban 
Relación Histórica, Política, y moral de la 
Ciudad de Cuenca 
Cuenca 1741 Juan de Santa 
Gertrudis 
De la ciudad, conventos y otras noticias de 
Cuenca. 
Meta-
Orinoco 
1741 José Cassani Historia De La Provincia De La Compañia 
De Jesus Del NuevoReyno De Granada En 
La America, Descripcion, Y Relacion Exacta 
De Sus Gloriosas Missiones En El Reyno, 
Llanos, Meta, Y Rio Orinoco, Almas, Y 
Terreno, Que Han Conquistadosus 
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Missioneros Para Dios. 
Guayaquil 1741 Dionisio de 
Alsedo y 
Herrera 
Compendio Historico De La Provincia, 
Partidos, Ciudades, Astilleros, Rios, Y Puerto 
De Guayaguil En Las Costas De La Mar Del 
Sur 
Riobamba 1743 Pedro Vicente 
Maldonado 
La villa de San Pedro de Riobamba (1743-47) 
Orinoco 1745 Joseph 
Gumilla 
El Orinoco Ilustrado y Defendido 
Barquisiment
o 
1745 José Lorenzo 
Ferrer 
Instrucción y noticia de la ciudad de 
Barquisimento y su jurisducción que es como 
sigue 
General 1748 Antonio de 
Ulloa 
Relación Histórica Del Viage a La América 
Meridional Hecho de Orden De S. Mag. Para 
Medir Algunos Grados De Meridiano 
terrestre, Y Venir Por Ellos En Conocimiento 
De La Verdadera Figura, Y Magnitud De La 
Tierra, Con Otras Varias Observaciones 
Astronomicas, Y Phisicas. Madrid: A. 
Marin.  
Guayaquil 1750 Dionisio de 
Alsedo y 
Herrera 
Compendio Historico De La Provincia, 
Partidos, Ciudades, Astilleros, Rios, Y Puerto 
De Guayaguil En Las Costas De La Mar Del 
Sur. 
Quito 1754 Dionisio de 
Alsedo y 
Herrera 
Descripción Geográfica De La Real 
Audiencia De Quito. 
Quito 1755 Juan Pío 
Montufar y 
Frasso 
Razón acerca del estado y gobernación 
político y militar de las provincias, ciudades, 
villas y lugares que contiene la jurisdicción 
de la Real Audiencia de Quito.  
Quito 1761 Mario Cicala Descripción Histórico-Física De La Provincia 
De Quito De La Compañía De Jesús. 
Quito 1761 Juan Magnin Breve Descripción De La Provincia De 
Quito. 
Quito 1761 Julián de 
Arriaga 
Descripción Compendiosa Histórico 
Corográficas y Eclesiástica Política de las 
Ciudades, Villas, Asientos, Pueblos, Número 
de la habitantes comprendidos bajo la 
jurisdicción de la Real Audiencia de Quito. 
Manuscrito 
Quito 1764 Unsigned 
account 
Proyecto para que la provincia de Quito salga 
de su miseria y con el cual aumentaría el Real 
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Erario considerablemente y a un tiempo se 
evitarán los crecidos quebrantos que padecen 
sus rentas, las que sufragan a la manutención 
de las importantes plazas de Cartagena y 
Santa Marta 
Guayana-
Orinoco 
1764 Francisco 
Fernández de 
Bovadilla 
Relación del viaje que hice desde Guayana al 
Alto Orinoco, de orden del coronel Don 
Joaquín Saas Moreno de Mendoza, 
comandante gobernador de esta provincia y 
Río de Orinoco, a recoger el frutos de 
aquellos cacahuales, instruir los indios de 
aquel país y traer algunos capitanes de las 
naciones Maquiritare, Amuisana, Urumanavis 
y Guaipanabis 
Venezuela 1764 Joseph Luis de 
Cisneros 
Descripción exacta de la provincia de 
Venezuela 
Santiago de 
Atalayas 
1765 Gregorio 
Sánnchez 
Manganeque 
Informe sobre la provincia de Santiago de 
Atalayas 
Quito-
Guayaquil 
1765 Miguel 
Agustin de 
Olmedo 
Camino de Quito a Guayaquil en el siglo 
XVIII 
General 1766 Juan de Santa 
Gestrudes 
Serra 
Maravillas de la Naturaleza 
Quito 1766 Dionisio de 
Alsedo y 
Herrera 
Plano geográfico e hidrográfico del distrito 
de la Real Audiencia de Quito y 
descripciones de las provincias, gobiernos y 
corregimientos que se comprenden en su 
jurisdicción, y las ciudades, asientos y 
pueblos que ocupan sus territorios 
Quito 1766 Vicente Ortiz 
de Áviles 
Informe del Gobierno de Quijos, Macas y 
Canelos 
Choco 1767 Unsigned, 
undated 
account 
Description of the province of Zitará and 
course of the River Atrato : critical edition  
Cauca 1771 Various 
authors 
Estado general de las ciudades y pueblos del 
Cauca en 1771 
Quito 1771 Mario Cicala Descripción Histórico-Fisica De La Provincia 
De Quito De La Compañia De Jesus (2 vols) 
General 1771 Giandomenico 
Coleti 
Diccionario histórico-geográfico de la 
América Meridional 
Guayaquil 1771 Francisco Descripción de la ciudad de Guayaquil, su 
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Requena importancia para el Estado y necesidad de 
fortificarla 
Meridional 
America 
1771 Juan Domingo 
Coleti, Jesuit 
(1727-1798) 
Dizionario Storico-geográfico del´ América 
Meridionale. 
Cauca 1771 Various 
authors 
Estado general de las ciudades y pueblos del 
Cauca en 1771 
General 1772 Antonio de 
Ulloa 
Noticias americanas : entretenimientos 
phisicos-historicos, sobre la América 
meridional, y la septentrional oriental : 
comparación general de los territorios, 
climas, y producciones en las tres especies, 
vegetales, animales, y minerales : con 
relación particular de las petrificaciones de 
cuerpos marinos de los indios naturales de 
aquellos países, sus costumbres, y usos : de 
las antigüedades ... 
Orinoco 1772 Joseph 
Gumilla 
Historia natural, civil y geográfica de las 
naciones situadas en las riveras del Río 
Orinoco  
General 1772 Francisco 
Antonio 
Moreno y 
Escandón 
Plan geográfico del virreinato de Santa Fe de 
Bogotá Nuevo Reino de Granada, que 
manifiesta su demarcación territorial, slas, 
ríos principales, provincias y plazas de armas; 
lo que ocvpan indios barbaros y naciones 
extranjeras; demostrando los confines de los 
dos Reynos de Lima, México, y 
establecimientos de Portvga, sus lindantes; 
con notas historiales del ingreso anual de sus 
rentas reales, y noticias relativas a su actual 
estado civil, político y militar 
General 1772 Pedro Messia 
de la Zerda 
Relación del estado del virreinato de Santafé, 
que hace Pedro Messia de la Zerda a su 
sucesor Manuel Guirior, año de 1772  
Cartagena 1772 Diego de 
Paredo 
Noticia Historial de la Provincia de 
Cartagena de Indias 
Guayaquil 1774 Francisco 
Requena 
Descripción Histórica y Geográfica de la 
Provincia de Guayaquil en el Virreinato de 
Santa Fe 
Tunja 1775 Don Andrés 
Berdugo y 
Oquendo 
Informe del Visitador Real Don Andrés 
Berdugo y Oquendo sobre el estado social y 
económico de la población indígena, blanca y 
mestiza de las Provincias de Tunja y Vélez a 
 291 
mediados del siglo XVIII 
General 1775 Vicente 
Basilio de 
Oviedo 
Cualidades y riquezas del Nuevo Reino de 
Granada. 
Guayana-
Orinoco 
1779 Fermín de 
Sansinenea 
Descripción de la Provincia de Guayana y del 
Río Orinoco 
Nueva 
Andalucía 
1779 Antonio 
Caulín 
Historia Coro-Graphica Natural Y Evangelica 
De la Nueva Andalucia, Provincias De 
Cumaná, Guayana, Y Vertientes Del rio 
Orinoco.  
Chocó 1780 Juan Jiménez 
Donoso 
Relación de las provincias de Chocó, Zitara y 
Novita y del Río Atrato 
General 1780 Filippo 
Salvadore Gilii 
Ensayo de historia americana; o sea, Historia 
natural, civil y sacra de los reinos, y de las 
provincias deTierra Firme en la América 
meridional. Estado presente de la Tierra 
Firme.   
Venezuela 1782 Luis de 
Chávez y 
Mendoza 
Mensura y descripción de los pueblos de 
indios situados en las provincias de Nueva 
Andalucía y Nueva Barcelona, realizadas de 
orden del Rey don Carlos Tercero por el 
Oidor Decano de la Real Audiencia de Santo 
Domingo, don Luis de Chávez y Mendoza, 
1782-1784 
Maynas 1785 Francisco 
Requena 
Descripción del Gobierno de Maynas y 
misiones establecidas 
Barinas 1787 Anonymous Noticias de las Provincias de Maracaibo y 
Barinas 
Maracaibo 1787 Anonymous Noticias de las Provincias de Maracaibo y 
Barinas 
Darien-
Panama 
1787 Manuel García 
de Villalba 
Descripción de la Provincia del Darién a 
norte y sur, medios de poblarlo al sur y 
discurso reflexivo sobre la conquista, por el 
teniente del Batallón de Panamá Don Manuel 
García de Villalba 
Santa Marta 1787 Antonio Julián La perla de la América, provincia de Santa 
Marta. Reconocida, observada y expuesta en 
discursos históricos a mayor bien de la 
Católica monarquía, formento del comercio 
de Espanã, y de todo el Nuevo Reino de 
Granada, e incremento de la cristiana religión 
entre las naciones bárbaras que subsisten 
todavía rebeldes en la provincia. 
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Guayana-
Orinoco 
1788 Miguel 
Miarmón 
Descripción Corográfico-Mixta de la 
Provincia de Guayana, en que da razón de los 
ríos que bañan y facilitan sus 
comunicaciones; de su población, tierras de 
labor útiles de sus frondosos montes, frutos y 
comerciol y se proponen algunos medios los 
más asequibles y conducentes a su 
vivificación y aumento 
Esmeraldas 1788 Pedro Vicente 
Maldonado 
Descripción de la Provincia de Esmeraldas. 
Buscar en  Documentos para la historia de la 
Audiencia de Quito. 
Casanare 1789 Unknown Noticias sobre los Llanos del Casanare y San 
Martín, Nuevo Reyno de Granada 
Quito 1789 Juan de 
Velasco 
Historia Del Reino De Quito En La América 
Meridional. Published in 1789, 1841, 1842 
and 1844 
General 1789 Francisco 
Silvestre 
La jurisdicción de la Real Audiencia de Santa 
Fe 
Maracaibo 1789 Don Francisco 
Saavedra 
La Provincia de Maracaibo en 1791 según un 
informe del segundo Intendente de Caracas, 
Don Francisco Saavedra 
Mérida 1789 Héctor 
Bencomio 
Barrios 
La provincia de Mérida vista por el ejército 
realista. 
General 1789 Francisco 
Silvestre 
Descripción del reyno de Santa Fé de Bogotá 
General 1789 Antonio 
Caballero y 
Góngora 
Relación del estado del Nuevo Reino de 
Granada que hace el arzobispo de Córdoba 
Excmo. Sr. Don Antonio Caballero y 
Góngora a su sucesor el Excmo. Sr. Don 
Francisco Gil Lemos—1789 
General 1790 José Corral Descripción compendiosa de las provincias 
de Quito sujetas al virreinato de Santa Fe de 
Bogotá o Nuevo Reino de Granada 
Antioquia 1793 Ángel Velarde 
y Bustamante 
Descripción general y particular de la 
Provincia de Antioquia 
Nueva 
Barcelona 
1796 Anonymous Informe sobre la Nueva Barcelona 
Muzo 1796 Martin de 
Urdaneta 
Memoria instructiva de las provincias de 
Muzos y Colima 
Maracaibo 1797 José Domingo 
Rus 
Informe sobre la Provincia de Maracaibo, 
hecha al Consulado de Caracas por el 
diputado consular del Puerto de Maracaibo 
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Popayán 1797 Diego Antonio 
Nieto 
Visita de la gobernación de Popayán 
Socorro 1803 Juan Salvador 
Rodríguez del 
Lago 
Informe sobre el estado de la provincia del 
Socorro 
General 1803 Don Pedro 
Mendinueta 
Relación del estado del Nuevo Reino de 
Granada, presentado por el Excmo. Sr. Virrey 
Don Pedro Mendinueta a su sucesor el 
excmo. Sr. D. Antonio Amar y Borbón 
Quito 1803 Francisco José 
de Caldas 
Viaje de Quito a las Costas de Océano 
Pacífico por Malbucho, hecho en julio y 
agosto de 1803 
Cartagena 1805 Manuel de 
Anguiano 
Descripción geográfica militar y política de la 
provincia de Cartagena de Indias 
Quito 1806 Juan de la 
Zerda y 
Zorrilla 
Descripción del nuevo camino de Quito al 
puerto de la Tola, 1806 
Quito 1806 Juan 
Romualdo 
Navarro 
Idea del Reino de Quito 
Venezuela 1806 Francisco de 
Pons 
A Voyage to the Eastern Part of Terra Firma, 
or the Spanish Main, in South-America, 
During the Years 1801, 1802, 1803, and 
1804. Containing a Description of the 
Territory Under the Jurisdiction of the 
Captain General of Caraccas, Composed of 
the Provinces of Venezuela, Maracaibo, 
Varinas, Spanish Guiana, Cumana, and the 
Island of Margaretta; and Embracing Every 
Thing Relative to the Discovery, Conquest, 
Topography, Legislation, Commerce, 
Finance, Inhabitants and Productions of the 
Provinces, Together with a View of the 
Manners and Customs of the Spaniards, and 
the Savage as Well as Civilized Indians. 
Cali 1808 Various 
authors 
Estado de Cali y sus partidos 
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Appendix B. Itineraries, routes, and stages of the New Kingdom of 
Granada and documentation of the Expeditionary Army of Costa 
Firme, 1814-1818. 
 
 
Chorographic texts confiscated during the 
Reconquista wars  
New documents produced during the 
Reconquista wars 
Viaje de Quito a las costas del Océano, 1803. Planes de defensa y ataque de varios puntos 
de Cúcuta y Pamplona, 1816. 
Viaje del Alto Orinoco y Río Negro, 1800. Planes de Nueva Granada por Casanaré, 1815 
(falta). 
Viaje desde Cali al Chocó y Villa Honda para 
Ibagué. 
Planes de defensa y ataque, 1815. Acompaña 
un itinerario de longitud de Girón a Zapoteca 
y Barichana, identificado con el mismo 
número. 
Planes para la conquista de los indios del 
Darién, 1784. 
Planes de operaciones para la plaza de 
Cartagena, 1815. 
Plan de defensa del río Sinú, Río Hacha y la 
capital del Reino, 1806 
Plan de defensa de la plaza de Cartagena. 
Plan para el aumento y prosperidad de la 
provincia de Cartagena (falta). 
Plan de defensa y ataque de la provincia de 
Guayana. 
Noticia de la apertura del camino de Orrao, 
1794. 
Itinerario desde Santa Fe al pueblo de La 
Fundación. 
Noticia de la provincia de Darién, 1794. Itinerario de Valencia a Calabozo. 
Noticia sobre el corregimiento de Tunja, 
1794. 
Noticias sobre varios caminos. 
Noticia sobre la provincia de Barinas y del 
Nuevo Reino de Granada (falta). 
Itinerarios de la parte occidental de la actual 
Venezuela, 1818 
Itinerarios relacionados con Barinas. Itinerario de Pamplona a Santa Fe, 1816 
Diario sobre el descubrimiento de Nuevo 
Mundo, 1802. 
Itinerario de Santa Fe a Sogamoso. 
Diario sobre el descubrimiento del camino 
del Opón, 1793. 
Itinerarios y postas del Nuevo Reino de 
Granada. 
Diligencias actuadas sobre el gobierno de 
Neiva, Popayán y Margarita, 1777 
Colección de oficios sobre defensa y ataque, 
1816 (falta). 
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Derrotero de la ciudad de La Plata, 1783. Demarcación de leguas desde la ciudad de 
Santa Fe a Villa Honda, 1816. 
Descripción del río Orinoco, 1783 (falta). Memoria del reconocimiento militar de el 
Paso de la Cabrera, 1815. 
Descripción del Hoyo de Chimana, 1794. Memoria instructiva de la provincia de los 
Muzos y Colimas, 1815 
Descripción del nuevo camino de Quito al 
puerto de La Tola, 1806.  
5.- Papeles pertenecientes a la guerra de 
Cúcuta, 1814. 
Camino que se pretendió abrir de Pamplona a 
Barinas, 1788. 
Descripción de la expedición al río Atrato, 
1815 
Relación de minerales procedentes del Nuevo 
Reino de Granada. 
Expedición de Santa Fe a Apiay, 1815. 
Noticias de los llanos de Casanaré y San 
Martín, 1796. 
Medidas de la jurisdicción de Buga y 
Cartago, 1815. 
Noticias de la provincia de Neiva, 1796. Derrotero de Girón hacia Tunja, el Socorro y 
Santa Fe, 1815. 
Noticias de las provincias de Cartagena, 
Antioquia, Chocó, Santa Fe y Popayán, 1806.  
Descripción de la provincia del Darién, 1815. 
Noticias del puerto de San Bartolomé hasta 
Zaragoza, 1794. 
Descripción de la cascada de Tequendama, 
1815. 
 Descripción del gobierno de Girón y 
corregimiento de Tunja, Sogamoso y 
Duitama, 1815. 
 Descripción de los caminos de Sogamoso a 
Tunja, 1816. 
 Descripción topográfica de la provincia de 
Antioquia, 1816.  
 Noticia de las nuevas minas descubiertas, 
1816. 
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Appendix C. Publications About Colombia’s Natural Wonders in 
Foreign Media, 1810-1830  
 
Newspaper/magazine Article Place Date 
The Lady's Magazine; or, 
Mirror of the Belles-
Lettres, Fashions, Fine 
Arts, Music, Drama, &c. A 
New Series. Vol. 6 
Observations connected with the 
Natural History of Colombia. 244 
London April 1825 
The Lady's Magazine; or, 
Mirror of the Belles-
Lettres, Fashions, Fine 
Arts, Music, Drama, &c. A 
New Series. Vol. 8 
NOTICES IN NATURAL HISTORY, 
connected with the Colombian State 
London May 1827 
The Lady's Magazine; or, 
Mirror of the Belles-
Lettres, Fashions, Fine 
Arts, Music, Drama, &c. A 
New Series. Vol. 5 
Letters Written form Colombia in 
1823.  531-532 
London Oct 1824 
The Lady's Magazine; or, 
Mirror of the Belles-
Lettres, Fashions, Fine 
Arts, Music, Drama, &c. A 
New Series. Vol. 5 
APPEARANCE, CHARACTER, 
AND MANNERS, OF THE FAIR 
SEX IN COLOMBIA. 615 
London Oct 1824 
The Lady's Magazine; or, 
Mirror of the Belles-
Lettres, Fashions, Fine 
Arts, Music, Drama, &c. A 
New Series. Vol. 6 
INFLUENCE OF CLIMATE ON 
TRANSPORTED ANIMALS 
London March 1829 
London Chronicle. Issue 
3246 
On the Chimborazo.  London Sept 23, 
1777 
Oracle and Public 
Advertiser.  Issue 199929 
On the Chimborazo. London May 10, 
1798 
Magazine of Zoology and 
Botany I 
Excursions in the Neighbourhood of 
Quito, and Towards the Summit of 
Chimborazo, in 1830. Col. Hall 
London 1835 
The Literary panorama, 
1806-1819. Vol. 2. [lxii]-
[lxii] 
CATARACT OF TEQUENDAMA, 
IN SPANISH AMERICA. 
London April 1815 
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The Weekly entertainer : 
or, Agreeable and 
instructive repository. Vol. 
57, 194-195 
Cataract of Tequendama, in Spanish 
America. 
Sherborne
, UK 
March 10, 
1817 
Methodist magazine. Vol. 
43. 834-836 
The Works of God Displayed: 
Description of the Cataract of 
Tequendama, in South America  
London Nov. 1820 
The Literary gazette : A 
weekly journal of literature, 
science, and the fine arts. 
Issue 397. 553 
SIGHTS OF BOOKS. M. Mollien's 
travel in Colombia. Review of the 
forthcoming publication of the book 
(featuring the great views of nature) 
London August 28, 
1824 
The Oriental herald and 
journal of general literature. 
Vol. 15. Issue 46. 35-45. 
GENERAL VIEW OF THE 
PRESENT STATE OF SOUTH 
AMERICA 
London Oct 1827 
Dublin University 
Magazine. Vol. 2. Issue. 9. 
349-352 
A TRIP TO THE FALLS OF 
TEQUENDAMA 
Dublin Sept 1833 
The Literary magazine, or, 
Universal review. Vol. 10. 
Issue 10. 9-15. 
Book review. Description and Natural 
History of Perú 
London Jan 1757 
The Edinburgh weekly 
magazine. Vol. 57. 11-13. 
Natural History. An Account of the 
Heights of Different Places in the 
World 
Edinburg
h  
July 3, 1783 
The Scots magazine. Vol. 
45. 432-433.  
Account of the Heights of different 
Places. 
Edinburg
h  
Aug 1783 
Sun. Volume: XXIII; Issue: 
1181 
From the Minerva. Cataract of 
Tequendama 
Pittsfield, 
MA 
May 8, 
1823  
Universal magazine of 
knowledge and pleasure. 
Vol. 90. 179-183 
THE CONTEMPLATIVE 
PHILOSOPHER. Farther 
Observations on Mountains. (Starts 
with the Andes) 
London Mar 1792 
Monthly magazine, or, 
British regster. Vol. 16. 
Issue 105. 146-150 
National Institute. Copy of a Letter 
Read in the Class of Physical and 
Mathematical Sciences. Alexander 
Humboldt to Citizen Delambre. From 
Lima, Nov 25, 1804 (Travels in South 
America) 
London Sept 1803 
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The Literary magazine ; or, 
Monthly epitome of British 
literature: 359-363.  
To the Editor of the Monthly Epitome: 
A brief account of the Travels of Mrs. 
Humboldt and Bonpland between the 
tropics in 1799, 1800, 1801, 1802, 
1803, and 1804 
London Jul 1805 
Monthly Review, or, 
Literary Journal. Vol. 89. 
101-111. 
Book Review. The Hundred Wonders 
of the World and of the Three 
Kingdoms of Nature. (Contains an 
account of remarkable mountains 
including the Chimborazo) 
London May 1819 
Monthly Review, or, 
Literary Journal. Vol. 59. 
312-317. 
Political, Commercial, and Statistical 
Sketches of the Spanish Empire in 
both Indies; Reflections on the Policy 
proper for Great Britain at the present 
Crisis; 
London May 1820 
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